Vol 5. En. Hashim Mbita Southern African Liberation Struggles

SADC
Hashim Mbita Project
Southern African
Liberation Struggles
Contemporaneous Documents
1960–1994
edited by
Arnold J. Temu and Joel das N. Tembe
5
Liberation War Countries
(continued) & Frontline States
published by
Mkuki na Nyota Publishers Ltd
P. O. Box 4246
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
www.mkukinanyota.com
© SADC Hashim Mbita Project, 2020
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Contents
1 INTRODUCTION
Map of SADC Member States
Foreword
Contributors Introduction
1.1 Interfacing with Personal Assistants to Former Presidents of Frontline States
2 LIBERATION WAR COUNTRIES

Angola
2.1 “Angola and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa, 1949-1992” by Artur da Silva Júlio, Eduardo Ruas
de Jesus Manuel, and Rosa da Cruz e Silva
2.2 Angola – Personal Stories
Mozambique
2.3 “Mozambique and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa, 1960–1994” by Joel das
Neves Tembe and Alda Romão Saúte Saíde
2.4 Mozambique – Personal Stories
3 Namibia
3.1 “Namibia and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa” by Bernard
Ben Mulongeni and Victor L. Tonchi
3.2 “The Namibian Liberation Struggle” by Jeremy Silvester, Martha Akawa
and Napandulwe Shiweda
3.3 Namibia – Personal Stories
South Africa
3.4 “The South African Liberation Struggle” by Sifiso Ndlovu, Gregory
Houston, and Bernard Magubane
4 4.1 South Africa – Personal Stories
5 Zimbabwe
5.1 “Zimbabwe’s War of Liberation” by Ngwabi Bhebe and Gerald Mazarire 1
5.2 Zimbabwe – Personal Stories 139
FRONTLINE STATES
Botswana
5.3 “Botswana’s Role in the Liberation of Southern Africa” by Thomas Tlou and
Part Mgadla 267
5.4 Botswana – Personal Stories 359
iv
6 Tanzania
6.1 “Tanzania and the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa, 1961 to 1994”
by Arnold J. Temu, Neville Z. Reuben, and Sarah N. Seme
6.2 Tanzania – Personal Stories
7 Zambia
7.1 “Zambia’s Contribution to the Liberation of Southern Africa, 1960 to
2001” by Mutumba Mainga Bull and Lee Habasonda
7.2 Zambia – Personal Stories
EXTENSION COUNTRIES
Lesotho
7.3 “Fighting from ‘the Belly of the Beast’ Lesotho’s Contribution to the
Liberation of South Africa” by Tefetso Henry Mothibe and Munyaradzi
Mushonga
7.4 Lesotho – Personal Stories
Malawi
7.5 “Malawi and the Liberation Struggles in Mozambique and
Zimbabwe, 1964-1980” by Kings M. Phiri
7.6 Malawi – Personal Stories
Swaziland
7.7 “Swaziland and the Liberation of Mozambique and South Africa, 1960-
1994” by Bonginkosi Azariah Bhutana Sikhondze
7.8 Swaziland – Personal Stories
8 COUNTRIES AND REGIONS OUTSIDE SADC

8.1 “The Contributions of Anglophone West Africa to the Liberation Struggle
in Southern Africa: 1960-1994” by Muhammadu Mustapha Gwadabe
8.2 “Francophone Black Africa in the History of Liberation Struggles in
Southern Africa” by Abraham Constant Ndinga Mbo
8.3 “The Contribution of North Africa in the Liberation Struggle of
Southern Africa” by Mahmoud Abul-Enein
8.4 “Against the Grain: Support Work for Southern African Liberation in
Canada and the United States” by John S. Saul
8.5 “East Asian Support to the Southern African Liberation Struggle, 1960s
to 1994” by Alicia Altorfer-Ong
8.6 “Cuba and the Caribbean's collaboration with Africa and SADC” by
Hedelberto López Blanch
8.7 “The German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Liberation
Struggle of Southern Africa” by Hans-Georg Schleicher
8.8 “Nordic Support to the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa –
9 Between Global Solidarity and National Self-Interest” by Hakan
Thorn
8.9 “The Soviet Union and the Liberation of Southern Africa” by
Vladimir Shubin
8.10 “Western Europe, Southern Africa, and Transnational Solidarity
Networks, 1960-1994” by William Minter and Richard Hengeveld
v
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
9.1 The Contribution of the Commonwealth Towards the Liberation Struggle of
Southern Africa
9.2 “India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia & Sri Lanka under NAM: Contribution to the
Southern Africa Liberation Struggle” by Suresh Kumar
9.3 “The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Liberation Struggle
of Southern Africa” by Mohammed Omar Maundi
9.4 “UN Contributions to the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa” by
E. Kisanga and Ulli Mwambulukutu
Zimbabwe
Independent on 11 November 1975
5.1
Zimbabwe’s War of Liberation
by Ngwabi Bhebe and Gerald Mazarire
Introduction ......................................................................................................... 5
1960-1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1965-1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . 30
The Intensification of the Struggle after the UDI ................................................ 35
1970-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Developments in Rhodesia, 1971-1972............................................................... 48
The Resumption of the War, 1972 ....................................................................... 52
Problems in ZANU, 1974-1975 .......................................................................... 66
1975-1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 75
The Situation in ZANU after Geneva ............................................................... 100
Abbreviations .................................................................................................. 137
5.1 zimbabwe analysis 5
Introduction1
Absences and the Dominant Narratives of the War:
The history of the Zimbabwean liberation is ambiguous. Any attempt to document
it must contend with the fact that, although it is an academically over-researched
subject, very few of the participants have made a conscious attempt to record their
experiences collectively for posterity. This study undertakes such a task, which is
now even more complicated by the fact that the history of liberation in Zimbabwe,
as anywhere else in the region, is inexorably linked to contemporary debates about
state making.2 Unlike, for instance, the official Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA) history of the struggle in Angola, no liberation movement in
Zimbabwe has submitted to a definitive history of its role in this crucial episode.
Studies so far carried out on the history of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle,
in fact, pale into insignificance when compared with the avalanche of individual
and institutional works by former Rhodesian counter insurgents, who continue to
churn out volumes about their side of the war. To date, the narratives of liberation
movements and African participants in the war have been produced spontaneously,
not according to a systematic system of collection, and have largely been captured
by scholars, journalists, novelists, and other writers in this form. Biographical
accounts remain by far the most dominant medium through which public liberation
memories have been rendered. It has been argued that biographies, especially those
produced by and/or about nationalist leaders in Zimbabwe, are by and large
narratives of ‘self and nation’, going beyond simply being mere records to become
statements legitimating the post-colonial state.3 Certainly biographies, in the
absence of collective histories and with the increasing loss, due to death and other
causes, of the generation of participants of the war, easily become the arenas over
which national and collective memories of the war are contested.4
Inthepastfiveyearsalone,theseassertionscaneasilybeconfirmed.Threebiographies
on key figures in Zimbabwe’s liberation war have appeared and in all instances
attracted widespread national response. The first, a biography of Simon Muzenda,
Zimbabwe’s first Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President, was published just after
his passing5 and won the annual book fair prize of 2004. It became the basis of a
memorial and of a museum exhibition of his life and times. In academic circles, it
set tongues wagging and was taken by some as a narrow canonisation of ZANU-
PF’s hegemonic claim to the liberation history of the country. A culmination of a
series of interviews
(1) The Research Team leaders were Ngwabi Bhebe and Gerald Mazarire.
(2) Mandaza, I. “Opening Remarks.” Workshop on Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa: New Perspectives.
Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town, September 2008.
(3) Alexander, J. “Political Prisoners’ Memoirs in Zimbabwe: Narratives of Self and Nation.” Cultural and Social
History 5.4 (2008): See p.395.
(4) Raftopolous, B. “Comments.” Workshop on Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa: New Perspectives. Centre
for African Studies, University of Cape Town, September 2008.
(5) Bhebe, Ngwabi. Simon Vengayi Muzenda and the Struggle for Zimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press, 2004.
6 southern african liberation struggles 1960–
1994
with Simon Muzenda and other leading contemporaries in the struggle, the book
has attracted attention for its ‘ethnic factor’ approach, which inevitably alienated
a number of interest groups not necessarily subscribing to Muzenda’s take on the
struggle. Two years later, an autobiography by Fay Chung emerged that was as
defiant as the hostile introduction by the publisher.6 Much noted for its description
of life in the Mozambican camps and the welfare of women therein, this is one
individual recollection which makes very bold judgements on events and
personalities in the struggle using the author’s own ‘poetic justice’. It is Chung’s
fairly authoritative and often photographic narrative that has excited commentary
across the spectrum of her colleagues in the war. An occasion launching the book
that was attended by H.E. Hashim Mbita is, in itself, illustrative. Wilfred Mhanda
(Dzinashe Machingura) asked to be the discussant and criticized Chung’s
judgmental tendencies, saying that they “took advantage of the dead and that the
dead were not there to defend themselves” (referring to the impression given of the
late Josiah Tongogara). Short of suggesting that the book was a collection of half-
truths, assumptions, and personal prejudices, Mhanda chastised Chung for not
seeking clarifications and corrections before going to print. It was on this occasion
that Margaret Dongo, herself a former liberation fighter and MP, stood up to say
that it was time Mhanda wrote his own story!
Lastly, in January 2007, Edgar Tekere published his ‘autobiography’.7 It is
difficult to state whether it is indeed self-written, given the style of its production
and presentation. It is stated that Tekere narrated his life and times to Ibbo Mandaza,
who “edited” it, removing “unnecessarily provocative statements”. Mandaza also
provides a scathing introduction, couched in his political inheritance theory, and
spends some time on Muzenda’s biography (cited above), condemning its author,
Ngwabi Bhebe, as an organic historian partaking in the creation of a party-centred,
myth-making presentation of the liberation war. First, it should be stated that in its
conceptual makeup, this book is presented in its entirety not as Tekere’s “lifetime of
struggle”, but rather as those aspects of his life that are either an antithesis of or in
competition with Robert Mugabe. This pre-occupation drowns Tekere’s life in his
own book; where his life does surface, it is sanitised, censored, or justified with one
excuse or another. Thus, even his own political party after independence, the
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), is summarised in three odd pages. Besides all
this, it is one account that has had a tremendous impact, not least for what it says or
does not, but for the public reaction to it.
A few‘national’ outcomes resulted from the publication of the Tekere book. Within
a week of its launch, the press was awash with commentaries across the spectrum
of editorials, features, letters to editors, and opinion pieces, as was Zimbabwe’s
burgeoning cyberspace of diaspora and local websites. Three weeks later, the
ZANU
(6) Chung, Fay. Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories of Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle. Harare: Nordic
African Institute, Uppsala/Weaver, 2006. The introduction by Preben Kaarsholm equally presses a strong critique of
ZANU PF in the post independence period.
(7) Tekere, Edgar. Edgar Tekere: A Lifetime of Struggle. Harare: SAPES Book, 2007.
PF youth tabled a motion, supported by the Women’s League, to expel Tekere from the
party and discipline those party members, including Ephraim Masawi, the Governor of
Harare Province, who attended the launch and “failed to defend the President”. As
it turned out, of all these commentators, only Prof. Jonathan Moyo, whose review
was published on www.newzimbabwe.com, had actually read the book. For the
first time, in a televised interview on the eve of his birthday, President Mugabe
pointed emphatically to a personality conflict in Tekere’s character. As Mugabe put
it: “he wanted to be a military leader at the same time that he was a political
leader…”, in apparent reference to the underlying tension that runs through Tekere’s
narrative8.
These recent biographies demonstrate the Zimbabwean ‘psyche’ on the subject of
the liberation war. It is a ‘psyche’ that is not only ripe to reflect on the war, but also
hungry, and will consume any statement ‘reading different’ from the larger narratives
it has been familiar with in the past twenty-eight years. It also raises a number of
salient points on the authority to ‘speak the war’, let alone write it, since it turns out to
be a widely contested area in modern Zimbabwe. There is a noticeable increase in the
number of people intending to ‘sit and write’ their role in the struggle. Enos Nkala,
a founding member of ZAPU and ZANU in the 1960s ‘threatened’ to write his own
narrative and publish it “only after his death” exposing some “sell outs”. John
Nkomo, another founding member of ZAPU, will be writing a history that will put
straight the record of the role played by Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
(ZIPRA) in the struggle. Indeed, President Mugabe has said that part of his time
will now be dedicated to doing “some reading and writing”.
One cannot deny that there is something about ‘writing’ with regard to the high
profile personalities mentioned above, perhaps something to do with an elite
disposition common around the world where biographies and memoirs of
statesmen and women, film stars and celebrities, are big business in the publishing
world. Zimbabwean liberation personalities have not fared badly in this respect;
the most widely published being Ndabaningi Sithole with factual and fictional
work approaching the level of an autobiography. This chapter refers to three of his
works, The Nationalist Struggle, Obed Mutezo, and Letters from the Salisbury
Prison.9 Joshua Nkomo’s The Story of My Life, Maurice Nyagumbo’s With the
People, Didymus Mutasa’s Rhodesian Black Behind Bars, and Nathan Shamuyarira’s
Crisis in Zimbabwe are but examples of work by nationalists that have been available
in the genre of these
written histories.10
It has been equally common in our trips around the country to encounter former
combatants who have either ‘written’ or are in the process of ‘writing’ their
histories
(8) Mugabe, Robert. Interview of 18 February 2007.

(9) Sithole, Ndabaningi. The Nationalist Struggle; Obed Mutezo: The Mudzimu Christian Nationalist. London:
Oxford University Press, 1970; Letters from the Salisbury Prison. Nairobi: TransAfrica Publishers, 1976.
(10) Nkomo, Joshua. The Story of My Life. London: Methuen, 1984. Rpt. Harare: SAPES Books, 2001; Nyagumbo,
Maurice. With the People: An Autobiography from the Zimbabwean Struggle. Salisbury: Graham Publishing, 1980;
Mutasa, Didymus. Rhodesian Black Behind Bars. London: Mowbrays & Co. Ltd., 1974; Shamuyarira, Nathan. Crisis
in Rhodesia. London: Deutsch, 1965.
1994
in the struggle as well. We have on occasion collected these and typed them where
the authors have been forthcoming. Two things emerge poignantly from the
foregoing: First, consistent with the aims of this project, there is a growing feeling
amongst a generation of Zimbabwean liberation war participants, still living, that
time is fast running out for them, and that nobody will be left to tell their liberation
story. Second, though subtle, there is the presumption that ‘writing’ is the best mode
of preserving and publicising this history.
We have sought to confront these matters more forthrightly through a paradigm
shift that respects all processes, of whatever persuasion, that seek to preserve the
liberation heritage. The Hashim Mbita project has been presented to the wider public
as an initiative that, although culminating in a written (and perhaps opinionated
account), is first and foremost a collection exercise. We have in this regard been
able to work collectively with three major stakeholders in the liberation heritage of
the country: the National Archives of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU PF) Information and Publicity Department, and the Mafela Trust.
We shall dwell briefly on the nature of our relationship with each.
Firstly, the National Archives of Zimbabwe launched at the end of 2004 a
project aptly titled “Capturing a Fading National Memory,” which was designed to
complement its predominantly documentary archive of the liberation war. Mr. Ivan
Murambiwa, the Director of the organisation, noted with some level of accuracy that
none of the nationalists and liberation fighters (neither the living nor the passed on)
have been keen to donate their materials to the National Archives. What they have in
their collections are predominantly deposits by white liberals and a very few
African nationalists such as Daniel Madzimbamuto. This oral history initiative of
2004 sought to retrieve as much as possible the memories of the ‘common man’ in
the struggle, at the same time as it pursued and persuaded those surviving
nationalists to give their testimonies. The Hashim Mbita team already participates
at the Directorate level of this project and has cooperated through different forms of
support in the ‘Capturing Project’ where interviews have been held with, for
instance, Rtd. General Zvinavashe (Sheba Gava) and Comrade Emmerson
Munangagwa. Moreover, joint initiatives have been held with mass interviews with
peasants in Gutu Communal Lands. The project has also allowed the Hashim Mbita
researchers access to interviews that the National Archives collected in Chiredzi
and Tsholotsho in 2004. As the Mbita Project, we also jointly employed a number
of University of Zimbabwe Department of History students. In addition, the
Hashim Mbita project has a special team of Research Assistants drawn from junior
staff in the History Department who do specific interviews and supervise the
technical processes of transcription, video editing, and database management of the
findings of the research project. Under these and other arrangements, the oral
history section of the National Archives is our repository for back up material
emanating from our own collection.
Secondly, the ZANU PF Department of Publicity, through Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira
and his publicity Director Mr. Steven Chidawanyika welcomed our initiative
warmly.
They,inturn,havebeenworkingwiththe NationalArchivesandthe National Museums

and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) on the Zimbabwe Heritage Trust, a project
doing similar work and coordinated by the syndicate of Southern African Political
Parties based in Dar es Salaam and loosely connected to H.E. Hashim Mbita. We
have been invited to sit in their meetings and share ideas. Our relationship as the
Hashim Mbita project has been, however, distinct. Mr. Chidawanyika arranged
interviews for us with colleagues within and outside the ZANU PF Headquarters.
Our team of research assistants was deployed there to go through interview routines
that were also captured on video. We converted the interviews into DVD format and
made the copies available to the ZANU PF Publicity Department. It should be
acknowledged that we are not professional photographers, nor is any member of our
technical team, we used these as a means of maintaining a rapport with our
interviewees and also found out that possession of a personal copy of one’s
interview (professionally done) was an important way of spreading the message
that sharing one’s experience is a lifetime investment in one’s own archive.
Frequently, interviewees became free and some even called us to arrange interviews
with the result that our collection schedule increased everyday and our team was
often overwhelmed. We may hasten to say that the ZANU PF Publicity Department
has been undertaking its own‘history collection exercises’ as is often indicated in
their work plans. We have had occasion to look at these collections, which are
usually no more than one word answer or paragraph length issues. We did not
interfere with their process nor change it, but we asked them to spread the word
regarding the Hashim Mbita Project as they went on these collection exercises.
Meanwhile the majority of our very fascinating accounts have come from
connections made at ZANU PF Headquarters; this was primarily because of the
collegial network in place amongst old ‘guerrilla friends’, who half the time knew
what happened to so and so and very often pulled out a notebook with his or her
address and phone number and there we were! We thereby struck the next interview
very easily and there was a knock on effect. The other effect was very much
psychological; on more than one occasion former combatants refused to cooperate
with us, demanding to know,‘Who are you?’With connections made through ZANU,
we needed to just mention that we had been referred by so and so and it was fine.
Normally, we simply found someone already waiting for us or calling us after they
had made arrangements amongst themselves. ZANU PF also had a considerable
archive and library which we have had occasion to tour. The Publicity Department
had also, in principle, agreed that, as our relationship grew, we could access and scan
their enormous photographic collection for the project.
Lastly, the Mafela Trust, an independent body that has been collecting the history
and paraphernalia of former ZIPRA combatants, expressed a willingness to work
with us. One formal meeting was held with them under the auspices of the Archives
project, we were able to send our research assistants whom they took on their oral
history collection exercises, and they gave some of the interviews in their own
collections for our purpose. We drew on a few in this chapter. The trouble, however,
1994
was that the Mafela histories, as with the ZANU collections, are very valuable, but
often very brief.
This was the context we worked in, choosing to launch our own initiatives
through contacts already in place. It may be important to mention that we greatly
benefited from our broader identity as academics; through our networks in this realm,
we were able to approach fellow academics who have conducted research on the
subject to share their resources. The Aluka website11 has come in handy in this regard
and we draw constantly from material in its custody. We also draw upon interviews
done by other academics with notable liberation people who have since died.
The Formative Years, 1890–1965
The Zimbabwean struggle for independence has its origins in the long drawn out
campaign against racially inspired injustices traceable to the initial pacification of
the African groups in the country by the British South Africa Company (BSA) in
the 1890s. It is easy to treat, as some historians of an earlier generation were keen
to maintain, African response and indeed resistance to European colonisation as a
continuum. Up to 1963, this response took the form of modern versions of the old
imperial ideology of ‘equal rights for all civilised men’ and the ambiguous doctrine
of ‘partnership’. In this period, the state sought to achieve the assent of African
elites through provision of more and higher education for Africans, development of
lease-hold and eventually free-hold schemes in the cities, and the creation by
means of the Land Husbandry Act of a ‘prosperous peasantry’. During that period,
chiefs were of little importance. There was a symbolic change in nomenclature
from the Department of Native Affairs to the Department of Internal Affairs.
The crucial allies were seen as the African urban and rural middle classes, who
were targeted by the Build A Nation campaigns, were offered the vote in heavily
qualified franchises, were promised a very slow dismantling of urban segregation,
and eventually were even to be offered the chance to acquire land in the areas hitherto
reserved for Europeans by the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.
This‘liberalism’ was accompanied by authoritarian control of the majority of
Africans in town and in the countryside, and by repression of those who
advocated the alternative ideals of a mass franchise and an African majority rule.
Sir Edgar Whitehead’s ‘liberalism’ was accompanied by the Emergency of 1959, by
show trials, by detention and restriction, and by the passage of coercive legislation
like the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act.
By 1961, it had become clear that the ‘liberal’ paradigm had failed. The
federation was breaking up. The most highly educated Africans had joined the
nationalist movement and were leading the nationalist parties. Authoritarian and
interventionist attempts to implement Land Husbandry and bring about a rural land
tenure revolution were frustrated by widespread resistance. In the towns, Africans
(11) www.aluka.org.
with the most secure tenure were demanding the Municipal vote and the right to
control Councils.
The Rhodesia Front government elected in 1963 targeted different African allies.
Its ideology was ‘community development’ through which African ‘traditional’
communities in the rural areas and township communities around the cities could
achieve a degree of self-government. This was an ideology which went with the
revival of social and occupational segregation; a new legislative division of the
land into white and black areas; a neo-traditional emphasis upon ‘authentic’ chiefs
and African religious leaders; development of an inferior education ‘appropriate’ to
Africans, etc. This cluster of ideas constituted‘the Rhodesian Way’, which the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 was supposed to defend.
Each ideology gained some African supporters and the Rhodesian government
throughout employed many policemen, soldiers, clerks, teachers etc. Africans in
town and in the countryside adapted on a day to day basis to the pressures on influx
control and rural social engineering, and to the realities of racial discrimination.12
The National Archives of Zimbabwe has just released a set of files covering these
years of community development which cover in great detail local forms of resistance
instigatedby ZAPU,featuringundergroundsabotageactivities.13Anumberof activities
in urban areas are referred to in the municipal records and reports of Bulawayo and
Salisbury.14 It has often been questioned whether urban and rural resistance had any
connections and whether it was urban nationalism that spilled into the rural areas or
vice versa. This ambiguity is still largely present in the various testimonies
collected, but sometimes archival records of Police Criminal Investigation
Department dockets and subsequent trials of rural and urban activists can be
illuminating.15
1960-1965
The Divisions in Nationalist Politics, 1961
Most of the interviews invariably begin with the onset of mass nationalism and its
overlap with the beginning of the armed struggle. This is mainly due to the memory
span at the disposal of the majority of the interviewees. A rare transcript of a
narrative by Malachia M. Basvi Madimutsa recalls some internal dynamics within
(12) Gann, L.H. and M. Gelfand. Huggins of Rhodesia. The Man and His Country. Allen and Unwin, 1964.
(13) S3700/3/32/1-100. Ministry of Internal Affairs Reports and Correspondence 1963-1978. See also already
available material on community development in the Community Delineation reports; National Archives of
Zimbabwe (NAZ) S.2929 are critical. Particularly revealing of neo-traditionalism is the Spirit Index for every
medium, priest, holy place, and independent church leader, NAZ S.2376.
(14) McNamee, J.P. “Report on Native Urban Administration in Bulawayo.” Bulawayo: Government of Southern
Rhodesia, 1948; Roger Howman. “Report of the Committee to Investigate Urban Conditions in Southern
Rhodesia.” Salisbury:1943; B.W. Gussman. African Life in an Urban Area, Bulawayo, 1952-3; Percy Ibbotson’
“Report of a Survey of Urban African conditions in Southern Rhodesia”. Salisbury: 1943.
(15) See for instance Rhodes House Collections: John Conradie Papers: Trials of John Conradie 1966-7, Ndabaningi
Sithole, Sketchley Samkange, Michael Mawema, Leopold Takawira, Maurice Nyagumbo, John Mutasa, and Moven
Mahachi. A lot more of these can be found in the Historical Manuscripts collection of NAZ under the Guy Clutton-
Brock Papers.
1994
the National Democratic Party (NDP) on the eve of its second Congress in 1961.
As Madimutsa says:
When Leopold Takawira was appointed Interim Acting President of the NDP, there
was a general dissatisfaction among Ndebeles who wanted the exiled Joshua Nkomo
for the presidency. Their pressure brought them success when Nkomo was elected
National President at the Party’s First Congress at Drill Hall in Salisbury in 1960.
Leopold Takawira was posted to London to take up Nkomo’s former post as
NDP Chief Representative in London. When the Second NDP Congress was held in
McDonald Hall in Bulawayo in 1961, there was a general feeling among the Shonas
that Nkomo was not providing the kind of dynamic leadership the struggle required.
Among the leading prospects for the national leadership was Leopold Takawira who
was being sponsored by the Karanga faction of the Harare Youth Wing. This faction
was led by Patrick Bvunzawabaya (Highfield Brach Youth Chairman), Patrick
Nhariwa (Highfield Brach Youth Secretary), Claudius Danha (Treasurer), and George
Mudukuti (Committee Member).16
Nkomo’s own written account is cognizant and informed of all the conspiracy
theories behind the split, not only when it simmered under the surface in the NDP,
but also when the bubble burst in the subsequent political formation ZAPU. As
Nkomo puts it:
….but the most important event by far was the inaugural meeting of the Organisation
of African Unity, over which the Emperor Haile Selasie presided in Addis Ababa in
May 1963. North Africans and those South of the Sahara, French-speakers and
English- speakers, progressives and conservatives, came together to dedicate
themselves to the future of our continent. Enthusiasm was high, and Kwame
Nkrumah’s vision of unity swept everyone along. The OAU has by no means fulfilled
all the hopes we then placed in it, but it was and still is a noble idea. Ironically it was
during that inaugural meeting, when all our minds should have been on the single
purpose of liberating Africa, that the divisions within our movement first came into
the open.
….At the Addis Ababa meeting I found out what [my Egyptian friend Mohammed
Faiek]…meant, when Leopold Takawira and his friends launched their campaign
against my leadership.17
In an interview with the New African editor Baffour Ankoma in 2002, Robert
Mugabe, who was assumed to be part of the conspiracy against Nkomo’s leadership,
revealed his version of what led to the split:
Mugabe: When I came back, I didn’t tell you the story why I didn’t finish the four
years in Ghana. When I came back, parties had been banned, and here in the then
Southern Rhodesia, the African National Congress (ANC) had been banned, and
people had been detained under the Detention Act in February 1959. I came back in
1960, about May, June. I found that the National Democratic Party (NDP) had been
formed to replace the African National Congress. It was then just six months old.
Then I started telling people, friends and relatives who had joined the NDP, they
wanted me to tell the people, at political meetings and rallies, how Ghana was; how
free the Ghanaians
(16) Malachia M. Basvi Madimutsa. “Problems Within the Nationalist Movement” Unpublished mimeo.
(17) Nkomo, Joshua. The Story of My Life. London: Methuen, 1984. pp.112-113.
were, and what the feeling was in a newly independent African state. So I went
round and talked about how young people in Ghana who had only done Standard 7
were being raised up, being taught how to type, and the wonderful life there was in
Ghana, the “Highlife” at the time and so on; you know, the very, very inspiring
environment there was in Ghana. So I told them all that, and about Kwame
Nkrumah. I told them also about Nkrumah’s own political ideology and his
commitment that unless every inch of African soil was free, then Ghana would not
regard itself as free. So I went round politicising people, using what I regarded as
factual description of my experience in Ghana. And this was now in June, July 1960;
and by then there was quite an amount of concern by the people about the leaders
who had been arrested in February 1959 after the Detention Act had been applied.
And there was now a movement to get them released. There were demonstrations, I
remember the July, August demonstration of that year. I was instrumental, together
with others, some of whom are now dead, and we urged the people to strike, to strike
in order to demonstrate our desire to have those in prison released. The strike
succeeded in Harare first, then it was re-echoed in Bulawayo, Gweru and Mutare, and
people wanted their leaders released.
Of course the workers who joined the strike had their own grievances about their
working conditions, pay and salaries. So we took all that together and bundled it up,
and we said no, we wanted the leaders freed, and the workers must also be paid, but
it was mainly political, we wanted the leaders who were still in detention to be freed.
On the NDP, Mugabe continues…
Mugabe: Finally, oh they got me, they got me. They got to know me too. But it took
them a long time to know who this guy was. Not in 1960. We sailed through that
year. But then in October, the NDP held its inaugural congress. They asked me to
chair it in Goodwill Hall; it was a hall for coloured people; I don’t know whether it
is still there. At that inaugural congress in October 1960, we had Nkomo elected in
absentia as president. I was then the information and publicity secretary of the NDP
and that was what I was to the very end of the party until it was banned. Of all the
parties that had existed in colonial times, the NDP had the longest life. It went
through the whole of 1960 and the whole of 1961, and was only banned in
December 1961, just a week or so before Christmas. It was then that we
immediately formed ZAPU, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union. At the time,
Joshua Nkomo had returned towards the end of 1960 from Britain, and the ANC was
banned. He had attended the All People’s Conference in Ghana, and from Accra he
went to London. It was when he was in London, in February 1960, that the swoop was
done here and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and this was when the major
nationalist parties were banned. So we made him president. When the NDP was
banned in December, within a matter of 10 days we formed ZAPU. But we didn’t
want to call it ZAPU initially. There was KANU in Kenya, and TANU in Tanzania,
and here the name given was ZANU. And as publicity secretary, I said ZANU yes, it
would give uniformity with what had happened elsewhere in the sub-region, but for
me PU - the people’s thing - was what mattered, so why can’t we call it ZAPU. So
ZAPU was my choice actually as publicity secretary, and I thought it would give a
better ring and a better appeal to the people - the people’s union. So Nkomo said,
“OK, you can have it your way”. So we called it ZAPU. Baffour: And Nkomo
became leader.
Mugabe: Nkomo became leader, I was still publicity secretary.
1994
Baffour: There are allegations that you unduly supplanted Nkomo and became leader.
Mugabe: No, if anyone was defending Nkomo, it was I. I was the last to leave
ZAPU and only at a time when I felt things had gone too far. No, no, no, I was the
whole way through against anyone who wanted division, who wanted us to remove
Nkomo. No, not I. I feared that if we did that we would divide the people almost
immediately and Matabeleland would go its way. So we sailed through that problem.
ZAPU did not have as long a life as the NDP. It got banned in September 1962. It was
formed just before Christmas 1961 and got banned nine months later. And we had
planned that ZAPU would go beyond what the NDP had done. The NDP had been
principally a people- mobilising party, getting the people to be much more conscious
than during the ANC days. When the ANC was banned in 1959, not much work had
been done and the people were, as it were, raw. But they became now much more
mature. There were more politicisation, more conscientisation about their
nationalism, and giving also a belief and a greater sense of confidence in them, and
they wanted to do in Zimbabwe what others had done elsewhere, for example in
Ghana, and after Ghana of course we had the other Francophone countries becoming
free. You know Nigeria would not have independence for a start, they said they were
not mature yet. They laughed at Ghana when Ghana wanted independence. They
[Nigeria] wanted a kind of political tutelage for a year or two before their own
independence. And so to get the people to have the confidence that they could
actually overcome the European here [in Zimbabwe], the psychology that was
required to re-orientate them was great. And so, we had people who actually when
the native commissioner or district commissioner or policeman was saying any
nonsense or was trying to challenge you at a political meeting, there were people
who could actually box him, box him to give people the confidence. Or say rough
things to him or dismiss him as nonsense. So people could now say: “Ah, can people
do this to a white man?” And it took some time to get them now to have confidence
in themselves. But confidence was coming. But ZAPU was banned nine months
after it had been in existence. And at that point, we said we should not form another
party. We should go underground, prepare our people now, send people to be trained
abroad, and nobody had any experience how a guerrilla war could be waged. And we
got detained after the banning. We got detained when David Whitehead was prime
minister, and I was detained at my own place. The detention was very ridiculous and
ludicrous all at the same time….
On the details of the ZAPU split, Mugabe’s version goes something like this:
….But James Chikerema and Nkomo came to us and said it was necessary, if we
were going to embark on a guerrilla struggle, for them to visit Egypt and talk to
Abdel Nasser; but along the way they would first talk to Julius Nyerere and if they
could also go to Accra, they would talk to Kwame Nkrumah. We said fine, and they
were given funds by our treasurer, and so they travelled. By the way, we in ZAPU had
imposed on ourselves a restriction that we would not go to the United Nations to make
appeals for financial help, because in the NDP we had tended to rely too much on
outside help. Anyway, Chikerema had tremendous influence on Nkomo. He was the
man we said should organise young men for guerrilla warfare. So they travelled to
Tanganyika and then to Egypt. And when they got to Egypt, we heard they had gone
on to London and to New York. We said why violate the restriction we made for
ourselves not to go to the United Nations and make financial appeals? When they
came back, we were
very disappointed that they had done this. They told us that they had had lots of arms
from Nasser, and we said yes and so what? They said when things started happening
here, it would be very serious; you just have to press a button here and there would be
an explosion. We said, “Ah, press a button and...? Have we trained our guys yet?” The
rest of us didn’t want to know the numbers, but we wanted to know whether we were
now at a stage where enough people could undertake these sabotage acts to mark the
beginning of a guerrilla struggle. They said yes. Later we found that what they called
arms were just about two truck loads. But how can you wage a guerrilla war with
two truckloads of arms? You may be able to start something, yes, but you can’t say
because we have that you can fight an effective guerrilla war. They said - and this is
Chikerema who had influenced Nkomo - that they had messages from Nkrumah,
Nasser, Nyerere all to the effect that we should leave the country because there was
going to be a very, very serious programme of guerrilla struggle. We said: “Ah, are we
at that stage?” They said, yes. I said to Chikerema in front of Nkomo: “If we leave the
country without real preparations, the people would say we have deserted. Are we
that ready?” They said if we start things here, we will get arrested. I said no. And Jason
Z. Moyo who was close to me, he was my best man at my wedding when I got married
to Sally [his first wife from Ghana who died in 1992], he was the secretary for finance
in the party, he also had said no. And Nkomo and Chikerema said:“OK you remain
behind, perhaps you will change your mind, we are going, but give us your car.” So my
little car, an Opel Rekord, the only car I have bought in my life, which I bought when
I was in Takoradi [Ghana], I asked Sally to come with it, to send it before she came
here to Southern Rhodesia as it were. I said fine, “you can have it. I wanted to
exchange notes with J.Z. Moyo, the two of us were quite keen in the NDP and also in
ZAPU. So I talked to J.Z. Moyo and he too was against our leaving the country. But
he said: “If we stayed behind and things didn’t go well, then the rest of the people
would accuse us of having obstructed the campaign. So let’s go.” I said fine, I will go
with Sally. So we travelled from here to Bulawayo, then we joined J.Z. Moyo and we
drove through the southern part of the country and crossed into Botswana. There was
a river there, it was quite full, and we had to wade through the water with the car, but
the car managed to pull through. When we arrived in Francistown [Botswana], the
leader of the only party in town (not the same as the present party) accommodated
us, while J.Z. Moyo arranged for a small plane to fly us to Tanzania. So on Good
Friday, we left Francistown and landed on the border with Zambia for refuelling. We
slept there actually, then we flew on to Tanzania and used a local flight to Dar es
Salaam. When we were there, staying in the hotel, an arrangement was made for us to
meet with President Nyerere. His secretary was Kambona. So we met Nyerere. Mind
you, the background was that Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Nasser all wanted us to leave
the country, so we could form a government in exile, and when things happened here
in Southern Rhodesia, naturally, the leadership would be free from arrest. And now
we are meeting Nyerere. But when the issue was put by Joshua Nkomo, it was put
this way: “Mr. President, we are here to ask for support, we would want to form a
government in exile, and we have decided that it wouldn’t be safe for us to remain in
Rhodesia, and so we want you to provide us with a room here, and secondly provide us
with all the support, financial and material, that we might require for the purposes of
waging a struggle.” And Nyerere looked at us for a while. And he said: “Well, I know
very little about guerrilla struggle and governments in exile. But the little I know is
that before you can establish a government in exile, you sure must have a
1994
square of control of your territory. You don’t have that. There is no fighting that has
taken place in your country. And there are no guns that have the range of firing bullets
from here to your country. I would be very happy to provide you with a room, but we
would be doing you a disservice if we allowed you to form a government in exile
here. That’s a matter we cannot do at the moment.” So we were just listening. And we
went to our hotel; it was called the Metropole, owned by Tiny Rowland. And I then
went to Takawira, (he is late [dead] now), he was the chairman of the party external.
And I said: “Ah, Mr. Takawira, did you hear how the conversation went? We had to ask
for the first time for permission to live in this country, to be accommodated here, but I
thought we had been told that the request for us to be outside our country came from
Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Nasser. What is this? So we’ve not been told the truth. But why
should this have happened?”We all concluded that it was Chikerema’s own
persuasion to Nkomo. That was the bone of departure between me and Joshua
Nkomo.18
This rivalry filtered down to the party membership and Cephas Msipa recalls:
We fought each other on the split because we wanted to preserve unity of ZAPU. Ooh
that was some kind of madness. I remember in 1963 I was travelling to Nigeria
and
there was this big headline, ‘Zimbabwe is engaged in some war of destruction’. That
was what was happening in 1963-64. But again in a way people were guarding their
unity. You know they did what was being initiated by those who formed ZANU PF
and they were prepared to fight in order to remain united. But it was a vicious fight
really, because people lost their lives, some were burnt alive, I saw it with my own
eyes, friends became enemies, of course it was like when friends turn against each
other....
what was interesting was that literally friends were prepared to kill friends. I know
in my case Eddison Zvobgo was my friend, but in the name of ZANU PF he sent
some people to destroy my house and my school which I was heading. And in fact we
talked about it later and he said you know I gave them a drum of beer to drink so
that they get drunk and I said you go now and stone. And when I went to look, I said
you have not done enough, I gave them another drum the following day and they
went. But I also organised the young youth, ZAPU youth and they literally destroyed
his house completely. And he had to leave Mufakose (laughing). It was as bad as
that. But the good thing about it was that we had time to go about it, and to say that
was foolish, why did we do that. That’s why some wouldn’t see it happening again.
Ooh petrol bombings you know, people learnt to make these petrol bombs and were
using them, so many times to destroy life and property. You know it was bad and I
hope we won’t do it again.19
In other smaller towns, the situation was the same and ZANU seemed to be more
on the offensive. Solomon Marembo recalled that Fort Victoria had the most vicious
ZANU youths who took to drug abuse and did not hesitate to kill. They actually
ferried droves of youths to Salisbury in buses to reinforce their less vigilant
colleagues there. However, Fort Victoria was also a place with long established
ZAPU structures and supporters who were determined to defend their party under the
local leadership
(18) Mugabe, Robert. “No Remote Control Ever Again.” Interview with Baffour Ankoma. New African Magazine.
May 2002.
(19) Interview between Cephas Msipa and Ishmael Mazambani, (Gweru) 2008.
of Samuel Munodawafa. Marembo recalls that one of the people he recruited into the
Fort Victoria Youth branch was Mark Dube who had come to Fort Victoria with Terry
Maluleke as a trade unionists and he “immediately left trade unionism and joined
ZANU and we recruited him to fight ZAPU and the rest of our enemies.”20 Mark
Dube was eventually arrested with the rest of the nationalist leadership and placed in
a restriction camp, and thereafter left for the struggle in Zambia. He appears later in
this chapter as a member of the ZANU High Command under the name of Joshua
Misihairambwi.
Prison, Restriction, and its Narratives, 1962-1966
As soon as the Rhodesian Front (RF) swept into power in 1962 it began to tighten
the screws on African nationalism. By the end of 1964, most of the leaders of the
African Nationalist parties had been thrown into prison and/or into a restriction
camp. A number of them wrote about their experiences during or after their period
of bondage. Although, as Jocelyn Alexander argues21, these prison narratives are
both about self and nation, this is particularly the case for those written after the
experiences in prison. All of them need to be read in the context of the longue
durée, as part of a corpus of experiences reflecting the shaping of the struggle in
Zimbabwe over time. The prison was a theatre of struggle among the prisoners
themselves and between the prisoners and the state. It is also crucial to note in the
pre-and post-independence period how prison became the rite of passage into radical
Zimbabwean nationalism, the acid test for endurance against the violence of the state
responsible for the making and unmaking of many a nationalist. But prison was not
only for high profile nationalists; as the war escalated, it also became home for
many ‘civilians running with terrorists’ an ambiguous term used by the Smith
regime to describe those Africans caught up in the uneasy position of serving the
demands of the guerrillas and satisfying the requirements of the Rhodesian
Security Forces. We encounter most such narratives from the mid 1970s onwards,
and this chapter features the special circumstances of the situation at the Gorge or
‘Mutimurefu’ Prison of Fort Victoria, which took so many of these war-time civilian
prisoners that it warranted an attack by the guerrillas in an attempt to free its
inmates. However, the first association between prison and Zimbabwe’s political
struggle begins with those people who spearheaded the campaign for majority rule
in the period just before the break up of the Central African Federation.
Zimbabwe’s longest serving political prisoner, Maurice Nyagumbo twice made
an attempt to write his experiences and smuggle them out of prison, and, on both
occasions, the Rhodesian authorities confiscated the manuscripts. The one that
made it to the printers had actually been written entirely on toilet paper. Starting his
long encounter with the Rhodesian prisons in February 1959, Nyagumbo was at
(20) Interview with Solomon Marembo by Prof. Bhebe, (Harare) 12 November 1999.
(21) Alexander, Joclyn. “Political Prisoners’ Memoirs in Zimbabwe: Narratives of Self and Nation.” Cultural and
Social History. 5.4 (2008).
1994
the time a member of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress and had
spearheaded a nationwide campaign to disrupt the functions of the Native Affairs
Department. He was arrested at home in Makoni and driven to Salisbury to join
other Congress stalwarts from across the country, including Henry Hamadziripi,
Edson Sithole, James Chikerema, Daniel Madzimbamuto, George Nyandoro, Paul
Mushonga, Moses Ayema, and Robert Marere. For this early generation of prisoners,
the experience seemed like fun: they sang and chanted nationalist slogans in the
face of their captors and took pride in challenging European prison officers and in
converting the African warders to their cause. Maurice Nyagumbo makes the best
illustration of a prisoner who knew his rights and he reminds his readers several
times in his narrative that he used every opportunity to use violence to deal with
European intransigence. In an encounter with the Chief Native Commissioner, S.E.
Morris, at Marandellas Prison, he regrets that he “...had picked up a chair with which
to hammer Morris’s head but this was grabbed by the African warders before it landed
on Morris. I felt so disappointed because I had spent a lot of time quarrelling with
him instead of bashing his head.”22 Nyagumbo’s story, like so many others of its
kind, is also a record of the experiences of others and an internal reflection of the
struggles outside prison. One of the key omissions in Zimbabwean studies of the
nationalist struggle is the little known Zimbabwe Nationalist Party (ZNP) which,
although not explicitly detailed in Nyagumbo’s account, finds expression in it as an
opposition movement to his own National Democratic Party (NDP).23 While at the
Lupane Restriction Camp, Nyagumbo took a swipe at the ZNP leadership for their
lack of community responsibility, their love for women, and their attempts to disrupt
local NDP meetings. The founding of a local NDP branch with an influential
organising secretary, Welshman Mabhena, went a long way in “overrunning the
already well established branches of the ZNP.”When all the restrictees were moved
from Lupane to Gokwe in May 1961, it seemed even the Rhodesian state was aware
of the differences between them, so that it had to move the NDP group to Sengwe
and the ZNP group to Bumbuzi. Again, in the simmering conflict over Nkomo’s
leadership of the NDP, a fight broke out at Marandellas prison between George
Nyandoro and Kufakunesu Mhizha, leading the authorities to separate George
Nyandoro and James Chikerema from the rest of the NDP prisoners and sending
them to Salisbury Prison.
The political violence that followed the split of ZANU from ZAPU increased the
justification for the Rhodesian government to embark on a massive clampdown on
political activity between 1963 and 1964. The result was that nearly all nationalists
across the country were in some form of confinement by the end of 1964; they also
carried their differences with them. Tekere recalls that, after his arrest in 1964, he
was first taken to Salisbury Prison and then transferred to Gwelo Prison where he
(22) Nyagumbo, Maurice. With the People: See p.140.

(23) According to Nyagumbo, members of this Party in restriction at Lupane included Patrick Matimba, Philip
Foya, Maurice Musarurwa, and Chikoya Dzwukamanja.
was joined by Joshua Nkomo, Josiah Chinamano, Daniel Madzimbamuto, and others
from ZAPU. As Tekere recalls:
...Daniel Madzimbamuto wanted to kill us,accusing us of the murder of his brother,who
had been killed during the in-fighting between ZANU and ZAPU. When he was killed,
I and my group had been descending on other towns from Gweru to fight with ZAPU
members. Nkomo took him into his cell for protection.24
Most ZANU activists were moved to WhaWha Restriction Centre near Gweru,
while those belonging to ZAPU were sent to Gonakudzingwa. Later in June 1965,
all the ZANU detainees were moved to Sikombela Camp near Kwekwe. Many have
told their individual circumstances of arrest and how they were eventually sent
to prison. Joshua Nkomo was picked up in Enkeldoorn at an ‘ox roast’ party in a
military style operation that left his supporters crying, but, like the Biblical
messiah, he promised them he would be back.25 Simon Muzenda was arrested in
Shabani and his supporters kept vigil at the prison, sixty women brought him food
the following morning, forcing the police to shift his court hearing to Gweru.26
Robert Mugabe, it is said, ‘flew into prison’ when he was arrested soon after a trip
from Ghana. One can easily distinguish between the agency of each detainee
expressed in the narratives relating to the restriction period (which are often
triumphant and revolutionary) and the despair, immobility, and loneliness associated
with the confinement of prison life after 1966. Nkomo starts off his life at
Gonakudzingwa Restriction Camp reflecting on Godfrey Huggins’s thoughts that
Africans were part of the local fauna, which, like elephants, should be “herded into
reserves for their own safety.” Later he boasts how much ZAPU was able to convert
this hostile environment into a place for political education for the masses living
around Gonakudzingwa. His narrative also has its funny notes. For instance, he tells
of when the police shoot the dogs guarding the restrictees, not for any shortcomings
on the part of the dogs, but for the crime that they were responding to names the
inmates had given them such as ‘Smith’ or ‘Janet’. Spouses of detainees also provide
key information about life in detention. Joanah ‘Mafuyana’ Nkomo has retold her
difficult encounters with Rhodesian authorities when trying to see her husband,
Joshua Nkomo, at Gonakudzingwa. Not only did she need a permit to see him, she
had to travel two days to Gonakudzingwa from Bulawayo, only to be restricted to at
most a five hour visit in the presence of a police officer who recorded all their
conversations. At one point she was not allowed to see him for two years. When
permission was granted, Nkomo, Joseph Msika, and Lazarus Nkala had been moved
from Gonakudzingwa to Buffalo Range Prison, which was inaccessible by train, so
she had to organise with friends and hire a car with the wives
(24) Tekere. A Lifetime of Struggle. p.61.

(25) Nkomo. The Story of My Life. p.123.
(26) Interview with Simon Muzenda by Prof. Bhebe, 23 July 1984.
1994
of the other two detainees. Even for such effort, the visit was not allowed to go
beyond forty minutes.27
For the ZANU group, it was at Sikombela Restriction Camp that they came up with
the “Sikombela Declaration” authorising Chitepo and the exiled wing of ZANU in
Zambia to form a Revolutionary Council to carry out the armed struggle in earnest.
Sikombela was also an interesting community in that the detainees had established
a school, clinic, and other amenities for the local community. It was a place where
personal relationships were also nurtured. One of the most illustrative accounts of the
day-to-day activities has been given by the late Shona novelist, Mordikai
Hamutyinei, who describes each character in the camp: Edson Sithole was
nicknamed ‘Bhokisi’ (Box) for being a box of brains, Enos Nkala had the radio with
the widest frequency, Moses Mvenge was good at climbing trees, Leopold Takawira
was a keen, but not so good, soccer striker, while Simon Muzenda took to the stage
on ‘Happy Night’ each Saturday to dance the traditional Mbakumba or
Muchongovoyo dance.28 He and Eddison Zvobgo not only had to build their own
house, they also had to adapt to a diet of Zebra meat.29
Several different reasons are given for the end of the restriction periods. For
Hamutyinei, it was a Christmas day binge that turned into a riot that inevitably
required the police. For Mugabe, the coincidence between the Chinhoyi battle of April
1966 and the decision to move all ZANU detainees to Salisbury was all too
obvious.30 Thereafter, the whole ZANU Executive and thirty other ZANU
detainees were taken to Salisbury Central Prison where they were treated like
ordinary criminals, living in crowded communal cells and eating bad food. Several
representations were made to the authorities to be accorded the treatment due to
political prisoners, but to no avail. It was decided to stage a hunger strike which
lasted for four days until the Prison Superintendent came in with forms for them
complete, and, as Hamutyinei shows, this move was not a solution, but a move to
divide the prisoners:
...in the evening we saw Paysley [the Prison Superintendent] bringing us some
forms to fill. This meant that those with businesses back at home and those with the
qualification of JC (Junior Certificate) and above would now eat the food that was
taken by the Coloured prisoners. As ZANU we all refused this plan to divide us and
Paysley pleaded with us to eat while he made arrangements that we all received
proper food the following day.31
The ZANU prisoners tried to kill the boredom and gloom of prison life. They played
soccer within the walls of the prison and played tsoro (a chess-like game), but still
they had to adapt to a routine of being shut up in the cells from 4pm to 8am. The
fatigue, boredom, and loneliness is best illustrated in a poem written by Eddison
(27) Testimony of Joannah Nkomo in I. Staunton. Mothers of the Revolution. Harare: Boabab Books, 1990: See pp.
228-229.
(28) Hamutyinei, M.A.. Zvakanga Zvakaoma MuZimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984: See Chitsauko 3 and 4.
(29) Interview with Eddison Zvobgo by Prof. Bhebe, 28 August 1984.
(30) Smith, D. and C. Simpson. Mugabe. Salisbury: Pioneer Head, 1981: See p.56.
(31) Hamutyinei, Mordikai. Zvakanga Zvakaoma MuZimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984: See p.49.
Zvobgo, where, in the confines of his cell, he has no one else to befriend, but a
brick.32 Most prisoners used this time to further their education and many got their
degrees while in prison; Mugabe earned at least three and Edson Sithole earned a
doctorate in law, while studying in their cells. We will return to the politics inside the
prisons at different stages in the development of the struggle.
The Turn to Armed Struggle: ZAPU ‘Urban Sabotage’ and ZANU
‘Crocodile Gang’, 1963-1965
It has been a fascination for us in our interviews to encounter contests between former
ZIPRA and Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) combatants
over who fired the first shots of war, contests that are reminiscent of the splits
enunciated above. Dumiso Dabengwa’s The Organiser details some of the early
sabotage work in Bulawayo that he spearheaded as a ZAPU youth leader, while
some interviews in the Mafela Trust collections place the beginning of ZIPRA
military action as early as 1963. This mainly took the form of urban sabotage. As
one C. Mpofu recollects: “We were itching for direct engagements but we had to
use rudimentary methods, while recruiting at the same time.”33
Such methods included the use of tins,nails,sadza (cornmeal mush), and detonators
to make explosives to blow electric pylons such as those along the Khami road in
Bulawayo. In 1963, Dumiso Dabengwa deployed some trained cadres in Salisbury
armed with plastic time bombs to be placed in shops, hotels, and white residences at
night. Some, like L. Mhlanga and Ethan Dube, recalled visiting nightclubs
patronised by whites and planting plastic bombs. Mhlanga recollects that “in that
same year we set Meikles Hotel on fire with more than thirteen cars burnt and
many people injured.”34 There were also sabotage activities in Mabvuku which led
the Rhodesian intelligence to suspect the hand of Russian communists.35 In
February 1964, Moffat Hadebe led the foiled ‘Ezidube Attack’ near Kezi, during
which all of his men were captured or killed in the Rhodesian ‘fire force’
interception.36
ZAPU also tried using some European and Asian collaborators, especially
lecturers based at the Universities of Zambia and Rhodesia. In 1965, a group of
such lecturers operating under Giovianni Arrighi was organised. It included John
Conradie, John Reed, and Ivan Dixon, who conspired to bring in explosives and
hand grenades and succeeded in smuggling them in amidst tight security at the
Chirundu Border post, distributing them to ZAPU youth. They were indeed
responsible for most of the explosions that went up in Salisbury during that time.
But soon they were betrayed by a ZAPU colleague, leading to the arrest of all the
lecturers. Arrighi and
(32) E. Zvobgo. “My Companion and Friend: A Bare Brick in My Prison Cell.” M. Kadhani (ed.). And Now the
Poets Speak. Gweru: Mambo Press.
(33) Mafela Trust interview with C. Mpofu, 13 August 2007.
(34) Mafela Trust interview with L. Mhlanga, 12 August 2007.
(35) Mafela Trust interview with J.M. Ndlovu (Sentenced to death after the Mabvuku incident), (Bulawayo) 31
January 2007.
(36) Mafela Trust interview with M. Hadebe (commander of the 1st ZAPU unit to attack at Ezidube), 12 June 1999.
1994
Reed were released after questioning and left the country immediately, but Conradie
and Dixon remained because an arms cache was recovered at their house. Conradie
was sentenced to twelve years.37 Apart from these, ZAPU also had plenty of other
sympathisers prepared to participate in the sabotage work. An interesting case was
the multi-racial couple Patrick Matimba and his Dutch wife, Adriana van Hoorn,
who, after being frustrated in their quest to stay together as a family in Rusape by the
segregationist policies of the Rhodesian regime, retaliated by planting bombs that
exploded in five different hotels in Salisbury. They were also able to cross the
border before they were caught.38
Although their real reason for splitting from ZAPU was ostensibly to launch a
more confrontational strategy, the founders of ZANU were only able to crystallise
this position at their Congress held in Gwelo in 1964. It was attended by about a
thousand delegates representing over 30 out of the 50 districts. With the Rhodesian
Front Party keen on declaring independence from Britain, the major preoccupation
of the Congress was to find means of empowering its Central Committee to come
up with means and ways of combating the UDI. The result was ZANU’s Five-Point
Plan, which was kept a secret of the National Executive. Until now this plan
remains a mystery, but parts of the first stages of the plan were published as a
statement issued by the ZANU President, Ndabaningi Sithole, under the title the
“Clarion Call to War” (19 June 1964). The statement warned of plans by the Smith
regime to declare unilateral independence, and it gave the following instructions to
African people:
Those who are working in towns, mines and farms, etc, should prepare to withdraw
their monies from banks, building societies and post office savings banks and put aside
and buy large stocks of food which should be stored in a safe place.
Those in the reserves should not sell any more of their cattle, sheep, goats, pigs
and fowls. They should store large quantities of maize, groundnuts, corn, etc.
Every family should study the surroundings of his home and locality for strategy.
Everyone should be ready to act as soon as the final instructions come from
the President.
When the Government declares unilateral independence, all Africans must stop
paying dipping fees, cattle fees, dog fees and poll tax until an African Government is
fully established in Zimbabwe.
Town residents must stop paying rents from the day unilateral independence
is proclaimed.
Every man must have axes, bows and arrows and other instruments ready to oppose
physically unilateral independence, and ACT as soon as unilateral independence
is declared.
(37) Chung, Fay. Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: See p.58; Ellert, H. The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-
insurgency and guerrilla warfare 1962-1980. Gweru: Mambo Press, 1993: See p.22.
(38) Ibid. pp. 22-25. For the trials and tribulations faced by the Matimbas, see M. Mushonga. “The Black Peril:
The Story of Patrick Matimba.” Paper Presented to the Historical Dimensions of Human Rights and Democracy in
Zimbabwe Seminar, University of Zimbabwe, April 1998.
All African parents must withdraw their children from school as soon as illegal
independence is declared. The President of ZANU will declare a state of emergency
in the party and the country when the time comes. That will be the time to act and
whatever you are ordered to do. Zimbabwe is near –now you should lay down your
lives, honour and fortunes to make it a reality. Long Live Zimbabwe.39
A covering statement from Robert Mugabe, Secretary General of ZANU, described
the document as a clarion call to “military resistance.”40
It was under the auspices of the Five Point Plan that ZANU sent groups of
volunteers for military training, and on their return they undertook acts of violence
likely to send the message across to the Rhodesian Front that it should brace itself
for war. One of the groups was known as the ‘Crocodile Gang’, which killed Petros
Oberholtzer, the first European in Rhodesia to die in an act of war, in Melsetter
in July 1964. This event has been the subject of much attention, featuring in three
novels, Sithole’s Obed Mutezo, Peter Godwin’s Mukiwa, and Michael Raeburn’s
Black Fire, all of which have been ably analysed by Professor Terence Ranger.41
Professor Ngwabi Bhebe and other University of Zimbabwe History Department
staff members interviewed the leader of the ‘gang’, Willie Ndangana, before his
death, and he gave
a fascinating account of how he started his career as a ZANLA cadre. Recruited in
Lusaka where he was working as a carpenter, Ndangana was originally a member
of ZAPU, who went over to ZANU after the split of 1963. He recalled being part of
the first thirty six volunteers to ZANU’s military wing that gathered after the
congress of 1964 to be trained in China. When the trip to China did not
materialise, most of the volunteers were disillusioned, leaving behind only nine of
them, Ndangana himself, Rick Moto, Amos Kademonga, Master Mazvane, David
Dhlamini, and Victor Mlambo. As he recalled:
Six out of nine men came first and stayed at Takawira’s house where Sithole also
lived. We reached Harare on the 24th of June 1964, and we were greeted by the
Secretary General R. Mugabe who was left in charge. Takawira was in prison, and
Sithole had been arrested in Masvingo. At Mugabe’s office he asked how many men I
had and I told him that altogether there were six of us. We told him that we wanted
pistols but after he had asked if we had any training in handling such weapons and we
said we had not, he said he would prefer we used knives and sticks. He said he would
deploy us to whatever area we liked. I said I preferred an area with hills, mountains
and caves and he said that he would send us to Manicaland. We left for Mutare on June
28th, 1964 under the name ‘Crocodile Group’.42
Ndangana and his group were not given the weapons, but money to travel to Umtali
where Ndabaningi Sithole was undergoing his high-profile trial as leader of ZANU.
(39) Sithole, Ndabaningi. “Clarion Call to War.” In Letters from the Salisbury Prison. 19 June 1964.
(40) Sithole, Ndabaningi. Obed Mutezo: The Mudzimu Christian Nationalist. London: Oxford University Press,
1970: See pp.138-140.
(41) Ranger, Terence. “Violence Variously Remembered: The Killing of Pieter Oberholzer in July 1964.” History
in Africa. 24 (1997).
(42) Interview with Comrade William Ndangana by Prof. Bhebe, (Harare) 12 July 1984.
1994
Part of the money was used to purchase knives for the team, and as soon as they got to
Mutare, they attended the court proceedings in order to seize any opportunity to talk
to Sithole during the court breaks. They managed to get a few minutes with Sithole
who linked them up with a local contact, one Shasha, who would in turn link them
up with another contact, Obert Mutezo in Nyanyadzi. Mutezo’s role was to identify
‘targets’ for the group to attack. Ndangana does not state why Nyanyadzi was
chosen, but in his testimony he reveals that he hailed from the area. Their first
attempt to attack the Nyanyadzi police station was foiled when Amos Kademonga
was detected by an alert policeman who gave chase.43 They split in various
directions to meet at an agreed rendezvous, but again Amos arrived late which
raised suspicion amongst his colleagues that he was ‘selling out’. The following day
they attacked a car belonging to a young African couple at Chikwizi River; they let
them go after the man shouted “I am one of you!” After being released, the man
went straight to the police station to report the matter. A police Land Rover
returned to the spot and fired shots into the bush in the direction where the group
had fled, but did not seek to pursue them. Ndangana goes on to narrate how they
attacked a white man in his car and then fled pursuit by the police:
During the free periods we had had while waiting at the cave we had been writing
bulletins introducing ourselves as the ‘Crocodile Group on War Confrontation.’
We wrote that we were going to kill all white men and that all white men who
wanted to stay alive should leave the country, and warning Ian Smith to beware. So we
left these bulletins at every place where we had done some action, leaving some
bulletins at the Nyanyadzi Police station near the spot where the helicopter had been
parked and also at Chikwizi River Bridge. When we ran away from the police, Amos
ran for good so there were four of us left. We were later to learn that Ricky had been
arrested at Mutare while staying at Mudzingwa’s house. As Amos did not return, we
thought that he would reveal our meeting place so we did not go back to the cave.
We decided to go away from the area and go elsewhere. We walked across the hill
throughout the night and reached Biriwiri Secondary School in the morning. From
there we took the road to Melsetter until we had reached a place where the road turns
and there was a bridge. This place was bushy, so we decided we would rest near a
stream. When my friends had settled, I left them and went to a nearby shop to buy
two loaves of bread which we shared between the four of us; I would use my sword
for cutting the loaves into halves and we would sit down and eat.
We talked about making another attack that evening. It was a very bushy area and
there was a large tree near where we camped and also a lot of stones on the ground.
We rested; I went to buy food and more bread. At this time we had no contact with the
povo [the people]. We wanted to rest for some time until our legs were strong before
attacking again. We finally decided that we were ready for action on 4 July 1964.
We
wanted to act while it was still light so that we could be sure that we were attacking
whites and not blacks. So we arranged some large stones across the road in order to
(43) Throughout the narrative, Kademonga is suspected to be a Rhodesian informer; one of their colleagues in the
‘gang’ was so convinced of this that he threatened to kill him. Towards the end of their campaign, he escapes from
the group and he apparently gives away his friends to the police.
block the road, then heaped up more stones alongside the road with which to attack,
and lay in waiting. Suddenly there was a Volkswagen Kombi driving towards us
from the direction of Biriwiri Secondary School with parking lights on. The man
drove until he was very near the bridge of stones we had built across the road and
then stopped. When he saw us he shouted “Kaffirs”, that was it. We threw stones at
him. He was sitting by the steering wheel close to us so almost all the stones fell onto
him. Then his wife and child were sitting on the other side and did not get hit. He got
out of the car to fight. He was ready to retaliate, but he was bleeding heavily, the
sword was now in my hand and as he moved towards me I stabbed him in the stomach
until the whole sword had sunk in. He staggered backwards and picked another stone,
my friends had moved back a little.
The man staggered back to the car and his wife helped him in. They started the car
but as it moved forward it hit the stones across the road, hit a rock and overturned after
moving a distance of about 150metres. Now my friends ran to the car. The wife wanted
to get the child out and I think the man was also trying to get out. The problem was
that the kombi’s windows were high up so they were stuck. The man put his head out
through the window and I stabbed him on the neck, he fell back inside on top of his
wife and child. So all the stones we threw fell right on top of him and his wife and
child were unhurt. We still had the two petrol bombs we had made at the cave; we
therefore intended to blow the vehicle up. I lit the cloth at the top of the bottle with a
match and threw the petrol bomb onto the kombi. There was a small flame but it
soon blew out. The man was bleeding heavily this time and there was a lot of blood
inside the car. We tried the second petrol bomb, but still there was not much of a blaze.
I resorted to using the sword again but it was just the man who was getting stabbed.
Before long we saw a car approaching, so we decided to run, going backwards on
the Umtali to Mhakwe road. We were certain that the white man was already dead.
So we saw no use of going back to the scene, but instead headed towards Nyanyadzi,
not realising that the police were on the alert. Apparently our meeting place in the
cave had already been raided and Amos was in the hands of the police. At Nyanyadzi
we went to Mrs. Kondo’s house. We got there at 8am. Here we found the children
sleeping outside and they said that their mother was in the house. We knocked at the
door and she asked who it was and I said ‘Ndangana’ and she came out quickly
wearing only a petticoat, and told me that the police were in hot pursuit and I would
soon be caught. She said that the police had been looking for me for the past two
days; she thought I had moved out of the area already. She said that we had to
leave, her husband was rather timid; she said the police had been coming and going
so it was not safe for us to stay. Most of the men had been taken in by the police. She
would have driven us out of the area, but there were roadblocks.44
After this act, the remainder of the group planned on leaving for Salisbury through
Fort Victoria. The police were all over the area and set up roadblocks on all the roads
leaving Nyanyadzi in search of the gang. David Dhlamini and Victor Mlambo
decided to cross the border into Mozambique, leaving behind Ndangana and Master
Mazvane to undertake the trip to Salisbury on their own. Dhlamini and Mlambo
were later arrested, while Ndangana and his colleague made it to Salisbury and
were smuggled
(44) Interview with Comrade William Ndangana by Prof. Bhebe, (Harare) 12 July 1984.
1994
across the Chirundu border in a container truck into Zambia. Zambia was still not
safe for them either, but the ZANU officers there (amongst them Percy Ntini, Silas
Mushonga, Chidavaenzi, and Josiah Tongogara) quickly arranged that the two be sent
to Malawi. Even in Blantyre, the Rhodesian Special Branch was still in hot pursuit
and local newspapers flashed Ndangana’s face on the front page as a wanted man.
Robert Mugabe, who had been tried in absentia while in Ghana, passed through
Malawi to meet the ZANU recruits and brief them on the arrangements he had
made for their military training there. This is how Ndangana, Noel Mukono, and
seven others found their way out of Malawi in a plane provided by Kwame
Nkrumah. They were flown to Half Assini military camp in Accra, while Mugabe
flew back to Salisbury to be thrown into prison on arrival.
Emmerson Mnangagwa, who led the other ZANU sabotage group that blew up
railway locomotives in Fort Victoria, gave his own account:
[In] 1962 when I was in Lusaka as a Youth Secretary for Lusaka constituency for
UNIP [United National Independence Party of Zambia], and ZAPU had an office in
Lusaka (there was no ZANU then) and a Mr. Nkiwane was ZAPU’s representative
then. So when the ZAPU officials came to UNIP Offices at Freedom House their
contact person was myself. I was of Zimbabwe origin, but I was a party member of
UNIP stationed at Freedom House. After ZAPU was banned, Willie Musarurwa came
to Lusaka (I am only connecting on events that will lead to Muzenda). Musarurwa
came and stayed in Lusaka. Wagoneka was then active in ZAPU in Lusaka. Nkiwane
had moved as chairman of the province and Wagoneka had taken over. He introduced
Musarurwa to me. Musarurwa recruited me into ZAPU, arguing that as a Zimbabwean
I should leave UNIP and join ZAPU and go for military training. So after elections
in 1962 in Zambia, I joined ZAPU and was sent for my military training at Iringa.
When I got to Iringa, there were two groups – one from Mashonaland and another
from Matebeleland.
…So after going to different places and countries for military training (Egypt and
China), when I came back in 1964 (when ZANU had been formed), I was told that
the legendary vaMuzenda was with ZANU. Then I knew that when I got back to
Zimbabwe for military operations, I must look for vaMuzenda.
We were given 4 names. We were told to look for vaMuzenda, Thomas Maramba in
Mvuma, Nhariwa and Solomon Marembo, and Marima who was in Bikita. We were
told that those were the people we should contact first and they would link us up with
others. We memorised those names. So we came to the country in 1964.
…As we were going to the townships, we spotted a stationary train and at that
point we were really lusting for some action. We had our dynamite we had kept for the
aircraft aborted sabotage. We had twelve sticks of them. Next to the train, there was
a group of security guards warming themselves by the fireside. My friend asked me
to crawl into the driver’s cabin of the train while he stood guard ready to shoot
should the security guard notice what was happening and tried any preventative
action. So I crept inside the train, which was partially lit by outside yellow tower
lights. I found someone sleeping inside, resting after fuelling the engine with coal.
Because of the yellow tower lights the fellow looked like a white man. I beckoned
my colleague and told him there was a white person having a nap and friend his
excitement at the chance
of killing our first white victim. So he discouraged me from using a firearm, but to
kill him with a knife. So I drew out my dagger and stood outside the fellow holding
my dagger with my right hand ready to plunge it straight into his heart. As I was
steeling myself for the act and counting down from 10 to 1 and just as I counted to 4,
the fellow woke up. When he saw the big dagger ready to descend into his heart, he
was so shaken that his bowls loosened and he soiled himself with this own
excrement and urine. I also discovered that I had nearly killed a black man. So we
left him alone and let him escape while we concentrated on blasting the train. We used
twelve sticks. I fixed them; put all the necessary caps and fuses. To avoid being
injured by bits and pieces of iron from the exploding train, we decided to take cover
in one of the culverts underneath the railway lines. We then lit the fuses which
ignited the explosives and blasted the goods train. That was the first serious act of
war in that town.
In another interview, Mnangagwa retold the story of his arrest at a ZANU
colleague’s house after allegedly being sold out by Michael Mawema. He was
sentenced to death, but was spared because of his age. Part of his duty while in
prison, however, was to carry away for burial some of the prisoners who were
hanged. He concentrated on his law degree, which was to prove useful in his role
within his party when he later moved to Zambia in the 1970s.45
So far as ZAPU was concerned, the decision to adopt the policy of confrontation,
and, by extension, the armed struggle was made well before the ZANU split of
1963, therefore putting paid one of the major reasons given by ZANU malcontents
for leaving ZAPU. This is shown by ZAPU’s commitment to send people for
military training as early as 1962. According to Dumiso Dabengwa,
We actually left the country under the auspices of the PCC. We left under the direction
of James Chikerema, who was head of the Special Affairs Department, who was
answerable only to Nkomo, who was the president at that time. We got orders from
Chikerema to leave the country and go out for better training. It is important to
remember that in terms of military training under ZAPU, that had taken place long
before the split in 1963. These had been people who had been trained, like Charles
Chikerema; I think his group must have gone training with Mphoko Gordon Buche
and others in China in 1962. I remember when they came back, some of them stayed
outside the country in Zambia, while a few of them were brought in the country to
come and teach us how to use bombs. So the military training under ZAPU started
long before 1963.46
This was a continuation of a policy already adopted by the NDP which sent the
first group of trainees to Ghana, amongst them Simon Khaya Moyo, Sihwa, and
Nziramasanga. Two more groups left for China soon thereafter. Most of them were
already involved in the sabotage operations of 1963 using explosives smuggled
from Zaire and Zambia. By 1964, ZAPU’s external wing was established in Zambia
to augment work that had been started by Willie Musarurwa. It was led by James
(45) Interview between the “Capturing a Fading National Memory” team and Comrade E. Munangagwa, (Kwekwe)
c. July 2006.
(46) Interview with Dumiso Dabengwa by Prof. Bhebe, (Bulawayo) 1 December 1989.
1994
Chikerema and Jason Moyo, and the wing was able to coordinate training and
fighting strategy more systematically. This time their attention was turned towards
the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union where Akim Ndlovu, Dumiso
Dabengwa, Ethan Dube, Edward Bhebe, Gideon Ngoshi, Joseph Nyandoro, Ambrose
Mutinhiri, and Jabulani Ncube were sent in 1964. Others were sent to Bulgaria,
China, and a few to North Korea. According to Mbulawa Moshe Noko, ZAPU was
also offered training facilities in Egypt, and, in November 1964, Algeria followed
suit, accepting a total of 120 recruits, 18 of whom would be trained as officers. In
1966, Cuba joined the fray of training ZIPRA cadres following an agreement
reached at the Tri-Continental Conference. Thereafter, more centralised training
facilities were established in Tanzania through an OAU scheme, involving
instructors from various OAU member states. In the 1970s, Yugoslavia and Libya
also joined, as did Ethiopia, which joined towards the end of Zimbabwe’s liberation
war. The offer from Vietnam could not be accepted since it came towards
ceasefire.47
Akim Ndlovu gave us a glimpse of his training experience in the Soviet
Union: I was one of a small group of six which trained in the Soviet Union. There
were too many reasons why countries tended to train small groups for us. One reason
was that
these countries could only train a reasonable number of people which they thought
the party could reasonably and safely handle. Such countries had to take into account
that such a party might not have a base where it could house and possibly handle its
trained cadres. There was no point in training 2000 men for a party when it couldn’t
possibly handle them.
The second consideration was that these countries had not thought of seriously
training freedom fighters together with their own freedom fighters. In many cases, the
training of freedom fighters was a separate scheme from the general training of local
armies. My personal experience fits well this description. We were not trained together
with the Soviet Union recruits. We trained as a small group and we had a different
programme of training and ours was a condensed training programme. It had to be
condensed because, had it not been, it would have taken us two years to complete, but
we did it in one year.
Our training was mainly staff and officer training, which included military training.
In fact, it had all the subjects you can think of in military science. In other words, they
gave us what they regard as fundamental in military training. The other aspect of our
training was that of budget. The countries which gave us training facilities could not
publicly allocate funds for our training because of their own and our own security. So,
small sums of money had to be secretly set aside; therefore only limited numbers could
be trained this way. Moreover these countries were training for many more countries
which were fighting the liberation wars. If you were training this side of the bush
you could safely guess there were other groups from other countries which were
under going military training also on the other side of the bush. We were of course
never mixed and so we never knew how many groups were involved.
(47) Interview with Mbulawa Moshe Noko by Prof. Bhebe, (Nyabezi Communal Lands) 29 December 1989.
Our training equipped us for both guerrilla and regular warfare, so part of our
syllabus dealt with guerrilla warfare and part of it with conventional warfare.
Because the two cannot be divorced, they are complimentary. If you are trained in
guerrilla warfare, you have to know that you are going to meet in the field an army
which is trained in conventional warfare, so that you must know the later. You have to
know the tactics and strategies, the equipment, movement, etc which are peculiar to
conventional warfare. In as much as the conventional warfare personnel has to know
guerrilla warfare because you can only fight something that you know.
By 1965, however, all those who had been sent for initial training were back, so
that nearly 40 to 60 trained ZAPU combatants were ready for deployment. But first,
they needed to deliberate on strategy:
[Some] wanted us to use the Castro method-viz, the whole group to go into the country
and start carrying operations in the country and train people inside the country, so
that we could enlarge our army that way. Others felt that no operations should be
undertaken right away. Instead, we should send few people into the country to go and
recruit more cadres in the country and bring them out for training. That process to be
continued and maintained until we had a sizeable army after which we could then start
the operations.
A third school of thought advocated for the setting up of a command system,
have rear bases and headquarters in Zambia, which would send some people into the
country, charged with the task of recruiting more cadres and where possible carry
out limited operations. This view received more support than any other view and this
was what we recommended to the leadership (James Chikerema, J.Z. Moyo, Edward
Ndlovu, Silunduka and George Nyandoro, and later Jane Ngwenya). They accepted
our recommendations and asked us to form our command structure, which we did.48
Akim Ndlovu became the first commander of this new set up, which was simply
known as the Special Affairs Department. The hierarchy was still rudimentary,
but had various offices such as Chief of Staff, Chief of Reconnaissance, and so
on. They decided on a prompt programme of action to cross into Zimbabwe and
launch operations. Dumiso Dabengwa, who was the Chief of Reconnaissance, set
about identifying points along the Zambezi between Kazungula right up to Feira,
suitable for infiltrating cadres into Zimbabwe. Initial assistance was obtained from
Zambian fishermen, who supplied dugout canoes for a small fee. Through these,
light ammunition and cadres were ferried across the Zambezi to carry out limited
operations and to identify active members of the party. According to Dabengwa,
We crossed them at the rate of two people at a time. Their task was to recruit people and
where possible carry out some limited operations. The armaments they got were
very light armaments; in certain cases a chap had just a pistol with ammunition. In
other cases, it was a small submachine gun with ammunition. This was for their
defence in case during operations they met the enemy forces who would fire at
them. Their
(48) Interview with Dumiso Dabengwa by Prof. Bhebe, (Bulawayo) 1 December 1989.
1994
mission was to get into the country, to get into certain points, to certain people whom
we knew were still active members of the party; get to them and work with them on
recruiting and sending people outside.49
By the summer of 1965, much of the groundwork had been done and so too had the
number of recruits increased. ZAPU felt confident to send into the Mana Pools area
two groups, which went in two separate ways via Chirundu and the area east of the
Victoria Falls. Although relatively few in number (each group not exceeding a
section or 8 men each), they had instructions to identify targets and launch surprise
attacks and retreat into the wild bush. The Chirundu group was exposed to the
enemy due to the unsuitability of the terrain of the Zambezi escarpment; they were
also unable to make quick contact with the local population which was sparsely
distributed in this area. A number of them were killed or captured, but a few made
it back and established contact with the other group. The Falls group was successful
in crossing and infiltrating the local population, but grew complacent and was
exposed by local informers. They were also attacked and lost some men. ZAPU
considered these operations a strategic failure, which forced them to rethink.
1965-1970
ZAPU’s New Strategy: ‘The Castro Approach’ of 1966
In 1966, a new strategy was proposed taking into account the previous mistakes.
First, ZAPU refocused its energies on consolidating all its trained personnel and re-
training all those trained abroad to adapt to the demands of the local war situation.
After this, the cadres would be deployed according to the ‘Castro Approach’, i.e.
deploying as many men as possible who would work quietly inside the country
recruiting and carrying out local training. They would then only go into specific
military action after reporting back to the Headquarters in Lusaka indicating their
readiness to do so.50
The first part of the programme, according to Mbulawa Noko, was to take out
of hiding those trained personnel in the various villages, farms, and private houses,
and bring them together under one command structure to spell out an operational
plan. The second part was a consideration influenced by the ongoing negotiations
between ZAPU and the South African ANC to undertake joint military operations.
Noko reveals:
We began to regroup our forces at Nkomo Camp, which was in a farm of one of the
supporters called Matyenyika Ndlovu. He was roughly 25km from Lusaka. This is
where our first big group was assembled and it was later mixed together for a thorough
rehearsal with the ANC. This was the joint group which later on crossed into Zimbabwe
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid.
in 1967, through Wankie with the instructions that they were going to penetrate into the
country as deep as possible, before they broke apart into smaller units and also to give
the necessary cover for the ANC Umkonto we Sizwe as it proceeded to South
Africa.51
The chapter returns to the ANC/ZAPU activities at a later stage, but first it should be
emphasized that all these military activities were, in part, a product of the mutation
and transformation of the nationalist struggle into a revolutionary armed struggle. It
was also a bold reaction to the hardened position assumed by the Rhodesian Front
symbolised by the UDI. The other implications of the UDI to the general socio-
political situation obtaining in Rhodesia and how this in-turn influenced
developments thereafter are also worth considering.
The UDI: International and Local Implications
Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 had serious international
implications for indeed the key matter became its recognition. The legality of the
matter rested with the mother country, Britain, whose immediate response, in tandem
with the United Nations Security Council, was to declare sanctions, a total ban on
trade with Rhodesia, and an oil embargo. The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson,
hoped to end the rebellion“within months, if not weeks”through economic sanctions,
rather than by military force. This failed to bring down the rebel regime as expected,
but instead gave way to long drawn out negotiations on warships (Tiger 1966 and
Fearless 1968) and emissaries shuttling on endless missions between London and
Salisbury. In the end, this process succeeded in softening Britain’s hard line stance,
providing the Rhodesians with guarantees of military non-intervention, giving way
to an increasing tendency by Britain to bend over backwards to appease the same
rebels it was meant to contain.52 Naturally the RF felt more confident to proceed with
its plans than ever before, especially given that some of its sanctions-busting
projects were paying dividends. The result was the 1969 Republican Constitution.
British policy largely shaped that of other western nations. The USA, which
was nursing wounds from its nearly disastrous foreign policy in Vietnam and the
Dominican Republic, was keen to compensate for this on the domestic scene by
improving race relations. In his speeches, the outspoken Afro-American activist,
Malcolm X, linked American racism to the US support for white supremacist
regimes in southern Africa. The connection was not helped by the fact that Malcolm
X was assassinated a week after a speech he made in London advocating for the
overthrow of Ian Smith.53 If it imposed sanctions, the USA stood to lose nearly
20% of the high quality chrome ore that it imported from Rhodesia, which would
mean a heavy reliance on Soviet chrome at the peak of the Cold War. According to
Andrew DeRoche, President Lyndon Johnson developed no concrete plan
towards Smith
(52) Moorcraft, P. A Short Thousand Years: The End of Rhodesia’s Rebellion. Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1979: See p.24.
(53) DeRoche, A. Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe 1953-1998. Asmara: Africa World
Press, 2001: See p.104.
1994
and the UDI except to follow behind and offer diplomatic support for British
policy. This set the tone for future American policy towards Rhodesia, until the
more active interventionism of the Kissinger years discussed below. Meanwhile,
another economic factor made America even more anxious; the inclination of the
Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda to participate fully in the sanctions against
Rhodesia, which in practice would halt the flow of copper (if Smith’s channels via
South Africa were to be closed in retaliation) and raise the price of copper, which
was badly needed in the USA. Such a price increase would force the American
market to turn to aluminium, a move that would further distort the market price of
copper, even in Zambia itself. After a threat by African leaders to sever ties with
Britain and their self-evident act of walking out in protest when Harold Wilson
addressed the UN General Assembly, the USA supported an oil embargo against
Rhodesia by providing planes to airlift oil for Zambia until the country built a
pipeline from Dar es Salaam to the Copperbelt in 1968.54 These actions were
designed to protect US interests in Zambian copper. From 1969, the policy went a
step further when the new Nixon administration introduced exceptions to the ban
on minerals that could be imported from Rhodesia; chief amongst these were
petalite (a rare lithium-bearing mineral) and chrome, controlled by a US company,
Union Carbide, with an 80% stake in Rhodesian chrome. The 1971 Byrd
Amendment allowed for the importation into the USA of “any strategic mineral
being imported from a communist country”55. This way the USA renewed its
imports of chrome, nickel, and other materials from Rhodesia. Subsequent US
policy towards Rhodesia was informed by other unfolding regional and international
developments affecting US relations with other countries, in particular the ‘Tar
Baby’ option which envisaged the longevity of white rule in southern Africa, while
at the same time recognising nationalist aspirations for self-rule, and détente or
ceasefire as it was being implemented by the USA towards the Soviet Union. Henry
Kissinger, the Secretary of State under the Gerald Ford administration, was to fully
pursue this policy.56
In other western countries, several factors worked in favour of the African
nationalist struggle in Rhodesia. In Germany, the Berlin Wall had gone up on 13
August 1961, dividing West Germany and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
along capitalist and socialist lines respectively. In its search for new friends and in
its desire to secure a peace treaty between the allied powers of the second World
War and the two German states, the GDR saw African liberation movements as
important allies. It therefore set up a solidarity committee and went on to open an
‘Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the GDR in the United Arab
Republic’ in Egypt to facilitate links with the liberation movements. Initial contacts
were established with the ANC in Rhodesia and later its successor, the NDP,
resulting in the first visit to the GDR by the NDP vice-president, Morton
Malianga, in April
(54) Ibid. pp. 124, 126, 128.

(55) Ibid. p.171.
(56) Moorcraft. A Short Thousand Years: See pp.38-39.
1961. With time, however, the growing conflict in the‘world revolutionary

movement’ between the USSR and the Eastern Block countries on the one hand and
China on the other meant that the GDR’s assistance became more directed to ZAPU,
rather than to its splinter movement ZANU, which leaned toward China.57
In the Nordic countries, the response was quite varied. Sweden’s official position
on sanctions in general and support for Zimbabwean liberation movements in
particular was dictated by the UN Declaration on Decolonisation of December 1960,
which made the ‘Rhodesian question’ part of the larger independence process in
Africa engendered by this declaration. More significantly, in May 1969, the
Swedish Parliament endorsed a unilateral decision to support African liberation
movements, and, the following month, ZANU became the first beneficiary in
southern Africa of its humanitarian assistance.58 With time its relationship with
other movements grew enough to make Sweden the leading Nordic supporter of
Zimbabwean liberation. Meanwhile, Norwegian support changed with successive
governments. The Liberal- Conservative party, which ruled Norway from 1965 to
1971, showed as little interest in developments in Rhodesia as in those within
Europe itself. It dragged its feet in
implementing the sanctions. On its side was the far right socialist party, the Anders
Lange’s party formed in 1973 which subscribed to the laissez-faire view that trade
should not be restricted in anyway, hence its sympathies for the Rhodesian regime.
When Smith declared the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, Sweden
and Finland immediately broke ties with the Rhodesian government, but Norway
waited. It followed upon the US principle, which resulted in the unilateral lifting
of sanctions on Rhodesian chrome in 1973. Under these circumstances, Norway
maintained its honorary consulate in Salisbury. On the other side of the political
spectrum, Finn Gunstavsen, representing the Socialist People’s Party, was the
single most important advocate for majority rule in Rhodesia.59 More generally
anti-imperialist opinions and direct anti-Rhodesian sentiments were expressed by
specific individuals within the Norwegian government, all of which culminated
in the UN/OAU conference on the African liberation struggle held in Oslo in
1973. At this conference the Norwegian government, for the first time, called for
applications from the liberation movements for funds, although in practice Norway
never ceased to stress the importance of finding peaceful solutions for Rhodesia.
By 1974, the first tranche of money amounting to 200,000 Kronor was released to
be shared equally between ZAPU and ZANU; by 1979, the figure had increased to
nearly 8,000,000 Kronor.60
(57) Schleicher, H.G. and I. Schleicher. Special Flights: The GDR and Liberation Movements in Southern Africa.
Harare: SAPES Books, 1998: See pp.92-95.
(58) Sellstrom, T. Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Volume II: Solidarity and Assistance 1970-
1994. See pp.153, 156.
(59) Lorenz, W. “Norway and ‘Rhodesia’: 1965-1980.” L.T. Eriksen, ed. Norway and National Liberation in Southern
Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikanstitutet, 2000. See p.180.
(60) Ibid. p.183. Only one grant was made to the Muzorewa led ANC in 1977.
1994
Finland was less ambivalent. In the years before 1973, the Finnish government
did not seek to be involved with liberation movements in southern Africa. It had
kept a low profile in its international policy since joining the UN in 1956. Instead,
it was the Finnish civil society that took the lead in calling for action against human
rights abuses in southern Africa. Finland fulfilled the trade embargo obligations
determined by the UN, and passed a law forbidding trade with Rhodesia in 1967.
It stood to lose nothing since its trade relations with Rhodesia were negligible
anyway. Finland resolved to maintain a ‘do not disturb’ policy, which emphasised that
Finland was not supposed to be involved in world politics, especially in matters
that could jeopardise trading relations with other super powers. It therefore treated
the Rhodesian question as an internal issue.61 Indeed, when ZAPU sought support
from Finland in 1972, the answer was that the Finnish government did not support
violent activities. The Finnish government had not reached the decision of principle
at the time and no aid to any liberation movement was authorised. ZANU and the
ANC requested funds several times, but nothing materialised.62
The Rhodesian Response to International Sanctions, 1965-1970s
The Rhodesians did not take these international developments lying down.
Immediate and long term measures were taken promptly to ensure survival under
the socio-political circumstances. As mentioned already, the British hoped to
use sanctions to bring the Rhodesian rebels to book in a short while. Much of the
responsibility for sanctions-busting was borne by the Rhodesian Air Force which
often employed‘devious means’to overcome most of the challenges brought to
bear.63 By the early 1970s, sanctions-busting was a fully established part of local
industrial growth in which the Rhodesian government invested a lot of resources.
However, much credit should be given to Jack V. Malloch, the owner of a successful
Rhodesian private airline company Air Trans-Africa (Pvt) Ltd, which began with
only one aircraft, a Douglas DC7 CF built from cannibalising two such aircraft.
Through its primary role as a sanctions-busting machine, Malloch went on to build up
a fleet of six aircraft, amongst them, long range cargo planes. These, coupled with the
fleet already in the possession of the Rhodesian Air Force, rendered sanctions
ineffective even with the withdrawal of South African air support in the mid 1970s
under increasing diplomatic pressure from the USA.
The Rhodesian Air Force adopted various guises so as to conceal the operations
of Malloch’s aircraft. Due to the fact that the name Air Trans-Africa was already
known outside Rhodesia, they used other names as alternatives. One was Affretair
registered in Libreville, the capital of Gabon; the other was Cargoman, set up in
(61) Soiri, I. and P. Peltola. Finland and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Uppsala: Nodiska Afrkainstitutet,
1999. See p.135.
(62) Ibid. p.134.
(63) Cowderoy, D. and R.C. Nesbit. War in the Air: Rhodesian Air Force 1935-1980. Alberton: Galago Publishing
Ltd, 1987: See p.85.
Muscat, a major town on the Arabian Gulf, with their offices in the suburb of Seeb.
These networks were also extended to Oman, known to have little sympathies for
southern African liberation movements after what they perceived as the takeover of
Zanzibar by Tanzania.
With the assistance of Jack Malloch, the Rhodesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
established a low key diplomatic presence in Libreville and later on in Abidjan.
This presence, according to Henrick Ellert, led to the Rhodesians getting orders
for planeloads of beef, clothing, textiles, shoes, and fresh produce going through
Libreville.64 Rhodesian beef, rated far much higher than Scottish beef, was the
major export, which was supported by various veterinary certificates issued in
Swaziland, supplied through a contact in that country.65 Other exports included
oranges, grapefruit, and vegetables, some of which were grown on the estate at
Mazoe, which was run by the British South Africa Company using the most
modern techniques. A greater quantity of these fruits came from the new estates in
Chiredzi in the Sabi Valley, where citrus was grown under irrigation on a large
scale. The fruit was
stamped with the trade names ‘Outspan’ or‘Jaffa’, depending on which name was more
favoured in the country of destination. Willard’s potato crisps were also exported to
the Arab world. Tobacco, even though it was a major export, was transported by
rail or road to South Africa and by sea to the wholesalers. This high quality Virginia
blend was in demand by manufacturers throughout the world, particularly in
Britain. Jack Malloch’s fleet also provided large scale logistic support to the
Biafrans during the Nigerian civil war. The Rhodesians capitalised on this
opportunity to benefit from Nigerian petroleum products.66
The Intensification of the Struggle after the UDI

The 1966 ZANLA Chinhoyi Battle
The ‘Chinhoyi Battle’ in April 1966, involving seven Zanla freedom fighters killed in
a pitched battle with Rhodesian forces near Sinoia, features prominently in
Zimbabwe’s popular memory of the war. Described by Martin and Johnson as the
deepest penetration in this phase by any guerrilla group, the battle took place near
the town of Sinoia on 28 April 1966.67 The group had been infiltrated into the
country as part of a gang of about 20. They were supposed to divide into three
teams. According to Cowderoy and Nesbit, two of the teams were ordered to cut
power lines and attack white farmers. The third was to attack and occupy the small
town of Sinoia.68 One of the first two teams killed a white farmer and his wife,
Mr. and Mrs. Viljoen.
(64) Ellert, H. The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-insurgency and guerrilla warfare 1962-1980. Gweru: Mambo
Press, 1993: See p.163.
(65) Ibid.
(66) Ibid.
(67) Martin, D. and P. Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe. London: Monthly Review Press, 1981: See p.10.
(68) Cowderoy, D. and R.C. Nesbit. War in the Air: Rhodesian Air Force 1935-1980. Alberton RSA: Galago, 1987:
See p.43.
1994
Both of these teams attempted to blow up a number of electricity pylons without
much success. Eventually an informer betrayed their presence to the BSAP and all
the men were arrested.69 The other group, consisting of Simon Chimbodza, Godwin
Manyerenyere, Christopher Chatambudza, Nathan Charumuka, Ephraim Shenjere,
David Guzuzu, and another one only identified as Peter, made a camp on a farm
owned by Noel Edwards.70 Two of the freedom fighters went into Chinhoyi village
to contact a ZANU official. They made several such visits, but, in the end, their
presence was betrayed by an undercover police man.71
It is interesting to note how the Rhodesians responded to this incursion as a purely
police matter, which did warrant a military reaction. The Commissioner of Police
did not even ask or consider asking for assistance from the army. He did, however,
call on the Royal Rhodesian Air Force to assist. On 27 April 1966, four helicopters
of 7-Squadron were called out to assist the police during the operation. Two were
given immediate tasks, while the other two were put on standby. These were
civilian versions of the Alouette III mounted with a MAG 7,62mm machinegun, the
standard NATO gun manufactured in Belgium and firing 850 rounds per minute.72
This superior firepower, coupled with the fact that the freedom fighters’ plan had
already been given away, made them an easy target for the Rhodesian police, who
shot them to the last man.
The Chinhoyi battle, despite being a failure, overshadows all previous armed
activities, including contacts by ZIPRA commandos with Rhodesian Forces in
Nkayi Reserve the previous month.73 It appears ZIPRA had begun well before
1965 to secretly deploy military personnel in the country. The battle’s popularity
is practically a product of Rhodesian publicity as much as ZANU took advantage
of this to declare formal entry into the battlefield. However, the collections by Kees
Maxey and the Fabian Bureau papers show evidence that, in July and August and
later in September of the same year, ZAPU infiltrated four and six groups
respectively through the northeast at Gonono, splitting at Mt. Darwin to go to
Mtoko and Salisbury; all were intercepted and arrested, and their trials were well
recorded in the Rhodesian Herald.74
The 1967 ZAPU/ANC ‘Wankie/Spolilo Campaigns’
As mentioned earlier, ZAPU’s new strategy involved retraining and regrouping
its forces in the context of its negotiations with the ANC of South Africa. The
leaders of the two parties decided to pool their forces together to confront the
alliance
(69) Ibid., p.43.

(70) Martin and Johnson, p.10.
(71) Ellert, H. The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-insurgency and guerrilla warfare in 1962 -1980. Gweru: Mambo
Press, 1993: See p.11.
(72) This is the weapon that was to wreck havoc amongst the freedom fighters of the 1970s; it was popularly known
as the ‘NATO’.
(73) Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 21421.
(74) Maxey, Kees. The Fight for Zimbabwe: The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI. London: Rex
Collings, 1975: See p.58, 60.
between South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal in Mozambique. Oliver Tambo and
James Chikerema made it very clear that they shared common enemies, a situation
which required liberation movements in southern Africa to form a joint front. Under
the auspices of this alliance, ZAPU and the ANC launched two major campaigns
into the Wankie and Spolilo areas in 1967. The details of this campaign have been
well elaborated in The Road to Democracy in South Africa.75 Other scholars who
have analysed these campaigns have described them as yet another lesson in
strategic failure.76 Naturally, those involved tend to blame each other for the
shortcomings. The following account presents the ZAPU side of the story.
In 1967, our aim was to send a large group of men into the western part of the
country, who would then split into smaller units of one section each and spread out
into the western part of the country. As we were working on that strategy, the ANC
came in and said look we are having problems sending our men through Botswana;
they got intercepted, arrested, and turned back. Moreover, we are now aware that the
South African forces are assisting the Rhodesians in tracking your own guerrillas
and we don’t see any reason why we should not send in our men through the fighting
zone of Zimbabwe. If they get involved in any clashes, they will be clashing with the
South African forces. Rather than clash with them in South Africa, they might first
as well clash with them as they enter the Rhodesian territory. So they asked if they
could send a unit of their men with our men with the purpose of going with our men
right up to the South African Border, so that they could cross the Limpopo into their
own country. In other words, they were asking for transit facilities. This was negotiated
with the leadership and the leadership gave a green light. Comrade Chikerema said
he didn’t see any reason why they shouldn’t be given a transit facility. We then
worked out a programme and sent these men. It was a platoon, which is about 30
ANC men, and the rest were ZAPU guerrillas. ZAPU sent in about two platoons,
that when they got to the Park they were to separate into small units with some
spreading out into the Wankie Communal area, a group going through to the Lupane
Area, another group would move with the ANC men and remain in Tsholotsho, and
the last group, which was destined for Kezi and Gwanda, was going to proceed with
the ANC and see them through right up to Limpopo and then come back to their
operational areas. And they would choose to operate in Kezi, Gwanda, or Beitbridge:
this was a matter of detail which they had the liberty to decide on.
The ZAPU unit was supposed, therefore, to be split into four: one group in Hwange
Area, the 2nd group proceeding to Lupane, and the 3rd group in the Tsholotsho area,
and the 4th group based in the Gwanda area, that is this group that was going to see
the ANC platoon across the Limpopo. They would remain in their sections of about
two each with about fifteen men in each area. The instructions from the headquarters
to these men were again to recruit, to train locally or inside the country, and wherever
possible they were to look for targets which were within their means of attack and the
(75) Ranilala, Rendani Moses et.al. “Chapter 12: The Wankie and Spolilo Campaigns.” SADET. The Road to
Democracy in South Africa. Pretoria: Zebra Press, 2004.
(76) Bhebe, N. The ZAPU and ZANU Guerilla Warfare and the Evanglical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe. Gweru:
Mambo, 1999.
1994
targets should be away from their bases, which they could hit and disappear and travel
perhaps for two days to their bases, so that they didn’t give the enemy the opportunity
to start looking for them in the areas where the attack would have been made.
They had fared very well, until they started separating into these small units,
when unfortunately some people became careless. For instance the ANC comrade
said he is not prepared to move into Johannesburg, in South Africa, and he was
going to the road, either to stop a car or do anything to secure that car in order to use
it to travel to the border of Zimbabwe and South Africa. At this border he would
abandon the car, cross the border. How he did this we don’t know. But this particular
comrade got a lift and his weapons so that they were not seen by the owners of this
car, and managed to go as far as Bulawayo. In Bulawayo, he stole a motorcycle
which he was going to use to travel to Plumtree border post. However the owner of
the motor cycle raised the alarm by reporting the disappearance of his property to the
police. The police started looking for the motorcycle and to set roadblocks on the
roads leading to the border areas and the comrade was intercepted. He exchanged
fire with the police, but was overwhelmed and captured by the Rhodesian police.
Some of the men became careless and left foot prints in the Wankie Game
Reserve and the game ranchers spotted the footprints and immediately reported to the
security forces. This led to an encounter in the national park. A big fight took place
there. There were heavy loses on both sides. The enemy lost substantially, and we
also sustained heavy losses. Most of our men then scattered out. A number of them
led by J. Dube (he was one of the commanders) thought the situation was too much
for them and decided to cross over to Botswana together with the ANC comrades
and to stay there so that they could map out the fourth strategy of how to get back
into the country. But in the process of doing that, they ran into the Botswana police,
who stopped them. And our instruction to our own forces was that they should never
have any confrontation with the Botswana police.
So when they were asked by the Botswana police to stop and surrender their weapons,
they did so sheepishly as per instruction from the headquarters. They were arrested
and had to spend some time in the Botswana prisons. Some of the men who escaped
from the Wankie battle went into the communal areas, where they disappeared into
the rural population and lay low for sometime after hiding their ammunition. Later on,
they were able to communicate with us in Zambia.
At the beginning of 1968, our next strategy was to do a similar operation in the north
eastern parts of the country. This time it was through the Mana Pools area. Again we
had almost a similar contingent as the last one and still with a platoon of ANC friends
who were in transit to the Limpopo. This operation was actually more successful
than the Wankie one because we were more prepared for it. By way of preparation,
our reconnaissance team plus a few of our comrades actually including those of the
ANC crossed with the men and went to stay with the men for three months inside the
country. We pushed through right up the Spolilo area. Lots of ammunition was taken
in and lots of stores of food and clothing were taken in. The idea this time was that
these men were going on a similar mission as that of the last group, but they had to
recruit on a bigger scale and they had a better rear base created for them so that they
should not rely only on the local population. But that they should have a stronger back
of food, arms, etc. So we created a lot of ammunition dumps in the area, right from the
Zambezi up to almost Spolilo Escarpment. We went on pushing in and it was going
to be a continuous exercise, in which we on the Zambian side would continue to send

in supplies and we had already mapped out areas for storage. All the fighting people
needed to do was to send back their men to come and get what had been put in the
stores. It was going to be a continuous plan and it was well thought out.
Again the same mistakes as happened before were committed. The men had started
spreading out into various areas where they had been instructed. For instance, there
was a group supposed to go to the Kariba area, we had a group commanded for Bindura
area, a group which was to go to Chinhoyi (including the Msengezi area), and we had
a group which was to move in the Mazoe area where we thought there would be good
targets.
The groups had started splitting up, so that the Bindura group had started moving
to its areas and the Kariba group was in the process of moving to its area. But two
comrades went into the Hunyani River and when they came back, they forgot to cover
their footprints. The footprints were those of the famous eight, when you stepped on
the ground it left a mark shaped almost like the figure 8. The game ranchers who were
patrolling the area saw the footprints and they decided to follow the track of the prints.
When they approached the base, they saw the terrible and massive weaponry. They saw
anti-aircraft weapons, which were all trailed around the camp. So they went back and
raised the alarm.
On that day, the Rhodesian television called upon every territorial member to
report to base and the Rhodesians mounted all the arsenals they could lay their hands
on. Gunships, helicopters, spatter planes, etc and the following day they prepared to
attack when our men were completely unaware that they were spotted by the enemy.
But when the commander of the base noticed the helicopter which kept on hovering
around them, they realised that they had been spotted. At that stage he decided that
spreading the men out would not be the most appropriate thing to do. He decided at
any rate to send some smaller units away. He decided that the main unit, which was the
strongest comprising of eighty men, remain at the base. They evacuated their shelters,
which they had been using and did not destroy them, but left some smoking fire
going on to give the impression that they were still inside the shelters. They retreated
backwards, almost 5 km, having worked out that the enemy would mount his attack
from the front. They took positions ready to defend the base. Towards afternoon the
enemy came.
First the bombers came and they showered the camp with bombs. The shelters
were destroyed to shreds while the trees around were cut into pieces, and they did not
realise they were bombing empty shelters, which had been evacuated. Soon after that
the ground forces came in to carry out some moping up operations, but as they came
through and moved through the base, they soon realised that the base was empty.
It was only then that they noticed the footprints which were left deliberately clearly
marked so that they could pursue the freedom fighters to their well defended positions.
As the enemy got nearer, the freedom fighters initiated the attack and fierce fighting
ensued, during which our men accounted very well for themselves. We realised some
substantial loses on the side of the enemy. When it got dusk, it was time to carry
out a prepared plan of escape. The commander had already issued instructions on
evacuation and how they would spread out into smaller groups. So the whole of that
night they carried out that strategy and moved in smaller groups into various areas. But
the enemy had launched almost the whole battalion and they were bombing the whole
1994
of that area, with helicopters, with armoured vehicles, etc, so that a number of men fell
into enemy ambushes. Some of them got captured, others got killed, but some of them
managed to break through the enemy lines and to shelter among the rural people. They
remained there for a long time and up to 1969, we were still getting communication
from our men telling us that they were still sheltering with the rural people. They were
telling us of their running out of ammunition and that they were staying low, so that
if you want to contact us we are at such and such points. So the Spolilo operations
were stretching into 1969. So those were our two experiences and big operations in the
1960s, which we carried out in conjunction with our ANC colleagues who were
seeking routes through Zimbabwe to South Africa. At that stage, it was felt at the
headquarters in Lusaka that our strategy needed reconsideration with a view to
making corrections of our mistakes of army, to also look at our recruitment and
personnel strength. It was at that stage, that differences began to arise within the
leadership. J.Z. Moyo within the executive raised up some criticism about the way
certain operations were carried out, and unfortunately Chikerema wouldn’t listen to
those criticisms and replied by taking decision to suspend all those who raised
criticism against him.
We certainly did have that in our training. We were taught how to organise the
masses in order to rally them in support of the liberation struggle. And this we did
from the early stages of the war. Our men were only able to get assistance from the
population, to be supplied food by the population, to be accorded safe conduct through
out this movement, to be able to get information about enemy forces, and in certain
places to be able to be accommodated by the population and made the people aware of
the need and the necessity to assist the war effort. So we did politicise the masses.
Of course, to a very large extent when we got to the people, we found that they had
long been politicised.
We did not want and as ZAPU we avoided trying to bring the ideological question
to the population. We decided to leave that to the political leadership. We thought that
it would be wrong for us at that stage to start discussing seriously issues like
socialism or ideological concepts of that nature with the population. All we did was
to tell them about our appreciation of what socialist countries were doing, how they
had organised their social-economic life, but without pushing it too hard on the
people.
‘The Temporary Lull’ or Is It?
Retired General Zvinavashe has complained about historians who have continuously
perpetuated the erroneous view that after the ‘Chinhoyi’ and ‘Wankie and Spolilo’
battles, hostilities ceased. His view is that such a presentation of the struggle
ignores, not only the many campaigns ZAPU and ZANU launched across the
Zambezi into colonial Rhodesia during the late sixties up to 1970, but also pays very
little attention to the enormous recruitment efforts the two parties mounted in both
Zambia and Rhodesia in order to replenish their forces. Relating his own personal
life in Zambia and his eventual entry into the struggle, Gen. Zvinavashe drew
attention to the large population of people in Zambia at the time, who had moved
there as a result of the Central African Federation and to evade the UDI. These
formed the bulk of the first recruits normally press-ganged into the fledgling
guerrilla armies. Report Mphoko, a member of the first ZIPRA High Command has
availed an authoritative
account which details ‘Operation Chikuwa’, a strategy used to recruit in Zambia in

the early 1960s:
When ZAPU was preparing for the major military offensives in Wankie, it was felt that
personnel for reinforcements were not enough, and very few people were joining the
liberation army. The command then decided on forced conscription of Zimbabwean
nationals based in Zambia. The recruitment drive was code named ‘operation
chikuwa’ (a Swahili word, ‘take’). The Operation was spread throughout the
Zambian Copperbelt, Lusaka, Mubwa, and the Southern Provinces, led by selected
commanders. My sector of operation was around Lusaka, including Kamwala,
Mandevu, and Kafue. In my team there was an old district party organiser called
Kenneth Nyamupingidze, who knew most Zimbabweans in Lusaka; because he once
worked with Amos Ngwenya in the province, Moffat Sikhosana, who was an
instructor in Morogoro training camp in Tanzania; and Mncedisi, a Morogoro
graduate. Nyamupingidze pointed at a certain house in Mandevu belonging to a Mr.
Kingstone. Operation Chikuwa was already the talk of town. When Nyamupingidze
knocked the door, Kingstone responded in Nyanja ‘Ni Ndani?’….Kulipe Kingstone
Apa’.
We insisted that he should open the door. He then shouted ‘Kawalala Kuno’.
Normally in Zambia, if a Kawalala cry is made, neighbours come in no time to mete
out instant justice, but because they were aware of ‘Operation Chikuwa’, Kingstone
could not be assisted.77
ZANU had secured a base in Zambia in 1965 at a farm, a few kilometres out of
Lusaka, but also suffered a shortage of recruits. It frequently turned to the
Zimbabweans in Zambia, who had settled to a successful peasant life in the
Mumbwa area. There were very few volunteers and, like ZAPU, ZANU resorted to
conscription or luring students to Zimbabwe with false promises of scholarships.78
ZANU apparently capitalised on the ‘break up’ of ZIPRA after the ‘Wankie-Spolilo
Campaign’ disaster, which saw the desertion of a number of recruits suspicious of
the negligent leadership of the ‘old- style’politicians in ZAPU.79 In addition to this,
there was a group of intelligentsia based at the University of Zambia who operated
study groups under the auspices of ZANU, amongst them Dzingai Mutumbuka, Fay
Chung, Simbi Mubako, and Sam Geza.
Returning to Gen. Zvinavashe’s assertion, the impression of a cessation of
hostilities goes against the large number of trials of guerrillas intercepted by
Rhodesian Forces in this period. The Rhodesian Herald carried reports of not less
than fifteen cases of guerrilla groups between 1968 and 1969. In December 1969,
ten trained ZANLA guerrillas infiltrated the Zambezi to undertake recognisance
exercises, which they
reported back after a month to Lusaka. By July 1970, some of these guerrillas were
attached to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), operating in
the Tete Province, including amongst others Mayor Urimbo and Justin Chauke.80
(77) Mphoko, Phelekezela (Report). “The Joint Military Command: Mbeya Tanzania March 1972 and the
Zimbabwe People’s Army, September 1975.” Unpublished mimeo.
(78) Josiah Tungamirai, a victim of this trick, describes his experience in detail in Makari, C. Magamba
eChimurenga: Josiah Tungamirai. Gweru: Mambo Press, 2003. See Chapter 10.
(79) Chung, F. Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. See p.78.
(80) Martin, D. and P. Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe. London: Monthly Review Press, 1981: See pp.26-27.
1994
ZAPU delivered some very important military achievements in January 1970. On
the 3rd of January, ZAPU freedom fighters attacked a patrol boat full of Rhodesian
security forces in the Zambezi River.81 Although the exact number of officers
killed in this incident was unknown, the boat and some of the dead bodies were
reportedly still floating on the river on 19th.82 ZAPU forces once again ambushed a
contingent of Rhodesian troops in the arid and rocky Makuti region, killing at least
three and wounding several others. In a short while, ZAPU guerrillas raided a
military camp and an airport in the Victoria Falls - Wankie area and killed 13
whites; eight of these were killed at the military camp and five at the airport.83 The
raids were conducted simultaneously. The airport raid also resulted in two
helicopters and one light airplane being damaged. Pretoria again quickly reacted to
Smith’s calls for help and dispatched more military personnel to Rhodesia to help
those already serving there. This time, Vorster flew 700 troops to Bulawayo, whence
they were sent forward to the affected areas.
On January 21st, a contingent of ZAPU guerrillas ambushed a Rhodesian troop
vehicle northwest of Bulawayo, killing seven.84 Three days later, another
Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) truck was ambushed in the same area, killing four
RF troops on board, including the platoon commander, A.J. Brading.85 Many more
members of this platoon were wounded and were left by some of their colleagues,
who disappeared into the thick forests. More contacts were reported southwest of
Salisbury on January 26th and at Kadoma on the 29th.86
Most of these activities have gone unrecorded, giving the impression that nothing
was happening. Indeed James Chikerema was getting overconfident regarding this
initial success, to the point of bringing film crews in the Zambezi to capture some
of these activities on location. This action became the basis of the differences that
brought about the ZAPU Crisis and the subsequent splits of 1971.
1970-1975
The ZAPU Internal Crisis and FROLIZI, 1970-72
The internal crisis in ZAPU occurred in the wider context of the detention of most
political leaders during the late 1960s and 1970s. Actual events leading to the crisis
arose, as some allege, from the ANC/ZAPU alliance in which James Chikerema
emerged not only isolated, but also answerable only unto himself, bypassing party
protocol. Apparently, the source of the conflict appears to have emerged during the
joint ZAPU/ANC campaigns when Chikerema invited a BBC television crew to
film the freedom fighters while crossing the Zambezi River, a move which exposed
them
(81) Zimbabwe Review, Vol.2, No.3/4, 1970.

(82) Ibid.
(83) Ibid.
(84) Ibid.
(85) Ibid.
(86) Ibid.
to positive identification by the Smith regime. There have been strong suggestions that
the emergent divisions were deeply tribal, culminating in three splinter factions: the
‘Dengeze’group loyal to Jason Moyo, the‘Murehwa Society’loyal to James
Chikerema, and the ‘Soul Brothers’, a non-aligned group. A group led by Walter
Mthimkulu, Matsikidze Gutu, and Gershom Pangwana resolved to arrest the
squabbling parties, resulting in mayhem that earned them the name Mhondi
(killers). This group was disarmed by the Zambian police, and everybody was sent to
Mboroma Camp, divided according to their specific groups. It was here that
Chikerema also dissolved the existing party National Executive Committee,
demoting J.Z. Moyo from Treasurer General to a farm manager. This sealed his fate
as widespread opposition to his leadership of the party grew. As a result of this
crisis, Report Mphoko recalls:
...all combat operations in Rhodesia were suspended. ZAPU was not allowed by the
Zambian government, at the request of James Chikerema, to bring into Zambia its
recruits from Botswana on transit up north for military training. Trained personnel
from up north were not allowed entry into Zambia en route to Rhodesia. ZAPU was
not allowed to handle or transport weapons of war on the Zambian soil.
The recruits who were already in Zambia were deported back to Rhodesia, including
people like Nicholas Nkomo and others. On arrival in Rhodesia, the deportees were
subjected to severe police and Special Branch interrogation under torture with offers
and options made to them. In the group of recruits that were deported to Rhodesia were
two trained guerrillas, who operated during the Wankie operations. They included Voil
Kophotsha and Ngcobo. On arrival in Rhodesia, the two were immediately arrested,
tried, and sentenced to death.
Chikerema, with the help of the Mtimkulu group, succeeded in arresting most of
the members of the ZAPU Executive and throwing them into detention at Mboroma,
where they were not allowed by the Zambian government to move to town except
to hospital. By then, however, Chikerema was still not able to take full control of the
weaponry located in various armouries known only to the imprisoned executive
members. He enlisted the support of Elias Katambi, the Zambian Commissioner of
Police, and launched a series of operations to recover these weapons both within
Zambia and from the operational areas in Rhodesia, but was unsuccessful.87
Meanwhile, Chikerema had been involved in unity talks with ZANU. However,
ZANU’s Secretary for External Affairs issued a press statement announcing that his
party had discontinued the talks until such a time as ZAPU had resolved its internal
conflict. Nathan Shamuyarira and others then resigned from ZANU and, together
with James Chikerema and Stanley Parirehwa, formed the Front for the Liberation
of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) on 1 October 1971. Other executive members included
Godfrey Savanhu, Tshinga Dube, Lovemore Chihota, and George Nyandoro. Shelton
Siwela, a Boston University graduate led the new party initially, but a few months
later he and Godfrey Savanhu were ‘ousted’, leaving James Chikerema as
president.88
(87) Mphoko. “The Joint Military Command.” See p.17.

(88) Mnangagwa, E.D. “The Formation of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe: FROLIZI.” C. Banana, ed.
Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990. Harare: College Press, 1989: See p.141.
1994
FROLIZI aimed to offer an alternative unified movement committed to the execution
of the armed struggle, devoid of all the squabbles that bedevilled the ZANU-ZAPU
rivalry. Such a movement would pursue a revolutionary agenda nourished by a
clearly defined socialist ideology, quite apart from what FROLIZI contemptuously
considered to be the ‘reformist’ politics of ZAPU and ZANU.
For this reason, FROLIZI was never accepted by either ZANU or ZAPU,
especially since it took advantage of the political differences of these two parties to
champion a military role which the OAU and, to an extent, the Zambian
government were very willing to support. ZAPU responded by forfeiting
Chikerema and Nyandoro’s positions within its executive, whereas ZANU
initially denounced FROLIZI as a “nepotistic group of cousins and relatives who
are determined to sabotage the liberation struggle,” but later on stated its position
simply as one questioning the need for a “third force”.89 Frederick Shava offered a
different theory for the formation of FROLIZI. He finds a curious coincidence in
Chikerema’s problems in ZAPU and Shamuyarira’s failure to wrest the chairmanship
of ZANU’s Dare from Chitepo in the elections of 1971. He submits:
It was during this [1972] Conference that our split came to the surface. Shamuyarira
and Parirewa led a group which wanted to unseat Chitepo from the Chairmanship of
Dare. In ZAPU too there was a corresponding development of party split. Chikerema
and George Nyandoro wanted to demote George Silundika and J.Z. Moyo. The idea
was that if Shamuyarira led ZANU and Chikerema also gained a freehand in ZAPU,
they now would bring the two factions together, and form a strong party.
.....Patrick Kombayi, who was Chairman of the [ZANU] Lusaka Province chaired
the conference of 1972, when they tried to oust Chitepo. At this conference things
worked out well for us. Shamuyarira contested the Chairmanship against Chitepo.
But Shamuyarira only managed to get 13 votes and was thoroughly beaten by
Chitepo, who got the overwhelming support of the conference. Shamuyarira lost and
left the party with his few supporters to go and form FROLIZI with Siwela.
Chikerema and Nyandoro also failed to oust T.G. Silundika and J.Z. Moyo and
also decided to quit from ZAPU. They joined hands with ZANU rebels to form
FROLIZI which they thought would become a big party. But they avoided taking up the
leadership and instead chose Siwela – a young fellow then in Ethiopia to lead
FROLIZI. Siwela was a combatant. After a short time Shamuyarira realised his errors
in all these. He was doing all these machinations when he was on sabbatical from the
University of Dar es Salaam. He therefore used his sabbatical trying to wrestle power
from Chitepo. When he discovered that FROLIZI had failed even to gain OAU and
Liberation Committee recognition, he dismantled FROLIZI. He then wanted to come
back to the party.90
Some accounts underplay FROLIZI’s military activities, yet, in its decidedly
progressive outlook, the party had to create the necessary ‘revolutionary situation’
within the country as quickly as possible. The answer lay in recruiting cadres from
(89) Sithole, M. Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle. Harare: Rujeko Publishers, 1979, Rpt. 1999: See
pp.119-121.
(90) Interview with Frederick Shava by Prof. Bhebe, (ZANU PF HQ, Harare) 7 January 2003.
Rhodesian prisoners in Zambian jails who exchanged their freedom for enlistment in
the FROLIZI ranks. Previous work by Tony Kirk (based on transcripts of their trials in
1973) has detailed the activities of some such twelve guerrilla members of
FROLIZI who raided Rhodesia in 1972. They show the activities of a group led by
one ‘Moses’, who was deputised by Amon Magiya Sibanda. It also had Christopher
Gumborinotaya and a coloured man, Richard Erol Robinson. There was also a
second group led by Hatidududzi Naison Guvamatanga and deputised by Charles
Nkomo, which also had two coloured men, Thomas Zerf and Cecil Mutargh. Moses’s
group was involved in a contact with a police reserve unit in Karoi in which he
died, leaving his group scattered around the Mukwichi Tribal Trust Land (TTL), all
of whom were caught or killed by Rhodesian troops. Guvamatanga’s group went
through Mangula and Hartley, hijacking a car on the way and stealing from a petrol
attendant in Gatooma, to Kwekwe, abandoning the car near Umvuma. They split
near Charter and the two coloured men (Zerf and Mutargh) went to Salisbury to
recruit, but were captured at home in Arcadia. Guvamatanga, Nkomo, and others
went to Enkeldoorn and camped at a farm, where they were discovered after killing
a white farmer; Nkomo was shot, but Guvamatanga and the other man escaped.
Guvamatanga was later caught after making fresh entry into Rhodesia. The injured
and amputated Nkomo was made to renounce FROLIZI in a radio broadcast. In the
end, Zerf and Mutargh were sentenced to 25 years each in prison, Gumborinotaya
was sentenced to 30 years, Guvamatanga received the death sentence, and Nkomo
life in prison.91 One of the key impacts of the FROLIZI arrests and the execution
of Robinson, in particular, was the reaction it caused amongst the coloured
community in Rhodesia at the time. According to Ibbo Mandaza, it was
“electrifying” and led more coloured youth to regard the liberation struggle in a
more positive light. This event, in particular, opened up negotiations between the
coloured dominated National Association of Coloured People (NACP) and the
emergent union of political parties under Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the African
National Council (ANC), but more on this later.92 Maurice Nyagumbo recalls meeting
eight of the FROLIZI cadres at Salisbury Remand Prison before they were hanged
and being “shocked by the bravery of these as they appeared absolutely unconcerned
with the death they were now facing”.93
FROLIZI military activities certainly had an impact and were at one point
described as “spectacular”, yet its greatest undoing was the formation in March
1972 of the ZAPU and ZANU Joint Military Command (JMC), co-chaired by Jason
Moyo and Herbert Chitepo respectively, and their increasing recognition by the
OAU Liberation Committee. There were also some internal contradictions within
FROLIZI
(91) Kirk, Tony. “Politics and Violence in Rhodesia.” African Affairs vol.74, no.294 (1975) pp.3-38; David Lemon
(Never Quite a Soldier: A Rhodesian Policeman’s War 1971-1982. Aberton: Galago, 1999.) gives an interesting
account of the murder of the Wedza farmer, Andreas Joubert, and how Guvamatanga was spotted on a bus in
Enkledoorn by an alert police constable. His version, however, claims that Guvamatanga was killed “under a storm of
Security Force gunfire” (49).
(92) Mandaza, I. Race, Colour and Class in Southern Africa. Harare: SAPES Books, 1997. p.746.
(93) Nyagumbo, M. With the People: See p.211.
1994
that manifested themselves through the eventual takeover of the movement by the‘old
guard’, Chikerema and Nyandoro, who effectively replaced the youthful leadership
of Shelton Siwela and Godfrey Savanhu.94 Soon the party began to disintegrate:
Shamuyarira rejoined ZANU with 23 others (even under the stringent conditions of
re-entering ZANU) and Siwela left for further studies in the USA. From this point
onwards, the OAU would have nothing to do with FROLIZI, which slowly
degenerated into Chikerema’s personal project, so that by 1974 when the Unity
Agreement was signed bringing together all the African liberation movements,
Chikerema appended his signature for FROLIZI when it was already moribund. In
addition, FROLIZI could not survive the disdain of the other two parties: Chitepo
certainly considered it an ‘influenza’and so many others, including some powerful
voices in the OAU, saw it as an unnecessary third force, with a recycled leadership. If
ZAPU and ZANU could achieve the necessary unity, the OAU would certainly
consider it a more worthwhile venture, and when such a situation presented itself,
the OAU turned its back on FROLIZI.95 Meanwhile, President Julius Nyerere was
pressing for a union between ZANU and FRELIMO, which came into being in
1973, and this, in turn, ended, according to Report Mphoko, the JMC. In practice
however, the JMC never worked because it was a ‘face saver’; militarily it
combined two movements at different stages in their capacity to execute the war.
This was to be proven in the developments in northern Mozambique involving
cooperation with FRELIMO, which had successfully opened up Tete Province as a
liberated zone in 1970. Given its solid relationship with ZAPU as ‘authentic’
liberation movements recognized by the OAU, which had recently been cemented
by a meeting in Khartoum guaranteeing Soviet support, FRELIMO was quick to
offer ZAPU the first opportunity to launch its operations from its Tete base.
Ravaged by its internal split ZAPU was “completely out of action until the formation
of FROLIZI” and so it turned down the offer, arguing that they were not and could
not be in full control of the area96. The offer was repeated in June 1972, but, still, it
was not taken. Certainly, the leadership crisis of 1971 had a hand in this and slowly
ZAPU lost its contacts with FRELIMO as a result.97 Meanwhile, ZANU had been
reorganising itself after the re-arrest of Nadabaningi Sithole on charges of plotting to
kill Ian Smith in 1969. In April that same year, it held its first biennial conference
and elected an eight member war council or Dare ReChimurenga (ZANU
Revolutionary Council), chaired by Herbert Chitepo. By November, members of the
Dare formally approached the FRELIMO High Command to operate from Tete, yet
since FRELIMO was reserving this for its ideological ally, this request was not
granted until ZAPU’s position in 1972. Even then, Samora Machel made it very
clear that the offer was not being made to ZANU as an ally, but as a contribution to
the pursuance of the struggle
(94) Sithole, M. Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle. See p.125.

(95) White, Luise. The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2003: See p.17.
(96) Ibid.
(97) Sibanda, E.M. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961-87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern
Rhodesia. Eritrea: Africa World Press, 2005: See p.163.
in Zimbabwe.98 Former ZIPRA fighters offer a different explanation. They claim

that ZIPRA already had an advanced cooperation programme in place with
FRELIMO, and they were sending in cadres to assist FRELIMO with logistics and
transportation of its personnel in the opening of the Tete corridor. Yet at this point,
ZIPRA lost two of its specially trained field commanders, Robson Manyika and
Rex Nhongo, who defected to ZANU.99 Former ZIPRA commander, Akim Ndlovu,
had this to say about the ZAPU-FRELIMO alliance:
There were several meetings leading to the cooperation between ZAPU, ANC (SA),
and FRELIMO. First of all, the political leadership discussed and agreed that there
was need for them to extend their cooperation to the military field. Then it was
decided that the two military wings should meet and discuss joint military
cooperation. We met: namely the late Samora Machel, Chissano... from our side it
was myself, Dumiso Dabengwa, and from the ANC side it was Joe Modise
and...Walter Mavuso. We met in Lusaka; this was soon after the death of Mondlane.
On the FRELIMO side, it was during the Triumvirate of Uwah Simango, [Marcelino]
Dos Santos, and Machel. We met with Machel and Chissano while Chikerema
discussed with Dos Santos and Simango. So we discussed the question of Tete and
we took a decision. The decision was that we had to send right away a consignment
of weapons to Tete to assist our FRELIMO comrades. We sent a truck of weapons to
Tete and it was driven by Killion Dube, one of our colleagues who come from Kezi.
That was how the Tete Front was opened with the close assistance of ZAPU.
A further decision was taken to dispatch Comrade Manyika to Tete to go and work
together with FRELIMO cadres, the aim being to understand the problems of that area
and then follow up with prepared groups after he had reported back to us. On the basis
of this report, we would be in a position to know how many people we would send,
what type of people we would send in, with what equipment, what kind of operations,
moving towards which direction. So Robson Manyika was sent out to Tete at the head
of a small group to carry out this study. Manyika’s mission was overtaken by the
split. Robson himself defected to ZANU during the crisis. Then during the split,
FRELIMO turned to ZANU and concluded the alliance with the latter.100
However, Henry Hamadziripi has a different version. He claims that FRELIMO’s
Eduardo Mondlane had long since invited ZANU to fight together with them.
He states:
We [ZANU] had no weapons and the Russians had started supplying weapons to
Africa e.g. Egypt, Algeria, former Portuguese colonies. Mondlane said that
FRELIMO was prepared to share with us the weapons received so far. He made that
pledge and indicated that he was prepared to work with me through and through.
Then Nyerere promised that he was going to persuade Chitepo to leave his job in
Tanzania and join us. Mondlane made it clear that Mozambique will not be free until
Zimbabwe was free because historically we are one, citing the Kingdom of
Munhumutapa as one
(98) Martin and Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe. See p.17.
(99) Sibanda. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union. p.163.
(100) Interview with Comrade Akim Ndlovu by Prof. Bhebe, (Ndlovu Residence in Bulawayo) 29 December 1989.
1994
vast empire which embraced both peoples...Mondlane then instructed top FRELIMO
leadership to work together with us. That is why battles like Chinhoyi were fought
using arms acquired from FRELIMO...101
This version has not been corroborated by anyone so far, but the arrangement was
supposed to be based on Hamadziripi’s personal friendship with Mondlane and a
FRELIMO plan to use Zimbabwean guerrillas to open a front from Manica to Beira
in the fashion of the ZAPU/ANC alliance. It probably failed to materialise with the
death of Mondlane. However ZAPU continued to lose key personnel as it teetered
on the brink of collapse during its crisis. Rex Nhongo also crossed to ZANU in
March 1971, but after receiving training in Moscow and Bulgaria. He had begun
consultations with Josiah Tongogara through the ZANU representative in Dar es
Salaam, Godfrey Savanhu, nearly a year before, but it was decided that he stay with
ZAPU until ZANU’s negotiations with FRELIMO to operate in Tete were
complete.102 When Eliakim Sibanda interviewed Sibiya Mpofu, one of the ZIPRA
cadres involved in the FRELIMO cooperation, Mpofu revealed that Robson
Manyika had continued his operations in Tete giving the impression to FRELIMO
that he was still with ZAPU when he had shifted his allegiance to ZANU already. In
the process, he was privy to the tactical plan ZIPRA was proposing to open up Tete
and sold the idea to ZANU, where he was already instrumental in establishing its
army.103
Developments in Rhodesia, 1971-1972

The Pearce Commission, the ANC, and the Increasing Involvement of the Church
The timing of the churches’ participation in politics in general and in Zimbabwe’s
liberation war in particular is no coincidence. By 1964, political parties had been
banned, political rallies outlawed, and all the political leaders thrown into prisons
or forced into exile. Before then, most church denominations, such as the Dutch
Reformed Church, were committed to keeping ‘religion and politics apart’. African
nationalists, on their part, were showing their disillusionment with the church by
increasingly seeking to revive African traditional culture because of the failure of
local churches to address the prevailing racial injustice. The developments of 1964,
however, changed the situation, clergymen stepped in to fill this void and to carry on
the work of the politicians from their pulpits. A number of them gathered around the
Christian Council of Rhodesia (CCR), an organisation formed in 1964 as a forum
of opinion with the ecumenical mission to facilitate dialogue between the churches
and the government.104 Although the evangelical denominations distanced
themselves from it, the CCR became the most vociferous critic of the UDI, boldly
challenging the declaration’s claim that it was defending ‘Christian Civilisation’.
Ironically, there
(101) Interview with Henry Hamadziripi by Prof. Bhebe, (Harare) 14 November 1999.
(102) Marti and Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: See p.87.
(103) Ibid.
(104) Skelton, K. Bishop in Smith’s Rhodesia. Gweru: Mambo Press, 1985: See p.93.
were a number of casualties amongst those members of the Christian community

who stood up openly against the UDI or the Smith regime’s intolerant attitude toward
the African majority. For criticising the UDI and the wanton detentions without trial
of political activists, for example, Bishop Ralph Dodge and Rev. Robert Hughes of
the United Methodist Church were deported in July 1964. According to Canaan
Banana, by the time of its first meeting in Gwelo in November 1964, the CCR had
become openly political, spearheading the campaign against not only the UDI, but
also the Land Tenure Act.105
In September 1970, the World Council of Churches (WCC) announced that its
battle to combat racism would include grants totalling USD$143,000 to various
liberation groups in southern Africa, and some funds went to the banned ZAPU and
ZANU.106 Some churches criticised this move, arguing that the world Christian body
should not openly support violence, which was a misinterpretation since the aid was
for social welfare, rather than the purchase of armaments. The WCC issue certainly
divided the churches in Rhodesia. The CCR met in Salisbury on 11 November
1970 (the occasion of the 5th Anniversary of the UDI) to consider the WCC’s
decision. They voted 30 to 4 to support the “gesture of concern and compassion for
the oppressed people of Rhodesia”. The Salvation Army withdrew its membership
from the Christian Council and the Presbyterian Church threatened to do the same;
the Anglican Church became divided between its Bishop Paul Borrow, who
proposed to withdraw, and the lay members of his church, including Peter M’kudu,
who challenged him to withdraw in his personal capacity, but not on behalf of the
African members. Rev. Canaan Banana of the Methodist Church UK resigned after
his church decided against the WCC’s gesture. Meanwhile, Christian Care, the social
welfare arm of both Catholic and Protestant Churches, had quietly pursued work
amongst detainees’ families and assisted detainees with correspondence materials
for their education. Its biggest venture became the Cold Comfort Farm project. In all
this and perhaps up to the end of 1972, the Catholic Church was not as active as the
Protestant churches in politics; in fact, the Catholic Bishop’s Conference was “non-
committal and the bishops and clergy were divided in their views”.107
In 1971, the British once again launched an attempt to engage the Smith regime
throughconsultationsmadebythe British Commonwealth Secretary SirAlec Douglas-
Home with various groups with interest in the Rhodesian question. The result was
the Smith-Home Proposals for a Settlement which amended the 1969 Constitution,
making concessions on a qualified franchise that would allow Africans to vote with
increasing numbers over time. This approach would be supported by a British capital
injection of £50 million, but only after the proposals had been accepted by the Africans
(105) Banana, C.S. Politics of Repression and Resistance: Face to Face with Combat Theology. Gweru: Mambo
Press, 1996: See pp.109-114.
(106) Muzorewa, Bishop Abel. Rise Up and Walk: An Autobiography. London: Evans Brothers Ltd., 1978: See p.87.
(107) McLaughlin, J. On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. Harare: Boabab Books,
1996: See p.20.
1994
whose opinion was to be tested by a Royal Commission. The content of the proposals
fell far short of the nationalist demands and did not offer much to Africans in terms
of the principle of one man one vote. Now that most of the nationalist leadership was
in detention, a front had to be formed as quickly as possible to make a united stand
opposing the proposals. Ruth Chinamano, who had led a deputation of detainees to
make representations to Sir Alec, consulted with the nationalist leadership still in
detention and, together with her husband Josiah, Michael Mawema, Edson Sithole,
and Cephas Msipa, approached Bishop Abel Muzorewa to become the leader of
this new coalition, which was named the African National Council.108 Bishop
Muzorewa was considered neutral and dignified. His career was fairly high profile:
having obtained a Masters degree in the USA, he returned to Rhodesia in 1963
during the eventful split within the nationalist movement. He became an active
clergyman within his church to be elected its youngest Bishop in 1968. Muzorewa
became involved in the campaign by the church to oppose the 1969 Rhodesian
Republican Constitution and the subsequent implementation of the 1969 Land
Tenure Act. He took his campaign to the pulpit and gained national fame for his ‘Dry
Bones’ sermon, delivered in January 1970, in which he compared Rhodesia to
Israel in its political bondage and exile during the time of Ezekiel. He was
subsequently banned from entering the Tribal Trust Lands, a move that provoked
widespread protests from men and women of his church who wore their uniforms
and marched across the country waving placards in solidarity with their Bishop. In
his own words,“The whole country was surprised and angered by it [the banning].
‘Congratulations!’ many said. At first, that response puzzled me. Later I understood
its meaning. If I was considered a threat by the regime, then I must be honoured as a
leading Zimbabwean nationalist”.109
An ANC Executive Committee was quickly put into place, composed of Michael
Mawema as National Organising Secretary, another neutral clergyman, Rev. Canaan
Banana as Vice Chairman, Charlton Ngcebetsha as Secretary General, and Edson
Sithole doubling as Legal Advisor and Publicity Secretary. There was little or no
time to conscientise the masses before the Commission began its public
consultations in early January. Meanwhile, the Rhodesian government not only
turned down all applications by the ANC to hold meetings in the TTLs, but they
also began arresting members of the ANC Executive and throwing them into
detention or restriction. The Chinamanos became the first victims of re-arrest.
Amidst these goings on, Bishop Muzorewa provided the ANC’s evidence to the
Royal Commission before taking his campaign to Britain itself and to the United
Nations; the result was a resounding ‘No’ verdict which brought all the British
efforts to nought.
(108) Mitchell, D. Josiah Chinamano. Harare: Longman, 1998: See p.30.

(109) Muzorewa, A. Rise Up and Walk: An Autobiography. London: Evans Brothers Ltd., 1978: See p.85.
The ‘Joint Military Command and Beyond’: ZANLA-ZIPRA Cooperation

and Recovery on Separate Paths, 1972-1974
In February 1972, ZAPU and ZANU presented to the OAU a fairly comprehensive
Unity Plan Document, which spelt out the modalities of a union between ZAPU
and ZANU, involving, among other things, common representations to International
Conferences, joint recruitment and combat operations within Rhodesia, as well as
operating joint accounts. Although this was exactly what the OAU had always
wanted, the agreement was doomed from the start due to contradictions at the
political and military levels. Chitepo and J.Z. Moyo wanted the unity arrangement
to lead the OAU to de-recognize FROLIZI, nothing more. On the other hand, the
structure of the military high command had emerged with some distortions which
laid the groundwork for squabbles over seniority as is shown below:
STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT MILITARY COMMAND (JMC)
Herbert Chitepo, Chairman (ZANU)
Jason Z. Moyo, Secretary (ZAPU)
MILITARY COMMAND
Nikita Mangena, Chief of Staff (ZIPRA)
Robson Manyika, Political Commissar
(ZANLA) Josiah Tongogara, Chief of
Operations (ZANLA) Report Mphoko, Chief of
Logistics (ZIPRA) John Mataure, Chief of
P/Training (ZANLA)
Gordon Munyanyi, Chief of Intelligence (ZIPRA)
Ernest Kadungure, Financial Secretary (ZANLA)
DEPUTIES
Lookout Masuku, D/Political Commissar (ZIPRA)
Charles Ngwenya, D/Chief Operations (ZIPRA)
William Ndangana, D/Chief Logistics (ZANLA)
Cephas Cele, D/Chief Personnel /Training (ZIPRA)
Webster Gwawuya, Deputy Intelligence (ZANLA)
Josiah Tongogara refused to acknowledge Mangena as his senior, although his new
position in the JMC had elevated him within ZANLA ranks to replace his own
seniors, such as Felix Santana, Benard Mutuma, and Noel Mukono. Report Mphoko
is of the opinion that ZANU wanted the alliance for immediate limited purposes
in its favour and that the Karanga section within it used the JMC to manoeuvre to
key positions in ZANU. Once the JMC had secured the necessary recognition from
the OAU and successfully overrode FROLIZI, it crumbled like a house of cards.
The two parties were once more at each other’s throats, ZANU making the
outrageous demand that ZAPU should disband and join ZANU on the grounds that
it had been
1994
a “sick party” since its crisis. These and other differences forced the parties to go their
separate ways.110
The Resumption of the War, 1972

‘ZANU Goes it Alone’: The Problematic Expansion Programme of 1973-1974
Upon securing the agreement with FRELIMO, ZANU quickly geared up for
immediate action. While on a visit to Sweden in October 1972, ZANU Chairman,
Herbert Chitepo talked of “a new offensive” that would begin at the end of the
year.111 Indeed, by the end of 1972, ZANLA had begun moving fighters and
equipment into Rhodesia, their main exit point being the Zambezi-Luangwa
confluence where they had established a transit camp at Chifombo on the
Zambia/Mozambique border. Initially, ZANLA operated in three sectors of
Zambia/Rhodesia: Rubatsiro, Nehanda, and Chaminuka. The Rubatsiro sector was
the northernmost sector, stretching from Chewori Safari area in the west to
Mushumbi Pools in the east. It was jointly used by ZANLA and ZIPRA during the
ill-fated JMC, and, even though they collaborated in some operations, they
frequently turned against each other amidst the animosity of the ZAPU/ZANU
rivalry. For this reason, Rubatsiro could never really count as a typical sector in the
ZANLA sense of the word, at least, in so far as the meaning that term gradually
assumed in the following three years. To this extent, Nehanda occupies a special
place as a pioneering prototype ZANLA sector, where much of the initial practical
experience of executing a guerrilla war was obtained and exported elsewhere. The
Nehanda Sector included, but was not necessarily confined to, Guruve, Mana Pools,
Rushinga, Bindura, Madziwa, Mt. Darwin, Muzarabani, Mazowe, Glendale,
Mutoko, and Chesa. These boundaries could be as fluid as they were porous
according to the accounts collected from former operatives.112 Rex Nhongo was
commander of this sector and his version of how he managed affairs in these early
years is illustrative:
When we had divided ourselves into groups, we said we would not first of all strike
but recruit at least 500 people. This was because at this time ZANU was not
recognised by the OAU; it was more a friendship between Nyerere and Chitepo, this
was how we stood with the OAU. At the first meeting at Chifombo, we refused to
cross because of strategy problems. We resolved that we would recruit more trainees
so that ZANU would be recognised by the OAU. What happened is that when the
group of forty five and the group of fifteen left Tanzania, there were very few recruits
left behind; therefore there was a problem for Dare reChimurenga to go to the OAU
and say, we had some fighters when we did not have any. This is how the 21 men in
Nehanda went about recruiting before fighting. We managed to recruit 350. This was
the first group that we recruited that left for Rhodesia. We then recruited another
400. Before this group had left the country and were still in the Zambezi, we saw the
enemy on surveillance,
(110) Mphoko. “The Joint Military Command.”

(111) Sellstrom, T. Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa. See p.168.
(112) Interview with Zeripha Mudimu, (Centenary) 3 March 2008.
so we quickly struck a farm. I was not there myself. Jairos was the commander and
political commissar of the seven men that made the first attack. They cut the telephone
lines and planted landmines at the farm. When the police security forces came to
investigate, they hit landmines; this is how they realised that we were not fighting.
They thought that the freedom fighters from Chaminuka were in this area, but it was
a different group.
I ordered that another group in Centenary plant landmines. They planted three,
two were hit by army trucks and one by a civilian motorist; by now the whites
realised that they were in a war situation. In 1972, we fought for four months and
lost eight men and the morale among our men fell very low. They had seen that it
was a matter of life and death. The problem was that some men wanted us to go
back to Lusaka
and report that the going was tough, but I said that, as we sang, “tinofa tichienda –we
shall die as we push forward the struggle,” we would go on and I persuaded the group
to stay on. We suspended gun firing and concentrated on planting landmines.
Fortunately at this time, we were joined by more trained men from Tanzania. This
group was made by George Rutanhire, former Deputy Minister of Sports, Youth,
and Culture. We met them on the banks of the Zambezi and we crossed well. Then
I had only six men left; their morale now improved; we sat down and arranged a
fighting programme. We had learnt that if we used guns we would not win; therefore
we had to keep recruiting to replace the men that died. We went on recruiting more
men. The OAU by now also had recognised that ZANU was one of the strongest
movements in Zimbabwe and that we were striving to get independence through the
barrel of the gun. We received a lot of war material from the OAU and also started
communicating with the people in Chaminuka. I still remember meeting with
[Josiah] Tungamirai, [Dakarai] Badza, and Cephas [Tichatonga]. I was with [James]
Bond and Ted Torana (He is at Parirenyatwa Hospital.); also present was Mayor
Urimbo who was the provincial Political Commissar and his deputy [Joseph]
Chimurenga. We wanted to report progress. The situation was still difficult. Mayor
came from Chifombo. We held a meeting in the Zambezi Valley; some of our men
were feeling the strain, and the enemy was on the offensive. Mayor, [Thomas] Nhari,
and Badza went back to Zambia, but I decided that we would not go to Lusaka
and leave the young men on their own, so I went back and I met three comrades
who confirmed that the enemy was on surveillance. We decided that as the enemy
knew, that we would move all our men further in towards Mubvurwa. We had been
operating in the area near Concession. We wanted the enemy to go further towards
the border in search of us, when we were actually inside the country. The problem
we had encountered in Concession was that it was a farming area and most farm
workers were immigrants from Malawi and it was difficult to convince them to
give us food. In the new operational area, we had no food problems because the
people understood what we were fighting for. We would buy maize and take it to the
millers and occasionally for meat we would slaughter domesticated animals from the
villagers’ paddocks so that my men would have some rest from running around. They
started hitting the Centenary area again and the enemy thought they had closed
us in, but we would attack and then spend two days and two nights walking back.
If we attacked an area we would not stay, we would walk for 12 hours going
back
1994
so that they would start searching after we had left. This helped us a lot and the
comrades realised that this was the way to stay alive. We continued doing this until
the end of 1972.113
Most narratives of Nehanda emphasise this pioneering motif. It was a place of
initial contact with peasants, where theoretical concepts were tested on the ground
and where statements had to be made to the Smith regime of the growing intensity
of the war. Most of 1972 was spent moving in war materials, establishing contacts
with the locals and recruiting, in other words, commissariat work. In July, ZANLA
cadres were in the vicinity of St. Albert’s mission, the object being to get as far as
Mavuradonha Mountain and use it as a cache. Apparently, the mountain had a huge
cave, which was used in pre-colonial wars as a refuge, a nhare (stronghold). They
loaded it with all the hardware, grenades, landmines, magazines etc., and it became
a staging point for further inroads into the interior. Contrary to some assertions that
in-the-field training of cadres was a phenomenon adopted by ZANLA in the later
stages of the war, in the Nehanda sector, this policy was implemented during the
initial political conscientisation of the masses. So, much like ZAPU’s ‘Castro
Approach’, Josiah Tungamirai recalls that in Dande they trained some groups of the
povo with some of them getting to be able “to operate machine guns and to lay
landmines as well as performing certain combat drills such as crawling”.114 In
December 1972, Josiah Tungamirai, Patrick Mupunzarima, and Kefasi Chinodakufa
arrived at Chiunye Business Centre near Mutoko and, upon entering a store with the
intention to buy some provisions, they encountered African Rhodesian detectives
who attempted to capture them. In a heroic feat in front of cheering povo, they
overpowered them and took them away into the nearby bush, not to kill them, but to
educate them on the objectives of Chimurenga (liberation war). The two men were
later released, unharmed to convey the message to their colleagues.115
More significant scores were made in the Mt. Darwin area in early 1973 when
ZANLA freedom fighters bombarded the administrative offices and attacked
Gwerevende farm, killing four white men and capturing the manager, Jerry
Hawksworth, in the Chesa Purchase Area. The freedom fighters took his car,
loaded it with the corpses of the dead men, and drove it to Nyakasikana Township,
where they burnt the car with the corpses in it. Jerry was taken to Mozambique and
handed over to the ZANLA Chief of Defence, Josiah Tongogara, who later took
him to Tanzania where he was released.116 It is still not clear what really inspired
early guerrilla groups to capture Rhodesian operatives and carry them back to
Mozambique, and why it was a favourite exercise of the guerrilla forces led by Rex
Nhongo. In an interview with one member of this group, Dennis Bhebe (Tsuro
Muchenje) revealed that similar action was taken against an African District
Assistant in the Chawarura area of
(113) Interview with Rex Nhongo by Prof. Bhebe, (Harare) 14 July 1984.
(114) Makari, C. Magamba eChimurenga: Josiah Tungamirai. See pp.91-92.
(115) Ibid. pp.84-88.
(116) Ibid. p.94. Interview with Paradzayi Manyani, (ZANU PF HQ, Harare) 13 February 2007.
Centenary in 1972. The unsuspecting DA was lured into a trap by a chimbwido

(a young female liberation war collaborator), pretending to be in love with him,
whereupon he was captured and marched to Mozambique by Nhongo and others.
The young chimbwido joined them and went for training in Mozambique to become
a fighter in her own right, adopting a Chimurenga (liberation war) name, Comrade
Mationesa.117 Beatar Chigwida (Comrade Theresa Sibanda) also recalls a case in
1972 where Rex Nhongo’s group captured yet another white Rhodesian police officer
known locally as ‘Paraffin’ and took him to a camp in Zambia, possibly Chifombo,
where he was actually converted and adopted the nom de guere, Vurayayi
Mabhunu.118
ZANLA freedom fighters emphasised the pungwe (nightly politicisation rallies)
as the chief means of persuading the masses to support the struggle, but they also
worked through religious authorities and symbols that appealed to the locals. Spirit
mediums interceded between the guerrillas and the people, particularly in Dande;
some of the spirit mediums had had experience working with FRELIMO guerrillas
in Mozambique. Sekuru Chipfeni, a local medium, for example, had established a
relationship with a FRELIMO sector commander of Tete Province. The commander
was one Joa Binda, who had told the medium that he was soon going to work with
Zimbabwean guerrillas.119 In the transit of weapons from Chifombo, guerrillas such
as Dakarai Badza and Sarudzai Chinamaropa were led by this Sekuru Chipfeni
right through their journey to Mukumbura. He was also instrumental in introducing
them to other key mediums such as Chiodzamamera and Chidyamauyu. They all
ended up at the ZANLA camp, Chifombo, where they were joined by Nyamhita, the
Nehanda medium who was brought in from Dande by Rex Nhongo and Joseph
Chimurenga on a stretcher bed in 1972. A mysterious woman, this medium was very
old and frail, but performed miracles. She died later in 1973 and was buried in the
pathway leading to Chifombo Camp, where she was revered as a saintly figure.120
Later it became policy within ZANLA to incorporate spirit mediums in their
training programmes and a camp (Pungwe 3) was established for them in
Mozambique.
By and large, spirit mediums had various roles that they played in the emerging
war, quite apart from their pivotal legacy in the First Chimurenga of 1896/1897. The
1970s war brought with it a new dispensation and the roles of the mediums changed
with the new circumstances. David Lan has shown that Dande mediums shared their
intimate knowledge of the countryside with freedom fighters, leading them along
little known pathways away from the main roads patrolled by security forces; they
showed them the best nhare wherein to hide their weapons; and they helped them
interpret the meaning of signs displayed by animals in the bush.121 More to the point,
however, ZANLA’s first famous attack in the Nehanda Sector was guided by
the
(117) Interview with Dennis Bhebe by Charles Maripfonde, (Charlton Res Farm in Centenary) 25 February 2008.
(118) Interview with Theresa Sibanda by Charles Maripfonde, (Westberry Farm, Centenary) 22 February 2008.
(119) Tungamirai, J. “Recruitment to ZANLA: Building up a War Machine.” N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, eds. Soldiers
in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. Harare: UZP, 1995: See p.42.
(120) Makari, C. Magamba eChimurenga: See p.92-94.
(121) Lan, D. Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe. London: James Currey, 1985: See p.157.
1994
spirit medium Chiwawa/Pondai. This attack on Altena Farm near Centenary took
place on 21 December 1972. Chiwawa/Pondai was later arrested and sentenced to
several years of hard labour for his role. This attack changed the Rhodesian attitude
to the mediums. Whereas they had collected information about spirit mediums to
legitimate claims to chieftainship by loyal followers, overnight they switched to
using such information as a vital tool for counter insurgency.122
The developments in the Nehanda Sector and the growing number of recruits
gave ZANLA the confidence to expand its operations. This expansion was part of
a strategic plan conceived by Chitepo and Tongogara in November 1973 to open
up new sectors and “attenuate the enemy forces by causing their deployment over
the entire country”. This effort would be followed by a strong mobilisation drive
targeting all sectors of African civilian society in order to have a “psychologically
devastating effect on the morale of the whites”.123 This strategy was a disaster in
the long run for it was never firmly supported by a consistent supply of arms and
other necessary logistical support to help stir it into motion. This situation affected
mostly the Chaminuka sector where, according to Rex Nhongo, “some mistakes had
been made,” resulting in the leakage of information to the enemy before they could
launch any major operations.124 At this stage the emphasis was still on recruitment
and where it mattered any attack on enemy targets was to be followed by a long term
withdrawal over long distances. Although this was an operational area falling under
the command Kenneth Gwindingwi and his deputy Josiah Tungamirai the interviews
collected recall the gallantry of Rex Nhongo and how he inspired most youth to join
the struggle. Dennis Bhebe, who became one of the early recruits, remembers how
eager he was to see Rex after hearing all the rumours about him:
…we could hear our parents talking about him (Rex Nhongo) and that is when I
became eager to see him. However my father continuously warned me not to talk
about these guerrilla fighters since it could get us into trouble. Every evening my
father took sadza and disappeared into the dark.125
It was one thing to convince recruits and yet another to keep them going especially
in the face of enemy attacks. A number of the people interviewed in Chaminuka
also remember Comrade James Bond, who was attacked with a band of recruits near
Nyakasikana village in Chesa TTL in 1973 but was able to withstand the pressure
and repel the attack.126Another recruit, Lovemore Mheni (Stabern Chiweshe),
recruited by Josiah Tungamirai, spent almost three weeks surviving on fruits of the
forest. He recalls:
(122) Ibid. p.192. For an official view of the government’s impression of the role of spirit mediums in this war, see
The Rhodesian Herald, 25 November 1971.
(123) Smith, D. and C. Simpson. Mugabe. Salisbury: Pioneer Head, 1981: See p.76.
(124) Interview with Rex Nhongo.
(125) Interview with Comrade Dennis Bhebe (Tsuro Muchenje) by Charles Maripfonde, (Charlton Res Farm,
Centenary) 25 February 2008.
(126) Interview with Comrade Letia Kagodo by Charles Maripfonde, (Chiripiro Farm in Centenary) 26 February
2008.
We rarely ate, surviving on raw green mealies [maize] as well as crickets (makurwe)
and so on…We could grind dried meat (chimukuyu) so as to produce powder to cook
porridge and also, I still remember roasting tortoise shells for us to survive. Do you
know that reeds (murara) can be cooked and served as relish? We did that…127
At this stage, ZANLA suffered a number of setbacks; it lost so many fighters and
the morale of the fighters was dampening. A number of them were suggesting to
their leaders that they should withdraw back to Lusaka to tell the leadership that
the going was tough. The leaders pressed on and decided to suspend the use of
guns to concentrate on laying landmines. Fortunately some of the recruits who had
been sent out for training were starting to come back. A group of 300 cadres
trained in Tanzania and led by George Rutanhire arrived to boost the numbers and
more action was to follow in 1973 as a result of these reinforcements both in
Nehanda and Chaminuka.128
ZIPRA’s Recovery Plan, 1971
Meanwhile, ZAPU was also in the process of reorganisation amidst the smouldering
ashes of the split of 1971. It set up a Revolutionary Council composed of all
members of the party’s executive and all members of the command structure of the
military wing. It was under the auspices of the Revolutionary Council that a new
army, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was formed.129 The
Revolutionary Council was composed of Jason Z. Moyo, George Silundika, and
Edward Ndlovu, with Dumiso Dabengwa as overall Secretary. Its Chief
Representatives were Stephen Nkomo, Ethan Dube, Maloa Noko, Amos Ngwenya,
Akim Ndlovu, Sikwili Khohli Moyo, Saul Ndlovu, Lazarus Mpofu, and Aaron
Ndlovu. The Revolutionary Council also constituted the ZAPU National Executive
in exile. The ZIPRA High Command as of 1972 consisted of the following
members:
Rogers Mangena (Alfred Nikita), Chief of Staff
Lookout Masuku (Mafela), Political Commissar
Charles Ngwenya (John Dube), Chief of Operations
Gordon Munyanyi, Chief of Intelligence
Phelekezela Mphoko (R. Mphoko), Chief of Logistics
Cephas Cele (King Tshaluza), Personnel and Training
‘Operation Xoxoza,’ 1972-1973
Even after the Wankie/Sipolilo disaster and the Chikerema movie feat, ZAPU had
continued infiltrating reconnaissance teams into northern Rhodesia. A number of
them, including survivors of the Sipolilo campaign, had sought employment in local
(127) Interview with Comrade Lovemore Mheni by Charles Maripfonde, (Chiripiro Farm in Centenary) 26
February 2008.
(128) Details as related by some of the participants can be found in J. McLaughlin. On the Frontline: Catholic
Missions in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. Harare: Boabab Books, 1996: See Chapter 4.
(129) Dabengwa, D. “ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation.” N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, eds. Soldiers
in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. See p.32.
1994
farms where they sent back regular reports and were also involved in recruitment.130
South African police were still camped along the Zambezi River between
Kazungula, Victoria Falls, Chirundu, and Kanyemba to intercept Umkhonto we
Sizwe (MK) freedom fighters. ZAPU decided between 1970 and 1971 to send in
heavily armed platoons to attack these South African troops and facilitate their own
large scale deployment.131 At this stage, in its recovery period (1972-1973), ZAPU
certainly did not seek an aggressive plan. Instead, ZIPRA strategy was to carry out
sabotage without fully engaging the enemy; the former ZIPRA Chief, Dumiso
Dabengwa, elaborates this strategy as one involving a “continuous cycle of
retreating, planting landmines, and hiding”. It was a strategy designed to give the
newly formed ZIPRA space to breathe, that is retraining and reorganising its forces
which had been idle since the 1971 crisis, to prepare them for more intensive
operations planned by the Revolutionary Council.132 This strategy started paying
dividends in August 1972, when several landmines went up in the Mana Pools area.
This area was a key target since it was a Rhodesian command centre controlling
several military bases in the Zambezi valley and the Hurungwe District. ZAPU
cadres were more dramatic; they did not make their presence a secret, often
choosing to drop leaflets near or around any site of contact. From the 30 August
1972, several incidents of vehicles detonating landmines were reported, including
some that claimed Rhodesian troops.133
These activities were consolidated in a much larger operation, code named
“Operation Xoxoza” (Xoxoza, a siNdebele word meaning ‘to prod a river with a
stick to determine its depth as one crosses’). According to Report Mphoko, it was
an operation designed to ‘prod’ or test the Zambian attitude towards ZAPU after its
crisis.134 It was coordinated by three members of the ZIPRA High Command,
John Dube, Gordon Munyanyi, and Report Mphoko, assisted by Maketo Ndebele,
Roger Matshinini Ncube, and Mazinyane. It was officially put into action in 1973 and
several isolated attacks were reported thereafter with ZIPRA making an effort to
publicise its activities by claiming responsibility. ZIPRA leaflets were found near a
landmine blast that killed Sidney Eskreet and injured his colleagues near Mana
Pools in May 1973, and in the same month ZIPRA guerrillas shelled a pump house
supplying water to the Chirundu Sugar Estate some 60 km west of Mana Pools.135
In September, they had closed in on Hurungwe, striking a camp housing a platoon
of nearly forty-two South African soldiers and killing all but two of them. The
attack was carried out in the morning at 01:45 hours. At daybreak, the Rhodesian
Air Force descended on the scene of the smoking camp to evacuate the dead in two
French-built Allouite helicopters. At that time, the ZIPRA unit had already
withdrawn, leaving ZAPU pamphlets strewn on the scene. Thereafter, Ian Smith
was compelled to make a
(130) Sibanda. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union. See p.163.

(131) Ellert. The Rhodesian Front War. See p.28.
(132) Dabengwa, Dumiso. “ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation”: See p.32.
(133) Zimbabwe Review. 14 January 1973.
(134) Mphoko. “The Joint Military Command.” See p.20
(135) Zimbabwe Review. 14 January 1973.
flying consolation visit to the South African troops in the area on the 1st of
October, four days after the incident, in the company of the Army Commander
Lieutenant General G.I. Walls, the Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshall I.J.
McLaren, and the Commissioner of Police, S.F.S. Bristow.136 One major result of
Operation Xoxoza, according to ZIPRA, was Ian Smith’s closure of the Rhodesian-
Zambian border, accusing Zambia of harbouring ‘terrorists’. Although Rhodesia
reopened their border shortly thereafter, Kaunda closed the Zambian border until the
end of the war. More importantly for ZIPRA, however, Operation Xoxoza and the
events leading to Chikerema’s formation of FROLIZI, turned ZIPRA’s fortunes in
the eyes of President Kaunda and the Zambian government. Shortly after these
developments, Kaunda called J.Z. Moyo to the State House to inform him that all
restrictions that had been imposed on ZAPU were now lifted.137
After this decision, recalls Mbulawa Noko, large groups were no longer training
in Tanzania under the OAU programme. Zambia started to train ZIPRA cadres in
1973 on a programme that was “entirely Zambian”.138
The Immediate Rhodesian Response, 1972-1974
These events of the early 1970s and the ZANLA attack on Altena had many other
consequences. Firstly, the Rhodesians acknowledged the turn in the tempo of the
war and responded by forming the Joint Operations Command (JOC) in December
1972. A large scale operation was launched covering the northern districts of
Rhodesia, code named “Operation Hurricane”. The areas covered by the operation
stretched from Karoi to incorporate Muzarabani, Dotito, Mt. Darwin, Centenary,
Madziva, Bindura, Chiweshe, Murewa, and Mutoko. A series of base camps were
established in these areas as part of the Rhodesian strategy to deal with the guerrilla
threat internally. Members of the Special Branch were deployed to coordinate the
collection of intelligence on guerrilla movements and support.139 Similarly,
Rhodesian platoons patrolling this zone were increased from one to twenty four in
the following twelve months.140 In addition, the Rhodesian government, after
noticing the ‘support’ that the guerrillas were being offered by the locals, invoked
Chapter 29 of the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), providing for severe
penalties for anyone “harbouring or failing to report terrorists”, which included the
death sentence or imprisonment for “lying” about the presence of “terrorists”. Under
the Emergency Powers (Collective) Fines Regulations published in 1973, the state
imposed collective
(136) Zimbabwe Review. 6 Oct. 1973, Vol. 3, No. 1.

(137) Mphoko. “The Joint Military Command.” See p.20.
(139) Ellert, H. The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare 1962-1980: See p.49.
(140) Parker, J. Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of A Rhodesian Special Branch Officer. Alberton, RSA:
Galago Press, 2006: See p.25.
1994
fines and confiscated property of all inhabitants of an area if the particular offenders
who had rendered assistance to the guerrillas could not be identified.141
Operation Hurricane was carried out through various missions or operations and
the first one was launched in early 1973, code named “Operation Overload Phase
I”. This operation was a direct response to guerrilla activity and it provided for the
creation of Collective Villages and later on Protected Villages (PVs). These
exercises were preceded by a population census conducted by Rhodesian police in
the Dande and Muzarabani Tribal Trust Lands. By the middle of 1973, thousands of
local people had been forcibly driven into ‘detention centres’ at Msengezi Mission,
Gutsa, Hoya, and Mukumbura. Nearly 50,000 people were resettled in the PVs.142.
In the second faze of “Operation Overload”, launched in 1974, another 240,000 were
resettled.143
The ‘Political’ Mutation of the ANC, 1972-1974
Following its success in achieving the ‘NO’ vote in 1972, the ANC manoeuvred to
transform itself from a pressure group run by volunteers into a full fledged political
party. This was a dangerous move, especially in the context of the increasing
guerrilla activity since 1972, so it was imperative that the new party should not
show any links with the exiled movements involved in the war, at the same time as it
pushed for a national constitutional convention. Meanwhile, the Rhodesian
government was wary of these plans and moved to pre-empt them by targeting
leaders of the movement for arrest. This suppression by the government posed
another challenge for the transformation of the ANC, and, in 1973, it lost two
members of the executive, Michael Mawema and Eddison Zvobgo, who both left the
country. The ANC resolved to follow a twofold path to liberation involving the
intensification of the armed struggle, at the same time as leaving the door open for
negotiations with the Smith regime. In 1973, Muzorewa embarked on a series of
regional and international trips to solicit support, while at the same time pressing
for a national constitutional convention back at home. Smith and the RF continued to
insist that the Smith-Home proposals that had been rejected by the African majority
in 1972 should constitute the basis of any further negotiations, but, by September
1973, they were loosening up. In July, Smith summoned Muzorewa to consider a
new offer he was making which was no more than making available a further six
parliamentary seats for Africans. Other nationalists frowned upon the whole deal,
which was not helped by the Smith government’s continued persecution of ANC
leaders amidst these consultations. The ANC Deputy President, Nason Ndhlovu, and
the acting national organising secretary, John Chirisa, were thrown into detention at
the time. These are the circumstances in which Eddison Zvobgo resigned his post as
Director of the ANC’s External Mission in protest to become ZANU’s Secretary
General. In his autobiography, Muzorewa argues
(141) Manungo, K.D.. The Role Peasants Played in the Zimbabwe War of Liberation with Special Emphasis on
Chiweshe District. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ohio University, 1991: See p.171.
(142) Flower, K. Serving Secretly:An Intelligence Chief on Record Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981. London
and Harare: John Murray in Association with Quest Publishing, 1987: See p.122.
(143) Parker, J. Assignment Selous Scouts. See p.26.
that his mission to end the bloodshed caused by the war was misinterpreted by his
nationalist colleagues and misrepresented by the Smith regime in a propaganda stunt
to divide the nationalist movement. In any case the negotiations came to nought, and
a modified version became the basis of the Anglo-American proposals that led to the
Geneva conference. Meanwhile, for all his work in leading the nationalist movement
inside Rhodesia, Muzorewa was awarded a United Nations Human Rights award
in December 1974.144 The ANC finally announced publicly that it rejected the
Smith Proposals, arguing that the additional six seats would not alter the whites’
two-thirds majority in parliament. However, soon after making this announcement,
the publicity secretary, Dr. Edson Sithole, was thrown into prison. Amidst all these
developments, the Frontline States emerged as the most formidable force
determining the fate of the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle. It is crucial to
understand what this coalition stood for before actually analysing their role in the
events that unfolded after 1974.
The Frontline States Controversy, 1974
The earliest countries to gain independence in central and southern Africa gathered
around a solidarity coalition known as the Pan African Movement for East Central
and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). Of these, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaire went a
step further to provide rear bases for liberation movements in the region, and even
beyond in such places as the Seychelles and the Comoros Islands.145 These
countries became known as the ‘Mulungushi Club’, who worked hand in glove
with the OAU Liberation Committee to offer assistance to the various liberation
movements waging their struggles in the region. Later, when Mobutu’s Zaire fell
by the wayside, Tanzania and Zambia remained to form the core that gave rise to
the Frontline States. With the independence of Mozambique and Angola, this core
was expanded to incorporate these newcomers and Botswana, as well as providing
representation to the liberation movements still fighting for independence.
Two main views have dominated the interpretation of the role of the Frontline
States in the liberation of Zimbabwe. The first and popular view perceives this
coalition as primarily providing assistance to the Zimbabwean liberation movement
at their economic and political peril. These sacrifices were made in three broad
areas: provision of military bases and logistical support for the execution of the
war, diplomatic support given to the Zimbabwean nationalists throughout the
various negotiations they entered during and after the war, and lastly, keeping the
nationalists united in their demands.146 According to this view, the bonds
cemented by this regional cooperation during the Zimbabwean liberation war laid a
firm foundation for the formation of the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference
(144) Muzorewa. Rise up and Walk. See pp.131-133.

(145) Temu, A. “Landmarks of a History of the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa: The Hashim Mbita Project.”
Dar es Salaam: Workshop to Launch the Hashim Mbita Project, 2006. p.1.
(146) Thompson, C.B. Challenge to Imperialism: The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe. Harare:
Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985: See pp.2-3.
1994
(SADCC) after Zimbabwe’s independence and continues to inspire the legacy of
regional cooperation to this day.
The second argument departs from this view and seeks to define the idea of
“frontlinestatism” as the “tendency for nations nearest a theatre of socio-political
upheaval to want to get involved with the outcome”.147 In Africa, although the
term was popularised in 1974, “frontlinestatism” was as old as the African struggle
for independence as a whole. The general trend in Africa, however, was that in any
given conflict some nations became “more frontline than others” either because of
their proximity to the theatre of conflict or because of their desire to protect certain
interests in the outcome of the conflict. According to the logic of this argument,
each nation in the frontline of conflict supports the particular liberation movement
most consistent and compatible with its interests. In the Angolan conflict, for instance,
Congo sponsored the MPLA, Zaire sponsored the National Front for the Liberation
of Angola (FNLA), and Zambia sponsored UNITA, and these three constituted
the cohort of Angola’s Frontline States. In the case of Zimbabwe’s liberation, this
argument submits that Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda took the front seat in October
1974 when he was at the centre of the Anglo-American initiative and in contact with
South Africa. By November, he had incorporated Tanzania, Botswana, and
FRELIMO to constitute the initial “four frontline states”. Angola was incorporated
only after its 1975 civil war, and upon the insistence of Mozambique (since Kaunda
begrudgingly accepted MPLA victory over UNITA). Tanzania, which was
geopolitically far from the centre of conflict, is said to have been incorporated
through the long term friendship and paternal relationship Kaunda had with
Nyerere, the TANZAM, which in turn was nourished by the ‘father-son’ relationship
between Nyerere and Samora Machel, fostered through Nyerere’s role in the
formation of FRELIMO and his support for Machel’s ascendancy to power after the
death of Eduardo Mondlane. Angola was more concerned with the liberation of
Namibia in the desire to ward off the South African threat, while Botswana was
militarily insignificant to voice anything in the coalition. This scenario left Kaunda
with a free hand, not only to decide the course of liberation, but to anoint the leader
of the process. This argument suggests that because of Kaunda’s long standing
personal friendship with Joshua Nkomo, he was much more prepared to see him as
leader and ZAPU as the sole authentic liberation movement. Kaunda, it is argued,
perceived Zimbabwe’s liberation from Nkomo’s point of view, which is why he was
prepared to see only Nkomo negotiating with Smith, nobody else, and was much
more hostile to the presence of movements other than ZAPU in Zambia.148
Although this second argument is developed by a scholar with ZANU sympathies,
who subscribes to the structuralist ‘struggles within the struggle’ thesis along tribal
lines, could this thesis explain the various contradictions within the Zimbabwean
(147) Sithole, M. Frontlinestatism and the Zimbabwe Question. Salisbury: Ryanson House, 1978: See p.6.
(148) Ibid. See pp.12-13.
struggle? Indeed, by 1974, the Frontline States were not a coalition of like-minded
people. They brought together diverse views of liberation: Zambia, Angola, and
Mozambique had strong Soviet links with Marxist-Leninist leanings, while
Tanzania was more attached to China and subscribed to more Maoist concepts of the
struggle. The question for Zimbabwe remains: how were these ideological
differences reconciled amongst these supporters in order that they chart the path to
liberation for which the Frontline States have been credited?
Détente and the UANC, 1975
Meanwhile,amidstthesedevelopments,the SouthAfrican Prime Minister JohnVorster
and President Kenneth Kaunda went into talks to facilitate peace in Rhodesia under
the emergent American policy of détente.What was in it for Vorster? One may ask. Ian
Smith in his memoirs quotes Vorster seeking Zimbabwean nationalist and Frontline
States approval for their recognition of his apartheid South Africa as it was. “I’ve
got them eating out of my hands...” he reportedly bragged,“...They have promised
that if I can help them solve the Rhodesian problem they will acknowledge South
Africa as we are today.”149 Through their initiative and the cooperation of the
Frontline States, all the detained nationalist leaders were released from prison to
attend talks in Lusaka. Joshua Nkomo and Joseph Msika arrived from
Gonakudzingwa representing ZAPU. ZANU, who had just deposed Ndabaningi
Sithole as President of the organisation while at Que Que Prison, sent Robert
Mugabe and Morton Malianga, but the Frontline States refused to recognise them
and sent them back. Sithole was called in only to arrive after the meeting was
over.150 FROLIZI, which was nearly moribund, was represented by James
Chikerema, and Bishop Muzorewa and his deputy Dr. Elliot Gabellah stood in for
the ANC together with Edson Sithole who had also been released. The Lusaka
meeting consisted primarily of instructions by the Frontline leaders for the various
nationalist parties to form a unified front to negotiate with the Rhodesians. From the
outset, the question of leadership was a thorny issue, dragging the talks on for more
than a week. Initially Kaunda wanted Joshua Nkomo to lead the coalition and only
him to be released and invited to the talks, but other Frontline leaders resisted this
approach. He further pushed that Nkomo be retained as leader with Muzorewa as
his deputy and Sithole as Secretary General, but ZANU fiercely opposed anything
led by Nkomo and Sithole. In this way, they settled for Muzorewa as a neutral
unifying figure. On the 7th of December, all the parties appended their signatures to
a Declaration of Unity at Lusaka’s state house, bringing about the United ANC. Side
by side with these unity talks, the Frontline leaders were meeting representatives of
the South African and Rhodesian governments to strike a deal to bring about
ceasefire, facilitate the withdrawal of South African troops, and convene
(149) Smith, I.D. The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith. London: Blake Publishing, 1997: See
p.166.
(150) For a detailed description of the circumstances leading to the overthrow of Sithole, see Martin and Johnson,
The Struggle for Zimbabwe. See pp.147-149.
1994
a constitutional conference.151 Smith had not intended the release of the detainees
to be a permanent arrangement, nor did he expect that the negotiations should lead
to immediate majority rule. The ANC and Julius Nyerere, however, pressed for
these issues, respectively, as a precondition for negotiations. Smith initially released
only about a third of the detainees and the rest in December. Talks with the UANC
began in February 1975, but in March Ndabaningi Sithole was re-detained on
allegations of plotting to assassinate members of the ANC executive. Practically all
of the released leaders lived under the threat of re-detention and naturally the talks
went nowhere and failed to stop the war, although Smith’s propaganda machinery
was already at work to give the impression to freedom fighters that the talks meant
ceasefire.
Some of the freedom fighters certainly felt that détente was a betrayal by the
politicians. In the spirit of détente, however, the South Africans had begun to withdraw
their troops and arrange meetings with the freedom fighters. In one incident on 23
December 1975, such a meeting was arranged on the Mazoe Bridge where five
South African policemen were persuaded to lay down their arms, but were all shot
by the freedom fighters.152 The detente initiative was to be tested at the Victoria
Falls Bridge meeting, and again it is interesting to note the different accounts of why
the talks failed. Ian Smith gives the impression that in all his negotiations with
Kaunda and Vorster, he had been reassured that Victoria Falls would be a declaration
of intent on both sides to negotiate, build the necessary mechanisms to discuss
proposals for a settlement, and then set a date for a conference to ratify the
proposals, preferably in Rhodesia. It was not the occasion to demand immediate
majority rule.153 The nationalists, on their side, demanded ‘majority rule now’,
and, if there were to be any other talks, they demanded the release of all the
remaining detainees and immunity from further arrests. Smith refused, and the
meeting adjourned, never to be reconvened, and so ended the so-called ‘Bridge
Talks’. Developments after this meeting can, however, be confusing to the student
of African nationalism, especially if it is accepted that two key leaders of the ANC,
Bishop Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo, not only started fighting to control the
organisation, but also went into separate talks with Ian Smith.
The Struggle to Control the ANC, 1975
The release of the nationalist leaders led to many new developments. First, the threat
of re-detention compelled most of them to quickly leave the country; secondly,
freedom in practice meant that they could contest the leadership of the UANC or each
return to the business of their respective parties and resume their different agendas
at the expense of this fragile unity. Each of the parties held different meetings and
soon the factional bickering of the 1960s returned to Rhodesian townships as their
followers fought each other and threw petrol bombs in 1975. The new power struggle
pitted Joshua Nkomo against Abel Muzorewa as each sought control of the UANC.
(151) Ibid. Chapter 12.

(152) Smith, I.D. The Great Betrayal. See
p.166. (153) Ibid. pp.176-182.
Joshua Nkomo, who believed that he commanded the largest following, with
ZAPU branches all over the country, pushed for a UANC congress to confirm his
natural leadership of the liberation movement. Muzorewa resisted. The continued
fighting irked the Frontline leaders, who summoned the UANC leadership to Dar
es Salaam to admonish them. Here is Muzorewa’s version:
In his bid for leadership Mr. Nkomo had claimed that he was the one who had been
instrumental in forming the African National Council in December 1971. He said that
he had instructed me to form the Council and that therefore I was obligated to him,
or under his command. Both Mr. Josiah Chinamano of ZAPU and Dr. Edson Sithole
of ZANU stood up to refute this claim. They pointed out that they were the ones who
had approached me to head the ANC, and there was no mention that I was to be a
provisional leader until Mr. Nkomo gained release from detention. I was relieved to
hear that I was not in any way obligated to Mr. Nkomo, and that the Consultative
Meeting confirmed that the leadership of the ANC would remain in my hands.154
Nkomo’s reason for pushing for a congress, according to him, had much to do with
the UANC’s lack of an army. As he writes:
It was unfortunate that there was no single national army. But military unity could
not come until we had a unified political direction, and that was the aim of the Lusaka
agreement, to hold elections for the leadership of the nationalist movement. The
agreement was that these elections should be held at a national congress bringing
together all the parties making up the African National Council. But it was impossible
to hold such a congress, since both Bishop Muzorewa and the Reverend Ndabaningi
Sithole had decided to leave the country. Rather than leave the national movement
without any leadership, ZAPU decided to go ahead and hold its Congress on 26-27
September 1975. The congress elected a new leadership, and once again
Zimbabwean nationalism had a genuine voice, the ANC Zimbabwe.155
Although this Nkomo faction could have been considered the ANC’s ‘internal wing’,
it was in essence a revival of ZAPU. The membership was itself conspicuously
partisan with Nkomo as president, Josiah Chinamano vice president, Joseph Msika
as General Secretary, Amon Jirira as Treasurer, Samuel Munodawafa as national
chairman, and William Khona as National Vice-Chairman.
Muzorewa and his group responded by expelling Nkomo, Samuel Munodawafa,
and Killion Bhebe from the ANC in order to “protect the integrity, unity and security
of the ANC and the future of the people of Zimbabwe”. They, in turn, planned the
so-called Consultative Assembly of 26 October 1975 to be the “properly constituted
annual congress of the ANC.” In his own mind, Muzorewa thought that Nkomo was
making all the moves to position himself as leader of any outcome of the negotiations
which he had already engaged with Ian Smith. The ANC Publicity Secretary, Dr.
Edson Sithole, in his public statements consistently reiterated the issue of this
collusion of interest between the Nkomo faction of the UANC and the Smith
regime. He was
(154) Ibid. p.157.

(155) Nkomo, J. The Story of My Life. Harare: Sapes Books, 2001: See p.161.
1994
abducted by Rhodesian Secret agents at the New Ambassador Hotel on 15 October
1975, soon after making an announcement that “officers of the state” were interfering
with the preparations of the planned Muzorewa consultative assembly.156 He was
never to be seen again.
The major sticking point for the UANC was the absence of an army, yet it was
not so much that such an army would be unachievable, more than it was really a
question of who would control it. In July 1975, the Frontline States had pushed for the
formation of the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC) composed of the armies of all
the bickering factions. This would facilitate the intensification of the armed struggle,
in the event that talks failed. The ZLC was stillborn. ZAPU members in exile
refused to participate in it, and ZANU members Simon Muzenda, Michael
Mawema, and others abandoned it soon thereafter, leaving James Chikerema
effectively in control as Secretary General. The united army was supposed to be
called the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA) with Bishop Muzorewa as
‘Commander-in Chief ’. It will be recalled that, of all the signatories to the UANC
pact, only ZAPU and ZANU had functioning armies and neither Chikerema nor
Muzorewa could count on controlling both. It was under this illusion as
‘Commander in Chief’ that Muzorewa decided to go into exile in Mozambique,
ostensibly to be close to the theatre of war and to come into contact with the
trainees; there, he met with plenty of surprises.
Problems in ZANU, 1974-1975

Nhari Rebellion
Towards the end of December 1974, ZANU experienced an insurrection amongst
its fighting forces in the frontline led by Thomas Nhari (Raphael Chinyanganya) and
Dakarai Badza. They have both been variously linked to secret connections with
the Rhodesian Special Branch who convinced them that independence was near and
that they were being used to fight the war ‘and die’, while their leaders lived in
luxury in Zambia and Mozambique. ZANU was not grounded in the front as a result
of its new strategy. While Chitepo still wanted to push on with the offensive begun
in 1973, his benefactors Kaunda and Nyerere were emphasising restraint in the
context of détente. This position inevitably put a strain on the resources that ZANU
could commit to the war effort. So, genuinely, its cadres were experiencing a
number of operational problems with shortages in both ammunition and supplies.
Others have tried to link the Nhari rebels with the frustrations of the Manyika under
the perceived dominance of the Karanga in the Dare reChimurenga following the
elections of 1973, where Manyika notables such as Simpson Mutambanengwe and
Noel Mukono either lost key positions or were demoted.157 More recent
revelations, however, trace the rebellion to Cornelius Sanyanga, a Zimbabwean
employee of Lonrho who connived with fifteen ZANLA commanders to get rid of
radical elements within the ZANLA
(156) CCJP. Civil War in Rhodesia. Salisbury: CCJP, 1975. Rpt. Harare: CCJP, 1999. pp.56-60.
(157) Bhebe, N. Simon Vengayi Muzenda. Gweru: Mambo Press, 2004: See pp.177-179.
high command to pave the way for international investment in an independent

Zimbabwe. Some pro-Russian commanders on their part were keen to eliminate their
pro-Chinese seniors, hoping that Russian support and superior Russian weapons
would accelerate the armed struggle.158 The conspirators are said to have met with
Rhodesian “colonels” to arrange for the transfer of power from “one army to another”
without involving the politicians in Salisbury or Lusaka. The story of how the
rebels proceeded to capture several members of the Dare has been well recorded in
various texts of the Zimbabwean struggle. One person affected by the insurrection,
Josiah Tungamirai, relates his experiences as follows:
On the 10th of December 1974, when Ian Smith was broadcasting his ceasefire in the
radios, in Zambia in a township known as Kamwala, a serious misunderstanding took
place between liberation fighters. Some comrades led by Nhari and Dakarai Badza
turned against the party leadership. Tongogara’s wife and children, as well as some
members of the Dare, were captured. What bothered me is that this took place when
some leaders like Comrade Tongogara and Comrade Herbert Chitepo were away in
Romania. Comrades Nhongo, Kangai, Mupunzarima, Gumbo, and Chauke were in
China. They [Nhari and his colleagues] saw this as the best opportunity to rebel. These
dissidents then took me and other remaining commanders and said, “Look comrades,
these leaders of ours are living large and overspending; they are all old so we don’t
need them anymore. They have failed to supply us with the weapons. We have now
decided to go to Chifombo to capture that camp. We have seen that the war cannot
proceed amidst this confusion.” I did not personally agree with what they were
saying, so I challenged them with alternative views saying, “Comrades! Why would
you want to destroy the revolution in such a bad way, why don’t you be gentlemen
enough? If there are some leaders who you have lost confidence in, then call for
their dismissal otherwise dismissing all of them would destroy our struggle and
party.” I realised I was just wasting my time, nobody heard me, these dissidents
never cared to listen to anyone supporting the current leadership. To them they
wanted a total overhaul; everyone opposed to this was their enemy. Anything that
was subversive to the party could not be tolerated. They remained adamant and they
insisted that all of them, from Chitepo to the lowest rank should be dismissed. When
they realised that I did not I agree with them they imprisoned me. Since I had
become their prisoner, they could not waste their time talking to me. They tied me
with some fibre ropes to the extent that I could not free myself. This frustrated me
because they kept me as is done to any prisoner. Being a prisoner is painful,
especially if you are imprisoned by your close one. The dissidents surrounded me. I
was tied at my legs and wrists and made to walk like that for seven days on our way
to Chifombo, a distance of approximately eighty kilometres. Whilst we were on the
way, when we reached south of the Zambezi River, we met other armed comrades.
From that group, thirty five were selected, including some who were amongst us and
they were put on a firing squad and they all perished there. Up to now I don’t
understand how I escaped this predicament. When others were being selected for the
killing, I and others were left alive. When we got to Zambezi River they began to
argue, with Badza saying,“Let us murder Josiah, wafa-wafa [death-
University Press, 2003. p.23.
1994
trap] guys.” Nevertheless, they didn’t kill me as they had intended as other dissidents
expected. Eventually we arrived at Tresela Camp, in Mukumbura area and we met
some female guerrillas who had come from Chingwea [Nachingweya] in Tanzania.
Most of the comrades, who supported Nhari, did that out of fear. What could they do
after having seen the imprisonments, torture, and murder which was perpetrated by
Nhari’s rebels? Even on our way, they ordered some comrades to surrender their
arms. What else could they have done? It is the code of conduct for one to obey the
commander’s orders without any objections. The likes of comrade Lovemore Chakadya
and Peter Ngwenya were buried alive. These were destroyed and they perished.
These dissidents were very ruthless. Up to now I don’t even know how I managed to
escape the hands of these murderers, but I would like to think I was saved by God
and the ancestral spirit of the Chifambausiku dynasty, which stood firm for me. Now
what can we say? Comrades were beaten and they were burnt with some cigarettes
and they were accused of supporting Tongogara. We arrived at Chifombo and we met
Sheba ‘Fox’ Gava, who was the provincial Commander in this area. These dissidents
arrived at the Chifombo Camp and they said, ‘Comrade Gava come and see. We have
brought two white Rhodesian prisoners, let’s go and see them.’ When they got into
the bush, Comrade Gava realised that he was now a bandit and the guns were aimed
at his chest and they said, ‘We have taken over the control of this camp, where is
Tongo?’ The man ran out of his mind and became short of words. What could he have
done? His fellow comrades had turned against him.159
William Ndangana, who himself was a Manyika, pursues the tribal argument and
believes he was a victim of the rebellion because he had refused to be part of the
Nhari arrangement. They had incorporated him in their plan because Ndangana was
Ndau. He was also from the east and by proximity he ought to join the Manyika. His
refusal was taken to be selling out. Here is his detailed account:
I knew them [the rebels] because they were always accusing me of lack of tribalism.
I respect people who lack tribalism. They were all from Manicaland and tried to
organise us along tribal lines. Chitepo even complained about these [tribalistic]
characters. The other tribalist was Hamadziripi (a Karanga). He would befriend
Mukono, particularly after the latter’s being voted out of Secretary for Defence. A lot
of private meetings took place among these elements. When the rebels tried to
overthrow the High Command, Hamadziripi and Mukono knew about it. What
Hamadziripi did not know was that there was an element which was killing the
Karanga and killing all sorts of people who had close relations and were
collaborating with the Karanga. So there were a lot of killings. When the rebels had
done this, they marched to Chifombo to terrorise the camp. From the camp they
headed for Lusaka. They arrived in Lusaka in December 1974.
When they arrived, I was at the office and it was here that we had our records. My
duty was that of Chief of Staff so that I supervised the whole administration. Dziso
(General Staff), Pedzisai Mabhunu, and Mbuya Tsitsi worked with me. Tongogara
was also there and he was the Chief of Defence. When they came in I enquired for a
report and Nhari showed me a very hostile attitude. I tried to enquire and he talked
rubbish. I chucked him out. Hamadziripi tried to intervene but I insisted on the proper
(159) Makari, C. Magamba eChimurenga. Gweru: Mambo Press, 2003: See pp.96-98.
protocol for him to have an interview with me. He asked for money and we gave him
$250 and K100. The rebels consisted of Nhari, Caesar, Molife, Cephas Tichatonga,
Sam Chandawa, and Timothy Chiridza (driver). The three members of the General
Staff were Nhari, Cephas, and Sam. They wanted to go back by a Land Rover by
11:30 am. Nhari now behaved normal. They left and we remained to work as usual.
We worked normal hours. There were no hours of loafing. Often I used to go with
Mayor Urimbo. Meanwhile the rebels drove for 40km by the Chipata road, made a u-
turn and came back at night. By then they had already made some arrests at the
camps. They had arrested Sheba Gava who commanded Chifombo. They had gone
to the Zambia-Zimbabwe- Border (ZZB) and found that the commander, Rex Nhongo,
was in China. They caught Cephas Ndanga who was the Deputy to Rex Nhongo. The
Political Commissar was Peter Sheba. Ndanga and Gava were to be treated as
enemies. They arrived back in Lusaka at 5:30 pm. They saw Chimurenga whose
character was very strange and they wanted him to take them to the Chief of
Operations. Chimurenga played diversionary tactics. He took them to his own house.
The coup group then tried to find my house, but they could not find it until they
walked on foot, asking for the house. They got there at 11 pm. I opened the door for
the four. They told me they had problems with their car. The car was reported to be
houses away. I repaired the car and asked them to come back into the house and sleep.
They said John Mataure would give them the car if Ndangana allowed it. I went with
them and got the car from Mataure. Chemist Ncube said, you have the car. Mataure
pretended not to know the coup plot. They volunteered to take me back home. There
was no respect for my rank. I was not taken to my house. Instead I was taken to a
slaughter place. Then they pointed a pistol at me, forcing me to go to the forefront.
We went to Chigowe’s place. When we got to Chigowe’s place they bashed his door.
Just before we got to Chigowe, they tied up my hands. There was moonlight.
Chigowe’s wife came out naked and I prevented them from shooting her. Then we
left for Chimurenga’s house, where I and Sheba were arrested. We were called traitors
and the others were called rebels. Then we went to Dabulamanzi’s house. They wanted
to shoot him, until I persuaded him to cooperate. They wanted to get to Chifombo
during the night, but we had a tyre puncture. Nhari wanted to shoot me. We left the
Land Rover with one of them. When we got to Chifombo, Badza was there and we
were made to run to where Gava, Tungamirai, Teurai, and Loveness were tied up and
were being beaten and tortured. Mationesa was abusing me. At 1:30 am, Badza came
and he was respected by the rebels as the new chief. He said Ngangana is a stooge
because I was under the Karanga dominance. They told me that they were going to
put me on a firing squad with Tongogara, Hamadziripi, and others. We were then
ordered to go out with Tandi, who was Badza’s brother-in-law, Pfumo and Roy, at 3
am. We walked on foot carrying food supplies. We got to Kashiri, who had promoted
himself camp commandant. They said they took an oath of success of
the coup. When we got there, we found the northeast povo having been given a lot
of cattle. We were guarded by women. Roy killed one comrade as he now practised
summary justice. Three days before the rescue team, we witnessed the interrogation
and beating to death of somebody.
After three days, Tungamirai and Chimurenga escaped. The guards were either
beaten or killed on accusations of negligence. I saw the killing with my own
eyes.When Badza heard of this, he gave orders that we, the remaining prisoners
should be killed on the 12th of January 1975. Tongogara and Nhongo got a new group
from Tanzania to
1994
rescue us and it managed to defuse Chifombo. Elias Hondo led the rescue team. When
they got the letter with the news of the rescue operation, Kashiri and Tandi never
came to kill us. There was an exchange of fire between the rescue team and the
rebels. I managed to break the ropes and ran away to the FRELIMO camp. I was
barefooted and almost naked. I took a bath and they gave me clothes. I was
extremely smelly. I was joined by Gava and others the following day. Kashiri, Tandi,
and others were killed. We were very thin after having been underfed. When we got
to Chifombo we joined Chitepo, Kangai, Hove, and the rest of the Dare. Chimurenga
had not arrived. We held review meetings of the killings that had taken place.
Mataure was reviewed for assisting the rebels and he was suspected.160
William Ndangana also gives details of how the ZANLA command system was
restructured after the suppression of the Nhari rebellion as follows:
RESTRUCTURING OF THE ZANLA HIGH COMMAND, 1975
Chief of Defence: Josiah Tongogara
Chief of Operations: W.H. Ndangana
(Chief of Operations to work from ZMB at Chifombo.)
Political Commissar: M. Urimbo
Chief of Information and Secretary: C. Chigowe
Chief of Camp Commandant of All Camps: Robson Manyika
Provincial Commander BZB: J. Chimurenga
Provincial Commander ZZB: Rex Nhongo
Provincial Commander ZMB: Sheba Gava
Chief Logistics and Supply: J. Chauke
Deputy for Logistics: C. Dabulamanzi
Camps Political Commissar: Dzinashe Machingura
Military Attaché: Elias Hondo
Provincial Political Commissar: Cuthbert Chimedza
Provincial Political Commissar: Josiah Tungamirai
Provincial Political Commissar: D. Moyo
Camp Security and Intelligence: J.
Nyikadzinashe Provincial Security and
Intelligence: E. Seke
Provincial Security and Intelligence: Sarudzai Isaac Chinamaropa
Provincial Security and Intelligence: Patrick Mpunzarima
Rugare Gumbo confirms the links between the rebels and the Smith regime. When
the rebellion took place, he had been away leading a ZANU delegation to China and
on his return, he found that all the political leaders detained in Rhodesia had been
released and some of them were at Mulungushi. One evening after a meeting with the
former detainees, he was waylaid by the rebels driving a lorry, who had come to
arrest him and Mukudzei Mudzi. They were distracted by John Mataure’s car which
sped past them (Mataure was apparently involved in the Nhari conspiracy). They
headed
(160) Interview with William Ndangana by Prof. Bhebe, (Harare) 12 July 1984.
for Tongogara’s house and there was pandemonium there until the Zambian police
arrived. The police arrested everybody, including the captives Kangai and
Mudzi.161 Kangai had been abducted on his way from a meeting with Kaunda at
State House and was thrown into the rebels’ lorry, but they were all intercepted by
the Zambian police. One of the rebels, believing that their mission had been foiled,
attempted to kill everybody in the car with a hand grenade amidst pleas from all the
prisoners and his colleagues. Meanwhile the police, according to Kangai, were
...firing randomly, threatening to fire at us and shouting hands up! Then I said to
Mukudzi Mudzi, what have we done? We are now lumped together with the rebels.
I then turned to the Zambian police and said, I think you are making a terrible
mistake. There are two groups of people here – the people who have been kidnapped
and the rebels who have kidnapped us. So I asked, why are you lumping us together?
The police shouted back, you are talking too much, shut up. I insisted, we want you to
understand our situation. In the end, one of them came forward and said to his friend,
yes I think he has a point there.
While we were having these exchanges with the police, there was a Zambian
riot squad which advanced towards us, firing at us. They were also shouting, “You
people don’t want independence, what are you doing you fools? You fight amongst
yourselves, what are you doing?” And all this was accompanied by firing. It was
most terrifying and I saw one of the female comrades urinating on herself. But I kept
on saying, can you just give us a minute so that we can explain what is happening. I
was with His Excellency President Kaunda, participating in the discussion at State
House, and, as I got to one of the houses where we were staying, I was arrested by
these people. And now you are lumping us together with our kidnappers.
Finally someone said fine, we will sort you out. He separated the captors from the
captives. The rebels were put in one car and we were put in another car. By that time,
it was at dawn between 4 and 5 am. We had been there for almost the whole night. In
the morning, they let all those who had been kidnapped go and detained the rebels. We
then continued with the meeting at the State house. But the rebels were released after
being detained for only one day.162
When they were released, the rebels headed off to Chifombo where another group
that had captured Josiah Tungamirai, Sheba Gava, and William Ndangana had gone.
Meanwhile, Rex Nhongo, who had foreseen the possibility of a mutiny before he
left with Gumbo and others on the mission to China, arrived on a flight a day later
than Gumbo. Judging the attitudes of his colleagues in the front, he had withdrawn
all the weapons back to Zambia. So when the trouble began, Nhongo took Cletos
Chigowe with him to retrieve the weapons. They returned to Lusaka with all the
weapons and quickly arranged for a group that was still undergoing training in
Tanzania to come immediately to the rescue. It arrived, but on that night Nhongo
had an accident and was hospitalised, leaving the rescue mission to Chifombo to be
led by his deputy Patrick Mupunzarima. They stormed Chifombo and managed to
secure the release
(161) Interview with Rugare Gumbo by Prof. Bhebe, (Masvingo) 04 May 2007.
(162) Interview with Kumbirai Kangai by Prof. Bhebe.
1994
of Ndangana, Dauramanzi, and Gava.163 However, the leaders of the rebellion
were still at large and according to Nhongo it was agreed that they should call them
in for a discussion to settle the matter at Kaswende. Nhari and his colleagues fell
for the trick and were rounded up and arrested. There are varied accounts, however,
of how the events unfolded. The following accounts are simply variants that have
not been presented before. According to Luise White, a committee was set up to
investigate the mutiny at the Chimurenga General Council of 22 January 1975. It
was composed of Chitepo, Gumbo, and Kangai. Although the investigation was
never completed, somehow Tongogara announced a list of those implicated,
amongst them Noel Mukono, Mukudzei Mudzi, John Mataure, Simpson
Mutambanengwe, Cornelius Sanyanga, Nelson Dziruni, Richard Hove and his wife,
and Sekai Holland. Chitepo was named as a suspect for whom there was no evidence
at the moment.164 Of these, only Mataure was present and he spoke in his defence
to no avail; he was executed together with Nhari at once. The rest left Zambia or
sought police protection. Chitepo, who had promised the Zambian government that
the rebels would not be executed, was found in the difficult position of being a
suspect himself and having to sign the execution orders as Chairman of the Dare. He
now lived in open fear for his life.165 It is also alleged that all the political leaders
were against the executions, but were in no position to oppose Tongogara who was
determined to execute them all. Fay Chung believes Tongogara certainly wanted to
eliminate potential rivals, and was successful, in this case, in having Mataure
executed. Richard Hove, another potential rival was saved by his wife, who stripped
naked in front of Kaunda and managed to get Kaunda to order her husband’s
release.166
All this was happening amidst the unity talks to establish the UANC as elaborated
above and it has frequently been suggested that Kaunda’s government had a hand
in the Nhari rebellion judged by what they did or did not do to facilitate the mutiny
or the release of the rebels. Zambia was already experiencing an economic crisis
as a result of the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia, so it would “easily support any
group that would weaken ZANU and ZANLA, including the Nhari group, because of
ZANU’s refusal to hand in its arms as part of the détente exercise.”167 This
situation was not helped by the killing of Chitepo two months later.
The Chitepo Assassination of March 1975
There has never been a subject as controversial in the struggle for Zimbabwe as the
death of Herbert Chitepo, who was killed by a car bomb planted in the front wheel of
his VW Beetle on 18 March 1975. To date, several theories have been developed
about the reasons for his killing, the identity of his assailants, and the effects of his
death on
(163) Interview between Dr. N. Shamuyarira and Rex Nhongo, 17 July 1984.
University Press, 2003. See pp.39-40.
(165) Ibid. p.40.
(166) Chung, F. Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. See p.94.
(167) Ibid.
the future of the struggle. A survey of these theories has been done by Luise White.
Here, we emphasise the testimonies of Chitepo’s contemporaries. But first, we
explore claims by those who openly admit to have killed Chitepo, the Rhodesians.
According to Peter Stiff, the Rhodesian intelligence wanted Chitepo dead because
“we believed his early demise would create just the right climate at the moment.
Besides that, he is a dangerous and important member of ZANU.”168 Martin and
Johnson submit that Chitepo had been a Rhodesian Central Intelligence
Organization (CIO) target since 1969, when he was identified as the brains behind
the review in military strategy and the conduct of the guerrilla war.169 He had been
opposed to talks and indeed to the whole détente exercise, arguing, “There will be
no talks, no negotiations, no discussions involving our movement until Mr. Smith
recognises the right to immediate majority rule. …[T]he war goes on and it will
continue until we have liberated every acre of our country.”170 Such an attitude cost
him even the support of Nyerere and Kaunda, who called him a ‘Black Napoleon’.
Yet even though he posed so much danger to the Rhodesians, different accounts
regarding the identity of two different Rhodesian assassins have since emerged, one
implicating Chuck Hinde and the other Taffy Bryce.171
On the other hand, his own colleagues in ZANU have been implicated in his death,
which was the reason why Kaunda arrested all the ZANU High Command and threw
them into jail soon after Chitepo’s funeral. There have been reports about Chitepo
receiving several warnings that his colleagues were plotting to kill him. He seems
also to have had several premonitions of the same murder, which he expressed in the
many letters he wrote to President Kaunda, Kamuzu Banda, and others. Henry
Hamadziripi recalls that on 31 October 1974, a mysterious fire gutted ZANU offices
in Lusaka, and the main offices affected, it seemed, were those of Chitepo and
Mukudzei Mudzi. The Zambian Police refused to investigate, but instead issued
threats to Chitepo and Edson Sithole. There was increasing hostility towards Chitepo
from both within Zambia and from Tanzania’s Foreign Minister, John Malicheya. In
light of this situation, the Dare actually decided that Chitepo should be
accompanied wherever he went. It is not clear, however, whether the guards were
meant to protect him or to guard him from escaping. Hamadziripi, who travelled to
Addis Ababa with Chitepo to attend an OAU meeting a few days before his death,
had this to say:
...before Chitepo passed away, we went to the OAU. I was in his company. We were
in Nairobi and we met his friend he had trained with in London and he said, ‘Ah!
Believe my eyes?’ We said, why? Then he replied ‘You were supposed to have been
killed, how come you have not been killed? They are after you!’ I was shocked. I
then asked what we were supposed to do then. He said the best was not to allow him
to go back to Zambia or any of these neighbouring countries anymore. All the
same,
(168) Stiff, Peter. The Story of an SAS Assassin. Alberton: Galago Publishing, 1985.
(169) Martin, D. and P. Johnson. The Chitepo Assassination. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985: See p.38.
(170) Ibid, p.23.
(171) Ibid. p.124; Stiff, P. See You in November: See pp.125-127; Martin and Johnson. The Chitepo Assassination:
See p.100.
1994
we proceeded to the OAU Liberation Committee in Addis Ababa. We bought some
clothes which we never used. On the way back, we parted as he took a plane to Arusha
where his family was and I got back home. As soon as I arrived in Lusaka, I phoned his
wife and urged her to keep her husband (Chitepo) for at least more than a week, but
the wife said that at times baba [father] can be difficult and may not be able to keep
him for that long. Then Chitepo demanded to speak to me and we talked. I told him
that it was important to see his family and that I would come and pick him up. But then
he convinced me and said, ‘Look, we have got a trip to Malawi on the 4th of March
1975 where we are going to see Banda’. Then I said, Okay you can come and pick me up.
Chitepo then came in the early hours of the 4th/5th March 1975. I had bought
tickets for our trip to Malawi. Unfortunately, I think Chitepo had talked to some people
in Lusaka that we were crossing into Malawi... The other purpose for our mission to
Malawi was to go and buy enough food for forces who were said to be starving in
Mozambique... I also bought a ticket for Chigowe. When we were about to leave the
airport someone came to me and said I was wanted over a phone call. I think there was
talk to the effect, ‘keep that man there’.
Then Chitepo said to me his last words,‘We are going ahead’and I said‘To go
ahead?’ We booked at Shirte Hotel. I was worried; he was worried. In seven days,
Chitepo went back to Zambia. There were intentions of sending me to Rhodesia.
Chitepo tried to
talk to everyone that I should not be sent to Rhodesia.
We were detained in Malawi for 14 days. Finally Tiny Rowland prevailed,
arguing that I could not be sent to Rhodesia. Tiny was a friend of mine. Then one
morning around 3 or 4 am, someone came to knock at our place and told us that we
were free to leave. We were asked whether we wanted to go to Tanzania or Zambia. I
kept quiet because I was angry. On our way, I found Stanley Mau Mau tied up. He
was going to be one of the people to go with me to Lusaka. Then we went to Lusaka
and Chitepo had been killed that morning but I didn’t know.172
Hamadziripi’s account is interesting in its inconsistencies and secrets. First, it does
not say explicitly who called him to say “Keep that man there.”; secondly, it is not
honest on the reasons for his detention in Malawi. Both issues are controversial
subjects in the story of the assassination of Chitepo. In the report of the Commission
of Inquiry into Chitepo’s death, Hamadziripi was suspected of travelling with Chitepo
in order to kill him and this was revealed in letters Chitepo wrote to President Banda
while in Malawi, which resulted in the Malawian authorities detaining Hamadziripi
and Chigowe for Chitepo’s protection. Later, when Chitepo returned to Lusaka, he
requested the release of the two.173
It is not our object to solve the mystery of Chitepo’s death, but to examine its impact
on the pursuit of the struggle on ZANU’s side. One of the immediate consequences
of Chitepo’s death was that Kaunda ordered the arrest of nearly all members of the
Dare and of ZANLA’s High Command, and appointed an international commission
to investigate Chitepo’s death. The Commission submitted its report, implicating
Chitepo’s colleagues, and the deposed ZANU leader Ndabaningi Sithole endorsed
(172) Interview with Henry Hamadziripi by Prof. Bhebe, (Harare) 14 November 1999.
(173) White, L. The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: See pp.42-43.
its findings by issuing a statement that Chitepo was actually a victim of a Karanga
coup. Sithole argued that the Karanga had manoeuvred from a minority in the early
years of ZANU’s formation to a majority in the High Command, where they were
now bracing themselves for a full take over.174 This assertion was not only refuted
by ZANU’s Eddison Zvobgo in a reply, but also exposed for its inconsistencies.
Zvobgo counter-accused Sithole of having his tribe dominate instead the ANC-
ZLC, whose agenda Sithole and the Frontline leaders were now promoting.175
1975-1980
The ANC-ZLC Fiasco and ZIPRA/ZANLA Clashes in Zambia and
Tanzania, 1975-1976
The feuding in the ANC political leadership spilled over to the guerrillas in the
training camps in more explicit ways, especially following an attempt to place
them together in one camp at Mboroma in Zambia. The ZANLA contingent at
Mboroma had been largely brought in as rank and file detainees arrested after the
Chitepo assassination. Mboroma was originally a ZIPRA camp, where they detained
people whom they “regarded as accomplices of the Smith regime”.176 At a later
stage though, and in the interest of the ANC/ZLC programme, it was converted into
a camp to start joint training of the Zimbabwe Liberation Army, an experiment that
was also pursued concurrently in Tanzania in Morogoro and Iringa. FROLIZI and
ANC guerrillas started trickling in to start the process in earnest. This attempt failed
dismally, largely because of the ZANU situation. The ZLC leadership came into the
camps to apprise the trainees of this new development, but the ZANLA cadres,
now leaderless, interpreted the imprisonment of their leadership as a ploy to stop the
war and negotiate with Smith, a practical move to hijack ZANLA’s “efforts at
pushing the war to the stage it had reached.”177 Stabben Chiweshe (Champion
Pfumo) was one of the ZANLA guerrillas at Mboroma who had this to say:
When we were arrested, we were sent to Mboroma, and the reason why we were
detained at Mboroma was because of a plot by an enemy called Henry Kissinger,
who was a senior enemy to most of Africa that was fighting for liberation. Whenever
he intervened, people suffered, and that was the same with us. We were detained in
the middle of the wilderness where you could only hear the sound of birds, nothing
else. We stayed there for one week, and the detention camp was being filled bit by
bit. Every time they caught one of us, she/he was brought to Mboroma... After the
second week at Mboroma, we started to see members of James Chikerema’s
FROLIZI and also ZIPRA and the UANC and some soldiers from the Rhodesian
Front. We were now five opposing factions detained at one place. We stayed there
throughout 1975, which was the time of détente.
(174) Sithole, N. Statement on the Assassination of H. Chitepo and ZANU. Baumogher, ed. vol. 2 Doc. No 40. 10
May 1976.
(175) Zvobgo, E. ZANU’s Reply to N. Sithole. Baumogher, ed. Vol.2 Doc. 41, c. June 1976.
(176) Nkomo, Joshua. The Story of My Life. London: Methuen, 1984. Rpt. Harare: SAPES Books, 2001: See p.174.
(177) Ibid.
1994
The first incident arose out of the fact that the others, including the Zambians,
were proposing that the war should stop, all the leaders in detention in Zambia to be
released and brought to Mboroma. The whole group detained at Mboroma would
then start the war afresh, with a new leadership. We in ZANU could see that we had
only maybe one or two members of the High Command detained with us at Mboroma,
and maybe three from the General Staff. But ZIPRA had many members of the High
Command there and we knew that. They wanted to put in a leader from ZIPRA and the
head of the new arrangement, and we in ZANU did not agree with that arrangement
and we refused.178
The cadres clearly failed to get along and were suspicious of each other. Serious
problems emerged from fairly petty things, such as cooking duties and surprisingly
the same developments were registered in Tanzania. Champion Pfumo continues :
The problem was that our kitchen was the same, and we had cooking duties, one day
ZANLA, the next day ZIPRA, and so forth. The ZANLA number at Mboroma was
the biggest, and we were the only ones with female combatants there, all the others
had men, very strong giants. It seemed as if they had selected only very strong men
from the other parties so that they would cause chaos at Mboroma. ZANLA had men,
children, old men and women, girls and boys. After we had refused the leadership
arrangement proposed by ZIPRA, one day our meat was poisoned....
Two days after the poisoning, there was a fight. We were fighting with sticks,
stoning each other. It was a ferocious fight. The main bone of contention was that
some of the other people were trying to force us to renounce the armed struggle, and
we in ZANLA did not agree with that, and ZIPRA saying they believed in talks. The
clash ended only after we in ZANLA were moved to another camp about 5km away
from the main camp at Mboroma. We had many recruits who had just come from
Rhodesia, others who had stayed in Zambia for a long time, others who had trained,
but everyone was itching to go and fight the Rhodesians. We then decided that we
could not just pass our days seated and started to teach other politics. We had a full
program for the whole day. If it had been a university, many people would have
graduated from there. Many actually learnt more than they would have learnt in
training in the normal camps....
One day, the leaders of all the parties whose people were detained at Mboroma
came: Sithole for ZANU, Nkomo for ZAPU, Muzorewa for UANC, Chikerema for
FROLIZI. Rhodesia was represented, but I don’t know the person. They came to the
main camp where the food was stored. The Zambian regiments also stayed in the main
camp. When the leaders came, they said that they had agreed to go back to Zimbabwe
and talk to Smith and transfer leadership of the country without further fighting. The
parties would remain separate, but Muzorewa would lead the country when we
went back to Zimbabwe. ZANU refused. We said the time to talk had long gone, we
were here to fight. Sithole, Nkomo, Chikerema, and Muzorewa talked and tried to
persuade us, but we refused then and there at that parade. The Rhodesian Front rep
said nothing. They then left the camp and met with our leaders at the camp, including
Webster Gwauya and Simon Muzenda, who were also under arrest. Muzenda was the
only one allowed out of the camp to talk on our behalf. When those five leaders went
back, we remained.
(178) Interview with Staben Chiweshe (Champion Pfumo) by Charles Maripfonde, (Mt. Darwin) 12 May 2008.
Two days later, some of our comrades went to the main camp to collect our food.
The ZIPRAs and others had already disagreed and had their own mini-camps in the
Mboroma Camp. We were the only group that had vehicles and our guys drove the
vehicles to the main camp, with one driver called Murehwa. Our logistics officer,
who was a woman, was then kidnapped by the ZIPRAs at the main camp. Murehwa
then beat a hasty retreat and came to report what had happened. We then decided to
go and fight. We filled our two Bedfords and went to the main camp. The ZIPRAs
and their Zambian guards were already lying in ambush, knowing that we were
coming. They started firing upon us, using the guns they had captured from us when
we were arrested. Many of us died. Then a whirlwind came and those who were firing
at us and we could not see each other at all. Those firing at us thought that they had
destroyed us, that with their AK47s and NATO they had massacred us. When they
stopped firing they found out we were alive and actually taking our injured and dead
comrades and putting them into our vehicles. Their very first shot had caused the
death of their commander who was sitting in a tent with our captured Logistics
Officer.
Those fighting us then started running away. We lost eight of our comrades to the
firing and others died later in hospital. Some of us we sent to Lusaka Hospital.
Muzenda came to see the injured and the dead. Sithole, who was still in Lusaka,
came and was only inspecting the legs and feet of the dead, who were covered,
maybe two corpses, and then said he would come back to see them when I return
from London where I am going to see my child who is having some stomach
problems. That is when people turned against Sithole, after he had turned against his
guerrillas. Our problem with him was that he had talked to the Rhodesians and
wanted the war to stop, which we refused, and this also led to the shootout at
Mboroma that led to the death of some of us. He refused to attend to those who had
been injured or killed. That was because we had refused his proposal to stop the war
against the Rhodesians. A message was then sent to Rex Nhongo and others, who then
responded by declaring that Sithole was no longer the leader of ZANU. Some of us
had even gone from Mboroma to Tanzania to go and express their displeasure with
Sithole’s leadership.
Sithole was called in to come and see the comrades who had been killed and
oversee their burial. He came, he saw, but quickly gave the excuse that he had to go
and see his sick daughter in America.179
Developments in Tanzania were much more serious, however. Probably after getting
wind of the situation in Zambia, tensions rose amongst ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres
in training camps in Morogoro and Iringa. On May 16, 1976, seven cadres were
killed at Morogoro training camp during a dispute over cooking duties as well. At
Iringa, worse was to come, instructors and their trainees clashed over the use of
partisan slogans and different approaches in the training programmes on the 6th of
June. Some of the ZANU trainees took advantage of being armed with automatic
rifles that were being used for training and fired indiscriminately at their unarmed
ZIPRA colleagues, killing seven and seriously wounding nearly 70. About 50
ZIPRA recruits
(179) Interview with Comrade Oscar Mdluli (David Ngozi) by Charles Maripfonde, (Nembire, Mt. Darwin) 28
February 2008.
1994
went missing and nine of them were discovered some days later. Forty-one were
still missing one month and nineteen days after the incident.180
Meanwhile, the ANC leadership started touring the camps in a bid to enforce unity.
Willie Deveteve, ex-ZANLA Field Commander, remembers an occasion at Mgagao
training camp in May 1975 when,
... the leaders for the ANC came and they were led by Muzorewa, followed by
Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua Nkomo, and Chikerema. They were accompanied by
Col. Mbita. We told them that we did not want to discuss anything until the ZANU
leadership was released. Comrade Sithole told us that this was impossible, but we
told them that they were not going to leave the place. They later on agreed... We
discussed a lot of things, but what surprised us is that Nkomo came with J.Z. Moyo
in good faith, Chikerema came with Nyandoro, but Sithole came with Noel Mukono
who had been associated with the Nhari rebellion. He had been expelled out of the
party and how did he return? We were suspicious and convinced that Sithole was up
to no good. We realised that the party was no longer in good form. When Sithole and
others got to Zambia, [they] issued [a statement] that the release of Manyika was not
possible till the Zambians finish their investigations. There were some allegations
that they killed Chitepo. The Lusaka group called some of the members of Mgagao
for a meeting. We sent the likes of the late Mundembe, Donald Pashai, Dzinashe
Machingura, James Nyikadzinashe, and Peter Mlambo. On arrival they were shocked
to hear that a new leader has been chosen and he was to be Kenneth Gwindingwi.
He came from the same place with Sithole. Our group was surprised to know that
Kenneth, a young guy, has been appointed whilst elders like Rex Nhongo were there.
They denied the move and they came out of Lusaka after long disagreements. When
they returned, they told us about the results of the meeting and the fact that Sithole
had chosen to visit his child in America than to go and see comrades who had been
shot by the Zambians. People started to question the viability of the revolution, now
that Sithole was turning to be a tribalist. He had destroyed our command structure.
Thus when the Mgagao document was signed, people opted to write to the OAU
asking for a new leadership.181
The turn of events certainly did not work in Sithole’s favour, and Sithole himself
did not help matters by placing so much faith in the ZLC and trying to prove that
the imprisoned ZANU leadership was now irrelevant to the struggle. He assumed,
wrongly, like Muzorewa, that he had the fighters behind him. They made this clear
to him by denouncing his leadership in a statement to the OAU dubbed the ‘Mgagao
Declaration’. Both Deveteve and Alex Mudavanhu confirm that there was some
communication between Mgagao inmates and the ZANU leadership in prison,
especially through Robson Manyika. The declaration was synchronised with efforts
by the imprisoned leadership to locate Robert Mugabe in Mozambique and impress
(180) “ZANLA-ZIPRA Clashes in Tanzania.” Document 126: Report by the ANC/Nkomo on Massacres of ANC
Cadres 30 August 1976. In Goswin Baumhogger, ed. The Struggle for Independence: Documents on the Recent
Development of Zimbabwe (1975 -1990). Hamburg: Institut fur Afrika-Kunde, 1984.
(181) Interview with Willie Deveteve by Gerald C. Mazarire, (Harare) 12 February 2007.
upon him to take up the mandate to lead the party and continue the struggle. They
wrote to him:
In line with our party policy and party procedure, we decided that you as the number
two man in the party would automatically take over the leadership of the party until
the party congress was convened. We communicated this decision to the Comrades
at Mgagao and they in turn made the famous Mgagao statement denouncing ANC-
ZLC and calling upon you to lead the ANC. We also started an extensive campaign
to inform all our members and organs of our decision and urged them to openly and
publicly support the stand taken by the Comrades at Mgagao. The response of our
party members and ordinary Zimbabweans has been overwhelming.
Because of lack of communication with you it was difficult for us to make a
formal statement to the world of our decision until we got to know your stand. Now
that we know your position we are in a position to make a formal declaration calling
upon you to immediately take over the party leadership… The burden and
responsibility of leading our party and revolution now rests on YOU. Should we be
released by our captors we shall be glad to join you in the field. Let us stress again
that our decision to have you as our party leader was reached after exhaustive
consultations and takes into account the views of most of the rank and file members
of the party.182
Mozambican Independence and the Growing Number of Recruits, 1975
Many young people had crossed the border into Mozambique following its
independence, but this was also partly because ZANU launched an intensive
recruitment exercise within Rhodesia spearheaded by those leaders who were still in
the country. Maurice Nyagumbo, who had been released from prison during détente,
was instrumental in the recruitment exercise for most of 1975, resulting in his re-
arrest.183 Machel welcomed the recruits and placed them in former FRELIMO camps
at Tembwe,Nyadzonya,and Chibawawa.Richard Hove recalls that following the
events at Mboroma, Machel summoned all the UANC leaders to Mozambique,
including Muzenda, Silundika, Jason Moyo, Chikerema, Sithole, George Nyandoro,
and Hove. While there, they met Robert Mugabe, Edgar Tekere, and Rex Nhongo
(who had escaped arrest in Zambia). First, Machel asked them what party they
belonged to, and all, save for the ZANU group, claimed to be ANC. Machel
rebuked them all for spending too much time on internecine infighting instead of on
fighting the enemy. He would arrange for them to go and tour the camps and see for
themselves how the recruits were eager to fight for their country, while their leaders
expended their energy on leadership squabbles.184 The tour was quickly arranged
and the delegation was able to see the large numbers of recruits, most of them
school children, and their plight. Three days later, Rex Nhongo travelled to Maputo
to explain to Machel that ZANLA was ready to fight since they had more than
2000 trained cadres in
(182) Excerpt from a Letter by J.M. Tongogara, K. Kangai, R.N. Gumbo to R. Mugabe (24 Jan 1976). Doc.35 in
Goswin Baumhogger. The Struggle for Independence: Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975
-1990). Vol. II, Doc. 1-249 (December 1974 –January 1977).
(183) Nyagumbo, M. With the People: See p.226.
(184) Interview with Richard Hove by Prof. Bhebe, (Hove’s Farm) 16 November 2002.
1994
Mgagao and those stranded in Mboroma on standby. Samora was agreeable as long
as this arrangement had Nyerere’s approval. Nyerere, who was still taken aback by
the reality of the Mgagao Declaration, would only buy the ZANLA case under the
unity arrangement of the ANC. But, realising the leadership complications implicit
in the Sithole deposition and in the army-less Muzorewa and Chikerema, he and
Samora eventually decided that they could achieve unity through the fighting
forces instead,
and this is how the idea of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) was proposed.
ZIPA or the ‘Third Force’, 1975-1976
The confusion caused by the arrests of ZANU leaders scarred the liberation movement
and worked against the unity of the various movements envisaged by the Frontline
States. The imminent collapse of the UANC meant that the Zimbabwe Liberation
Army would never come to be. It was best, therefore, for the Frontline States to
attempt to unify the fighters themselves, without the political leadership, and ensure
the continuity of the war. This task was left to the Liberation Committee, which came
up with the idea of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA). To implement this approach,
it was necessary to contain Muzorewa and other pretenders, ending the delusion that
there would ever be a ZLA. Muzorewa and Sithole were in Mozambique, but were
not allowed to access the guerrilla camps presumably because of the Mgagao
Declaration, but perhaps not to be allowed to interfere with the new ZIPA project.
There are three main theories advanced for the formation of ZIPA. The first depicts it
as a ‘third force’, the brainchild of Julius Nyerere (then Chairman of the Frontline
States) and which was only answerable to the Executive Secretary of the OAU
Liberation Committee, Colonel Hashim Mbita, who was also a Tanzanian, in order
to influence the outcome of the war in Zimbabwe.185 The second sees it as an
inevitable product of the collapse of détente talks at Victoria Falls.186 The third
submits that ZIPA was an independent ‘ideologically’ inspired initiative of the
guerrillas themselves to achieve unity of the liberation movements through their
armies.
The ZIPA High Command was as follows:
Rex Nhongo, (ZANLA) Army Commander
John Dube, (ZIPRA) Deputy
Nikita Mangena, (ZIPRA) Political Commissar
Dzinashe Machingura, (ZANLA) Deputy
Elias Hondo, (ZANLA) Director of Operations
Gordon Munyanyi, (ZIPRA) Director of Security and Intelligence
James Nyikadzino, (ZANLA) Deputy
Webster Gwauya, (ZANLA) Director of Political
Affairs David Moyana, (ZIPRA) Deputy
Report Mpoko, (ZIPRA) Director of Logistics and Supplies
Edward Kaguri, (ZANLA) Deputy
(185) Sithole, M. Frontlinestatism and the Zimbabwe Question. p.23.

(186) Smith, D. and C. Simpson. Mugabe. Salisbury: Pioneer Head, 1981. p.82.
Ambrose Mutinhiri, (ZIPRA) Director of Training and Personnel

Parker Chipoyera, (ZANLA) Deputy
Dr. Mudzingwa, (ZIPRA) Director of Medical Services
Tiyayi Pfepferere, (ZANLA) Deputy
The ZIPA project certainly worked in ZANU’s favour, and, in any case, ZANU
wanted ZIPA for its own reorganization after their situation in Zambia. First, Sithole’s
immediate reaction to the Mgagao Declaration was to freeze all ZANU accounts,
making it difficult to feed the thousands of recruits in the camps as well as to run
other party operations. The Liberation Committee was still processing the requisite
funds for ZIPA from Addis Ababa, and, in the interim, ZANU had to make do with
borrowing Tanzanian money. However, in a gesture of support to the ZIPA project, the
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo donated $6,000,000 in cash, which Nhongo
brought back in a suitcase. This money, together with the subsequent full financial
support from the Liberation Committee, came in handy.187 Secondly, ZANU took
advantage of Machel’s offer to move its administration and forces permanently to
Mozambique, where, in the process of warming up to the ZIPA project, it successfully
reorganized itself. Back in Mozambique, ZIPA established its headquarters and a
farm at Chimoio, and established base camps that received the thousands of refugees
coming from inside Rhodesia. Chimoio was divided into sub-bases: namely Takawira
1 and 2 for male residents and a training ground; Parirenyatwa, the camp clinic;
Chindunduma, a school complex; Zvidozvevanhu, the garage; Mbuya Nehanda, for
female residents; Chitepo, for trained females; Percy Ntini, a rehabilitation centre for
those wounded at the front (in the war); Chaminuka, for security; and Mudzingadzi,
mainly for agriculture. By the end of 1976, there were nearly 11,000 people living
at Chimoio, including refugee children. The ZANLA leaders of ZIPA did not make
it a secret that these were their recruits and it systematically established firm
control of the camps, while working out an operational programme of cooperation
with ZIPRA. This new offensive divided the operational areas into the three
provinces of Tete, Manica, and Gaza. ZIPA, however, continued to operate like two
separate armies as
Nhongo explained:
We put Tete under ZANLA because we had started fighting there. We therefore had
a lot of influence and did not want ZAPU to take over. We again took Manica; it was
ours. And left Gaza to ZAPU because we were sure of the support we would get
there. This was 1976.188
Initially Manica was experiencing problems under its provincial commander,
Morrison Nyathi, who failed to register any progress partly because of his methods of
operation and relations with the local population. Little did anyone know that he was
already a paid Rhodesian agent. The ZIPA high command back in Mgagao suspected
this and sent in Freddie Matanga on a 60 day mission to crack open the front in a

(188) Ibid.
1994
move that undermined Nyathi. Matanga, by far the most committed Marxist-Leninist
theoretician interviewed, had this to say:
…suddenly early April [1975], Comrade Rex Nhongo summoned me to a small
room; I was uncomfortable since I had never spoken to him directly. Heavy questions
were rushing through my mind wondering about the agenda of the meeting. Parker
Chipoyera was there, so was Ambrose Mutinhiri, Dzinashe Machingura, and someone
by the name Hondo, the top brass of ZIPA. They asked me to sit down and quickly
they went through their papers. Manicaland had been opened early in 1975 while
FRELIMO was settling down and they had allowed some cadres to pass
through to Gaza and Manyika. A reasonable time had passed. They said they had
a special (mission) assignment for me in 60 days. They told me I had to go to Manyika,
which had Morris Nyathi or Sectorial Commander for the Tangwena sector and Agri
Chaminuka ‘Ngoroyemoto’, as special instructor even to the civilians. Nyathi had
been a former Rhodesian soldier. There were also other high ranking combatants
in the Manica operational area, such as Mandebvu, Modern Kasiyapfumbi…. In the
midst of all the members of the General Staff, I was now being sent on a mission
into the Tangwena sector, a portion of Manica Province, to crack it. In sixty days,
they said I had to crack Manicaland with a team of men, open it, and get to Rusape
town, Nyazura and report back on the 59th day. They did not give me time to
question. We went out to a parade of well armed 100 men, with new AKs, rocket
launchers, RPG2’s, RPG7, and Mortars. I was introduced to the men, and all this to
me was a paradox. The soldiers
I was to command had trained with me in the same barracks, grounds, and offices.
Suddenly some of them who were senior to me were told that, here is Comrade Freddie
Matanga; he will lead you into a mission, and, moreover, there was Agri Chaminuka
‘Ngoroyemoto’, the Sectorial Security, who happened to be there as an officer waiting
to take his reinforcements. I was responsible to them. But then Ngoroyemoto was told
that he would not lead the mission, it was for Freddie Matanga. In the field, they were
required to follow me and not the provincial commander, Morris Nyathi, who was
waiting at Kapungure Border Post. We had no knowledge of the area. After the briefing,
I was taken to the office with Agri Chaminuka. I raised the question to Comrade Rex
and I pleaded with Parker Chipoera because he seemed to understand him better. I
said, you have given me a mission that cannot be rejected, but I am observing that there
are high ranking officers. But I am not an officer. Yet I am supposed to be leading
forces into the field which already has men deployed on the ground so that I would
have to pass through places with the deployed general commanders and others and to
conduct my campaign in the territory they have already occupied. I asked how we
were going to relate and who was going to command who. They laughed me off and
said that I would be informed and be required to report within a specified time. We
boarded our truck in the evening and we found Nyathi there. He had not heard the
news of the awkward situation of a junior officer supervising him. It was a rare
situation to have an ordinary soldier taking charge of officers and soldiers. They went
in with Agri Chaminuka and briefed each other. Morris Nyathi was out. I had a
special AK with a folding butt and magazine and my commander’s pistol. He said, so
you are Freddie Matanga. I looked stupid to him. He questioned if I was in charge of
these men, how are you going to go about your mission? But I explained I was told
the mission was mine and that I had a destination. I had learnt something from the
soft-spoken Akim Mudende. I said, I was not joining them to have dinner, but to
have some logistics.
Morris Nyathi quickly dismantled the group, rearmed them in a Hitler fashion, and
selected some 60 fighters and left me with 40. He then rearranged and swopped them
and their weapons around and left me with sniper rifles. My own AK he took saying,
‘the commander’s AK is mine.’ I said as long as you know that it can fire effectively
to kill, then it’s fine. The shape does not matter. He gave them very awkward guns.
Quickly he commanded the 60 men to some other bases and commanded Agri
Chaminuka to yet another base. He left me to fend for myself. Agri Chaminuka
offered to help me find my way from Pungwe down to Mandeya. Little did anybody
in this world know that Nyathi had sealed a deal with the Rhodesians to hand over
those 60 men to them. I proceeded with my men and kept persuading the 401 officers
I met together with Mandeya and others to part with and give me some experienced
fighters. Comrade Rex Nhongo’s assertion was right in that many of these men
already deployed in the field were roaming around the border eating, dressing smart.
They were moving into a militarized zone, flirting with girls on the Mozambican and
Zimbabwean border. They had established homes with girls enjoying themselves and
Comrade Mujuru said nothing is moving, so I was to open a new front. The
interesting thing was that none decided to join me. I ignored their undisclosed
feelings, so I stuck to the principle. I went and found interested people, junior
officers, such as Kasiyapfumbi and Modern, who agreed to join me and wanted to
explain things to me, but they had not even reached Ruda. Around Mandeya and the
Zindi, which side they had just reached; it was pathetic….
We attacked the Nyazura Service Station and the BBC picked the story that
terrorists attacked the service station. The freedom fighters, the BBC was calling us
freedom fighters, but the Rhodesian forces were calling us terrorists. It was now an
independent Mozambique we were operating from. They reported that a guard lit a
fire and the
service station was slightly damaged. The BBC talked about veld fires and they were
not consistent. On the 50th day, we were in Chiduku and on the 51st we had covered
Makoni, Tangwena, Zindi. The war was not difficult, it required people to think. If
you want to win a war, put it into simplicity, like the hide and seek play of
children… It was mid-May, I went to report that mission accomplished and I
returned under unusual circumstances. 189
Meanwhile, Nyathi had taken the sixty men he had requisitioned from Matanga and
handed them over to the Rhodesians, and continued to operate as if he was still on
the side of the guerrillas in order to hunt down and punish Matanga. When Matanga
returned to Mandeya, a local headman remarked:
“Ah boss, didn’t you go with others?”And I replied,“Where?” He said,“Didn’t you
hear that Nyathi rebelled against others and some are already dead! He was looking
for you; he even reached here accompanied by whites.” So we went on to Chimoio.
We were briefed by our leaders about it, and I said, “Oh God, I had lost 60 men.”190
Operationally, ZIPA had a number of other disagreements. According to Martin
and Johnson, some commanders argued that an offensive in the Gaza Province
could bring the South Africans, who had only completed the withdrawal of their
(189) Interview with Rtd. Brigadier Benjamin Mabenge (Cde. Freddie Matanga) by Gerald Mazarire, (UZ
Linguistics Audio Laboratory) 7 February 2007.
(190) Ibid.
1994
paramilitary police in early August 1975, back into Rhodesia on a larger scale.
ZIPRA commanders wanted Gaza to be exclusively theirs in order to give them
access to Matabeleland, where most of the ZIPRA freedom fighters came from.
The ZANLA commanders in Mozambique refused, insisting that joint forces must
operate on all three fronts.“We said we were not regionalists,” Nhongo said,“and
Samora said if that is your plan you can go back to Zambia.” Martin and Johnson
further posit that there were other problems with respect to ZIPRA’s commitment to
deploy its forces and resources. Thus, although ZANLA and ZIPRA had agreed to
commit all their trained cadres to the new offensive from Mozambique, less than
200 from ZIPRA were sent to the joint force, and, of these, only about 100
crossed into Rhodesia. ZANLA deployed nearly 422 of its Mgagao graduates. It is
also alleged that ZIPRA guerrillas arrived without arms and had to be armed by
ZANLA with weapons from FRELIMO, and, while ZANLA committed all its
transport to the joint force, ZIPRA sent no vehicles. ZIPRA strategy, the ZANLA
commanders insist, was to commit as few guerrillas as possible, while holding the
bulk of their force in Zambia in anticipation of opening a new front from there if
Nkomo failed to negotiate a settlement with Smith.191 Dumiso Dabengwa and
Cephas Cele revealed in two separate interviews that ZIPRA commanders issued
instructions to their cadres that, when they entered Rhodesia, they should desert,
get recruits, and then leave the country with them for Botswana.192 ZANU leaders,
in turn, did not know what would happen to them if the Nkomo-Smith negotiations
were successful. Mugabe’s first memorandum to ZANU and the only one he wrote
from Quilimane was evidently anti-Nkomo and reflected this ZIPA tension. He
wrote:
It has been necessary for us to allow a small ZAPU army to join our forces so that
the possibility of a second army disappears. But the requirement from us is that
they divorce themselves completely from Nkomo’s counter-revolutionary approach.
There is therefore a joint military front between ZANU and ZAPU, but only at
the fighting level and no other…there should not be any mix up on the matter, there
is nothing more than a joint military front with ZAPU in which we have the majority
of forces.193
More disagreements occurred, resulting in the withdrawal of ZIPRA to Zambia.
Samora, who was also not happy with Nkomo’s negotiations with Smith, urged
ZANU to fight on.
However, in its relatively short life span, ZIPA effectively made strides that
changed the direction of the war. Amongst other things, the ZANLA section of
ZIPA are credited with moving the war in a direction that in effect rendered détente
inspired negotiations useless and created the first so-called ‘liberated zones’. A
combination of
these factors spurred the Americans back into action (unwilling as they were to see
the Angolan and Mozambican scenario repeated in Rhodesia), and they dispatched
(191) Martin, D. and P. Johnson. Struggle for Zimbabwe. London: Monthly Review Press, 1981: See p.222-223.
(192) Interview with Dumiso Dabengwa and Cephas Cele by Prof. Bhebe, (Bulawayo) 29 December 1989.
(193) Smith and Simpson. Mugabe: See p.87.
Henry Kissinger on his shuttle diplomacy. This effectively arm twisted Smith into
conceding majority rule sooner than he thought and paved the way for the Geneva
Conference of 1976.194
ZIPA cadres, composed of a generation of youthful volunteers to the war, were
also an educated lot (most of whom had reached university level) who mixed their
military roles with an ideological purpose. They were concerned with setting up a
‘new society’ where the army, through its fighting, would articulate the objectives
of the party to the masses and educate them on how this could be achieved so that
in the ‘liberated zones’ such a society could actually begin to function. David
Moore fits them in the ‘second wave’ of recruits to Zimbabwe’s liberation
movements who spotted this highly educated background. They were distinct from
the ‘first wave’ made up of press-ganged exiles in Zambia, who were led by
original nationalists, or the ‘third wave’ recruits consisting of youthful voluntary
high school leavers.195 There is no doubt, ZIPA guerrillas were the first groups to
be seen in the operational areas outside Nehanda and Chaminuka sectors. In most
instances they are recalled by the people with nostalgia, as original, disciplined
forces, distinguishable by their learned approach to things, their command of the
English language, and the informed political lectures they gave to the masses.
Mordekai Hamutyinei encountered a group led by Sekuru Mamwutsa at Mugodhi
near Alheit Mission in Gutu TTL. They were equipped with radios and spoke in
excellent English. “What surprised me” remarked Hamutyineyi after being briefly
interrogated by the guerrillas,“was that the replies he [Comrade Mwamutsa] gave me
were in deep, sophisticated English that I could easily tell he had been to
University.”196
Yet the large number of recruits crossing the border into Mozambique at this
stage hardly knew the politics of the struggle and none, in the interviews that we have
conducted, can positively identify themselves as ZIPA. The former recruits provide
interesting accounts of this transit and eventual life in the camps. Quite contrary to
the chikuwa abductions of 1960s Zambia, these are adventurous stories of young
men and women voluntarily skipping the border after some ‘inspiration’, ‘peer
work’ at school, or a characteristic brush with the injustices of the Smith regime. Rtd.
Major Alex Mudavanhu (Feya Muchabvuma) was a ZANU branch member in a
Hippo Valley mill, who organised fellow workers to strike before being trailed by
the Rhodesian Special Branch. Young Steven Chidawanyika (Muchaneta
Zuvarabuda) used his pocket money to cross into Mozambique on his school
holiday.
Many provide touching accounts of arduous journeys to the training camps in
Mozambique. For instance, James Munyuki gave an account of how he travelled
into Mozambique via Gonarezhou. He noted:
(194) Moore, David. “Democracy, Violence and Identity in Zimbabwe’s War of National Liberation: Reactions
from the Realms of Dissent.” Canadian Journal of African Studies. vol 29, no. 3 (1995): See p.382.
(195) Moore, David. “The Zimbabwe People’s Army: Strategic Innovation or More of the Same?” N. Bhebe and
T.O. Ranger, eds. Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Army. Harare: UZP, 1995: See p.75.
(196) Hamutyineyi, M.A. Zvakanga Zvakaoma MuZimbabwe. Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984: See p.59.
1994
During that time, comrades (the trained ones) were crossing from Mozambique
through Gonarezhou National Park. We were eight. We started the journey. By the
time we reached Runde River, it was flooded. We started to quarrel among ourselves
in regard to where to sleep; it was already dark. Some were suggesting that we sleep
in the trees. I said,“No, I can’t because we might fall in the midst of sleep”. You should
take into consideration that we were all young. Finally we concluded that we sleep
in the valley. This was the only safe and hidden place.
The following morning, we continued with our journey and reached Mupapa. To
our disadvantage, this area was infested with Shangaan speaking people. Language
problem became a major deterrent factor because no one was able to comprehend
and speak Shangaan. People during this time were well-informed about sell outs, so
most of the people were refusing to give us information regarding the direction. One
lady came to our rescue after carefully identifying that we were school children. I
explained to her, that we were sent by Mr. Chigomo. She said,“You, where do you
come from? I replied, “I am from Gutu.” She explained that she was from the same
area. She gained confidence and gave us the direction. We were advised, however, that
we should not use the road as this would jeopardize our mission. The whites during
that time could just shoot at anybody they suspect to be a guerrilla. That road was a
usual route of the whites; we started to be frightened.
We began to feel hungry at that time. We were advised that the shops were nearer
by road. We bought our mugs and 2kg of sugar in anticipation for preparing our cool
water. We were hiding in the forest. There was no reason for us to carry everything
with us, so we returned most of the goods in the shop and continued with our journey.
By the time we reached the home we were supposed to meet the comrades, we were
very lucky that the comrades also arrived that night. There were from Mozambique.
They said to us, “You are lucky because we had just come to see a certain
businessman who is being reported to be collaborating with the enemy, but we are
returning to Mozambique this same night.” We underwent a thorough search from
these comrades until they were contented that we were just innocent but committed
and dedicated school children. Remember, we were carrying our results with us. We
were taken to the shop of that business, we started to loot things and they began to
harass the businessman. He was interrogated intensively. He confessed that there was
nothing he did so because the whites would just come to have their refreshments
there. So it was all impossible and strenuous for him to chase them away. We took our
things and went to Mozambique that same night.197
Most of the freedom fighters who went into Mozambique at this time give the
impression that they were being ‘welcomed’ by FRELIMO cadres, simply because,
until the ZIPA project fell through, the administration of the camps fell directly under
FRELIMO. An account by Lotus Gumbo of his experiences in early 1976 echoed
this perception. As he recalled:
We crossed Pungwe River and when we were in Mozambique just across the border
of Zimbabwe, we were left in the hands of a FRELIMO military contingent, a group
that liberated Mozambique. Comrade Paris Checherere had the chance to discuss
with the FRELIMO, instructing them that he had brought us to Mapai which was the
(197) Interview with James Munyuki, (Gutu) 08 May 2007.

first base in Mozambique. From there on we were supposed to go straight to Chimoio,

where he was supposed to first go and see the General Commander who was Josiah
Tongogara [sic; Perhaps Nhongo, as Tongogara was still in prison in Zambia]. We
stayed with FRELIMOs for two days, and on the third day, we were taken from
Mapai to Doroi, another base in Mozambique.198
Feya Muchabvuma trudged from Mt. Selinda to Espungabera with a group of friends
to find yet another FRELIMO base to receive them for onward transmission to the
ZANLA camps. Meanwhile they had to adapt to a diet of tree bark to save
themselves from starvation and dehydration. In the camps, it seemed, their purpose
was to wait with rather forlorn hope to go for actual training. Pardon Humanikwa
(Comrade Brown Patiripakashata) said:
I will tell you honestly, amongst us there were some who had developed skills that if
they put their ear to the ground they would tell you off hand that it was a Dodge or
Scania truck coming and whether it is loaded with food or not.
Then came the time to call those who were due for training, we went by the order
of our coming into camp…. But I learnt that the system had loopholes, which I took
advantage of to evade the misery of camp life. A Comrade in charge will call out
your name for instance ‘Comrade Hondo!’ and you had to respond ‘Icho’, then you
jump
into the lorry. If someone said ‘Icho’ before you, they took him instead. I learnt this and
I told myself the next calling I shall just be the first to answer, not caring whether the
owner was there. So he called ‘Comrade…’, and before he even finished I had said
‘Icho’ and I was in. That is why I was trained when I was so young and I went
straight into the transport department.199
The majority of the stories, even at this early stage of the camps, are concerned
with survival issues, hunger, and the various strategies of dealing with it. As Feya
Muchabvuma recollected:
There was so much hunger in the camps. I benefited because I joined the choir, which
was often called to sing for the ‘chefs’ and after singing we were always rewarded
with food. I was comparatively healthier than the average recruit and when people
were chosen for training I was selected for that reason.200
Comrade Akwias Akwino describes the situation at Nyadzonya with greater
detail: In 1976, people were over five hundred at Nyadzonya. Food shortages began
to bite. It came to a time when people were just given beans and water. One could
receive
soup and six beans which was the ration for the day. This led to some people to be
nicknamed Comrade Beans Six. This was a name, which came out of this
experience. A person was given six beans and small morsel of sadza in order for
everyone to get a share. We ended up going to bushes to hunt for wild animals like
what it used to be in the past, where people could live on meat from animals. We
caught these animals by
(198) Interview with Comrade Lotus Gumbo, (Masvingo) 04 May 2007.

(199) Interview with Pardon Humanikwa (Comrade Brown Patiripakashata), 14 February 2007.
(200) Interview with Feya Muchabvuma.
1994
making a circle, holding each other, and when the animal tried to escape, one person
could hold any part of that animal so that it would not escape! We ate the meat without
cooking it or drying it together with the skin. [sic]
There were some diseases, which were caused by shortage of food; there was also
malaria, adult malnutrition. One could count the number of bones on somebody,
because they would have been so skinny. So we ended up in the bush eating tree
roots which were called nyau, supplementing with tree barks (makavi). We even
caught a tortoise, but it was not easy to bring it into the camp. We used a tactic of
wrapping the
tortoise with the grass which we were supposed to use for thatching. At the security
they just asked us the number of people who had gone out and we told them that we
were fifty and also the number of those who had returned, but they did not notice that
I was holding a tortoise except other guys who had seen me wrapping it with grass.
Then we went into the camp and boiled our water and boiled the tortoise. We waited
until it got dark for us to cook our tortoise such that it was not going to draw the
attention of many people. Then we fried our meat and we really made a good feast that
day. All this was done in order for us to survive in these harsh conditions in camps.201
The Nyadzonya Attack, 9 August 1976
ZIPA operations, as mentioned earlier, were immediately felt by the Rhodesian
regime, which realized that the whole eastern and south-eastern sections of the
country were now vulnerable to attack. It responded by launching a military
operation, code- named “Operation Small Bang”, in February 1976, which began
with a premature raid on a transit camp jointly used by FRELIMO and ZANLA to
infiltrate Rhodesia through Sengwe TTL. Later on in August 1976, Rhodesian
reconnaissance revealed the existence of Nyadzonya, the main ZANLA training
camp, which they believed to be the source of logistics and personnel operating in
this eastern area, or the “Thrasher Zone”, according to their operational
classification. Already, they had to their advantage some ‘turned’ guerrillas, such as
the former provincial commander and member of the ZANLA general staff,
Morrison Nyathi, who well knew the structure and routines at Nyadzonya. The
narratives above provide the circumstances of Nyathi’s turning. To the Rhodesians,
his purpose was to apprise them of the daily routines of Nyadzonya, and, perhaps out
of his own humiliation, demotion, and desire for revenge, Nyathi was well disposed
to make available this information.
Nyadzonya was attacked on the morning of 9 August 1976 at parade time, around
800 hours. Rhodesian pseudo groups drove a column of vehicles into the base at
08:10 hours, disguised as high ranking FRELIMO cadres and attempted to address
the parade, while the rest took strategic positions within the camp. While still trying
to deploy, one of the security personnel at Nyadzonya gave an alarm for everyone to
take cover after he identified white men in the back of one truck, and the shooting
began. There was a sudden scramble to escape, and, as they attempted to flee, they
were mowed down by machine gun fire. Most of those who could not swim drowned
(201) Interview with Akwias Akwino, (Harare) 14 May 2007.

in the Nyadzonya River to the east, southeast, and to the south. It is estimated that
almost 200 people lost their lives in the river.202
According to oral histories collected in the rehabilitation exercise of Nyadzonya
by the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe, Nyathi supervised the
attack and the indiscriminate shooting continued for about 45 minutes. Instinctively,
most took up the prone position, while some attempted to crawl away later. Nyathi
instructed the Scouts to fire at even those that were lying down to ensure their death.
Then they mopped up the area and finished off those that were in critical condition.
Later, Morrison Nyathi ordered all those injured, to stand with their hands raised, and
surrender. About 300 did so. They were ordered to pick up the bodies of the girls and
heap them in one of the small barracks. This barrack was burnt. Of the 300 comrades,
there were four girls. One of them, Netsai Muhondo, was recognised by Nyathi as the
girl who used to supply food to Nyathi and other comrades before Nyathi became a
traitor inside Rhodesia. The four were ordered to find their own way to safety, if they
could walk.
The rest were ordered to sit down and radio contact with Salisbury was made.
The message was: “We have killed about 5,000 terrorists at Nyadzonya, and we
have destroyed the whole camp; we have also captured about 800. What must we
do?”
The reply came swiftly, ‘Kill them all’. Seven enemy forces with light machine
guns and sub-machine guns lined up before the comrades. From this group, they
picked out six people: one former member of the special branch in Rhodesia, one
former soldier in the Rhodesian Army, and three others who were considered fit and
strong.203
They were asked questions like, ‘Where is Nhongo?’, ‘Who is your
commander?’, ‘Who knows the way to the farm (Chimoio)?’
Nyathi ordered the squad to fire. As they fired the first shot, one comrade raced
on the parade and shouted the slogan, ‘Pamberi nehondo!’ (‘Forward with the
war!’). He was shot instantly.204 The total number of those who were shot dead
during that incident totalled 525 (including 5 FRELIMO officials). The camp
suffered about
1890 casualties and 319 were sent to different hospitals; 26 were sent to Chimoio
Camp, 100 to Chimoio Hospital. 122 were sent to the local clinic, and Beira
Hospital received 71 patients.205
Comrade Mariyo’s testimony also provides much insight into the events leading
to the Nyadzonya massacres. He gives a different account for the reasons for
Nyathi’s bitterness with ZANU. He states:
So what happened is that I saw Nyathi before he came with the whites. He was
someone well-respected in the front; he was actually a commander. But because he
came to Mozambique and lacked discipline, he was summoned to appear before the
parade and was beaten. There were many of those who were summoned because of
(202) NMMZ Report, Nyadzonya Massacre. Unpublished Report 2006.

(203) Makari, C. Magamba eChimurenga: See p.130.
(204) Ibid. p.130.
(205) NMMZ Report, Nyadzonya Massacre.
1994
their indiscipline they commit on the front and others in Mozambique. …So it was
not only Nyathi who was beaten, the likes of Charlie were also beaten, and some
trained personnel. They were all beaten and embarrassed in front of the people and
were reduced to expected levels. But after the beating, one was supposed to sit up
and clamour ‘pamberi ne ZANU’ and ‘pasi nevatengesi.’ That was what was done,
and it was a sign of acknowledging the wrong-doing and that nobody had victimised
you… Nyathi was later given his duties to go back to Zimbabwe since now he was
operating in the front. He was someone with his position, but I do not know what his
position was. I would like to say things I know…206
Nyathi and his Rhodesian accomplices chose a day on which they would catch the
Nyadzonya occupants unawares, and the 9th of August was ideal, especially that
everybody was recovering from the excitement of celebrating the anniversary of
ZANU’s formation the day before. The arrival of the convoy of vehicles was
welcomed in the usual fashion that FRELIMO vehicles were welcomed when
bringing in food or collecting people for training as noted before. Mariyo continues:
So we just heard the sound of the moving vehicles and we just felt happy. We heard
people very happy, people who were near the Nyadzonya River where our barracks
were situated. It was a distance from where we were holding the competition [for the
anniversary celebrations]. So people started running going there. So we were being
trained by Comrade Teddy in our side, ‘matoto.’ George Serima was chef ku ‘Matoto,’
but we had also the likes of Garfield who, however, died on this day, and then also
another guy called Nujoma. Teddy is the one who was leading us in the running that
day. When we had just gone back, that is when the guns started being fired. We dived
onto the ground. We then lay; it was gun firing through and through. We then crawled
to behind the barracks, and started running towards the Nyadzonya River, where we
were to cross through.
When we got to the river, we saw comrades who were there bathing and some
clothing themselves. They were the women comrades. We told them that things were
not okay. They asked us what was happening, and we replied that we did not even
know. Where we had come from it was just smoke, the barracks were burning on fire
and guns being shot. We then crossed the river and, having travelled some distance,
that is when I realised I was bleeding. I wondered; I did not even know that I was
shot. I only just noticed it later because of the bleeding. The wound was not deep,
but I realised that I was wounded, though better than my colleagues who had been
severely wounded.
Then people asked what had happened? And others, the survivors, who were
nearby said, ah, it’s Nyathi, who came and said ‘The comrades have turned against
each other.’ And started firing bullets. He had some whites in armoured cars. So you
find out that many people died, simply because people who were on the open ground
were crowded there and many people had gone there running. These people were not
armed, while those had guns, the machine guns which fired bullets. People terribly
died there.
(206) Interview with Comrade Mariyo, (Kwekwe) 04 May 2008.

So we walked, and met other comrades who had been severely injured. We helped
carry them and arrived at Pungwe River. Eeh, Pungwe River has fast flowing water
and it’s wide. When we were thinking how to cross the river, that is when we heard the
sound of the bridge being destroyed. The explosion was because Nyathi and others had
set the deal to ensure that there would be no reinforcement from the comrades to come
and help the fighting. So people wondered what had happened; we did not know that
it was the bridge that had exploded. We were thinking how to cross the river. So what
happened there was that there came the povo from Mozambique with ‘zvimwadhiya’
[canoes]. I remember the two old men who came there. One chimwadhiya could only
carry four people, three of us and the owner of the chimwadhiya. So it could carry two
injured comrades, one uninjured, and the owner. But at the time we were thinking
how to cross, some comrades would not listen, and thought they could swim and
cross. They got into the water and none crossed, they all drowned. So we stopped each
other because we realised that we would perish. The water was forceful, it was not
a joke. So those old men crossed us the river, two injured and one uninjured, until
we all crossed.207
Tendai Nhamo says the Nyadzonya massacre was one of the most painful and
traumatic experiences of the liberation struggle. She adds,
What pained me most about the liberation struggle was the massacre of untrained
children at Nyadzonya. To make matters worse, the attack was unleashed at innocent
children who literally knew nothing about military operations. There was this comrade
who turned into a sell-out and his name was Nyathi. Like many others, he left the
country for Mozambique to train as a liberation fighter. I even stayed with Nyathi and
we trained together. However, Nyathi was promoted into a member of the General
Staff and was in charge of the camp. To be frank, Nyathi had some intention to wipe
out all the children of the struggle because the Rhodesians had employed him. Nobody
amongst us knew that Nyathi was a sell-out. This later came to our realisation when
one morning Nyathi blew the emergency whistles, announcing that he had turned
against the cause of the liberation struggle. Soon after the emergency whistle, some
helicopters came and started dropping some bombs on the people and a lot of people
died as a result of this attack. Nyathi disappeared into one of the helicopters and left
with the Rhodesians.208
A number of scholars believe the Nyadzonya massacre, in particular, and other new
counter-insurgency measures introduced around this time by the Rhodesians were
responding to the military successes registered by ZIPA in the field. David Moore
attributes this success to the strategic innovations of the ZIPA commanders who
were far better trained than the ZANU old guard commanders like Rex Nhongo,
who had led the struggle before détente and the imprisonment of the ZANU high
command.209 The ZIPA commanders’ strategy, however, was based on the unity
of the liberation forces, which was not possible on the one hand because of the
clashes

(208) Interview with Tendai Nhamo, (Centenary) 3 March 2008.
(209) Moore, D. “The Zimbabwe People’s Army: Strategic Innovation or More of the Same?” Bhebe and Ranger,
eds. Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. Harare: UZP, 1995: See pp.79-80.
1994
they had amongst themselves in the joint camps and the operational areas shared
with ZIPRA, and the reluctance of the political leadership to have such cooperation
in the first place.
Apart from the other operational setbacks already outlined, ZIPA activities brought
about political developments which were not favourable for its survival. As the
Nkomo-Smith negotiations crumbled, Smith began making overtures to “moderate”
nationalists who would accept his “standards” and “guarantees” in order to concede
majority rule. Muzorewa had just returned from exile to another roaring welcome
from his supporters, but he was more or less meaningless in the military equation. So
too was Sithole, who had turned to Uganda to forge a military project supported by
Idi Amin to train what eventually became the Pfumo Revanhu. Sithole and Muzorewa
easily became the ‘moderates’ that Smith was looking for and they eventually
became an integral part of his Internal Settlement of 1978. Nkomo, on the other hand,
formed a political alliance, the Patriotic Front, with Robert Mugabe, who was
emerging as the new leader of ZANU after the developments registering the ouster
of Sithole and his rejection by the majority of ZANLA guerrillas. This alliance was
necessary for political expediency, given that the Kissinger-British proposals were
opening the way to the Geneva conference.
Mugabe did not believe Geneva was necessary, but used his participation there
to secure the release of ZANU leaders in prison in Zambia as a pre-condition.
Meanwhile ZIPA thinking was not only overtaken by these events, but also by the
restoration of loyalty to the ZANU old guard by its commander Rex Nhongo.
Nhongo remembers being summoned by Machel to be asked who would lead the
ZANU delegation to Geneva. He replied that it was going to be its Secretary
General, the little known Robert Mugabe who was ‘confined’ in Quelimane.
Machel reluctantly accepted the decision after consultations with Nyerere and he
asked ZANU to make a statement to that effect. “I asked Dzinashe Machingura to
make the statement while I left for Dar es Salaam,” says Nhongo. He goes further:
When I listened to BBC radio from Dar, I heard him denouncing the Secretary
General [Mugabe]. In Zambia, pressmen wanted me to confirm Dzinashe Machingura’s
statement. I told them I had nothing to say; they had to ask Mugabe. The press
published that there were contradictions within the party, that we were divided. We
approached Kaunda and told him that we would not go to Geneva without our men
who were in jail in Lusaka. The British pressurized Kaunda and told him to release the
men so that the Zimbabwean issue would be over. They were released. Samora
called Hamadziripi, Kangai, and myself to Maputo. We went to Maputo and Samora
advised us to take the Geneva talks seriously. The men, who were refusing to work
with the new leadership, refused to go to Geneva, and I told Tongogara, who was out
of prison, that I would let them go to Geneva while I remained in Maputo with the
commanders who I knew well. If I went, I knew there would be a mutiny and the
leaders would not have been allowed to return. They left for Geneva. Samora wanted
to know why I had not gone and told me to leave for Geneva that day. I said that it
was not possible and I told him why; he understood and wanted to know my
suggestions. I requested that he
intimidate the commanders by giving them the ultimatum that if they did not go to
Geneva, he would arrest them. He told me to go and fetch them. When I brought them
to him, he started scolding them, then he said there was a plane waiting for them
at the airport; some wanted to excuse themselves by saying that they had nothing
to wear. Samora asked me if I did not have any money and I replied that I had 20,000
pounds and I would buy some clothes for them out there. I had already arranged this
with Samora without their knowledge. I selected eight men that would go with me with
the knowledge that if I went with these eight men, not much would go wrong in our
absence. We left for Geneva and all of us stayed in the same hotel as ZANU…210
Nhongo did not make it a secret that he would readily hand back the ZANLA
military leadership to Tongogara, yet the ZIPA commanders, Machingura, Webster
Gwauya, and Pfepferere were hostile to a Mugabe-Tongogara arrangement. Forcing
them onto the plane to Geneva did not make things any better, and on arrival they
made statements to the effect that they had been “kidnapped to Geneva”. Amongst
themselves, they started making overtures to Henry Hamadziripi, the former trade
unionist member of the ZANU central committee recently released from Kaunda’s
prison. There is no obvious reason why the Marxist ZIPA commanders would warm
up to Hamadziripi save for his sympathies for a proletarian revolution as a former
representative of the workers. However, they were not alone in this choice; Nkomo
had paid Hamadziripi a number of visits while he was in prison in Lusaka and had
consultations with the British suggesting that Hamadziripi was the right candidate to
lead the ZANU delegation to the Geneva talks. In this spirit, Nkomo was convinced
that majority rule would emerge from Geneva and he would reward Hamadziripi with
a high ministerial post if he became Prime Minister of an independent Zimbabwe.211
Under these circumstances therefore, although Mugabe went to Geneva as
Secretary General of ZANU, his leadership was unconfirmed and his position
precarious. Fay Chung alerts us that, apart from the ZIPA-Hamadziripi threat, Mugabe
faced two other contenders to ZANU’s top post. Patrick Kombayi, the Zimbabwean
businessman of Zambia who had committed his personal resources and time to keep
the military struggle going in the previous year, genuinely felt he was entitled to be
the new ZANU leader. So too was Joseph Taderera, a former university professor
who had undergone military training in Tanzania and had been instrumental in
the crafting of the Mgagao declaration, who now wanted the post purely out of
ambition.212 The advantage Mugabe had in the end was that he was able to win over
most of the disparate interest groups within ZANU to his side, from intellectuals
and professionals like Eddison Zvobgo, Simbi Mubako, Dzingai Mutumbuka, Fay
Chung, Emmerson Munangagwa, Sydney Sekeramayi, and Hebert Ushewokunze, to
militarists like Tongogara and Nhongo, as well the prison group from Zambia. He
readmitted Nathan Shamuyarira, his old friend of FROLIZI fame, and had some like

(211) Interview with Henry Hamadziripi.
(212) Chung, Fay. Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: See pp.162-163.
1994
Canaan Banana, of Muzorewa’s ANC, who crossed the floor to his side during the
conference.
The Geneva Conference, October- December 1976
Kissinger had moved in quickly to secure a settlement in southern Africa following
developments in Mozambique and Angola; the USA worried about the threat of a
communist take-over in southern Africa if the trend continued and Zimbabwe came
under the control of radical blacks of the fashion of Samora Machel. Vorster was
interested in a quick solution to the Rhodesian question, as discussed above. There
was no better point for Kissinger to strike a deal than the post-Nyadzonya scenario,
when South Africa responded to the raid angrily by blocking the flow of Rhodesian
goods in and out of South Africa, cutting out money and supplies (ammunition, spare
parts, and fuel) and withdrawing its helicopters and pilots seconded to Rhodesia.213
In two weeks, the damage had been done and Smith was willing to negotiate. After
reassurances from Vorster, Kissinger arrived in the region on 13 September 1976 by
way of Dar es Salaam to sell his settlement proposals to all the parties concerned.
The Kissinger plan was straightforward, but misunderstood by all sides concerned.
In summary, it provided for majority rule in two years time, while an interim
government composed of half black and half white members took charge until the
elections. Britain would chair a constitutional conference at an agreed venue and
work around the modalities of legislation that would enable and legalise majority
rule. Although Smith was agreeable to the point of making his historic national
announcement accepting the principle of majority rule, he, however, assumed that he
was bargaining with Kissinger and not with the African nationalists. For him and the
Rhodesian Front, it was simply a means of regaining the support of the ‘Free
World’, lifting sanctions, and gathering enough momentum to wipe out the
‘terrorists’ once and for good. On the other hand, Kissinger sold his ideas to the
Frontline leaders and by extension, to the Zimbabwean nationalists, only as the
basis for discussion and negotiations not as a cut and dried deal. These are the
circumstances in which all the parties left for the Geneva conference.
The conference began on 28 October 1976, three days after the scheduled date
because the Patriotic Front had requested a three week delay to formulate their
negotiating strategy. It was chaired by Ivor Richard, the British Ambassador to the
UN, who in the eyes of the Zimbabwean nationalists was not a respectable
candidate, and a sign of the British lack of commitment to the whole affair. Under
these and other objections, the meeting dragged on until Christmas, when it
adjourned never to be re-convened.
The sticking points were obvious and explicit even in the opening statements of the
various parties; the Patriotic Front did not mince its words. As Joshua Nkomo began:
(213) Steadman, S.J. Peace-Making in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe 1974-1980. Boulder: Lynne
Reiner, 1991: See p.95.
We must at this conference, close and seal the chapter of British colonialism. We regard
this conference as strictly between Zimbabweans of whatever colour and race, on the
one hand, and the colonisers, the UK government, on the other. The simple and straight
forward issue before the conference is the transfer of power from the coloniser, the UK
government, to the people of Zimbabwe through the process of decolonisation. We are
emphasising the clear fact that Britain never ceased to be the coloniser of Rhodesia
and must now therefore actively take steps to march out of Zimbabwe through the
normal process of decolonisation…214
Robert Mugabe was no less uncompromising:
…the object of this conference is not to negotiate the principle of the transfer of power,
but rather to work out the modalities of that transfer…We… hold as strongly today as
we have always done in the past, that it is the responsibility of Britain as a colonial
power and of no one else, to grant us our right to self-determination…215
He demanded a precise date for independence within a year, the disbandment of the
Rhodesian army, and its replacement by a joint army of the Patriotic Front in the
interim period. Muzorewa, who believed something would certainly come out of
Geneva, pushed for elections on the basis of one man, one vote so that ministries
emerging out of elections would be distributed proportionately to the votes
received.216 Smith found all these demands untenable and inconsistent with what
he had envisaged. He left barely five days into the conference on the pretext that
he had a country to run.217 In fact, he was going back to effect the integral part of
his strategy, to take advantage of the resumption of supply connections with South
Africa to intensify operations into Mozambique and escalate the conflict in a way that
would inevitably drag South Africa into the war on the side of the Rhodesians.
In the meantime, Ivor Richard continued his consultations well into January 1977,
shuttling between the Frontline leaders, Vorster, and Britain. The Frontline leaders
collectively agreed that only a settlement involving the Patriotic Front was
acceptable, and this move alienated Muzorewa, Sithole, and the Rhodesians and
provided the grounds for the latter to seek a settlement back home with these
“moderate blacks”. In this way, the Geneva conference fizzled out. Meanwhile, the
theatre of operations back at the front saw some interesting developments on the
ground for both ZIPRA and ZANLA.
ZIPRA Operations after ZIPA, 1976
After the failure of the ZIPA project, ZIPRA decided to withdraw its troops from
Mozambique in July 1976. They were totally convinced that ZIPA served ZANU
(214) Geneva Conference: Opening Statement by Joshua Nkomo, 29 October 1976. In G. Baumhogger. The
Struggle for Independence: Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975-80) vol. II. Hamburg: Institut
fur Afrika-Kunde, 1984.
(215) Geneva Conference: Opening Statement by Robert G. Mugabe, 29 October 1976. In Baumhogger, ed. The
Struggle for Independence.
(216) Geneva conference: Opening statement by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, 29 October 1976.
(217) Nzombe, S. “Negotiations with the British.” Banana, ed. Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990. Harare:
College Press, 1989: See p.178
1994
interests, rather than their own. Back in Tanzania, Nyerere blamed the failure of the
joint training programme on ZAPU and wanted them out of Tanzania. He went so far
as to arrest some of the ZIPRA commanders, such us Sam Moyo and others.
ZIPRA withdrew under very difficult circumstances to regroup once more in
Zambia. Richard Mataure gave a very revealing account of this episode. He
submitted that the re-organisation did not take long, however, as by 6 August 1976,
they had re-launched new operations in Kanyemba TTL, which led to the death of
Rhodesian Defence Regiment soldiers operating there and the capture of arms and
ammunition.218 Soon thereafter, ZIPRA fully deployed in what it termed
the‘Northern Front’ with a section sent to each of the following areas: Feira,
Mushika/Kazangarare, Chirundu, Kariba/ Nyamomba, Sinazongwe, Chipepo,
Livingstone, and Kabanga. Later in the year, they were reinforced by the groups
coming back from the Tanzanian training camps, including a group of 137 cadres
from Morogoro known as the ‘bouncers’ who were deployed in November 1976.
They boosted the strength of the various sections in the northern front so that they
now had the strength of a platoon each, whose operational area still stretched from
Feira in the east to Kazungula. This group of reinforcements gave strength to the
army until early 1977, when yet another group of 800 joined them. The ZIPRA war
effort easily intensified under these circumstances as shown by the number of
reported encounters with the enemy before the end of 1976. On 10 October 1976,
ZIPRA forces attacked three boats at Deka Fishing Camp in the Wankie District
along the Zambezi River, which were allegedly attempting to lay an ambush on a
suspected crossing point.219 More activity was reported in Kamativi in the
following weeks in attacks on tourist spots within Victoria Falls. By December,
they had taken their campaign to the towns, attacking Rhodesian police patrols in
Pumula Township and the Forestville suburb in Bulawayo.220
ZIPRA’s New Strategy and the Opening of the Botswana/Southern
Front, August 1976
The growth in the number of ZIPRA trained personnel deployed in the field
necessitated another change in strategy. The initial strategy, which had been to
deploy small forces to carry out minor operations, had to change because of the
increasing numbers.
The new strategy, from the beginning of 1977 onwards, involved getting the
forces to stay in the operational zones for far longer periods. Such a strategy
required an efficient logistical back up. ZIPRA would need to stop relying on
chains of supply from Zambia, and start relying on the local population for food,
clothing, and cover. One problem was gaining the local population’s approval of
such new demands; the other was how to achieve such long term deployment
within Rhodesia in the post-Geneva atmosphere, when Smith was stepping up
efforts to deal with guerrilla
(218) Interview with Richard Mataure by Prof. Bhebe, (University of Zimbabwe) 4 January 1990.
(219) Zimbabwe Review. Vol. 6, 1976, p.17.
(220) Ibid.
activity. Although ZIPRA continued to receive more trained cadres from the Soviet
Union, Cuba, and Libya that built its strength in the field to nearly 3,000 by mid
1977, these were stretched over the new fronts that ZIPRA opened under the new
strategy. In the same year, it opened the Botswana/ Southern front, which until then
had been handled by a skeleton force led by Nyamupingidza Babron Sibona, George
Moyo, and others. The new strategy certainly required more manpower and forced
ZIPRA to embark on a huge recruitment campaign, sometimes employing
unorthodox methods such as press-ganging school children, as transpired at
Manama High School on 30 January 1977.221 Three brothers with a detailed
recollection of ZIPRA’s recruitment programme in the Southern Front gave an
illuminating account. The first brother, a student at Manama at the time of the
abduction, recalls how three ZIPRA guerrillas had arrived some days before to
announce that they would take the students with them. He is one of the few to give
an account of how he volunteered to go, while others like Miss Mabuwa paint a
picture where everybody, including teachers, was forced to go with the
guerrillas.222 The second brother even demonstrates attempts by ZIPRA to pursue
the ‘Castro Approach’ of training the recruits within Zimbabwe. He says:
Dube [guerrilla leader] told us that the journey to Botswana would be far much longer
than the one from Masase. He said that we therefore required to do some exercises
in order to toughen and harden our muscles and general physic…We camped at
Nhamande and we were not aware that the reason was that we were waiting for further
recruits from Bulawayo and Salisbury. So the exercises were also meant to keep us
occupied. After two or three weeks, another group of three boys joined us. After
that, we were joined by a lot more people, with a large number coming from
Chingechuru and Nyororo. When they joined us, we continued our exercises. Once
the group got large, all secrecy vanished concerning our exercises. We would do our
trotting from Nhamande for a long distance right up to Ndoni village, the
Masvayamwando, round to Rushumbe. We actually disregarded all security
precautions: “it was forgotten”. We did that for about a week. In fact, the last two
days before we left for Botswana, we actually carried out exercises through the
villages in full view of the villagers. One of the reasons was of course to boost the
morale of the villagers, who were keenly supporting us and to impress them with our
progress in physical fitness. The Nyororo fellows were already trained. While we
were there, there was also a group of trained guerrillas from Zambia to reinforce
those who were already there to a vital recruiting base and local supporting
population. They brought their weapons and ammunitions to other logistics. The new
group came with the view of trying to convert Nhamande into a training centre, so
that they were now attempting to train people within the country. This nearly delayed
us. Dube was out on the day. So when he came back, he found that we had been
introduced to short march, skirmishing, a bit of judo, etc. Dube discontinued all that,
arguing that all that was necessary was that we should be groomed to be fit for the
journey and not to train us into full fledged guerrillas.
(221) Bhebe, Ngwabi. The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe.
Gweru: Mambo Press, 1999: See pp.244-248.
(222) Interview with Ms. Mabuwa by Prof. Bhebe; In an informal interview, Air Vice Marshall Elson Moyo
challenged the Research Team to let the public know that some students of Manama like himself volunteered to go
to war, (Harare) 30 June 2008.
1994
So for two days we did not do any exercises. I then talked to Dube and expressed my
concern that our group had grown rather too large to the extent of easily being spotted
and wiped out by the enemy. I talked to him on Sunday and the following Tuesday
we left for Botswana. We left at 5pm and went through the farms, Chiraramakura,
Zhoupembe. We stopped at Zhoupembe overnight, after crossing the tarred road and
we slept. In the morning, we walked a short distance up to Muzingwane River, where
we again rested, just below Makado. There were about 40 of us and we spent the
whole day there. We were again joined by a sizeable group from the Venda
communities. Our group tended to grow because the local boys either voluntarily
joined us or we forced them to do so in fear of the fact that they might go and report
us. Among the Venda, we were really very well fed by the local villagers. They
cooked a lot of sadza and slaughtered goats for us. They actually bade us farewell
nicely. But when we left this place, we did not find another place to feed us in a
similar manner. We went for a long time without food. This was a second day and by
this time we were avoiding villages. We had an advance guard which travelled 25m
to 30m ahead of everybody. It was supposed to communicate with the rest of the
group by means of signals. Whenever we crossed a road it had to be bridged by four
people, two on either side of it. These signalled for the rest of the people to cross
when the area was clear. We could have attacked the crossing cars, but that was not
our purpose. We were interested in getting to Zambia for training. So that is how we
crossed what we called danger zones such as rivers and roads. As we left
Mzingwane, there was a jet which over flew us at a very low altitude, so much so that
we believed it had spotted us. We also tried to recruit the local Venda people so that
they would act as our guides. We did not mind the age of such guides, even small
boys. Besides Dube was a local fellow so that he knew the area generally well. He
also knew the supporters of the liberation struggle.223
Expansion of the Training Programme in Zambia, 1974-1979
As more recruits poured in from Rhodesia, ZIPRA needed to transform its facilities
to accommodate this large influx. The Nkomo Camp, mentioned above, conducted
the first retraining exercise for already trained guerrillas before they were deployed
in the new exercise of 1974. In 1977, ZIPRA opened other camps such as
C.G.T.1,
C.G.T. II, C.T.T., and Koimba for men, and Mkushi Camp for women.224 Nampundwe
served as a reception camp throughout the war. That was where people were sorted
out according to age, gender, and physical fitness. Younger boys, mainly under the
age of 16, were separated and, at first, had a school established for them in April
1977 within that camp. 225 As shall be shown shortly, these camps were bombed
by the Rhodesians in 1978 and 1979, forcing ZIPRA to establish new camps such as
Victory Camp, just outside Lusaka. It was here that a school was set up for the
young girls. Later on, J.Z. Moyo No. 1, 2, and 3 were established further from the
reach of enemy attack. By 1979, these ZIPRA camps had well over 20,000 people
in them, as well as
(223) Interview with the Bhebe brothers by Prof. Bhebe, (Bulawayo) 25 September 1987.
(224) Ibid. p.105.
(225) Bhebe, N. The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe.
Gweru: Mambo Press, 1999: See p.18.
training facilities such as a technical college at Kafue and a rehabilitation centre for
those who were disabled in action.226
An insight into the nature of life in these camps and the training programme was
given by Miss Mabuwa, who lived both at Nampundwe and at the Mkushi Girls
Camp. Arriving there as one of the students abducted from Manama school, she was
barely 16 years old and she remembered being surprised by the large numbers of
other young people already there. She was quickly issued with an oversize
camouflage uniform and together with her colleagues joined into the daily fatigue
routines. “We hardly slept,” she says,
...when the whistle was blown for us to wake up for exercises. If one was slow or did
not wake up as required, he or she was beaten thoroughly. We were told that the camp
[Nampundwe] was designed to harden us and to develop violence in us. We stayed a
few days at Nampundwe, but to me it seemed like we lived there for a year. I think
what helped us most was the international attention that was focused on us as the
Manama group. We were always on the news. When we listened to Radio Zambia, we
would hear blatant lies. They would announce that the Manama school children are
well looked after and they are already back to school.
After some days, we were again transported elsewhere. All the girls from
Manama were taken away. We were taken to a new camp, where there was some tap
water and the conditions were a little better than in our previous camp. We were the
first to live at Victory Camp. We were told arrangements were being made for our
education in the camp. We were told some were going to take up professional
courses at the camp, but when we looked at the facilities available it was obvious that
no meaningful course could be pursued in that place.227
The selection process for those to undergo specialised training targeted older and
fitter people within the camp, yet because she was young, she had to join the rest
of the recruits in local training at Mkushi near Ndola. She became part of the first
and biggest group of girls to undergo military training. Earlier on, only a handful
of women (about five) had been able to undergo military training, and these did
so alongside the men at Morogoro in Tanzania. These women “were exceedingly
tough” says Mabuwa, and they became the first contingent of training instructors at
Mkushi. The camp became fully established in 1978 and a more systematic training
programme was put in place with more instructors who had just come from training
in Somalia. The curriculum included Topography, Map Reading, Combat and Tactics,
Military Engineering, Arms, Physical Training, and Drilling. Mkushi produced more
than two battalions of female combatants, numbering over a thousand. Mabuwa rose
through the ranks to become a platoon commander and has told more stories of
people she trained than can be quoted here.
(226) Ibid. p.105.

(227) Interview with Ms. Mabuwa by Prof. Bhebe.
1994
The Situation in ZANU after Geneva

Containing ZIPA and Regaining the Camps
Rex Nhongo’s testimony, quoted earlier concerning a simmering mutiny against the
old ZANU leadership, provides the background to a post-Geneva re-organisation
inside ZANU. Forcing the ZIPA leaders to attend the conference was an important
tactical move that not only immobilised them, but left them with no choice except
falling into line, being pulled in by the ZANU dragnet towards Mugabe. Soon
Machingura and his colleagues were to join the ZANU secretariat, led by Edgar
Tekere, at the Swiss Royal Hotel and get more and more involved in fund raising
activities to sustain the ZANU delegation in its prolonged stay in Geneva as the
talks dragged on. Meanwhile the ZANU leadership held on to their air tickets.228
Back home, they did not hold any tactical advantage either; they were now divided
amongst themselves on the issue of supporting Mugabe, with one group loyal to Sam
Geza as the Secretary General, and that led by Machingura being against Mugabe.
They had also totally lost Machel’s support, and Nhongo, their overall commander,
who had long felt undermined by their ideological radicalism, had thrown in his lot
with Mugabe and Tongogara. According to Richard Hove, the ZANU old guard not
only emerged stronger and consolidated from Geneva, but it was also better organised
than the Vashandi (workers) thought. The latter overestimated the support they had
from the guerrilla rank and file, and, in his opinion, Hove thinks the ZIPA version
of Marxist-Leninism was often misunderstood and did not appeal to the common
soldiers.229 Deceived by appearances that ZANU leadership would seek a
settlement on ZIPA’s terms, they were invited to a mini-conference in Maputo to
discuss the ‘leadership’ issue, whereupon they were all arrested by Mozambican
authorities and thrown into prison.
It still remained for ZANU to retake the camps. David Moore surmises that this was
only possible with the purging of those commanders loyal to ZIPA, which was
carried out in the Tongogara style of witch hunts and kangaroo courts, which were
always called to order by the whistle and publicly conducted at parades to reassert
leadership control. For Nhongo, the issue was not necessarily the camps, where he
had always held overall command, but the front, which needed to be restructured:
“sending new commanders and recalling others back, especially those that had
created bad names
for themselves... This strengthened our efforts at the front.”230
The ZANLA Offensive Escalates, 1977-1978
ZANU’s new programme sought to bring back order in its political and military
structures, while at the same time building up on the gains made by ZIPA between
1975 and the end of 1976. In restructuring the new high command, it intended to
(228) See Chung, F. Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. See Chapter 9.

(229) Interview with Richard Hove by Prof. Bhebe, (Hove’s Farm) 16 November 2002.
intensify the war further inside Rhodesia, crack open new fronts, and make a case
to the international community of who was actually in control of the situation in
Rhodesia after Geneva. First, at its Chimoio Congress, ZANU confirmed Robert
Mugabe as the President of the party and by the same token he became Commander
in Chief of ZANLA; Tongogara and Nhongo took up their positions as Chief of
Defence and Chief of Operations respectively. Specific portfolios in security and
intelligence, medicine, and training were reorganised, as was the appointment of new
field commanders as follows:
NEW ZANLA STRUCTURE:
Commander in Chief, Robert Mugabe
Chief of Defence, Josiah Tongogara
Chief of Operations, Rex Nhongo
Security and Intelligence, Sheba
Gava Deputy, Patrick Mupunzarima
Army Commissar, Mayor Urimbo
Deputy, Joseph Muparuri
Medicine, J. Ziso
Logistics and Supplies, Justin Chauke
Deputy, Charles Dauramanzi
Personnel, Josiah Tungamirayi
Deputy (Training), Joshua Misihairambwi
Field Commanders, Tonderayi Nyika, Rex Tichafa, and Anderson Mhuru
Retired General Zvinavashe reiterated that the Chimoio Congress should be seen
as an important step in the transition from the control of the armed struggle by the
military and the re-integration of the party leadership through the formation of a new
central committee. In 1976, he says there was no party at all; it was just the military
commanders running the show.231 It was at Chimoio that the decision to enlarge the
army and escalate the offensive was taken. This was to be achieved systematically
by appointing those that were formerly‘secretaries’to the posts of Field Commanders
and enlarging the number of sectors in each operational province. These were also
placed under sector commanders who reported to the field commanders. Overtime,
it was possible to interchange them. In 1978, there were more than six Field
Commanders including, apart from those listed above, Edzai Mabhunu, Bornwell
Masawi, Tinzwei Goronga, Perence Shiri, and Freddie Matanga. It is not the object
of this chapter to trace the careers of each, but certainly their names would appear
more frequently in the combat stories of 1977 to 1978.
This chapter incorporates stories provided by the Field Commanders themselves
in ZANLA Operational Zones or those working directly under them. One interesting
story came from Amos Sigauke, a former aide to Bornwell Masawi, the
Provincial
(231) Interview between Rtd. Gen. Zvinavashe, Gerald Mazarire, and the ‘Capturing a Fading National Memory’
Team, (Gutu) 16 August 2007.
1994
Commander of the Tete Province between 1977 and 1978. Although extolling his
virtues as a good soldier, the aide saw many shortcomings in his superior and read
much into his tactical errors. Frequently some commanders did little more than visit
the field occasionally to get a feel of the war by asking for an ambush to be
organised for them and participate in it as a sport. Common guerrillas often
ridiculed their commanders’ lack of field experience or their complacence. A wide
ranging interview regarding the day to day experience with a commander is worth
quoting at length:
We operated in the Nyambire, Dande, Berechigango, and Pfunyangwo areas for a
long time. We sometimes went back to Mozambique. Later I was assigned to assist
Bornwell Masawi, a Provincial Commander. Later, Comrade Tungamirai asked who
had assigned such a young boy like me while he was carrying out his inspection, but
my deputy said I was highly competent.
As a person who travelled with the Provincial Commanders, I had to patrol the
whole area, but I requested to be transferred because I had my own personal differences
with the commander Bornwell Masawi. He harassed me to an extent that we never got
along with each other.
He came with a man possessed with an ancestral spirit (svikiro) and he claimed
that the time for independence was around the corner, and he wanted to cleanse the
area. I was the unit commander and I felt that my soldiers will not fight because they
would prefer to just wait for independence. It was sort of demoralizing. To me it did
not make sense. We walked together with the svikiro and the commander, including
the unit. The old man was following behind and we crossed Ruya River and he
called
us back to eat, but I thought we had to cross the border in time so I objected. But
he, as the commander, had his way. We went back, to the old man. But after eating,
we discovered that the Ruya River had flooded, but it had not rained, maybe it had
rained up the river. The svikiro said that the ancestors had barred us from crossing,
so we were not supposed to cross. We had to made canoes from tree bark to send our
war materials across the river. But at that moment I did not blame anyone; but when
we got to the front, towards Easter in 1978 or 77, I am not sure. It rained on that day
and we had to leave our material with the local people so that we could collect it on
our way back. Bornwell Masawi (Provincial Commander) had a blanket, which the
Swedish government had given us. It was now heavy and wet and I had to give it to
the locals, to keep it, but Bornwell Masawi refused to leave it and declared that it
had to be carried. I did not want to carry it and I told my Deputy that. The other
comrades had to carry it, yet they were carrying heavy materials whilst Bonwell
Masawi and
the svikiro carried nothing. The blanket got heavy and we had to leave it without the
knowledge of Bornwell Masawi. When we camped to sleep, since we shared the
same place of sleeping, Bornwell Masawi asked for his blanket and I told him that we
had left it. I tried to explain, but he insisted that I had disobeyed him by refusing to
take orders. In another incident, the locals gave us traditional beer and I went with it to
him, but he said that I must drink it first. I sipped the beer, and he responded by
saying that I drink beer and if it wasn’t for him we would have drank all the beer
contrary to combat regulations, which outlawed such behaviour. But he drank the beer
himself. On another occasion, we were sleeping and it was getting cold and there
was a small drizzle, but he had no blankets. He woke up and stood arms akimbo. I
reacted by taking my gun and loading it, asking whom the person was. Of course I
knew it was him. He said we
were supposed to sleep with the locals, but I told him it was impossible. He claimed
that I wanted to shoot him, but I told him that it was dangerous to wake up and stand
in front of a soldier who is asleep because one can get shot thinking that it is an
enemy. I told him that we were not going to sleep with the locals. He also asked me
about my security, since I had not posted anyone to guard us and I told him that we do
not guard the area since the area was more peaceful than in Mozambique, where
people spent the whole night on guard. I also told him that the locals promised to
guard the area whilst we were asleep. Moreover we were told to rest at night. He
asked me where I got those principles, arguing that, “You are a unit which travel with
the Provincial Commander! Yet you do not guard the area?” I told him that I had
never been attacked at night. He called for Mapepa, a sectorial commander and senior
to me, and he told him the story, but I stepped aside.
They called me and I knew that they had been talking about me. Mapepa asked
me about the blanket and the gun incident. He said that I was even drinking beer. He
announced to me that I had been demoted, and I was to hold no position. He said that
I had to surrender the gun, I but disagreed with him, saying that demotion was not a
problem, but surrendering the gun was not possible. We had been told that you should
not give the gun to anybody, but you were supposed to die with it. I was with other
guys, whom I used to hang around with in the unit. We were told that if we do not
surrender, we will be arrested. We were beaten and that was my first time to be
beaten on the front. We went as far as Mabvuku and we wanted to track a guy who
had gone away with a gun and we had to find him to arrest him and take away the gun.
The guys who replaced our position were coming from Mozambique and they were
trained in Tanzania. Masawi told them that we were the ones supposed to carry
heavy material. I admit that I used to smoke (drugs/marijuana) with Topse (my
second in command who was also demoted). We used to smoke marijuana and we
felt nothing when we carried the material. It used to pain him and he regretted at
some point.
We got to Chikwaka and we wanted to address the public. We had to cross a small
river, but it was flooded. Bornface, the one who had replaced me, took out a barbed
wire and crossed and he tied it so that we could cross. Bornwell was wearing jeans
and the current was too much for him to hold on, and then he had to let go. At times
you could wish if he could get drowned. He was rescued by the guy who was near
him, though he could have died at that point. I looked at him and I grinned, and it
offended him so much. When we were just leaving the bank of the river, we realized
that there was another river in front since it was a sort of an island. They went back
before us to cross the bank. The helicopter came, whilst they were crossing. Topse
ran away with others, but I remained behind. I could not follow on such a spot. Seeing
that there was nobody on the riverbank, the helicopters followed the terrain. When we
were about to go, we realized that from a group of 17, we were now 6. We became
united once again, since we were not so few. …Bornwell did not like me because he
thought I had grinned at him.
On our way to Chesa, we were poisoned by the white soldiers. They poisoned the
grass and we were affected by the poison to such an extent that some could not walk.
Bornwell asked me whether we should go back or continue, considering the state
of others. I answered him that since I was no longer the commander, I could not be
answerable. He said since I was once the commander, I could have a say. He became
silent, realizing that I was right. We returned to Chesa with others who had swollen
1994
legs, but I was still okay. We reunited with the others and another group to boost our
numbers. Bornwell was a hard nut and short-tempered man. That could be the reason
why we always had some differences. He insisted that we go and camp at one
woman named Mai Chimbwido, but I told him that the soldiers had been reported to
be there. We had been told of their presence, but he insisted because he wanted to
play with the woman there. It was an area on a mountain and we had to climb it, I
heard the sound of a gun banging against a stone. I was sure because there is a
difference between the sound of a stone banging against a stone and that one of a
gun. I loosened the gun
that I had, a motor.232
Other commanders were entirely the opposite,demonstrating on the spot appreciation
of specific military situations, making prompt decisions, and implementing them in
a way that brought in results. Adaptation was important and so was innovation. Two
cases are worth quoting from Freddie Matanga’s testimony. First, the decision to deal
with the practical military situation obtaining at Vila Salazar:
Vilar Salazar was a flash point - a border post town on the Rhodesian border with
Mozambique. Both officers from the FRELIMO Comrades had seen it as a danger,
but I interpreted it differently. The Rhodesian soldiers would broadcast news over
a transmitter (micro) from the Maputo Broadcasting and they would trigger their
artillery thereafter; the situation would continue for 15 to 20 days. We knew they were
going to fire. It was a heavy exchange; at 12:30 they would shout from the bunkers
(saying Camarada, Camarada, it’s lunch time, we work with time, it’s time to rest)
and they stop firing and begin playing cards etc. In turn we had to have our lunch
quickly. After lunch they would start firing; it continued like this for days. I questioned
why the enemy behaved in this way. We could use the B10 until they expired in 13 to
18 hours, putting sacks and pouring water until it was a complete write off.
We also would use the B16, but it required special approval because it could carry
nuclear war material and the operation was a high risk and the smoke would move for
kilometres. Sometimes it was instructed to fire once because the cost of rockets was
about USD$2000. This weapon could send the enemies away and they would rest for
days. This could help facilitate our rest; it was a ploy to starve us and concentrate on
wasting your firearms, so I never concentrated on Vilar Salazar. They never crossed
into Mozambique, and we fired back to facilitate exhaustion of our firearms. I chose
to ignore Vilar Salazar. It involved firing without casualties; I put my mind into the
advance in the company of Victor Rungani, John Zongororo. And the general was kind
enough (Rex Nhongo); he gave me officers when necessary, to rest and under guard
we moved on.233
In the second place, there was the flexibility that these ‘men on the spot’ needed to
display in the field so that they did not become slaves to cartographic descriptions on
paper such as ‘Manica’ or ‘Gaza’ Provinces, which had little meaning on the
ground. Matanga explains:
(232) Interview with Amos Sigauke (Comrade Vasco Mudiwa) by Gerald Mazarire, (Harare) 23 February 2007.
(233) Interview with Rtd. Brigadier Benjamin Mabenge (Comrade Freddie Matanga) by Gerald Mazarire, (UZ
Linguistics Audio Laboratory) 7 February 2007.
We looked at the situation, the whole of Gaza Province within the northern side of the
Sabi, which we could not access because of the river; we had handed over to
Tonderai Nyika for his access in Musikavanhu. We, in turn, incorporated his men on
our side of the Sabi. Ultimately, we only remained with sector two which included
Mberengwa, Zvishavane, Shurugwi, Berejena, Buchwa to Gweru, and the southern
side, Beitbridge, Maranda 1 and 2, where Stoppa Chiridza was in charge, and Juru,
Shumba. Carlos was in sector two; visibly on the map, sector two cannot be
seen...234
It is thus difficult to account for the various peculiarities of each province, sector, or
detachment and its operations. At that stage, we put together the collective memories
of combatants and civilians in zones where ZANLA operated during the period
under analysis to describe a ‘war situation’ as it emerged. Once again, this
description is based on impressions as rendered by the people interviewed and the
evidence may be overwhelming in some areas and thin in others. The initial
emphasis here is on the combat experiences as rendered by those directly involved.
The Military Situation in the New Operational Provinces: Manica and
Gaza, 1977-1978
Tangwena, which was the northernmost sector in ZANLA’s Manica operational
province, opened during the ZIPA era. It was named after Chief Tangwena, who
had fought a heroic battle against the Rhodesian state, resisting the eviction of his
people from their lands. Chief Tangwena was now in the camps in Mozambique,
after having assisted Robert Mugabe and Edgar Tekere to cross the border. The
Tangwena sector covered Nyanga, Penhalonga, Watsomba, Gandanzara, Old Murapa,
Vhumbunu, andthefamous Zindidetachment.Italsostretchedinto Mandeya,Makoni,
Wedza, Chiduku, and surrounding areas. Testimonies collected regarding this area
seem to emphasise, not only the increased infiltration by ZANLA groups, but also
the rise of Rhodesian pseudo operations. On 1 April 1977, Rhodesian Selous Scouts
pretending to be guerrillas shot and killed Basil Nyabadza, leader of the St. Francis
African Independent Church in Makoni.235 Nyabadza was a well known supporter of
ZANLA freedom fighters, who used his vehicle to ferry goods and provisions for
the guerrillas. He owned a small shop at Makoni, which was a distributing point.
Earlier in 1975, he had been imprisoned for six months for a similar offence.
Despite these
attemptstostoplocalsupport,guerrillanumbersswelledinthissectorthroughout 1977.
A group incorporating Comrades Mariyo, Mhiripiri Shungu, Black Africa Masango,
and Dhuzu Bonde entered Hwedza around June 1977, and were involved in contacts
with Rhodesian troops in Gangare, Bhingi, Chitida, Pasina, Chidhenge, Zenda 1,
Zenda II, Chigondo, Garabha, Bhasvi, Mukurumure, Chinonga, and Chisasike. Their
supply line stretched from Chiduku, and groups moved back and forth through Ruda
(234) Ibid.
(235) Hastings, A. St. Francis African Church Makoni: Story of the Foundation and Development of an Independent
Zimbabwean Community. Leeds: Unpublished Manuscript, 2003: See p.57; See also T.O. Ranger. Peasant
Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe. London: James Currey, 1985: See p.271.
1994
and Mount Kambudzi. According to Comrade Mariyo, it was in the desire to intercept
this line, that the Rhodesians set up Ruda Camp and the Grand Reef Air Force base.236
Many former operatives in this sector remember encounters with enemy forces that
targeted their supply lines. Pardon Humanikwa, for example, retold how they ended
up having to split groups destined for the Tangwena sector as soon as they crossed
Nyanga. Humanikwa described one encounter with Rhodesian forces soon after his
group had split at Mount Jenya. This was a ‘fire force’ attack with three helicopters
on full assault. The leader of Humanikwa’s group, Tension Chipoko, successfully
brought down one of the helicopters with a motor bomb, but the Rhodesians were
reinforced with a ground force and a mounted infantry. By some stroke of luck, he
says, this contact attracted the attention of their colleagues with whom they had just
split; these colleagues returned to reinforce them and turned the tide of the battle in
the guerillas’ favour. As is often the case with these collected freedom fighter
stories, the narrative ends with the achievement of “all the helicopters were
downed”.237 They pursued the ground force and, according to Comrade Mariyo,…
When they were about to cross Nyatende River, I’m not sure of the name, we met the
Rhodesian forces, who were using motorbikes which had tubeless tyres. They were
very persistent, those people; maybe they were thinking that we had no bullets, but
they had realized that all their helicopters had been gunned down. These ones were now
running away from danger and they had nothing to defend themselves with as they
were fired at by the other guys. We did not kill them; we caught them alive and they
became captives who accompanied us on our advance to Mt. Jenya. The helicopters
were now flying at a distance away from us since they were now afraid of coming
closer. We had gunned down five helicopters and one spotter plane and this was the
largest now of planes to be gunned down at the same time and same place in
Tangwena sector area. On our way up Mt. Jenya, we met baboons and they ran away,
a sign showing that the mountain was safe and there were no enemies. We camped on
the mountain and other boys from St. Killens, which is part of Gandanzara, also came
after having heard what had happened. We had a parade that night so that it could be
seen who was there and who was not; those who had been injured and those who had
died during the battle. The number of those who died was very low; they were not
more than five people, but their guns were recovered by other comrades, who,
however, failed to carry the bodies of the deceased with them. The commanders had
also come and they started dividing people into sections and told them to disperse
quickly.238
Zindi Detachment was another interesting theatre of operations in Tangwena, as
noted earlier in the testimonies of Steven Chidavanyika. It became one of the
earliest liberated zones where guerillas were becoming even more adventurous,
ambushing convoys on the Nyanga main road at will.239 The guerillas operating
in the Zindi

(237) As shall be seen in the experiences of the guerillas collected in the various sectors, almost all the battles end
up with a helicopter being shot down; Our independent count of these claims from just the interviews collected for
this report adds up to over 100 helicopters, something well beyond the Rhodesian fleet.
(239) Interview with Cde Stephen Chidavanyika, (Harare) 6 February 2007.
Detachment believed strongly that their success was a result of the support they
were being offered by the spirit mediums, such as Sekuru Sakureba. They
maintained very high moral values, safeguarded by taboos and prohibitions against
the use of charms, herbs, and the consultation of diviners. They believed any
transgressor was always burdened with bad luck, such as injury or more than
frequent engagements with the enemy. The only salvation was confession and
Sakureba often came in for the exorcism.240
The Munhumutapa sector was immediately south of Tangwena and incorporated
Zimunya, Chitakatira, Bazeley Bridge, Manjengwa, Mukuni, Makarara, Dorowa,
Marabada, Mupati, and the surrounding areas. Amongst others, we interviewed
Comrade Wrong Kays Kays who operated in the Zimunya-Jindu-Bocha areas from
1977 and was involved in a number of battles that resulted in the capture of his
colleagues.241 Interestingly, a number of female platoons entered Munhumutapa
sector, bringing in supplies and ammunition from Mozambique and one of the
female combatants, Comrade Pfumo Rinobaya, remembered how in October 1977
her platoon was ambushed at Ndorwe Mountain where she and a friend, Comrade
Choice, were the only survivors.242 The mountainous terrain of the eastern highlands
offered a number of advantages to guerrilla warfare and a certain Comrade Mutekeri
gave a number of testimonies about how they evaded or surprised the enemy in the
misty environs of the Gandamasunga Mountain range. They also knew that under
these conditions the Rhodesians could not count on any aircraft support.243 Perhaps
the most widely celebrated ZANLA military score in the Munhumutapa Sector was
the attack on the Grand Reef Airbase on 17 December 1977. Grand Reef had
become Rhodesia’s biggest forward base, which had probably been used in the air
raids on Chimoio and Tembwe a few days before as described below. It was not
known whether the Grand Reef attack was a ZANLA retaliatory move, but they
successfully killed 22 Rhodesian pilots during the night attack, after which they
destroyed all the electricity pylons supplying the base. Another attack was made
the same day at a military base near the town of Umtali using mortar bombs which
hit a canteen packed with soldiers. The Smith regime described these two incidents
as “the boldest guerrilla operation so far.”244 In a communiqué issued after the
Grand Reef attack, ZANLA claimed:
On December 17, our forces launched a successful attack on the Grand Reef military
base west of Umtali. This base is a centre for attacks against our people in the semi-
liberated zones in the east of the country and for aggression against the People’s
Republic of Mozambique. It is thus of great strategic military importance to the enemy.
(240) Ibid.
(241) Interview with Comrade Wrong Kays Kays by Charles Maripfonde, (Vhuka Farm in Centenary) 22 March
2008.
(242) Interview with Comrade Pfumo Rinobaya (Ephraim Katsanza), (Chinyani Farm in Centenary) 18 March
2008.
(243) Ibid.
(244) The Daily News. “ZIPA Strikes at Vital Airbase.” Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 22 December 1977.
1994
The attack carried by a company of our comrades with artillery and light weapons
was preceded by careful reconnaissance… A Zipa [sic] artillery unit opened fire first
and a few minutes later the enemy returned fire. However, the enemy force which
numbered 500 were taken by surprise and were unable to put up effective resistance.
Our comrades were able to continue shelling for half an hour. An estimated 400 enemy
soldiers were immobilized and will play no further part in the military oppression of
our people or in the criminal aggression against neighbouring states…245
Further in the south, the Musikavanhu sector covered Chipinge, Chimanimani,
Marange, Bocha, Birchenough Bridge, and stretched into Enkeldoorn and Umvuma.
Parts of it could also have embraced detachments in Zaka, Gutu, and Bikita.
However, in considering the demarcations of Musikavanhu, we need to take into
account the rearrangements by the field commanders as elaborated by Freddie
Matanga earlier on, for there were indeed some overlaps with the northern sectors
of Gaza Province. Inevitably, this affected the coordination and deployment of
troops on either side of the Save River. Davis Hlazo was one of the ZANLA
guerrillas who operated in Musikavanhu after August 1976 with such people as
Eugenia Mudzimu and Mashukushe Zvidzai. Hlazo says he was deployed in
Chipinge under special circumstances, that is, after ZANLA had realized that the
many Shona speaking cadres who were being deployed in the Shangani-speaking
areas of Chikombedzi and Gezani were experiencing difficulties. It thus introduced a
policy of deploying a small number of people in their home areas and this is how
Hlazo ended up operating back at his home in Chipinge.246
They established a supply post at Chikwekweti and under the command of
Augustine Mhare they masterminded an attack on Rhodesian forces based in
Chipinge Town in 1977. Later on, they were joined by a special group of female
cadres who were trained at Sungamberi in Tanzania. They brought in supplies from
Mozambique, but were easily incorporated to augment the fighting platoons. Their
distinguishing mark, according to Hlazo, was that they were extremely light-skinned.
Some, like Varasi, Sarah Mbovhani, and Tikazulu, participated in a battle with his
group and miraculously evaded capture by the Rhodesian forces.247
The Gaza Province provides a cartographic challenge given the changes already
highlighted, and it is important to view it in the larger picture. As a province, it
stretched from Espungabera down to the Limpopo Valley and was initially divided into
four operational sectors up until 1976, when Sector 1 was joined with Musikavanhu.
Sector 4 was combined with Sector 3 and this effectively left two sectors, the first
stretching from the border with Musikavanhu all the way to the Chiredzi River and
the second going from Chiredzi to Beitbridge and further north as far as Filabusi.
Sector 1 has been recorded as the hottest of ZANLA’s operational zones, which
claimed nearly 20% of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts in one detachment (the
Nyajena
(245) The Daily News. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 6 January 1978.

(246) Interview with Davis Hlazo, (Masvingo) 23 June 2008.
(247) Ibid.
Detachment) alone.248 In the new ZANLA offensive, Charles Munyoro was the
initial provincial commander, and was assisted by Sector Commanders Watson Juru,
Hector Muridzo, and Metsi Rimwe. Later changes and restructuring brought other
legends like Nylon Masambaasiyana, Willie Deveteve, Fast Move, and Mike
Goromigo, among others. Deveteve recounts his early baptism by fire during his first
days in the operational zones:
We got into an area which was known as Sector 2 in Chiredzi and we were
accompanied by Provincial Commander Charles Munyoro. We met Chief
Masvenure, to the south of Chiredzi. The Sectorial Commander said that any new
comer was supposed to be baptized with a gun. So I was given two sections and we
were accompanied by Detachment Commander Zulu. We were assigned to check on
the Binya road, where whites used to travel so much. When we got there in the
afternoon around 3 pm, we laid an ambush and when the whites came we fired at
them. This was the beginning and the whites had to send helicopters and we fought a
terrible war which culminated in the evening. Another group was firing. The group
that laid the ambush had gone with Henry Muchena and they fought on the other side.
They realized that a new force was operating in the area. We fired at the enemy fiercely
and the Rhodesians responded by sending armoured vehicles. So we followed what
we had been taught, that if you see an enemy advancing, you retreat. We retreated, but
they thought they were pushing us into Mozambique.249
Under the guise of this ‘retreat’ Deveteve’s group successfully deployed in
Mberengwa and Chivi where they launched a full fledged war. For many people in
this area, the beginning of the war was marked not only by the assembling of
people at mass meetings or pungwes, but by the explosion of landmines and
pitched engagements between the guerrillas and the Rhodesian forces.250 Metsi
Rimwe was in charge of this sector, which was predominantly Shangani or Venda
speaking, a factor that posed some operational difficulties for the mostly Shona
speaking combatants of ZANLA. Comrade Bushu, who also saw some action in
this sector, confirmed this point, and reiterated that it was also a transit zone which
could not be avoided, since most ZANLA groups destined for deployment in the
entire Gaza Province used the Mapayi road and then parted somewhere near
Gezani.251 He also noted that in some cases they had to employ the services of
translators. Metsi Rimwe was, however, a good Venda speaker. The Rhodesians
attempted to create a local tracking army composed of mostly Shangaan speaking
men to capitalise on the communication difficulties that were being experienced
and win over the Shangaan masses.252 This effort did not achieve much and many
cadres like Akwias Aquino testify to the hospitality they continued to receive from
the Shangaan/Hlengwe people during their operations.253 With time, ZANLA was
augmented by FRELIMO groups who
(248) Parker, J. Assignment Selous Scouts: See p.187.

(249) Interview with Willie Deveteve.
(250) Interview with Dembai Madambi by Taguma Mazarire, (Masvingo) 7 April 2008.
(251) Interview with Comrade Bushu, (Kwekwe) 20 May 2008.
(252) Parker, J. Assignment Selous Scout: See p.70.
(253) Interview with Comrade Akwias Akwino, (Harare) 14 May 2007.
1994
were deployed sometime in 1978 into each sector of the Gaza Province.254
According to Freddie Matanga:
Sometime we received 200 FRELIMO men. It raised suspicion over our
consideration policies that we were implementing on the edges of Rutenga, Cold
Storage Area, Mupapa, and South East and East of Mberengwa. We were offered the
privilege of talking about it with the personal staff of the president of Mozambique.
We stayed with them for three to four days and I chose that they should go to what
was formerly Sector 3 and 4. Although they loved their jeans and radios, the officers
were simply sober and driven by social, psychological motivations. FRELIMO
officers went as far as Zvishavane, Mberengwa, Shurugwi, Buchwa, and
Berejena.255
Gaza contained all the crucial strategic links with South Africa, Rhodesia’s last
sanctions-busting ally, and areas which were very important to the Rhodesian
government. Such areas included the Rutenga-Bietbridge railway line, the
Somabula- Rutenga railway, roads, and other bridges in that sector. In 1977, Willie
Deveteve was specifically sent into the Gaza Province with a group of engineers on
a mission to sabotage these vital communication links. Towards the beginning of
1978, they had penetrated as far as Mataga, where they bombarded yet another
airbase in an event witnessed by their provincial commander, Freddie Matanga, who
had this to say:
We invited some of the detachment commanders from Sector 3 and Stoppa Chiridza
provided purely mature cadres. On the 9th of April, we set up the attack at 2:15 am
and shot the first bullet at 2:50 am. We called the D.A.s with red ribbon hats, some
were soldiers. There was a part somewhere we did our calculation before leaving
Shayishayi; we wanted 300mm bombs (mortar), and 250 mm, and about 50mm m90,
about 27 recoilless rifles, and shells for AK 47, RPG7. Mataga was a neighbour to
Nyala, a mini airbase, but they could not come to rescue during the battle. Cattle
broke out of the kraals, eating up people’s crops. Some of the men fell from the beds
because bombardment was intense. You could not even imagine it. After that attack,
Nyala Airbase could not offer Mataga Camp a rescue. The most they did was to fire
into the sky to scare us. I think this was one of the best attacks. Colonel Shumba
(Willie Deveteve), Watson Juru, Trevor Mbudzana, and Colonel Rungani were to be on
a stand by to learn from these veterans. The whole class went through without any
casualties, which is rare in a war. There was heavy machine guns fire, but it was
quickly put up. Something that made my mind bleed was the loss of Tsana, who was
a mortar and machine gun specialist and could control it at all cost and levels. The
withdrawal order was given, but one of the novices could not understand what was
happening, possibly out of confusion. He pulled off his position trying to adjust his
gun; the inexperienced soldier discharged about 11 rounds straight into the officer’s
back. We tried to save him, but in vain, so we buried him at Mataga256.
The largest number of interviews collected for this project concern Gaza, even
if the interviews were collected outside Gaza itself. After considering the effect of
this ZANLA offensive on the direction of the war in general, discussion of the
Gaza
(254) Ibid.
(255) Interview with Comrade Freddie Matanga.
(256) Interview with Freddie Matanga.
Province will focus on how non-combatants viewed the situation, in addition to

charting the military situation, as done for other sectors.
The Chimoio and Tembwe Attacks, 24 and 27 November 1977
As the ZANU war escalated, the Rhodesians decided to strike deep into Mozambique
to destroy the sources of the guerrilla operations in Rhodesia. The Chimoio
headquarters were an obvious target and it was a matter of time before they hit them.
The Rhodesians struck on 24 November 1977, after nearly a year of surveillance
and intelligence work. Less than 100 kilometres from the Rhodesian border, Chimoio
was a complex of camps with virtually all the branches of the ZANLA
administration and more than 11,000 residents.
Like Nyadzonya the previous year, Chimoio was attacked in the morning, around
08:00 hrs,a predictable time for ZANLA parades.Although attempts at retaliation from
those sections of the camp equipped with anti-air weaponry such as all the
Takawira bases, ZANLA’s lack of preparedness for such an attack was shocking,
allowing the Rhodesians to launch another assault the next day.257 Aggripah
Mutambara believes that the main objective of the attacks was to bomb the freedom
fighters’ armoury, which the Rhodesians could not locate precisely and their
concentration on this target allowed people to escape from such bases as Nehanda,
Kaguvi, Parerenyatwa, and Chitepo College.258 We have collected several
interviews from several survivors of the attack and they show remarkable variations
in the details and circumstances of the attack. Dickson Dzora remembers that
Sekuru Chipfeni, the spirit medium of Nehanda Sector fame, who was now
resident at Chimoio, had forewarned the ZANU leadership of the impending attack,
but was ignored.259 Both Dzora and Theresa Chigombe testify to the intransigence
of the Camp Commander Patrick Mupunzarima to some such premonitions coming
even from the cadres in the camp. As Chingombe recalls,
a certain comrade, whose name was Aaron, woke up, saying that we were not
supposed to go for the morning assembly because he had dreamt of a bird which was
coming from the Rhodesian side, and he said that he dreamt of the bird destroying
the people who were in the camp. By that time, Patrick Mupunzarima was the camp
commander and he punished Comrade Aaron for saying out his dream. Aaron was
beaten and Mupunzarima was arguing that they did not recognize his capacity as a
spirit medium; instead he argued that he recognized the medium of Sekuru Chiodza.
Aaron was severely beaten, but he insisted that his dream was going to come to pass.
Comrade Makasha was another leader at Chimoio and he could not understand it at
all. The following day, we were all summoned for the morning assembly and all of
a sudden
(257) Mutambara, A. Chimoio Attack: Rhodesian Genocide. Harare: Dept. of Information and Publicity, ZANU
PF, 2008: See p.52.
(258) Ibid. p.53.
(259) Interview with Dickson Dzora, (Harare) 15 February 2007.
1994
a spotter plane flew over us and Aaron shouted that the plane was the one he dreamt
of and everybody ignored him. When people were still trying to figure out what was
going on, the planes came and started dropping some bombs.260
James Munyuki confirms this narrative, and argues that a few days earlier there was
even evidence of strangers in the camps who had ‘sophisticated radios’; these
people also poisoned the food reserves undetected, so that some of the survivors of
the attack actually died of poisoned food.261
The length of the operation differs from interviewee to interviewee, and depends
on which base the person was stationed at the time of the attack. While it is generally
agreed that the attack lasted two days, some like Comrade Gumbo, who was at
Parirenyatwa base, believe it lasted only 20 minutes.262 Tonderai Tichatonga, who
was at Takawira II, believes it did not take more than ten minutes of indiscriminate
bombing to destroy this base. And he goes on to say, “That is when we saw that
there were Dakotas above us dropping the ground force all over, about a kilometre
around the camp. When we tried to escape to Mudzingadzi by crossing the river,
we discovered that we were encircled by the paratroopers. So you could survive the
bombing and find yourself facing the paratroopers, who could snipe you. So you had
to fight your way out of the cordon.”263 Letia Kagodo saw some of the assault
teams seeking and shooting them in cold blood.264 Several attempts to rescue the
survivors were foiled or ambushed by the Rhodesians, who roamed the camp for
the next two days. Arrangements were made to take the wounded to the main
hospital in Chimoio Town and a temporary base was set up at Siyalopi.265 An
ambulance involved in the work and bearing the Red Cross sign was attacked and
the occupants killed in cold blood. One of the camp medics, Elizabeth
Dumbarimwe, who survived the attack, recounts that it was not only those people
injured in the attack who she had to worry
about, but also those “vadhuwende” (patients) already in the camp hospitals, who
could not assist themselves in this emergency:
We were situated near the river, west of the main camp. The set-up strategy was that
patients had to be further from the entry point. The rationale was that the enemy
would come through the usual entry point, so we were furthest from the entry points;
we were near the river, so that we could wash the utensils we used, and also use the
water if comrades spoiled their linen. We heard some shooting and knew that there
was fighting in the main camp. We had been trained to think quick when there was
shooting, so that we could decide if this was training or fighting. We knew
immediately that this was a war. When the shooting started, we knew from the sound
that these were not the ordinary rifles we knew, so those patients who could run we
asked them to flee; those who couldn’t, we had to carry. We were lucky to be adjacent
to the shallow
(260) Interview with Theresa Chigombe, (Mt. Darwin) 25 February 2008.

(261) Interview with James Munyuki, (Chatsworth) 08 May 2007.
(262) Interview with Comrade Gumbo, (Masvingo) 04 May 2007.
(263) Interview with Tonderai Tichatonga, (Gweru) 12 May 2008.
(264) Interview with Letia Kagodo, (Centenary) 26 February 2008.
(265) Interview with Ackim Hunda, (Harare) 08 May 2007.
zone of the river and it was thus easy to cross it. Ninety-five patients crossed the
river, and we had been taught the ethics that as a medical officer you could not
abandon patients, because we were bound by the blood of liberation.
For the next week Chimoio was a sorry sight with corpses strewn all over so that
less conventional means of burying the dead were to be used, including bulldozing the
dead people into mass graves.266
The second phase of the Rhodesian operation turned on Tembwe Camp in the
Chifunde District of Tete Province nearly 72 hours later. The attack took three
days and, according to Refias Joseph Maraire, who was also a witness of the attack,
“ZANLA reinforcement forces came late. The Rhodesian forces were very harsh
and cruel to the wounded and sick defenceless people, sometimes burning or cutting
them with bayonets.”267 Although the precise circumstances under which ZANLA
opened Tembwe Camp are not clear, it was divided into two camps which were
about 5 km apart. Tembwe 1 was a refugee camp and Tembwe 2 was a training
camp, housing a total of 5,000 residents. Nearly 1,500 perished in the attack.
Amos Sigauke, who arrived as part of the ZANLA rescue team, recalls the
situation at Tembwe:
We arrived in Mozambique at the time when Tembwe was bombed. The day after the
bombing, we were assigned to go and assess the situation at that bombed area. We
were given a Land Cruiser by the Provincial Commander, and when we arrived the
Rhodesian soldiers were still checking on the area from their helicopters. The day when
it was bombed, it rained and this meant that the bodies decomposed faster. We arrived
at around 4 pm, which was the safest time to travel. We entered the camp and it was
traumatizing to see decomposing bodies and some bombs which had not detonated.
They had dropped some bombs, which could explode after some time so as to disturb
any rescuing team. We had to dig some trenches to bury the bodies and sometimes we
buried people in pits, which were used to dump rubbish at the camp. We carried the
bodies with our bare hands and you could see worms dropping from the bodies. It was
traumatizing. We had to stop the operation and continued the next day because we
were afraid of stepping on landmines if we operated at night.268
Yeukai Magamba, who was one of the trainees at Tembwe 2, gives the following
account of how they were attacked:
When Tembwe Base 2 was attacked, we were at the parade because every morning
we would assemble and get our duties for the day. The enemy had done a
reconnaissance of the camp routine, had observed everything such that we just saw
the whole sky above us full of jets. They started by bombing the armoury where we
kept our weapons, then bombed the place where we were assembled, then the
hospital, and the kitchen. We had been trained as medical staff that in the event of an
attack every one of us was supposed to run away with at least a patient; you were not
supposed to run away without a patient. If you ran away without a patient, you would
be labelled a sell-out. I ran out with one patient called Brokujacha, who was injured
in both ankles. While
(266) Interview with Toko Mpofu, (Centenary) 04 March 2008.

(267) Interview with Refias Joseph Maraire, (Harare) 09 May 2007.
(268) Interview with Amos Sigauke, (Harare) 23 February 2007.
1994
evacuating a patient you would be holding your gun. While I was crawling with my
patient a bomb was dropped near us, but we escaped unhurt because we took cover
under a big musasa tree. The gunner in the helicopter then saw us and fired upon us,
hitting the tree and also my leg, but I didn’t realize I had been hit. I continued to crawl
with the injured comrade, then removed his camouflage to use it as a bandage on his
injury because I had seen that he was bleeding excessively. It was then that I
discovered that I had been injured and took out a bandage to cover my injury. I
moved around with a full kit. The fighting lasted for more than four hours. One
doctor, Chenai, who came from the same area as me, died right before my eyes. I and
the injured Broku then dragged her near the river bank and covered her with humus.
The ground force also came to finish off the injured. I survived by covering myself
with humus, but comrade Broku smeared himself with blood. When the Rhodesian
forces came over, they were stabbing everyone to check if they were dead. When
they stabbed Broku, they were commenting that he was a dead terrorist. You don’t
breathe in such a time, and we survived because of that… The helicopters were then
shot away by the reinforcements from FRELIMO, and some fell within the camp.
After the enemy planes had gone, there was a lot of rain.269
Some of the people, like Maidei Nyika, who witnessed the Tembwe attack,
described the attack as one of the most traumatic they had ever witnessed. She
notes, “We were attacked in the morning when we were about to dismiss from the
parade that was held in the morning… We were alerted about the attack, but nobody
took these warnings seriously as many believed that the spirit medium was being
insane. Moreover the attack came whilst we least expected it.”270
Another witness to the Tembwe attack, Alfred Mumvuri, blamed the attack on one
J.D. John Dube whom he described as a sell-out. He argues, “There was a man by
the name J.D. John Dube, whom we thought shared the same nationalistic motives
of liberating the country, but this was actually opposite as he turned out to be a sell-
out, because he worked in liaison with the Rhodesians.”271
The Special Political Circumstances of 1977
While all this was taking place, the international political climate also reached an
important turning point. Between February and March 1977, Russian President
Nikolai Podgorny and Cuban Leader Fidel Castro visited southern Africa in a move
to strengthen ties with the independent countries and offer further assistance to those
still waging their struggles. Henry Kissinger’s quest for a Rhodesian solution since
1974 had been an attempt to spruce up Gerald Ford’s foreign policy in his re-election
bid. Stemming the communist tide in southern Africa was an important aspect of it.
He lost the election to Jimmy Carter at the end of 1976 and this at once threatened
the flow of events. Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy placed an emphasis on human
rights and maintaining good relations with developing countries. His way of
dealing with
(269) Interview with Yeukai Magamba, (Mt. Darwin) 20 July 2008.

(270) Interview with Maidei Nyika, (Centenary) 27 February 2008.
(271) Interview with Alfred Mumvuri, (Kwekwe) 20 June 2008.
the communist threat was to make a good impression on the developing countries
to discourage them from looking up to the Soviet Union’s communist policies as the
best example of approaching global and economic issues. In this sense, it differed
markedly from the Ford-Kissinger option of accepting ‘moderate blacks’ in power
in southern Africa and working through South Africa. Carter, through his Secretary
of State Cyril Vance, wanted a government ‘acceptable to Africans’, but, like Ford
and Kissinger before him, he wanted the British to take the lead in fostering such a
settlement in Rhodesia. Similarly, he also believed in working through the Frontline
leaders and South Africa, but was not prepared to countenance the domestic situation
of apartheid in South Africa itself. As soon as he entered office in early 1977,
Carter wrote to the Frontline presidents reaffirming his commitment to a negotiated
settlement in Rhodesia and took firm action in seeking to repeal the Byrd Amendment
allowing the USA to continue importing Rhodesian chrome.272 Vance worked with
the new British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, to continue a new wave of the so-
called Anglo-American initiatives based on a set of proposals that would provide for
an independence constitution, ceasefire arrangements, and a transitional government.
The key defining features of the proposals were 20% white representation in the
national legislature, a presidential system of government, an eight year guarantee of
protected representation for whites, compensation for property appropriated, and a
six month period under a British governor to supervise elections.
Part of the problem of working through the Frontline leaders was that they all
believed that the proposals would work if they recognized only the Patriotic Front as
the legitimate representatives of the Zimbabwean people. This attitude had already
alienated Muzorewa and Sithole and other groups that had emerged since Geneva,
including a new coalition of African chiefs called the Zimbabwe United People’s
Organisation (ZUPO) led by Jeremiah Chirau. Ian Smith had sounded Muzorewa
while in Geneva to consider the possibility of reaching an internal arrangement inside
Rhodesia, excluding the Patriotic Front, if the talks failed. He continued his overtures
when Muzorewa returned from his self-imposed exile, and from 24 November
1977 their negotiations started in earnest.After three months of protracted
negotiations, an agreement was reached over a settlement which differed from the
Anglo-American deal in reserving 28 seats for whites instead of 20 and giving a ten
year grace period instead of eight.273 Meanwhile, for most of 1977, Owen and
Vance were involved in several trips across the sub-region, but failed to sell their
proposals to the Patriotic Front, especially on the grounds of security arrangements
during the transition and ceasefire periods. Two meetings held with the Patriotic
Front in Malta failed to break the impasse and there was a high likelihood thereafter
that the USA and Britain would give it all up and recognise the internal
developments within Rhodesia. Inside Zambia, the economy was teetering on the
brink of collapse, and with an impending
(272) Steadman. Peacemaking in Civil War: See p.128.

(273) Muzorewa. Rise Up and Walk, Appendix D. See pp.278-282.
1994
election in December, Kaunda was forced to reopen his border with Rhodesia and to
persuade Nkomo to begin a new set of talks with Smith. Smith, on his part, had been
advised by his security chiefs that the military situation was deteriorating by the
day and the only way he could stop the war was by dividing the Patriotic Front
through securing a deal with Nkomo.274 In August 1977, Smith and Nkomo
reached a deal to install Nkomo as head of the transitional government, but Nkomo
insisted that Robert Mugabe should be part of the deal. In the end, both Nkomo and
Kaunda failed to sell their arrangements with Smith to Nyerere and Mugabe, and
this put more cracks in the Patriotic Front coalition. The Smith-Nkomo talks ended
when ZIPRA guerrillas brought down a Rhodesian civilian aircraft in a situation
described below.
Some Internal Dynamics in ZAPU, 1977
At the end of 1977, ZAPU experienced some internal setbacks inside Zambia,
when J.Z. Moyo was not only assassinated by a parcel bomb, but also some tensions
developed amongst cadres within the camps along tribal lines. Some witnesses are
of the opinion that there were internal attempts by some Ndebele hardliners to do
away with Nikita Mangena as head of the ZIPRA army. Mangena, who had always
advocated for unity of the Zimbabwean fighting forces and had been Deputy
Commander of the ill-fated ZIPA, was still not averse to cooperation with ZANU
where their operations overlapped in the field. “It was rumoured,” one ZIPRA
combatant told us, “that when at one time Mangena was touring the operational
areas inside the country, he met ZANLA combatants and exchanged ammunition
with them as a sign of comradeship, and Mangena did not deny the rumour. He in fact
said that he had done it as a gesture to show that they were united. I think that is
when he became hated by the Ndebele elements, who did not want to be united with
the Shona. From then onwards, he was labelled a sell-out. At that point there were a
lot of misunderstandings.”275
Mangena seemed to have been trying to deal with what were indeed embarrassing
cases where ZIPRA and ZANLA, in pursuit of their expansion programmes, not only
overlapped, but, instead of cooperating to fight a common enemy, exchanged fire. In
Silobela, one Gandiwa told the story of how,
Some ZANLA forces came from the east through Dabuka in 1977. When they
arrived, they called everybody to a meeting to politicise us. Some people came, but
others didn’t, thinking that they were Selous Scouts. They genuinely claimed that
they had come to fight a joint war with their ZIPRA counterparts. They asked where
they were and wrote a letter to be passed on to the ZIPRAs. The Mujibhas [male
runners for ZANLA guerrillas] who carried the letter were told that, ‘We don’t mix
with vana ‘sadza nehuku’. They can fight their war from the east and we will fight
from the western end.’ What angered the ZANLAs was that they found some
ZIPRAs beating up the povo at a beer party, arguing that they were supporters of the
‘sadza nehukus’. About ninety ZANLAs assembled with their weapons and sought to
demonstrate to the ZIPRAs that they outnumbered them and had more weapons.
They ambushed
(274) Flower. Serving Secretly: See p.209.

(275) Interview with Ms. Mabuwa, (Harare) 11 September 1987.
about seven ZIPRAs at Nguruve’s homestead, after which Nguruve committed

suicide. That’s when the whole thing started, and we started hunting each other. More
ZANLAs started pouring in, sometimes numbering as many as 500; so too did the
ZIPRAs, who started searching for ZANLA in the area called Jongola.276
More incidents were reported in Spolilo,where local ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders
tried to deal with the animosity against each other by exchanging platoons.Apparently
this never worked and proved to be an impediment rather than a solution.277 The
effort at cooperation was also confirmed in Chingoyo and Mahoho areas by one
ZANLA cadre, Claude Masweto, who operated in the Mt. Darwin and Dande areas.278
Mangena is said to have seen unity as inevitable and encouraged that this be
practiced back in the camps. The tension continued to rise until Pinda, one of the
Shona camp commanders loyal to Mangena, was ambushed by fellow ZIPRA
cadres on his way from Mkushi Camp. Tribal violence erupted, forcing most people
to flee from the camps and hide in nearby bushes. The ZAPU leadership led by
Nkomo and Msika came to quell the tension, but in a few months time, Mangena’s
car detonated a landmine and he was killed. The Rhodesians claimed responsibility,
although suspicions continued that it was an internal job.279
In 1978, Mangena was replaced by his deputy, Lookout Masuku, who proceeded
with a new plan of appointing resident commanders in the two fronts that ZIPRA was
operating internally. Rodwell Nyika took control of the northern front and Carlson
Mudzingwa went to the southern front. It also became necessary to restructure the
High Command following Mangena’s death. This was done simply through retiring
into the diplomatic service the older experienced commanders such as Cephas
Cele, Sam Moyo, Elliot Masengo, and Gordon Munyanyi. This allowed the younger
generation to take over under the following structure:
ZIPRA HIGH COMMAND, 1978:
Secretary for Defence, Akim Ndlovu
Army Commander, Lookout Masuku
Deputy Army Commander, Ambrose Mutinhiri
Chief of Staff, Major Gen Maseko
Military Intelligence, Ananias Gwenzi
Personnel, Sigoge
Training, Tondhlana
Operations, Mike Grey
National Security, Sekuru Patrick
Commissariat, Gedi Ndlovu
(276) Interview with Mr. Gandiwa by K. Shamuyashe, (Amaveni, Kwekwe) 21 July 2008.
(277) Tshuma, T. “Conflict in Matabeleland and the Midlands Provinces: A Study of Evolving Power Struggles
and the Creation, Operation and Demise of Super ZAPU (1980-1984)”. Unpublished BA Honours Dissertation.
Harare: University of Zimbabwe, June 2006. pp.11, 13.
(278) Interview with Claude Masweto (alias Maworesa MuZimbabwe), (Rusape) 4 May 2008.
(279) Ibid.
1994
Cuban and Russian Advisors, 1978
The change of the High Command in 1978 also coincided with the coming of Russian
and Cuban military advisors, a move much feared by the USA and South Africa.
The Russians believed ZIPRA should deploy smaller groups to strike targets in the
country and come back to Zambia. Yet ZIPRA had perfected the ‘Castro Approach’
with a well established infrastructure inside the country that enabled cadres to live
off the land. The Cubans much preferred this strategy and concentrated on strategic
innovation, leaving the Russians to assist with military equipment and other
operational issues. The Russians introduced the Karate Communication Systems or
Russian High Frequency radios with a range of well over 1000km. They were
deployed in all the platoons and enabled them to communicate with Lusaka
Headquarters across the border using a six-cell battery radio facility of less than
3kgs. These radios were further supplemented by the more sophisticated ‘non-
voice’ 3-9-3s communication system with a better power capacity.280
Such circumstances allowed improved strength which gave ZIPRA the
confidence to launch a much bigger offensive over a wide area. Todd Mpisi
commanded this improved offensive over Kariba, code-named Kariba I, Kariba II,
Kariba III, Chirundu I, and Chirundu II. The area also covered Makuti, Elephant
Walk, and the Zimbabwean side opposite Livingstone. Part of the strategy was also
to derail trains rolling stock between Wankie and Victoria Falls. Kaunda quickly
stopped this disruption, arguing that the trains also carried Zairian beef and copper
that was being exported via Durban. In addition, Zambia was having to import grain
through this railway system because of the ongoing drought. If ZIPRA continued
its attacks, it meant that Zambia would not be able to feed the thousands of refugees
in the camps. ZIPRA then applied its newly acquired Russian military hardware to
an even more ambitious project, downing of Rhodesian civilian planes with heat-
seeking missiles.
‘A Tit-for Tat Game’: ZIPRA’s Downing of Rhodesian Civilian Aircraft and
Rhodesian Retaliatory Raids, September 1978-April 1979
On 3 September 1978, ZIPRA guerrillas shot down an Air Rhodesia Vickers
Viscount four engine turboprop, a passenger plane with fifty-two passengers and four
crewmen that had just flown out of the Kariba Airport and was bound for Salisbury.
The plane was shot out of the sky using a Russian-made SAM-7, surface-to-air, Strella
rocket, and the plane hit the ground about 60km south-east of Kariba in Hurungwe
communal lands, where there were several ZIPRA platoons deployed.281 According
to the Daily News of Dar es Salaam, the search pilot said that it appeared that the
Viscount’s pilot had apparently tried to land on a 400-yard patch of broken ground,
but had hit the ground and careered into a gulley. Ten survivors of the crash were
then mowed down
(280) Interview with Richard Mataure by Prof. Bhebe, (University of Zimbabwe) 4 January 1990.
(281) “Guerrilla murdered air crash survivors.” The Daily Nation. Nairobi, Kenya. 5 September 1978.
by ZIPRA guerrillas and eight other survivors were then evacuated from the crash
scene by helicopter to Kariba. 282
Joshua Nkomo told Lusaka radio in an interview that the plane had been shot
out of the sky because the Rhodesians had been ferrying military personnel and
equipment from Salisbury and Victoria Falls using the Viscounts and ZIPRA had no
reason to believe this was a different mission.283 He also said the Rhodesians
could
not complain because this was “a military zone,” according to The Daily Nation.284
Nkomo also denied that his fighters had killed any survivors and emphasized that
his forces would not attack any civilian targets, and said that it was unfortunate if
any civilians were killed in the plane attack. Nkomo also wondered why the
western media showed concern only for the white civilians when about thirty to forty
Africans were killed every day by the Rhodesian security forces. According to
Radio Lusaka, Nkomo asked why“the same press ignored the barbarity perpetuated
by the notorious Selous Scouts and fascist forces on Africans.”285 When asked by
the BBC about the killing of the surviving civilians, Nkomo attracted international
outrage when he let out a chuckle. However, according to him in his
autobiography,“They asked me what weapons the plane had been brought down
with. Clearly I could not say it was a SAM-7: it was a secret that we had such things.
To turn the question aside, I answered that we had brought it down by throwing
stones, and, as I said so, I laughed a bit. I was not laughing at the deaths of all those
civilians, but at the evasive answer. The laugh was remembered, rather than my
regret at the unnecessary deaths.”286
A week later, according to the Zambians, Rhodesian Premier Ian Smith was
planning revenge for the shooting down of the Viscount. The Zambian Daily Mail
said that Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, said that the Zambian government
had reliable information that the “racist regime” was planning to attack Zambia.287
The Rhodesian Attack on Mkushi Girls Camp, 1978
Less than a month after the downing of the Viscount, the Rhodesians retaliated with
a raid on ZIPRA camps in Zambia on 19 October 1978 in an operation code-named
“Operation Gatling.” It was a coordinated attack on Mkushi Freedom Camp, CGT
1, 2, 3, and CTT camps. Like the ZANLA attacks before, these raids were carefully
planned after informed reconnaissance. The interviews provided little information
on the nature of the raids at other camps, but they did provide narratives from
survivors of Mkushi. They all confirm that the ZIPRA defence structure was a
sham. Only the thirteen instructors at Mkushi were armed with small arms and they
offered virtually no resistance to the Rhodesian Air Force and ground troops.
According to the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe rehabilitation
report for
(282) “Plane crash kills 52 in Rhodesia.” The Daily News. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 5 September 1978.
(283) Radio Lusaka broadcast, 5 September 1978 (SWB-ME 5911, B 3-4).
(284) “Guerrilla murdered air crash survivors.” The Daily Nation. Nairobi, Kenya. 5 September 1978.
(285) Radio Lusaka broadcast.
(286) Joshua Nkomo.
(287) “Smith poised to attack Zambia” (extract). Zambia Daily Mail. Lusaka, Zambia. 8 September 1978.
1994
Mkushi, the reasons for these poor defence mechanisms were that ZIPRA had never
been attacked in its rear bases before, so it relied on very basic state of alert training
drills that put everyone on standby in their foxhole to await further orders. This drill
would normally be practiced at sunrise, sunset, and when aircraft over flew the area or
when vehicles drove into the camp. This was a ZIPRA standing operational procedure
that applied to all training camps.288 Mr. Lovemore Mandima, the NMMZ Curator of
Militaria responsible for the rehabilitation exercise of former freedom fighter camps,
confirmed that a substantial number of casualties found at Mkushi were killed in
situ, that is, in foxholes, some were killed in bunkers that had been prepared during
defensive training exercises.289
Rhodesian troops occupied the camp complex for about six days, having laid an
ambush further up the road. The first casualty of that ambush was Alick Nkata, a
senior Zambian news producer, who wanted to cover the events of the attack. He
was mistaken for a ZAPU/ZIPRA official and was killed as he drove through to the
camp. This incident was followed by a joint ZIPRA and Zambian Army and Police
contingent, which drove in to investigate. Fourteen police officers, fifteen Zambian
army troops, and an undisclosed number of ZIPRA personnel were also killed.
Casualty figures for Mkushi have been estimated at over 1000 girls and women and
a few male instructors. Charity Ndiweni (comrade Monica Mguni) was one of the
instructors who survived the attack and she related her ordeal thus:
I was the Brigade Instructor of the C Coy. During that process, there was a
bombardment of the camp by Smith’s Rhodesian forces. Some of the cadres of my
brigade were out of the camp to the first base situated 2 km from the main camp, and
there remained only fifty of us, the commanders and one brigade which had come
from V.C. Camp. The bombardment occurred in the morning when I first heard from
a communiqué that he had received a message concerning the bombardment of M.C.,
and he encouraged us to be vigilant as commanders. It was about 10:45 am when I had
taken my brigade to the kitchen to have our food (we used to combine breakfast and
lunch making it one thing), when I heard the noise of the aeroplanes. I looked through
the window and saw three aeroplanes printed in the midst “ZAMBIAN AIRWAYS”
coming towards our base. I was shocked by the noise and the speed of these
aeroplanes. They started dropping bombs. I tried to shoot one of the planes with my
Semenov gun, but it was too late, comrade. The war had started. I shouted to my
company to take cover, but it was too late. The situation was serious because the
aeroplanes were dropping bombs. We ran towards the nearby river, trying to hide
ourselves. The plane came after us because they had seen us when we went into a
cave-like feature on the river. We were lucky because they missed us. All of us had
been covered with smoke and were suffocating. We spent the whole day in that cave
and at about 4:00 pm, a certain Rhodesian soldier came and stood in front of the
cave. They had captured one of our commanders called Jane Ndlovu, and she called,
“Comrades! Comrades! Come out and surrender yourselves, please!”We remained in
the cave, but some of the cadres
(288) NMMZ Rehabilitation Report: Mkushi Camp, Zambia n.d. Unpublished source.
(289) Interview with Mr. Lovemore Mandima, Curator of Militaria, NMMZ, (Heroes Acre, Harare) 28 October
2008.
surrendered themselves, and all who surrendered themselves to the Rhodesian soldiers
were shot down, dead. They threw another grenade on the mouth of the cave because
they had seen a movement inside the cave. I remained in the cave with my gun because
I said to myself, if I surrender to the soldiers “sengithengisile ilizwe lami!”(I would
have sold my country!). After a few minutes I then heard one of the soldiers
calling,“Let’s go Jimmy! They are all dead! Let’s go!” I didn’t know that one of my
legs was outside the cave as I had been busy saving my colleagues. A white soldier
fired three shots upon my leg and he went away. I said to myself,“I-ii, I’m shot! I-ii, I’m
shot!”I took off my bra and started to bandage the bleeding leg. I found that my leg
was not broken although I had been shot. I then came out of the cave, heading towards
the river, but I was groaning due to pain. At the river there was a Venda guy who was
our cook and he said,“You Charity, surrender yourself to the white men and you will
be saved!” He had told the soldiers that he had nothing he knew, except that he was a
cook, and he told them to ask me since I was the commander. I wrestled with him
and found my way out, and I jumped into the river and started swimming across it. At
the other side of the river there was a napalm chemical which had been thrown by
these whites and it was coming towards me. I jumped the flame and took cover with
one of the trees. They bombed where I was, but they missed me. Since I was
bleeding, I think that is what made them to leave me because they thought I was
dead. They left me like that and it was about 5:55 pm. Later on, I heard voices of
other cadres as they were heading towards the direction where I was and I took some
leaves and made a signal as the crying of a guinea-fowl (that was our password). The
other comrades responded and they came and we met. They started crying saying,
“Our commander is shot! Oh, our commander is shot!” I then saw that some of the
comrades had been shot in the buttocks and some had been maimed, no longer
having some of their limbs. They then carried me, since I could not walk due to my
leg which had been shot, to the local hospital which was about 15 km away from
Mkushi Training Camp. We were admitted into that hospital and at the hospital there
was a certain lady who pretended to be a nurse. She could come and asked what had
actually happened to us as if she was sympathising. What astonished me is that she
did not give us the medication prescribed by the doctor. I then reported her to the head
doctor and she was interrogated, and they later found out that she was an informer to
the Rhodesian soldiers. In fact, they found a walkie-talkie underneath her clothes and
she was fired...290
Another female instructor interviewed gave an account which confirmed Mguni’s
story with a vivid description of her encounter with Rhodesian ground force assault
teams as follows:
I crossed the river with a man called Ntatshana who was also an instructor. When I
looked back, I saw huge objects dropping. When I enquired from Ntantshana what
those things were, he said they were paratroopers, which had the infantry personnel
which were coming to assault the camp. It was 11 o’clock but there were so many
paratroopers dropped that they formed a dark cloud which obstructed the sunlight
(290) Interview with Charity Ndiweni (comrade Monica Mguni) by Charles Maripfonde, (Harare, ZANU PF
H.Q.) 14 April 2008.
1994
so that it looked like nightfall. To me the paratroopers and planes simply looked like a
huge flock of birds. The attackers actually spent many days in the camp just butchering
our people.
In the east, there was a Zambian camp. So I left the camp and went to hide near
an ant heap. One paratrooper dropped just a short distance from us. We were able to
see him. We identified him as an Aborigine who had painted himself black by way of
camouflage and had a beret. The moment he dropped, he started shooting in every
direction.After that he took off his parachute. But then one of the girls screamed loudly,
and the enemy soldier went for her with bayonet and savagely stabbed her to death,
and then moved away in the opposite direction from our ant heap and we immediately
knew that we had survived.
We never tried to leave our hiding place, but we just remained hidden in this place.
After walking a short distance, the soldier sat down to have his meal. We watched him
through his meal. All the time we thought he might just see us and finish us off. But
he didn’t. When he finished he went to join his comrades. We stayed at our hiding
place until night fall and emptied my magazine. Then we left. A short distance later,
we bumped into the hiding place of Ntatshana. So we joined him and started walking
in the eastern direction away from the enemy, heading for the Zambian camps. But
no sooner had we walked for a short while, than we got lost and found ourselves
back into the middle of the danger zone. The Rhodesian soldiers had even lit up the
place. Ntatshana wanted to open fire into the soldiers, but we held him back. In fact
Ntatshana was thoroughly confused, because a little later we came across a dead
body and he wanted to carry it with him, saying he wanted to go and show Joshua
Nkomo. We again prevented him from committing such foolishness. Later we came
across a pile of dead bodies with only one person still alive. She turned out to be
Charity, a girl I knew. Among the dead ones were several of my friends and
schoolmates from Manama such as Virginia. Charity had been shot in the face. We
carried her. I tore one of my pants which we used to bandage her to stop the bleeding.
She said she could feel that there was a bullet lodged in her head. She could not walk.
We could not walk. We walked for a whole night until we got to the Zambian camp
at dawn. When we got there, we found the Zambian soldiers getting into their trucks,
saying they were going to look for survivors. They wanted all the survivors to go
back with them and I refused to accompany them back. But no sooner had they
disappeared towards the camp then one of them was back at full speed, running away
from the Rhodesians and his pants completely torn until it looked like a skirt. In his
gasps he murmured that all the Zambian soldiers who had gone to look for survivors
had been mowed down in one fell swoop. In fact, the Rhodesian soldiers had laid
landmines around the camp and also booby-trapped the dead bodies, so that even
those who tried to bury them were in danger of losing their lives. In the end, many of
these people were not buried, but left simply to rot away. Fortunately Ntatshana
survived and was captured. After the war, we found him at home. The few of us
survived and gathered at Mkushi police camp. We were less than hundred survivors.
Mowed down were the first trained group and the one which we were training.
Altogether I don’t think 500 survived the massacre. From the police camp, we were
taken to Lusaka. The injured were admitted to hospitals. From Lusaka we were taken
to Mr. Milner’s farm. Then we were removed for our safety to Solwezi at the
Zambian border with Zaire.291
(291) Interview with Ms. Mabuwa.

Joshua Nkomo also described how the Rhodesian sweep teams identified Jane
Gumbo, the commander of the Mkushi Camp and ordered her to fire upon her own
pupils. When she refused, she was herself shot. He also confirms the presence of
mercenaries in the Rhodesian teams who mass executed ninety-one girls lined up
together in a move that angered the black troops under their command. These black
troops ended up helping large numbers of girls to escape, and came close to mutinying
against their orders.292 Two months later, Mulungushi Camp was raided under similar
circumstances on 22 December 1978, killing nearly thirty-three ZIPRA soldiers.
The Second Viscount and the Aftermath, 1979
ZIPRA responded to the attacks on its camps by bringing down yet another Viscount
flying from Kariba on 12 February 1979. All fifty-nine passengers on board
were killed. In an interview, Joshua Nkomo stated that the airline was shot down
believing that the commander of the Rhodesian forces, Lt. Gen. Peter Walls, and
twenty-one other senior army officers were aboard the aircraft on a tour of
Rhodesian bases along the border.293 The Zambia Daily Mail confirmed that Walls
was in the second plane which left Kariba twenty minutes later and that even when it
took off, it evaded attack by changing its flight route.294 The event received
widespread international condemnation, including some harsh words from Jimmy
Carter and the newly elected British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Nkomo
challenged them to also condemn the Rhodesian killing of thousands of African
refugees and trainees in the camps.295 The Rhodesians responded by attacking
Nampundwe Camp again on the afternoon of 23 February 1979, as well as another
newly established camp at Chunga.296 In April, an operation code-named “Operation
Liquid” was put in place to attack Mulungushi again. There is no doubt that all these
efforts were designed to avenge the loss of the Viscount and its passengers and in
order to boost the fast dwindling morale of Rhodesian whites. Their reconnaissance
had shown that Mulungushi had not been abandoned after the 22 December 1978
attack, but was reinforced with anti-aircraft defence systems and now contained
well over 9,000 people.297 On 11 April 1979, an attack was attempted on the camp,
but it failed due to tactical errors caused by a breakdown in communication,
resulting in Rhodesian planes bombing off target.298
ZIPRA’s ‘Turning Point’, 1978
In 1978 ZIPRA recalled all its commanders in the field to a Conference in Lusaka
with the rest of its High Command. This conference discussed the developments in
the field and noted that the Rhodesian forces had lost full control of the country. It
(292) Nkomo, J. The Story of My Life.

(293) “We shot down rebel plane” (extract). The Zambia Daily Mail. Lusaka, 15 February 1979.
(294) “Rebels probe plane crash.” The Zambia Daily Mail. Lusaka, 14 February 1979.
(295) Ibid.
(296) Radio Salisbury, 23 February 1979, (SWB-ME 6052, B 4). Radio Salisbury, 26 February 1979 (SWB-ME
6054 B 10).
(297) Stiff, P. Selous Scouts: Top Secret War: See pp.677-681.
(298) Ibid.
1994
was, therefore, a ripe moment for a change of strategy to one which became known
as the ‘Turning Point’. Central to this strategy was the consolidation of the ‘liberated
zones’ and the implementation of a strategy to defend them. This would be achieved
by transforming the guerrillas in the zones into regular fighting units that would
be augmented by battalions of specialised forces that ZIPRA had been training
all along. The sophisticated weaponry that ZIPRA had acquired would be used to
introduce “mobile warfare” to enable ZIPRA to “seize power” militarily from the
weakened Rhodesian Forces.299 Richard Mataure added that the new strategy was
designed to take care of Smith’s pre-emptive bombings on ZIPRA camps in Zambia
and Muzorewa’s propaganda “that he had all the people behind him as he had been
calling on our people in Zambia to come back and that their refusal was indicative of
the commitment to the overthrow of his government by violence.”300 Mataure went
on to say,
We felt that it was unwise to leave too many of our people in Zambia, where they
were exposed to frequent air raids, and so started working on plans to have more of
our people come home, where they were not only safer but where they could swell
the numbers of our operational units. This boosted our strength in the country even
further.301
All of ZIPRA’s specialised units trained in Ethiopia, Libya, and Angola were in
waiting at Mlungushi and Solwezi in Zambia, while its deployed strength now
stood at somewhere close to 8000 inside Rhodesia. ZIPRA control was confirmed
in such areas as Zowa, Chenjiri, Tsholotsho, Lupane, Nkayi, Lower Gweru, Filabusi,
Gwanda, and parts of Belingwe. It had also intensified its urban attacks,
spearheaded by Todd Mpisi. This situation on its own, says Mataure, demanded that a
new strategy be put in place. ZIPRA decided at that point to bring in regular
brigades,‘battalion by battalion’, as follows:
Chirundu: One of the areas we chose as a crossing point was Chirundu because it was
easier to cross where the river was narrowest and to cross our tanks. So Madyiwa
(now Colonel Khumalo)’s battalion was stationed at Ngwenyama, while the 2nd
battalion was getting on the other side of Mana Pools, now commanded by the overall
northern front commander, Rodwell Nyika. Quiet unfortunately this was the time
when the talks were going on at Lancaster House. So, while they were talking with us
in London, the Rhodesians went on fighting us. So, Madyiwa’s battalion was
attacking the RLI [Rhodesian Light Infantry] and the Rhodesian Air Force. At the
same time, inside the country, the guerrillas were becoming more and more
organised. Each region had in its presence a member of the Revolutionary Council
like the regional commanders.
(299) Brickhill, J. “Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976-1979.” Bhebe, N. and T.
Ranger, eds. Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995: See
pp.55-58.
(300) Interview with Richard Mataure by Prof. Bhebe.
(301) Interview with Richard Mataure by Prof. Bhebe.
Administrative reorganisation: I was one of the members of the RC [Revolutionary

Council] in the country in the Hurungwe District; there was Mabuku in Plumtree; there
was Gedi Ndlovu in Lupane; there was Todlana in Tsholotsho; Carlson Mudzingwa on
the southern front in the Belingwe-Beitbridge areas.
Also Botswana was used. We were now using our Scania trucks, distributed by
Swedes to transport our ammunition through Kazungula down to Francistown to be
distributed through the western border into the southern front, through Pantamatenga,
Plumtree, Beitbridge, and Belingwe. This was the way ammunition was sent into the
country, but we are talking of heavy loads here. This, therefore, meant we had to enlarge
logistical units, first by making sure that each and every frontal section of operation
had its own logistical unit. 302
Administration of the liberated zones would have been difficult without the full
cooperation of the people. As part of this new strategy, it was decided to rekindle
the old ZAPU infrastructure inside the country that had been lying low since the
banning of the party in the early 1960s. Mataure goes on to explain,
When this infrastructure realised that the liberation forces were getting on top of the
situation, it regained confidence and resurfaced. It resurfaced all the way from
Dande, Chipuriro, Kazangarare, Vuti west, Vuti east, Urungwe, the Magunji areas, the
Zvimba areas, the Mashayangombe, the Bhebes from Chitomborizi, his brother in the
Mangombe areas. All these prominent ZAPU district officials resurfaced and now
resurrected the party machinery for administrative purposes.
With the help of the people, we felt as if the whole northern front was totally liberated.
Our forces were now striking at targets in Harare, conducting their operations from
the Zvimba Tribal Trust Land, the Musengezi African Purchase Area, the Mhondoro
areas. But, by this time, we also rapidly moved into the ceasefire period. Our
strength in the country had risen to about 12,000 men. Soon we went into the
assembly points and the exercise was complete.303
The Contested Attack on the Salisbury Fuel Tanks, 11 December 1978
It may be necessary to end this section on the ‘tit-for-tat’ situation between ZIPRA
and the Rhodesian forces by including an attack that occurred during this period,
which was claimed by both ZIPRA and ZANLA. As mentioned earlier, part of the
ZANLA approach to the war was to eventually reach and control the towns and that,
for them, it was just a matter of time before they did it. Similarly, ZIPRA had long
begun launching attacks in urban areas and, as will be shown below, urban warfare
would be an integral part of their ‘Turning Point’ strategy. On 11 December 1978, the
Salisbury Fuel Tanks went up in flames after a mortar attack by guerrillas. Mugabe
issued a statement from Maputo the following day, stating that “the blowing up of
the fuel centre in Salisbury by our ZANLA forces comes as part of our operational
strategy for Salisbury.”304 Later at a news conference in Lusaka, Nkomo concluded
his statement by remarking,“…in this connection, let me say something here
concerning
(302) Ibid.
(303) Ibid.
(304) Mugabe, R. Press Statement. Maputo. 12 December 1978.
1994
ZIPRA’s devastating action against the regime’s oil storages in Salisbury on the
night of December 12.”305 This chapter may not solve the puzzle, but an interview
with William Mkumbuzi, a former ZANLA guerrilla who participated in the attack,
does provide some illumination, as follows:
After our selection, we had rehearsals for the operation in Salisbury at Chigari.
Everything necessary for the execution of that operation we would get in the front, but
we had to cross the border with our own guns. We stayed at Chigari for three weeks.
We were left at Border Base at Tete near Nyamapanda. From the Border Base, we
had a letter authorizing us to carry folding boats. Nyamapanda was semi-liberated
and the povo was helping us. We selected women who would help us in the front. We
took Mai Muhwati and Mai Hwiza from Mutoko. Mrs. Hwiza’s husband was working
in Harare and we wanted him to help us. It was August 1978 when we crossed the
border. In Domboshava area, we assisted comrades there in their operations. We
arrived in Domboshava in October. At first, Kuvhiringidza and Damage Bombs went
to do reconnaissance. The second reconnaissance was done by me and Damage
Bombs, so that we could plan where we were going to stay. We were then rejoined
with Mrs. Muhwati and Mrs. Hwiza. These women now fully understood the war.
Their children were now grown up. When we returned from the second
reconnaissance, we found Comrade Take-Time. We were telling the povo if they saw
something unusual, it was us fighting against the whites. We would inform them
before and after an attack. That day Take-Time had illicit sex with some chimbwidos
and was arrested together with his group. We went ahead with our plan, and we
requested the drivers ferrying fresh farm produce to Mbare Musika so that we could
conceal our guns beneath the farm produce from Domboshawa, and we pretended to
be purveyors of tomatoes up to Mbare. We then offloaded the tomatoes and
proceeded to the houses where Mrs. Muhwati and Mrs. Hwiza were staying, in
Beatrice Cottages in National, Mbare. Some of us went to stay with Mrs. Hwiza,
some with Mrs. Muhwati. The houses were conjoined. We decided to mobilise
people, some going to Glen Norah, some to Mabvuku. We networked with mujibhas.
We had Zimbabwe News newsletters that we distributed within the city. After about
two weeks, we heard that the Rhodesians now knew about us. The mujibhas told us
that the whites knew that we were in National, but did not know where exactly.
Musika, then we took Pfumo taxi. We took all the comrades and we then went to
Warren Hills to attack the Shell Tanks. We hit them from Lytton Road, which joins
Kambuzuma and the city. We used the M90 bazooka when we hit the diesel tanks. We
were supposed to escape through Domboshawa, but it was impossible so we had to
take the Chinhoyi road up to 53km from Harare. We had ripped off the
communication radios in the taxis. One taxi driver tried to resist, but then quickly
realized we had a serious aim. We then left the taxi drivers and told them to tell their
bosses that they had been hijacked. They then escaped through the Mazowe road.306
(305) Nkomo, J. Statement at a News Conference. 19 December 1978. In Baumhogger, The Struggle for Independence;
see also “Salisbury is burning.” The Daily News. Dar es Salaam, 13 December 1978, which claims, rather absurdly,
that the attack was launched by ZIPA.
(306) Interview with William Mkumbuzi, (Gweru) 16 June 2008.
Towards the ‘Year of the People’s Storm’: ZANLA Confronts the Rhodesian
Internal Settlement, 1978-1979
In his New Year’s message, the ZANU leader Robert Mugabe declared 1978 “the
year of the people”, meaning that power would be placed in the hands of the people
through the intensification of the armed struggle.307 In its planning, ZANLA, like
ZIPRA, envisaged conventional warfare as the means through which the final
annihilation of the enemy forces was to be achieved. In the following year, “the
year of the people’s storm”, ZANLA troops would literally “storm the towns from
the countryside.”308 Pursuant to these aims ZANU also began moving large
numbers of troops with heavy weaponry into the country. In March 1978, a group
of 445 ZANLA cadres entered the country via Zimunya led by Josiah Tungamirayi.
This group also had a contingent of 50 female fighters, two of whom were
members of the ZANLA General Staff, i.e. Comrade Catherine and Comrade
Mazvionesa. They became the first group to fight in larger‘companies’of 32 cadres
each, instead of in the ordinary ZANLA platoons. This was a modification designed
to enable them to fight bigger battles and campaigns using heavy weaponry such as
artillery, anti-air, and recoilless rifles. Under this operation, the first major attack on
a Rhodesian city was launched on Umtali, using mortar bombs and recoilless
artillery and forcing a retreat of Rhodesian forces that enabled ZANLA to move
more troops inside the country. Side by side with the increased military offensive,
emphasis was placed on political education of the masses regarding the meaning of
the Internal Settlement, to which the offensive was responding.
ZANLA had also been recovering from an internal disturbance following an
attempted coup by a group in the high command linked to the vashandi of the ZIPA
days. This group was initially led by those members of the Dare who had been
imprisoned in Zambia, including Henry Hamadziripi, Crispen Mandizvidza,
Rugare Gumbo, Cletos Chigowe, Mukudzei Mudzi, Kumbirai Kangai, and
Zivavarwe Muparuri, although some of them, such as Kangai, dropped out. Some of
these people still believed that the current leadership of ZANU was interested simply
in the transfer of power and had no capacity to initiate a socialist revolution. They
took advantage of the departure of the leadership for the first Malta Conference
held between 30 January and 1 February 1978, and were successful in arresting
Edgar Tekere and Hebert Ushewokunze and kept them tied in the bush on the edge
of a precipice. The rebellion was quashed by a contingent led by Morgan Mhaka
and Sobuza Gula- Ndebele. They successfully arrested the conspirators and brought
them to trial. There have been many narratives of how they were saved from
execution. For a while they were kept in pit prisons. Later, Samora Machel
requested that they be moved to a Mozambican prison in Beira; they were only
released just before Independence.309
(307) “Towards Conventional War: Smith’s Ides of March, 1978: Interview with Josiah Tungamirayi.” The Zimbabwe
News. 1978: See p.32.
(308) “The Military Situation is Excellent: Interview with Josiah Tongogara.” The Zimbabwe News. 1979. p.40.
(309) Tekere. A Lifetime of Struggle: See pp.99-104.
1994
The offensive of March 1978 was by and large meant to show that ZANLA had
not been disturbed by the rebellion and it was timed to dismantle whatever would
emerge from the so-called Internal Settlement of 3 March 1978. The rebellion had
facilitated the formation of an interim government to function until elections to be
held in February 1979. By then, it was hoped both Muzorewa and Sithole would
have persuaded all the Patriotic Front guerrillas to surrender. Meanwhile the two had
used this opportunity to form their own internal armies, the Auxiliaries or
‘dzakutsakus’ loyal to Muzorewa and the ‘Pfumo reVanhu’ loyal to Sithole. In
practice, these were young African men forcibly recruited and hastily trained and
armed to serve the purpose of augmenting the fast dwindling numbers of the
Rhodesian Forces. Under an operation, code-named “Operation Favour,” the
Rhodesians came up with a secret military plan designed to facilitate the much
awaited surrender of the Patriotic Front guerrillas. The plan provided for the retreat
of regular troops from operational areas and their replacement by pseudo-operations
units such as the Selous Scouts supported by these Auxiliaries. When this plan
failed to bring in any guerrillas, a second and more aggressive phase of Operation
Favour was implemented which involved the large scale training of the Auxiliaries
at Special Branch establishments known as ‘Mujibha Farms.’310 Interviewees in the
Masvingo Province have related their experiences on such ‘Mujibha Farms’ at
Maybrook Farm, ‘KwaMabhurugu’ near Mashava, and ‘Tentergate’ Farm near Great
Zimbabwe. Here, young men were captured and trained on a three month or less
crash course and deployed as and when the need arose.311
Sometimes ZANLA became a victim of its own successes and grew complacent
in the liberated zones at the expense of the locals. A tragic event occurred on 14
May 1978, when a group of drunken guerrillas failed to heed intelligence reports of
an impending attack and insisted on continuing a pungwe in the middle of the night
at Kamungoma Farm in the Dewure Purchase areas of Gutu. The resultant attack
claimed 105 African civilians and was described internationally as a massacre.312
ZANU’s Publicity Secretary, Eddison Zvobgo, described this attack as a deliberate
move by Ndabaningi Sithole and the Defence Minister of the Internal Settlement
Government, Kadzviti, to punish all those not supporting their deal. He warned,
ZANLA forces will continue holding mass meetings in the liberated areas,
irrespective of the massacres. The peasants butchered in Gutu and throughout
Zimbabwe will be avenged. We call upon the gang of four (Muzorewa, Sithole,
Smith, and Chirau) to think again.313
(310) Wood, J.R.T. The War Diaries of Major Andre Dennison. Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing, 1989.
(311) Mazarire, G.C. “Where Civil Blood Made Soldiers Hands Unclean: Rethinking War Time Coercion in Chivi,
South Central Zimbabwe 1976-80.” Journal of African Conflict and Development. vol. 1 no. 1. (2000): See p.57; see
also Ellert, Rhodesian Front War, p.180.
(312) Hamutyinei, Mordikai. Zvakanga Zvakaoma MuZimbabwe. Chapter 11.
(313) “ZANU Statement on Gutu Massacres.” The Zimbabwe News. 16 May 1978, p.35.
A peculiarity in the interviews covering this period of the Internal Settlement

government is the emphasis on the mass imprisonment of African civilians accused
of assisting guerrillas; this trend was widespread across the country. Tinos Murimi
Gabarinocheka was arrested for spearheading, as local ZANU Branch Chairman of
the Gozho base in Mapanzure (Masvingo), a kumagumbwa (witch hunt). He ordered
people to go to a diviner to identify a muroyi (witch) with the intention of sending
the culprit for disciplining by the ‘comrades’ based at Muchakata. The person was
identified, but escaped on his way and reported the matter to the police. Murimi
was arrested together with his wife under the Witchcraft Suppression Act, yet in
reality the government wanted him for his role in conspiring with guerrillas. He
says he was close to all the guerrillas in the Nyajena Detachment, especially
Kamba, Nylon, Chadyiwachapera, Muhambi, Champion, Tendai Mabvazuwa,
Shumba Chibayamabhunu, and others.314
An elderly gentleman interviewed at Munongo village in Charumbira, Mupunga
Matemera, who was confined at Mutimurefu Prison for assisting guerrillas confirms
the connection between ZANLA guerrillas and some prisoners. This resulted in a
foiled attempt to storm the prison in 1979. He says,
Guerrillas arrived disguised as visitors. They asked for me, Matemera, and pretended
they had brought me some groceries. Comrade Tendai handed me the parcel which
contained among other things, a loaf of bread and within this bread was a letter stuffed
inside, which informed us that they were coming to attack Mutimurefu. So on a Friday
evening, they attacked…We were sleeping on the other side. The line they hit had
well over 19 cells and the attack claimed a prison warder and three others. This was
a hit and run exercise and the guerrillas disappeared….315
Robbie Matambo, interviewed in Gweru, was also an inmate at Mutimurefu Prison
when it was stormed by guerrillas. His account is more vivid. He recalls it as
‘Gorge Range Prison’, as it was known those days [because it is close to the
Mutirikwe River gorge], and he had just been transferred there from Zimuto Camp
Prison, where he had been kept after he was captured as a mujibha in a battle near
Charumbira. According to his testimony, sometime in October 1979, guerrillas
approached some prison wardens on patrol at the Mutimurefu Prison. One of them,
on realizing that they were, in fact, armed guerrillas, opened fire. The guerrillas
returned fire and shot him at once; his colleagues were spared as the guerrillas
wanted to go straight to the Chief Warden, Mr. Ford’s house. Ford and his wife fired
at the guerrillas with automatic rifles, expelling the guerrillas. From that time
onwards, inmates were not allowed to sing liberation war songs, and thereafter life
became nasty in prison!316 Although not describing the storming of the prison in
particular, Robbie’s testimony
(314) Interview with Tinos Murimi Gabarinocheka by Taguma Mazarire, (Gozho, Mapanzure Communal Lands) 24
June 2008.
(315) Interview with Mupunga Matemera by Taguma Mazarire, (Chingweme Homestead, Charumbira Communal
Lands) 27 June 2008.
(316) Interview with Robbie Matambo by Ishmael Mazambani, (Kwekwe) 16 April 2008.
1994
is rich regarding the other trials and tribulations faced by political prisoners in
Rhodesian jails. He explained,
We were close to 1000 political detainees who had to put on red regalia while
other prisoners were around 500. When Gorge Range Prison was full, people were
transferred to Hwahwa Prison, Chikurubi Maximum, and so on. So we had some of
our predecessors, incoming prisoners of war at Fort Victoria Prison, Gorge Range
Prison, while others who had been captured earlier on were transferred to Hwahwa
and Chikurubi Maximum Prison…. We did nothing else but just sit.317
Robbie had a dramatic entry into prison, being a senior mujibha involved in
sabotage activity, blocking convoys, barricading roads, and assisting guerrillas in
the Muchakata and Morgenster areas. He was instrumental in the reconnaissance
work that led to the attack on the Great Zimbabwe Hotel. He also had been trained
by local guerrillas in handling G3 rifles. Robbie became part of an operation to
attack a network of ‘Mujibha Farms’ established near Fort Victoria, among them
Sikato and Tentergate Farms. In one such operation, his luck ran out and he was
captured by the Auxiliary forces who took him to Tentergate itself. Here, they not
only made efforts to convert him and his colleagues to the Rhodesian cause, but also
forced them to reveal guerrilla hide outs and bases. Later he was transferred to
Zimuto Camp, where they stayed in crowded cells and overnight they would hear
loud screams by captured girls (chimbwidos) as they were being raped by the
(Special Forces) Auxiliaries. During the day, they were forced to sing songs in
support of the Auxiliaries. Zimuto was a holding camp and so many inhuman
activities took place, including torture. It was after failing to glean any information
from them that they were sent to Mutimurefu for indefinite detention without trial.
There, they met less systematic brutality, except from individual wardens, he says,
but they also encountered some Auxiliaries in prison, who were imprisoned for
resigning from their army. “I remember one fellow we knew, and we took our
revenge on him.”318
In Chirumhanzu, Maud Muzenda retold how people were beaten to death in
police cells. As a nurse at Mvuma Hospital, she witnessed the death of a young
school boy from Holy Cross Mission who had been badly tortured by the police. The
Rhodesian also went a step further:
Sometimes people were also thrown into a pit called mbidzi. It was a big pit into
which people were thrown and tortured so that they would confess. It was very deep.
After throwing people into the pit, the authorities left them there for some time. They
only pulled them out, if they were ready to confess. If they refused, they would be
left to die in the pit.319
This situation was also prevalent in some ZIPRA operated areas, where general
looting and lawlessness was a defining feature of the poorly trained Auxiliaries that
surfaced in 1978. They often used their positions as armed men and their access to
(317) Ibid.
(318) Ibid.
(319) Muzenda, Maud. “Maudy Muzenda: Mvuma.” Staunton, I. ed. Mothers of the Revolution: See p.65.
the authorities as means of settling scores with the local people by facilitating their
imprisonment. A former boarding master at Manama High School, Wilson Chivalo
Mboyi, remained at the school after it was closed following the abductions of 1977.
His job was to care for the school property after the school had been turned into a
camp for Rhodesian Auxiliaries. Bent on stealing the school property, the
Auxiliaries ordered the arrest of Mboyi and two other mission nurses on trumped up
charges of assisting guerrillas. They tortured the nurses and forced them to
implicate Mboyi in the charges levelled against him. They all spent four and a half
months at Grey Prison in Bulawayo without trial in 1978 and later transferred to
Khami Maximum Prison where they were released in 1979. In his mind, he knew the
reason why he was arrested:
I still think I was arrested so that I could be taken away from the mission to give a
chance to the Auxiliaries to steal mission and my personal property. In the end, I
suffered a huge loss personally. They took possession of my wife’s scooter and
completely damaged it. My car was also taken over and was used to transport
women for the soldiers from the hospital and other neighbouring places. At the end,
they abandoned it and thieves came and put a finish to its destruction by removing its
various parts. Beds, tables, chairs of the school were taken by the soldiers to nearby
military camps such as Kafusi, Hwale, and you can still see some of the school things
in those camps even today...320
Meanwhile, ZANLA used its swelling forces, not only to move towards the towns,
but to take bold steps to sabotage the elections inside Rhodesia scheduled for early
1979. For example, in Chivi, Muzorewa and Zindoga began their campaign late in
March. Guerrillas had issued strict instructions to the locals to boycott both their
rallies and the elections themselves. However, on 26 March, Rhodesian forces raided
the villages and succeeded in dragging some 350 people to the venue at Chibi
Office. The same was also true of Sithole’s rally in the following week, where
military vehicles ferried nearly the same number of people.321 The guerrillas
intensified their ambushes, but from the 15th of April, the polling stations were
already established and guarded. A mobile polling station was also put in place and
the Rhodesian forces took steps to ensure a large voter turn out by driving all the
villagers from Mafenga to Sese into confinement around a polling station
established at Ngomahuru. A ZANLA group led by Comrade Nylon
Masambaasiyana attacked the camp and freed the people.322 In the end, the
security forces only succeeded in coercing 23.3% of the registered voters in Chivi
to the polls.323 Of these votes, Chirau’s ZUPO and spoilt papers both claimed over
10% of the votes in the district.324 A journalist for The Sunday Telegraph, who
observed the election in Chivi, failed to understand the reasons behind this poor
turn out, seeing it as: “A lack of understanding about the election itself. Despite a
widespread publicity campaign, the trickle of people filing through
(320) Interview with Wilson Chivalo Mboyi by Prof. Bhebe, (Gwanda) 6 June 1987.
(321) Wood, J.R.T. The War Diaries of Andre Dennison: See pp.315, 318
(322) Interviews with Venesiya Chifove and Elias Manyatera by Gerald Mazarire, 12 August 1998.
(323) Wood, J.R.T. The War Diaries of Andre Dennison: See p.321.
(324) Rich, T. “The Muzorewa Election: A Preliminary analysis of electoral response.” Unpublished Seminar Paper.
Harare, University of Zimbabwe, Department of History, 1980. p.12.
1994
the Chibi polling station seemed to have little idea of what they were doing or why
the were doing it…”325
The journalist had acknowledged that the Chivi people had been adequately
politicized not to accept the Internal Settlement. However, for its part, guerrilla
intimidation contributed much to this low turn out. As Tony Rich puts it, whatever
the reasons given by the voters, it appeared the ZANLA forces exercised sufficient
control to influence the poll as they wished.326 According to the interviews
collected in Chivi, the guerrillas had encouraged everybody to establish outpost
homes where they spent the day hiding, only to come back home at night; those
who were caught and forced to cast their votes were instructed to spoil their ballot
papers and probably accounted for the large numbers of spoilt papers.327 For an
unknown reason the Auxiliaries were withdrawn from active operation in Chivi in
May 1979, which left the district largely in the hands of ZANLA.328
Lancaster House Talks, Ceasefire, and the Road to Independence, 1979
Muzorewa won the bogus elections in April at nearly the same time that the
Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher assumed office in Britain and for once it
seemed highly likely that they would recognise Muzorewa and lift sanctions. Their
representative sent to observe the elections had described them as ‘free and fair’,
but Margaret Thatcher in the end did not recognise Muzorewa and chose instead to
persevere with the option of a settlement that would include the Patriotic Front.
This baffled many, especially coming from a Conservative government, but several
theories have been thrown about to explain the move. The first centres around
the pressure exerted by the African members of the Commonwealth, in particular
Nigeria, which had a large stake in British trade and went so far as to threaten the
viability of the British oil company BP-Shell within Nigeria if the Rhodesian
question was not solved.329 The second suggests that Kaunda, who was due to
host the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka in August that year, was exerting
pressure. He was, more than anybody else, desperate to bring an end to the war,
given its impact on the economy of his country. Indeed, during the Lancaster talks,
the Rhodesians bombed targets in Zambia, including vital bridges. The third theory
indicates that, with dwindling American interest in the whole matter, Thatcher
feared the further internationalisation of the conflict posed by the growing interest
Cuba was showing in participating more directly in the war.330
If changing the Conservatives’ view of Muzorewa’s government was one thing,
it was another, altogether, to bring the feuding parties to the negotiating table.
Muzorewa still basked in his sweet victory and would not let anyone take it
away.
(325) The Sunday Telegraph. 22 April 1979.

(326) Rich, T. “The Muzorewa Election.” p.12
(327) Interview with Constantine Vengesayi by Gerald Mazarire, (Jaka, Chivi) 27 July 1998.
(328) Wood, J.R.T. The War Diaries of Andre Dennison: See p.332.
(329) Stiff, P. Cry Zimbabwe: Independence –Twenty Years On. Alberton, RSA: Galago Pub., 2000: See p.18.
(330) Steadman. Peace-Making During Civil War: See p.168.
He did not think a further meeting was necessary, and, as he kept saying throughout
the Lancaster Talks, a government was already in existence. He had the support of
the Rhodesian military, but not that of his fellow Internal Settlement colleagues such
as Ndabaningi Sithole, who thought he had stolen the election. Smith, though not in
charge, still controlled the greater part of the Rhodesian delegation and he counted
on the intransigence of the Patriotic Front to frustrate the British enough to leave
them with no option but to recognise Muzorewa. In the meantime, the Rhodesians
would use every opportunity presented by the diversion caused by the conference to
escalate the war. On their part, both ZAPU and ZANU believed their military victory
was certain. Dumiso Dabengwa believes Lancaster was called to pre-empt ZIPRA’s
massive final victory using arms it had brought in to Lusaka through the assistance
of East Germany (German Democratic Republic); these arms amounted to 512 tons
of weaponry moved from Angola into Zambia between March and May 1979.331
For these reasons, the conference dragged on for 102 days and a conclusion was
reached entirely because of the hard-handed manner in which the Chairman Lord
Carrington dealt with the delegates. His trump card continued to be the threat to
recognise the Muzorewa government if the Patriotic Front did not tow the line.
The Patriotic Front contested the constitutional provisions they regarded as racist
(such as seats reserved for 20 whites), against restrictions on constitutional
changes, the retention of the Rhodesian forces, the restriction placed on the ability
of the new government to redistribute land that had been taken from the Africans
over the previous 90 years, the length of time given for a ceasefire to take effect,
and the location of forces during the ceasefire.332 The impasse on the land question
was solved by an unwritten Anglo-American guarantee to provide funds to
compensate for all the land appropriated.
The implementation of the Lancaster Agreement depended on successful ceasefire
arrangements. The ceasefire agreement was formally signed by all the parties on 21
December 1979, and in it all parties committed themselves to accept the authority
of the Governor to facilitate the transitional process ultimately leading to the
elections.333 A Ceasefire Commission was established in which the commanders
of the Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front forces were represented under the
chairmanship of the Governor’s Military Advisor. This commission also included
representatives of Commonwealth forces from Australia, New Zealand, Kenya, and
Fiji.334 The ceasefire arrangement required Rhodesian forces to move into their
barracks and stay under the authority of monitoring teams deployed throughout
their command structure. The Patriotic Front forces were to assemble via rendezvous
points to assembly places from which they would be monitored and they were to
carry their arms and equipment, but under the authority of their commanders.
(331) Schleicher, H.G. and I. Schleicher. Special Flights: See p.82.

(332) Martin, D. and P. Johnson. Struggle for Zimbabwe. London: Monthly Review Press, 1981: See p.316.
(333) Nzombe, S. “Negotiations with the British.” Banana, ed. Turmoil and Tenacity. See p.190.
(334) Ibid. p.193.
1994
There were twenty-four designated rendezvous points close to Rhodesia’s borders
in which both ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas were to assemble, and then they
would be directed to eighteen assembly points within Rhodesia where they were to
remain until after the election.335 On the other hand, the Monitoring Force was to be
in direct communication with both sides to enable each side to be informed of the
other’s movements to avoid misunderstanding. The two forces were not to have bases
in close proximity. The maintenance of law and order was left in the hands of the
Rhodesian police, acting under the Governor’s authority and supervision; any
transgressions to the ceasefire arrangements were to be dealt with by the
Commission.
However, these arrangements did not pre-empt the outbreak of conflict or
misunderstandings between the former belligerents and many such cases were
reported, including situations involving the exchange of fire. Many Patriotic Front
guerrillas did not enter into the assembly points out of sheer mistrust, and ZANLA
in particular had issued out orders behind the scenes to its cadres not to go in en
masse.336 Instead, mujibhas such as Tricos Elvis Mahumire were sent in to assess the
safety of these ‘killing bags’ as the guerrillas feared. Mahumire explains,
At first the issue of Assembly Points was not clear to the extent that some of the
comrades like Madison Toasted Tichatonga and the other one known as Mike refused
to go. We stayed with them at our home. They sent Dickson and I to verify whether the
situation was favourable in the assembly points… Eventually those comrades went
to join others and we remained at our own homes, but we got the message that
everything went on smoothly in those so-called Assembly Points…337
There were several loopholes in the implementation plan which certainly did little to
allay the fears of the Patriotic Front. For instance, the South African troops delayed
their withdrawal from Rhodesia and Britain did not exert pressure on them to do so
either. There were reported cases of retaliation by these forces as an editorial of the
Zambian Daily Mail put it:
As things stand now, we are far from peace in Rhodesia. In fact, the whole situation
looks as though the Patriotic Front have been shepherded to their death by the British
government. Lord Soames had been appointed to lay ground for the peaceful settlement
of the Rhodesian political impasse, but he is jeopardizing it. At this rate, it will not
be long before those assembly points become battle zones and gas chambers…338
Even though there were external forces and observers who had been deployed in
various centres of the country, there is ample evidence which shows that the security
forces continued to violate the cease fire agreement by acts of wanton retribution
against the guerrillas in Assembly Points. On 12 January 1980, The Guardian
reported:
(335) Parker, J. Assignment Selous Scouts: See p.269.

(336) Interview with Maidei Mapepa by Walter Mafuta, (Harare) 13 May 2008.
(337) Interview with Tricos Elvis Mahumire by T. Mazarire, (Chivi) 6 March 2008.
(338) Editorial. Zambian Daily Mail. Lusaka, 9 January 1980.
Rhodesian security forces have killed seven Patriotic Front guerrillas who refused to
lay down their weapons before being taken to an assembly area. British sources said
that it was an inevitable incident. The shootings, which occurred on Thursday near
Lupane, 190 miles southwest of Salisbury, were the first in which insurgents have
been killed during the cease fire… According to British officials, the guerrillas
became aggressive and refused to hand over their weapons. After they refused to, the
police opened fire, killing one of them. British officials said that Rhodesian troops
were called in to support the police and another six guerrillas were killed. The
remaining ten scattered into the bush… The shootings came amid continuing
violence across Rhodesia; most of it allegedly the work of dissident elements of the
other wing of the Patriotic Front, Mr. Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army (ZANLA)… Of the 20,860 guerrillas who had gathered in assembly
areas by yesterday, 15,240 have been identified as members of ZANLA…339
As a result of such violence, many guerrillas failed to meet the deadline of being in
assembly points by midnight of 4 January 1980. Patriotic Front commanders Rex
Nhongo and Dumiso Dabengwa had to issue an ultimatum and travel to all provinces
calling upon the freedom fighters to go to the nearest rendezvous points. Most people
interviewed recalled in general that they went through particular assembly points,
though they did not provide detailed stories regarding the assembly points. Tobias
Chikanya is a typical case amongst many who stated:
In Assembly Points there were a lot of people, especially in the whole province of
Gaza. In the Gaza Province we were put into companies, and my company was put in
Chasu Assembly Point. Others were put into Takawira, Chaminuka, Mavhonde, and
many others since they were many, and we were given money and food rations as
stipends whilst we were in these assembly points. All the three parties were mixed
together in these Assembly Points, that is, ex-ZANLA combatants, ex-ZIPRA
combatants, and the Rhodesian Forces, even at Independence…340
Although it is not the intention, in the interest of the brevity of this chapter, to go into
the integration of the various pre-independence contending forces into what became
the powerful and highly disciplined Zimbabwe National Army, it is essential to point
out that previous researchers, the National Archives project, the Mafela Trust, and
the current Hashim Mbita project have collected memories relating to this exercise.
We have collected memories of those that were integrated, those that carried out the
exercise, the politicians who superintended the exercise, and the combatants who
were demobilized at the consummation of the struggle marked by the hoisting of the
Zimbabwe National Flag and the lowering of the British flag on 18 April 1980.
Clearly, the chapter, its analysis and narrative, both of which are based on a
selection of retrieved memories, together with published and unpublished sources,
shows that the Hashim Mbita project has come in to build on a steadily growing
body of material, which posterity can confidently draw upon to get a good picture
of how Zimbabweans liberated themselves from colonial rule. The memories
we
(339) The Guardian (London).“Rhodesian Forces Kill 7.” 12 January 1980.

(340) Interview with Tobias Chikanya by T. Mazarire, (Masvingo) 3 September 2007.
1994
have collected touch on every aspect of our struggle. On the side of the liberation
movement, we have tried to cover consistent revolutionaries, the so-called
‘dissidents’, ‘rebels’,‘renegades’,‘detractors’, in other words oppositional elements of
every shade, as they were all part and parcel of the complexities of our struggle. In
the country itself and the operational areas themselves, we have accommodated the
views of those that sought peaceful accommodation or settlement with the
colonialists; we have collected memories of liberation war collaborators, memories
of those caught between cross fire, memories of political and war prisoners, and all
these efforts of the Hashim Mbita Project complement efforts of other individual
researchers, organisations, and institutions, such as the National Archives, ZANU-
PF’s Information and Publicity Department, ZIPRA’s Mafela Trust, the National
Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe, as well as the ongoing research by history
students in our universities. In fact, as we have shown in this chapter, when it
comes to the writing of the history of our struggle, no relevant source is
untouchable. Indeed we draw upon even the memories of our erstwhile enemies,
the Rhodesian colonialists and their military and other security agents. In short, the
Hashim Mbita Project Archive, which we are building, compliments and vastly
expands the store of memories of our struggles for independence, which we are
proud to bequeath to posterity.
Abbreviations
ANC: African National Congress (South Africa); African
National Council (Rhodesia)
BSA Company: British South Africa
Company CCR:Christian Council of Rhodesia
CIO: Central Intelligence Organization
CV: Collective Villages
FNLA: National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
FROLIZI: Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
JC: Junior Certificate
JOC: Rhodesian Joint Operations Command
JMC: Joint Military Command (ZANU and ZAPU)
KANU: Kenya African National Union
LOMA: Law and Order Maintenance Act (Rhodesia)
MK: Umkhonto we Sizwe (military wing of the South African
ANC) MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NACP: National Association of Coloured People
NDP: National Democratic Party
NMMZ: National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe
OAU: Organisation of African Unity
PAFMECSA: Pan African Movement for East Central and Southern Africa
PVs: Protected Villages
RAR: Rhodesian African Rifles
RF: Rhodesian Front
RLI: Rhodesian Light Infantry
SADCC: Southern African Development Coordination Conference
TANU: Tanganyika African National Union
TANZAM: Tanzania and Zambia
TTL: Tribal Trust Land
UANC: United ANC
UDI: Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965)
UNIP: United National Independence Party (Zambia)
UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WCC: World Council of Churches
ZANLA: Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (military wing
of ZANU)
ZANU PF: Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU: Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZIPA: Zimbabwe People’s Army
ZIPRA: Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (military wing of
ZAPU) ZLA: Zimbabwe Liberation Army
1994
ZLC: Zimbabwe Liberation Council
ZNP: Zimbabwe Nationalist Party
ZUM: Zimbabwe Unity Movement
ZUPO: Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation
5.2
Zimbabwe
Personal Stories
Chatimba, Johannes —141 Chingoo, Mai—227

Chimurenga, Shepherd—147 Chingoo, Sekuru—230
Mabandla, Nicholas —154 Dumbarimwe, Elizabeth—233 Hondo,
Mahere, Mark—163 Rangarirai—240 Hondoyedzomba,
Mariyo, Timothy —168 Brighton—246 Jumbi, Gibbs —251
Matete, Sabina R.—186 Kakweza, George —253
Msipa, Cephas—190
Matoyi, Evelyn —255
Musiba, Murairo Chikonye—212
Mugumiri, Freddie Chikona—258
Ndlovu, Dereck—215
Munetsi, Nolbert —260
Shoko, Abias Pelice—
Vadzvanyiriri, Disperse—262
218 Zvevamwe,
London—220
Chamunorwa, Abel—224
5.2 zimbabwe personal 141
stories
Chatimba, Johannes
[Gutu – Chikwanda]
Johannes Chatimba was born in 1962, and grew up in Gutu; he was working as a tractor
driver in Jeri when the liberation struggle started.
My name is Johannes Chatimba. I was born in Gutu and I also grew up here and after
that I went and worked in the farms. After that I started working at Pepia, from Pepia
to Jeri. I started tractor-driving at Jeri farm that is when the war started. After realising
that the war was getting tense I relocated to the rural areas where I started to hear of
the freedom fighters. I walked and walked with the comrades up to a time when Mr
Musata from our village was reported to the soldiers but after that the comrades came
disguised as soldiers. They rounded all of us and started insulting us in disguise, so
that the povo would think that they were true soldiers. Their aim was to get to know
the people who leaked the information to the soldiers. They told the povo that they
had done a great job in capturing the mujibha because all the comrades were going
to be in trouble.
The issue was, on that particular day the povo started insulting us saying that we
were being sent by the comrades or freedom fighters to come and take their goats and
chicken; Prato was a Selous Scout, mudzakutsaku. They then lied to them that we had
been sent by Prato to collect a radio and they got into the granary and took the radio
and they gave it to the freedom fighters. They asked them to let us go together so that
he would have a chance to see his children, and they agreed. The aim was to take
him to what was called butchery, where all the sell-outs, including witches were
killed. So we went there together and we passed through his young brothers’ place,
shouting at him that he supported comrades, they were dogs but his young brother
kept silent
and he did not say anything, because he realised that his brother was going to die so
it was his last day on earth.
After that we started walking together, after that we arrived at a dark cave and
inside the cave there were soldiers inside. When we arrived at the cave we started
to get in to the cave and he realised that there was something wrong. So as he
would try to push back the comrades would push him forward into the cave. We did
not beat him but he was beaten by the comrades because of that radio which was
found in his possession. He was finally taken out and we were sent to Mupfudze,
meaning pungwe, at his homestead. Women and men came at Machona’s place for the
pungwe. The comrades then took Mr Machona to his home under severe security or
guard. His entire beard was removed, bleeding. He was tied at his bed; but I am
thankful that he saved his wife, because he told them that the money he got from
his son was for himself, and he did not give his wife a single cent. So he was tied
alone in the hut and the hut was set on fire and burnt. People were adding wood to
the fire up to the time when he died. That was when we ran away from Mapanda
and went to Jichidza with the likes of Silas, Tongai Mabhunu and Tamazanda; that
was the group I was working
1994
with up to the time when we came into contact with white soldiers at Jichidza.
They were under the first battalion.
We were covered by the granary and they shot the granary and it fell down covering
or burying us and they came and opened the roof of the granary and they could not
see us. They thought that maybe we had escaped, but we were behind the granary.
So as they passed through in a single file, Tongai started from the south while Silas
using the northern side and Tamazanda was from behind or from the centre; they
started firing on the whites; all of the whites died and we ran away.
We went from Nyajena and there was also a contact in Nyajena. Three helicopters
were destroyed and after that we went to Zano. After Zano we proceeded to Ndanga,
Mupfugudo. At Mupfugudo there was a contact from early in the morning to 8pm;
many soldiers, more than 300 died. Not even a single one managed to escape
because they had assembled for the lunch hour and they were all relaxed. 17
helicopters came and all of them were shot down. We then proceeded to Bvukururu.
There was also a contact because many people died. Helicopters tried to bomb the
people and comrades, but many soldiers died because they had come with diesel
drums. The tank was placed in a mountain so that the helicopters would get or
easily get fuel, but the tank was also destroyed.
I was also injured on my back that day. We then proceeded to Gumbu, up to Zaka
Jerera. We had another contact there. It was difficult; we tried our best and proceeded
to Bilata up to Mutikizizi. We always clashed, up to the time when all freedom
fighters went to the keeps that year. I came from Jichidza where my mother’s sister
was staying, back here to Gutu, Makore.
When I was walking with the comrades, I had a gun belonging to a certain comrade
who was killed during the war, so I used that gun to fight, but I was not trained
before I was given the gun. We were trained by walking with them. What happened
was, freedom fighters were given money but we got nothing and I was ill during that
registration time. We were trained in Jichidza, and during training we were asked to
fire at trees, jumping, scrolling. That was the training we got so that they could see
if we were strong, and also so that they could see if we quickly sweat or quickly got
tired like someone with TB.
We were seven mujibhas, but I have forgotten some of them. I had no pseudonym.
As mujibha, walking was if you have been sent and you decide to do your own
things; I was beaten six times. I was sent to buy mbanje and I decided to smoke one
ball. I didn’t know I was being followed. I smoked up to when I finished and I
then went
back. So they told me that they saw me smoking, and I was beaten. If you had been
sent you were not allowed to smoke it because if it was too far, they only gave you
one hour and you had to run fast and come back.
The smoking was motivating. Those days we were used to seeing blood so
smoking would give use courage. There was no maybe in the event that you saw
soldiers, you would go to an extent that you see soldiers you would go to an extent of
trying to take
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the gun by force from the comrade so that you fire or shoot the soldier as a result
of courage.
He was born in 1962 and was about 25 years when the comrades arrived. At first
it was difficult because they would come even at my house. They would go to an
extent of asking any mother my whereabouts or even knocking at my door. They even
published our names those days by Prato. When his father died they published our
names, the helicopters would shout our names, Johannes, Miriro meaning Matasva, S
Magomo and Peter. They would spend the whole day in the aeroplane shouting and
saying we want these people to come to the open or to surrender themselves. That is
when we stayed in the cave for two months. The cave had four stages. You could
see rapoko of the old people in the cave, there was also a well inside.
When we were in the cave we survived because were given mealie-meal by our
parents and we would cook sadza. We did not see anything wrong. We finally got
out of the cave after two months and it was also after we have realised that the
helicopters had gone. So I just got out of the cave and I was taken by my mother
and we went to
her young sister’s place in Jichidza. As soon as I arrived the next day a pungwe was
called and we were told that people were fighting because we wanted independence.
I was working in the farms and I can say that I had grievances, just like at Bepira,
Chikwati, brother. I worked there for 17 cents per day. It was painful. Even up
to today, just imagine getting 17 cents, how much do you earn at the end of the
month? So I was working for free. As you know that a white man is cruel you
could hear him saying, ‘eeh, scavenger’ referring to you. Pete was very cruel to an
extent that if you were close he could kill you. As someone who worked in the
farms, I wanted to revenge. That gave me courage because they were cruel.
As mujibha we would go to collect bullets at Chipungabeira in Mozambique. I
went to Mozambique six times. At Chipungabeira, I can say, we used to meet
soldiers on our way back. We would find them waiting for us at the crossing point. I
survived because we were twelve and two were killed and some of us escaped
because we knew how to swim. We swam down the river. That was our main
problem we would encounter anytime. We would pass through Devuli Ranch. There
were lions in Devuli Ranch but God guided us along the way.
Ancestral spirits were very important. Even God played a crucial role. He guided
us. As I see it in the contact at Bvukururu ancestral spirits played a very crucial role
in that battle because we were just surprised on a pungwe. Soldiers had come and
they surrounded the base but all the freedom fighters and the mujibhas managed to
escape. That is when one of our comrades died and that is also when I was shot on my
back. Up to the end of the war when all comrades were asked to go to the keeps and
that was the time when I was ill. I had pains all over my body maybe it was because
of heavy duties I used to do such as carrying of bullets each and every time. So I
think that caused my illness up to when people were in the keeps for registration; I
was very ill that time. It took me five years to recover.
1994
During the Jerera battle we fought against soldiers and unfortunately some soldiers
were coming from the back; so when I tried to take cover I was cut by a wire but I
managed to escape up to the time I was treated by my colleagues.
The farm owners would beat us if we misbehaved. I grew up in the farms so what
I encountered in the farms made me to think of joining the war, especially Baranz
with his cruelty. Baranz was very cruel during those days. It was fortunate that he
was ill but Baranz I wanted to kill him straight. He would shoot people in his farms.
He was very cruel to an extent that if he saw or sees children with birds or with
young birds he would tell them to go and put them back. When arriving at the tree
he would tell them to climb on the tree so when coming down he would ask them
to jump from the top of the tree. Baranz was very cruel and even if the cows strayed
in his farm he would take them for free. Baranz was very cruel and I am surprised
he is still alive.
During the war I never thought of taking cattle from his farm. I don’t think people
took his cattle because there were soldiers in his farm. So they tried three times but
it was dangerous, but frankly speaking (laughing), Baranz, I am not happy. When I
went to Chisagwa Township he did not even try to stop but he rather increased speed
because he knows me and I once fought him. I beat him.
I was left with him and he was told not to be very much serious with us. So
during that time it was the time of harvesting and I was driving a tractor carrying
maize cobs to the cement so after that I parked my tractor and started to walk
slowly as people were busy throwing maize cobs in the trailer. So we started to
track people as they harvested maize cobs and he picked a maize behind a certain
woman who had a baby on her back and he shouted, ‘Bulat shityasiya barwe.’ He
threw the maize cob and it hit the baby on the head and the baby died and he
started laughing.
I just got off the tractor and asked him what he did, look, the baby has died. So you
also need to die. We started to fight, he is strong and I eventually fought him hard and
he ran away. When our boss came he asked us why we fought with him and we told
him that he killed the baby and they started fighting. Surely I don’t want to see Baranz.
When I was given the guns it was different, because you would just send them.
What I saw is that mujibha played a very important role especially spying and
giving communication, they played a crucial role. I think comrades played a big
role but the mujibha played a very big role. I think the government should
compensate these people even a little.
Relationship with chimbwidos was there because as you know, women and men,
they would indulge. The law was there but they failed, we failed. We were told that
we were not supposed to sleep or have sex with the chimbwidos, but we would do
otherwise. Yes, it was a burning issue because if you indulged in sex you always
met difficult problems.You know, at first comrades, that is what you got or could hear
from
the whites that they were fighting with baboons because comrades were given juju in
order to disappear but they failed as a result of indulging in sex with chimbwidos;
that is how I saw it because I witnessed that.
stories
At first we could not understand about comrades disappearing because if you look
or if you could look behind and find that there was no one so we could say they could
mysteriously disappear; but we later realised that it was not disappearance as
people thought but if you see them going this road and you look back so when you
try to find or locate them you would fail because they would decide to use different
or another road. That is what they used to do. It was good. I don’t know now.
On that aspect during that time of keeps (assembly Points) there was no-one I
managed to see; others were now operating on the other side and only three remained
behind with me but when others were taken to go for training in Mozambique. I
don’t know about the mujibhas who benefited in 1980 or what happened because I
eventually fell ill and I went to Jichidza.
Chivi area was very difficult because it is in a plain (flat land) so in case of a
contact you would see that it was difficult to hide or to take cover. Mountains are
spaced so that’s why we did not operate in Chivi for a long time because we
favoured the Nyajena side because of its terrain.
The only advice I can give is don’t hand back the country to the whites so if you
think of all the experiences, the torture, the beatings, it was difficult so they have to
think afresh. At the base or pungwe, ah, we would call the mujibha and doing that
we would be reading from a book, for example, mujibha, who is your mother and he
would say, eeh, we heard that your mother is a witch, so that name will be written
in the book and we will leave the book with the chairman so the next group would
come and to the killings you see, that’s how we would do. So during operations, in
the event that there is a group ahead of us as soon as we arrive at the area, we
would ask for the book and then kill. Some people were just killed without
committing any crime; it was unavoidable.
Vatengesi would be tied both hands and put on fire just like as if you are roasting
maize cobs. This was done in front of the people or the povo would be even
be singing, and clapping hands. Other methods were beatings, using plastics and
cutting using knives. The knives were sometimes used by the mujibhas and the
comrades. Sometimes if they were women we would tighten their dress to an
extent that she would say everything and with anger we would eventually kill them.
The povo would just say freedom fighters are cruel but some would say we are now
free because no- one would love to see a witch and a sell-out. Most of those who
were killed just died for no apparent reason. They were just killed, sometimes
because of enmity between people in the villages. So those are some of the reasons
you saw just after the war that some freedom fighters who were just killing some
people for no apparent reasons ended up mentally disturbed even up to now some
are still mentally disturbed. That is why you see that after they were given those
$50,000 gratuities some were buying cabbages for cattle instead of seeking
treatment, you see, it’s one of the issues at stake. There is no respect for those who
were mujibas and later comrades; we are getting by because no-one even knows
your name, they see us as useless. I remember the war and the way I toiled to get
even a small piece of land. It pains me a lot but if I continue
1994
thinking I will come to realise that human beings, by their very nature are greedy and
selfish because if I have a close look I can see that not all freedom fighters got land.
It is because our minds are selfish. The big chefs will always take all the benefits so
you end up saying, aah, I am not alone. I will just leave it like that.
After the war, during the days when all freedom fighters were asked to go to the
assembly points, not all of them went but some were left because if I remember
some even killed one white man called Chimuka. But those were the whites I was
talking
about, there was Chimuka and Borrence, those were the people who were supposed
to die but only Chimuka died. Some kutovhumuka, were there because we passed and
stepped through a lot of blood, because the blood of a human being is very important.
A human blood is different from that of an animal so people must remember that,
because not all freedom fighters were given money they should have given all
the
freedom fighters money but the other problem was I was ill so I did not get anything,
even a piece of land. It was useless because they had left me from the beginning, it
was useless. There are the likes of Mirio Matasva, he is there that one, Ane
Ndangariro. He once told me that it was better if they called us to join the army, it
was better and I said no, my friend, let us just wait and see what will take place but
Ane Shungu and he is very angry, I tell you.
We also thank you for talking to us about this. Signing off I am Chatimba.
stories
Chimurenga, Shepherd
[PFUKWA, Midlands State University]
Shepherd Chimurenga grew up in the Eastern Highlands and went to school at St.
Augustine. He joined the liberation struggle in 1975, and crossed the border into Villa
Manyika, Mozambique in 1976. He was trained in Chimoio and went into the
Department of Information and Publicity where material for funding the war was
prepared. There after he went to the front with the other guerrillas in operation. After
cease-fire he completed his education to doctorate level and has been working with
universities.
My name from the liberation struggle was Shepherd Chimurenga. I grew up in the
Eastern Highlands. I went to school at St. Augustine and went into the liberation
struggle in 1975. I had completed my O Level. I did my secondary education in
Rhodesia and going to O-Level was quite an achievement on its own, because there
was a lot of bottlenecking. It is then that I felt the oppression and oppressive system
in Rhodesia. There was political awareness that was growing in us because we
were exposed to a lot of literature of different struggles.We also read of the Marxist-
Leninist ideas. Like generations of the time we were inspired by independence
from Zambia, Mozambique, radicalism in Algeria and Zambia that was filtering
into Rhodesia, inspiring the youth of that time.
Narration of war biographies and memories of the struggle is never a pleasant
experience for the narrator. Especially for someone who was directly involved in it.
It is like reminding somebody of an old toothache. It is reminding somebody of the
traumas they experienced because indeed it was traumatic in many, many ways. These
memories are difficult at times to manage. That in preamble will be my experience,
so there may be a lot of gaps in my narration, not by choice.
The effects of the north-eastern campaign, were being felt all over, and war
materials and soldiers were being seen all over the place, in the southern and
eastern parts of Zimbabwe. When I was in Form 4 the war had spread to many parts
of the country, including the north-east. I crossed the border in September 1976,
went into Villa Manyika. It was a small camp, but by then there was a flood of
educated people from schools. It was an uncontrollable deluge. We moved to transit
camps in Manica, into Chimoio then moved to Doroi. Doroi was a vast hellhole that
could not manage the numbers that were coming in. This was where the trauma
started; that was where the suffering began. It was the beginning story of the
liberation war, the story of pain, of suffering and agony. There was nothing
glorifying about Doroi.
Doroi was built by the Nyadzonia tragedy, led by Nyathi who was responsible for
Nyadzonia; so when coming from Doroi you could see traumatised faces out of that.
It was a vast closed ball, disease was rampant, and food supply was erratic. I was
lucky to have stayed there for only three months, September to December 1976. I
don’t regret leaving it because the reports that I heard about Doroi of 1977, 1978,
and 1979 were terrible. I am related the late Shingirayi Wirimayi, the radio
personality, because
1994
he was one of those personalities I went into the struggle with. Anyway, I left Doroi
on a small mission of joining the department of information and publicity, which we
never did, because I disappeared into the ranks and went into training at Chimoio.
Chimoio was more organised as a military camp, whereas Doroi was a proper
refugee camp; so you should get that distinction from the narratives that you get.
If it is a narrative that ends with Doroi, it was purely a refugee camp, there were
no military structures, people were civilians, people were refugees. The few who
could make it were taken lightly. Most stayed there, most suffered there. My current
publications indicates part of that. At Chimoio I went into the Department of
Information and Publicity where they prepared material for funding the war. I went
into a camp near Chitepo College of Politics. There I was educated; I worked with
people like the late Lovemore Mazibisa, Mhizha Mhunga, I think Irene Zindi was
also there. It was a place near the clinic called Parirenyatwa and I still have a
mental liking of the whole place; and if required I wouldn’t mind drawing a mental
image of Chimoio. I have a very clear image. I was struck by malaria, I remember
that very well. Memories are either very much to celebration of time or you know,
brushes with death. I was struck by malaria for four days and what saved me was,
there was a medic who attended to me. There was inadequate medication by
standards of the bush. He bought medication everyday.
If I had been struck by malaria at Doroi I could have been dead. So I have
memories of that place. What saved me at Chimoio was my proximity to the clinic,
the availability medication and the care that I received because of the small number
of patients. After recovering from malaria I went into military training. The camp
commander was General Chiwenga. General Zimhondi was then the General
Commander for Manica Province. I trained with people like Major Chidawanyika;
I trained with various people. I was emaciated because of the illness, but I managed
to go through. What motivated me was the goals of the liberation. If I had been
pressured by anybody to go to the struggle I think I would have given up; but I hung
on because I was driven into the revolution by my own will, by my own desire to
liberate an oppressed people. I knew we belonged to the generation where we were
the youth. We had the physical strength and stamina. That was clear in my mind and
it became my source of strength, even operating where there was little muscle and
more brain. This was a question of brains and brawn.
I went through the training; it was rigorous, it was painful, very difficult. Again
food supplies were inadequate. At that time I want to compare it with the training in
our armies, which is indeed rigorous and I have a lot of respect for it. We had
inadequate shelter, clothing, and food; we were under war situation even doing
training. There was a danger of being attacked. The barracks was nothing but a shack
of grass. The only decent meal was the supper that you could take. We did our three
months training, then as bamboo pole, after the training we drafted a second phase.
The more physically fit ones were sent to Anti-aircraft training, heavy artillery training.
These are things like recoilless rifles, 82mm mortar, 60mm mortars. These are
heavy
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weapons usually used in mechanised units of an army. For guerrillas they have to
be carried over the shoulder. Imagine carrying such equipment though the bush, all
these are tactics of guerrillas using heavy machinery. They had to go through this
training so everybody who was not physically fit was eliminated. So I was
sidelined because of that. However we went into a more exciting and advanced
training and engineering. We went into explosives landmines and dynamiting.
Generally, we did a lot of things. One had to have O-Level Maths and good English
to understand how to do some of those things.
In our Engineering training I was impressed by the instructor Ishepe Chibende,
may his soul rest in peace; he died defusing a landmine. You will pick up that story
from others who witnessed his death because it is said they recovered nothing except
a few parts of his lower part so it was a tragedy. He inspired me. I grasped what
he taught. One of the instructors who assisted him borrowed my book and never
returned it. Another instructor was Black Savage, I remember interviewing him for
my own doctoral studies. After training I was inducted in a team of forty hefty, freshly
trained commandos. So there I was, with two engineers attached to this commando
unit, dwarfed by these huge commandos.
Our mission was to blast Mutare-Harare Railway line. I don’t know how this was
decided, but it started in August 1977, after seven months in the rear. How I got my
first gun is a story for another day; I will save that for another day. I never went
back to the rear until ceasefire. Stories of that period can fill volumes. I have a lot
of written material that is awaiting publication. One publisher has turned down my
stories but I will forgive her, mainly because her ideologies, her values, and
obviously her sympathies lie with Rhodesia. I forgive her. So on our first mission
we moved in up Honde River and crossed north of Mutare near Watsomba. I
crossed into the south of Kriste Mambo and moved on, north of Rusape. Our first
operation was at Matinhidza; a gang of terrorists blasted the railway line near
Matinhidza. This is in the military archives. I missed the second operation in
Headlands, which was three weeks later.
When we got to the last villages in the reserves near Rusape, into Rusape, we
were broken into units so I was attached to experienced guerrilla and one of them
is Action Moyo, who was the local commander. He is now deceased. When new
guerrillas were brought to the front they carried a lot of war material. Remember
even a single bullet was brought by a bag. There was no any kind of mechanisation
that you could talk of, so this is part of the trauma. The ammunition box, called cache
in Portuguese weighed about 30kgs. This guy called Frazer collapsed at a training
session, I remember this. He was very fit and he excelled in training, but he just
broke down during training. Some of us managed to endure; we were broken into
smaller
units, drafted into units of about twenty other guerrillas, led by this Action Moyo.
Most guerrillas in the Makoni District know him. Owen Gazi, was sectional
commander, he died near Nyazura after our operations. Augustine Mhere, led at
provincial level. It was Action who led us for the operation at Matinhidza; 20
metres
1994
were destroyed, but it never really paralysed the railway communications. That force
of our presence, the ability to penetrate to that point, I think, was what mattered;
because it was the first time an advance force of guerrillas had gone that far.
Obviously within the Tangwena Sector, other units by-passed south of Rusape near
Nyazura, moved into Chidoko, into Hwedza I remember our reinforcements in
1977 pushed as far as Hwedza. In 1978, groups pushed as far as Svosve
Detachment and Chihota. In other words we were heading close to Mhondoro and
into Seke. I remained in Makoni District near Rusape. That was when I lad most of
my landmines in those farms. So in brief that was one of the operations.
The second one was at Headlands. I missed that one because I had been moved into
another advanced unit; but we had to take a guerrilla who had been sent to the rear,
that was no fun. That was how I missed it. The third one, was in August/September
1978, I guess near Bradley Siding, about 20km north of Matinhidza; and again it’s
on record. This time there were two engineers who worked on that one. We had a
team of young guerrillas fresh from Tanzania, they were better trained. Chingoya did
wonders to guerrillas; they were more disciplined than Mozambican trained troops
because they had more time.
The Tanzanians did a good job, even up to today I have a lot of respect for
Tanzanian-trained troops, and Tanzanian army for all it did in training ZANLA. You
could even pick it up in their language, these were support units. We operated in units
that lay adjacent to the Inyanga-Rusape Road. In 1975 I was drafted into a unit of nine
guerrillas. It was a very cohesive unit; an advance unit which did its operations in
the farms between Rusape and Inyanga around Kriste Mambo. We attacked farms and
we opened up new spaces in new territory. It was the real cutting edge of the
operations; and when we went to the rear it was just for supplies.
In mid 1978, I later moved into a host of farms north east of Rusape, under
Action Moyo. He was the brains behind the abduction of a Johannes Martin, a
farmer who was abducted near Headlands in June 1978. This abduction caused
ripples that were felt in the whole detachment from Headlands as far as Mutare
South, as far as Inyanga, and as far as the border to the east. All that area, the
follow- up search of Johannes caused a lot of casualties. Lives of guerrillas were
lost and a lot of civilian lives were lost. The unit I was in escaped the attacks
because we were in the frontline, in the farms. So when they went to search in the
reserves they set things upside down, upsetting all the units. Action and his unit on a
reconnaissance mission went to the farm in broad daylight, and talked to the
workers. For some reason the farmer appeared, because he was leaving the farm
because of the war, and he saw these guys. They did not shoot him or talked to him;
they realised what they had to do. If they let the guy go, they were doomed! So
Action was in a dilemma; it was either he shot the white man, or captured him. They
decided to capture him. They drove that afternoon to Ipsheni Mission east of
Rusape and then on foot crossed into the communal lands, I am told, at about 7.30,
he walked into a group of comrades that were camping there. Everybody went
haywire about it. They asked him why he had
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captured him. Why he had brought the murungu there. He said he had no option but
to capture him. That same night he was marched another 30-40km by another unit,
as far as St. Barbara’s Mission, between the Inyanga-Mutare road, towards the
border. He spent the night near Watsomba, and the next night he crossed Honde
River over the border. In other words in two nights he was in Mozambique. Action
was sent back and was given other groups that continued with him. The white man
narrates his story in Hopes on Tomorrow by Thomas Wodden Woods. He really
walked.
The follow-up set the whole sector upside down. As they hunted for this white
man, the flow of our operations was disrupted. As a result Action was summoned to
Chimoio because he had caused so much suffering. He was dressed down for
having caused the mayhem. He was respected because he was bold and he was
cheerful. He was the same guy who led us through the Matinhidza. It’s only that the
events were not recorded. He never lived to tell his story. His name is there. He was
summoned to the rear. When he came back he was promoted to senior commander
and it is in this state that I see him.
Unfortunately that is when you see indiscipline creeping in. I don’t hesitate
to mention it. They had different ways of expressing themselves but Tanzanian
troops were disciplined. So what happened was, when Action came in as a Section
Commander, he was in command of younger troops in search of action; and when
Action was tired of action, he should be given rest. People operated for 30 months
without rest. That takes a heavy toll on the dynamic faculties of the mind; and this
kind of strain, in hindsight, was what caused trouble with the guerrillas. We saw
Action going back to the farms and fighting again. We operated in the farms in 1979,
as we went towards ceasefire. I was moved back into the centre of the detachment
in the villages, in the communal lands. I set a few landmines there at the end of my
engineering work. It was a kind of stalemate where Rhodesians could do much to
recover the space they had lost. We could engage the Pfumo Revanhu Dzakutsaku
in broad daylight. The enemy was the regular Rhodesian forces. The Madzakutsaku
were not trained compared to us, as they were a militia. We could easily run over
them. The
ceasefire found me in that state of stalemate.
Another interesting point is that when people went to Lancaster, the war actually
intensified to its highest point of madness. So even when the negotiations were going
on at Lancaster, people were dying at the front. This is where I get the sense of loss,
where some of the people who should be around with us passed away. Operation
Dingo was Chimoio. Ceasefire saw me going to the Assembly camp. I had a
harrowing experience because we delayed our movement, so had to pass through
Rusape. We lost comrades like Hidden, the detachment commander of Bonda,
because the Rhodesians were still in control. I remember all the questions that I
was asked like, ‘Did you lay any landmines?’ by my interrogator; I played an
ignoramus, given my innocent boyish face and I was only 21. So I said that I didn’t,
and the interpreter looked at me naively and dismissed me. Hidden disappeared at
Rusape.
1994
After the assembly point at Dzapasi I never really bothered to go to the ranks.
Instead I opted to go back to school, and I don’t regret that decision. I went back to
complete my A-Levels in a year, went and did my first degree, did some secondary
school teaching, went back to UZ for a second degree, then worked in universities
and I boast of a doctoral degree. It is not an honorary doctoral degree; it is a doctoral
degree in chimurenga, so that on its own is unique.
I used my experience; I brought in data collected from my contacts then and now.
It is ethnography material. My experience in war was an ethnographic exercise and
I stand to benefit from the Hashim Mbita project as well, as in the doctoral way. I
would want to hear more voices of more people who took part in the struggle. Where
are the women? The traumas that keep on coming back even up to today, are the
result of a past that has not been fully settled.
For your own information you wouldn’t believe it, but I was never attacked by
the enemy. I spent 30 months in the front, for some reason. Some of the traumas
that I saw were people emerging from struggles. One was a young refugee at Doroi
who escaped from Nyadzonia. He was seriously injured. You could see that he was
not mentally balanced. I don’t think he had ever been educated. He never understood
me as an educated someone but you could see in hindsight I saw the face of trauma
in what he did. People could say he was mentally not balanced. He could not be
trained in any military course, he was called Drenter.
The scars of Nyadzonia are vast, that is why Morris Nyathi was never forgiven.
Another one of my memories is the loss of Chebhende, the military instructor who
trained me. I am told only the lower limbs were buried. I had memories of this because
I remember carrying a rifle of one person who taught me to defuse a landmine.
Things went wrong and the guy was blasted. It was a dangerous course. I defuse
one landmine and actually had to work another one. That was a painful experience to
lose a comrade in such a way. In the last year of the war, a few months before the
end of the war indiscipline became rampant, I think I was at cross purposes with
some of my commanders, they were aware of my solid education, when they were
not. I had a way of managing the younger, the more disciplined, rank and file. I think
I witnessed a few traumas there.
I wouldn’t want to call the nature of the indiscipline among the guerrillas, illicit
relations with women, but rape. I don’t think the chimbwidos were willing. You don’t
negotiate with someone with a gun. Let’s drop the word rape, but there were a lot
of illicit relations. Some of the live evidence that I saw were pregnancies,
venereal diseases among guerrillas and because of that people involved became
sedentary. Yet guerrilla operations require you to be mobile, you don’t want to stay
two or three days on the same spot. You must be constantly on the move; guerrillas
are highly mobile people. But because of illicit relations with civilians, it demanded
them stay in a place for days in order to serve their needs. Of course there was a lot
of misunderstanding. You will find it difficult to collect a history of abuse of
women because nobody wants to talk about them, even the victims. I had several
enemies; men as well as
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women. This is where I have a bone of contention. This research and material that we
have at hand, one of our sources of reference is Irene Stanton; I think she has done
something. These people are not Zimbabwean, Irene is Zimbabwean but with a wrong
colour. The authorities are western authors on violence against women.
With all the codes of conduct guerrillas went to be involved with women
because rules are meant to be broken. Eight Points of Attention, Nzira dzemasoja
dzekuzvibata nadzo. It was a song, but you must understand the extenuating
circumstances of a struggle. They sang that song because the conditions of an
armed struggle are far from normal. These people never led a normal life; they never
had life. You are totally
outside. This is where the problem of ultimate sacrifice is misunderstood by people in
the struggle; at some point it had a devastating effect. There was a lot of drug
taking and alcohol consumption. I remember in the unit I was in the commanders
drank whisky, if available, every night. If there was beer in the community,
guerrillas drank it. It was not because of enjoying it. It was a tonic for a mind that
was under stress. Mjana was common. The thing that served some people was that
they understood that those were drugs, and they had to be very careful, especially
under the war. Let us not look at the abuse of intoxicants as a pleasure, but as a way
of coping with stressful times. When you are constantly dicing with death twenty-
four hours a day, is far from normal. You should respect war heroes.
In the attack at which Action died, the guerrillas were drunk. I have heard a lot of
tragedies about that. The only solution was that after many years of operation some
guerrillas were moved to the rear. New units were brought. People liked the operation
at the front than in the rear probably because home is best. Even some of those who
were injured wanted to go to the front.
What I have narrated is just a snippet of the whole canvas of the liberation struggle.
1994
Mabandla, Nicholas
[Zhombe, 14 May 2008]
Nicholas Mabandla, whose war name was Temel Nkomo, was born in 1956 in Silobela.
He joined the liberation struggle at an age of 21 years, and became a ZIPRA activist after
experiencing the oppression by the minority white regime.
My name is Nicholas Mabandla, I was born in 1956 in Silobela, then we moved to

Zhombe in 1958. I attended school but later stopped as there wasn’t enough money
and in those years the elders were not really concerned with education. My father did
not want me to go to work, but wanted me to herd his cattle, so he did not allow me
to get an ID. I told him that I needed some money for my upkeep and that I needed to
earn my own money rather than depend on what he offered me. I later got an ID and
set off to look for work; I worked in Bulawayo but most of the jobs were contracts.
I analysed the situation and found that it was oppression; and through discussion
with others we discovered that the whites could beat you up or fire you any time.
When WNLA (Wits Native Labours Association-popularly known as WENELA)
was initiated in 1974, I went to work there; we worked for whites and the
oppression was similar to that in Zimbabwe.
I was lucky because my boss wasn’t cruel and he treated both blacks and whites
the same. I was a First Aid practitioner, so I only attended to the injured, but because of
the temperature in the mine, I couldn’t stay awake for more than 20 minutes when I
was alone. I started work at 7pm and knocked off at 7am. I remember one day at
work, it was about 10pm, some whites came and one of them woke me up by
kicking my feet and asked me why I was sleeping at work. He asked me who gave
me the permission to sleep and I told him that my boss did. He tried to punch me
but I blocked him twice, and because I and my companion exchanged shifts, we had
knobkerries in our office, which we used as sticks or handles for stretcher beds. I
took one and hit him with it in the stomach twice, after seeing that he kept advancing
at me. He then rushed out, and I chased him and left him outside my office; then I
secured the door with wire just in case he came back, and I continued to sleep.
Upon reaching outside the shaft, he took my work card and left a message that I
report to the mine captain. I was taken there by a policeman from our mine. I had
heard from the other workers that the mine captain used to beat up blacks in his
office; so when we got there I refused to enter his office and since the guard was
also a Rhodesian I told him to leave, although he had been told to force me to go
in. The white man whom I had beaten up was also in the office. He asked me what I
had done and I told him that the white man had beaten me and I had ‘returned the
favour’. He asked me if I was allowed to sleep at work and I told him that my boss
knew that I slept at work, and that if he came to check on me he first phoned me, as
he knew that I would be sleeping, if there wasn’t any injury to attend to. They
phoned my boss and when he came he found me outside, and before talking to the
others, he asked me
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what I had done, and I told him. Then on talking to the other whites-they talked in
Afrikaans so I couldn’t understand the whole conversation – but what I heard was
that he asked the white I had beaten up that when he was checking on me who was
checking his subordinates and he told me to beat him again if he ever came to me
as I wasn’t under his department. I was told to leave and went back to the
compound. But one day after some weeks the white I had beaten up came to me
drunk. He had forgotten his light, so he wanted to borrow mine, and I told him that
if I was found without one I would be fired, but if he was found without one they
would simply warn him not to do so again. I also reminded him that we had a fight
before, so how was I to know if he was serious. He continued nagging me until I lent
the light to him; on the following day he gave me 54 rand to thank me. We ended up
being friends and he brought some food which we shared.
After completing my contract, I returned to Rhodesia. When I got home I realised
that what I had initially run away from was worse because the oppression was now
drastic. I remember one day when we were going to WENELA our IDs were taken
so we had to get new ones on arrival. I had got mine and was leaving home for
Bulawayo, when we encountered a roadblock just after Nkayi, near Inyathi and one
soldier told us to get down from the bus. As I was still new from South Africa I did
not know the situation at home and was I was wearing my Boston hat from South
Africa with a big rim and feather and was on the seat that was on top of the bus
wheels, which elevated me. Upon entering the bus this soldier ordered all of us with
our IDs that we drop off the bus. He happened to be a former classmate of mine and
when he got to me he didn’t look at me in the face, but just took my ID and made
me step aside. I didn’t want to take my eyes off him because I feared that he wanted
to shoot me, as I moved, while I was not looking,. Then I turned and came back to
where he was and he called
his accomplice to come and take a look at a mujibha. His friend told him to leave me,
and I got on the bus. When we had gone for some distance, the people began to sing. I
was lucky I was not shot, because they had shot three people the previous day. I
asked them how the soldiers had identified me, and I was told that my hat betrayed
me; I began scolding the other passengers for not telling me that before I got into
trouble, and then saying I was lucky.
When I got to Bulawayo I intended to go back home early, but I decided not to as
I wanted to meet the soldier who had nearly got me killed, when I had my own gun.
That was why I decided to join the struggle and I never returned home. I renewed my
contract with WENELA, but I worked for only a month, and received the previous
contract’s bonus. We had talked to one Indian who used to transport people who
wanted to join the war. His car carried six people; three of us had not received their
bonuses so we left them behind. When I joined the struggle I was 21, but I was with
another young boy who was only 17. We went and waited for the car at a town
called Caltonville, and because we had money we did our shopping for clothes.
When he
came he said he wanted to collect his ‘sandwich’ and by this he meant his girlfriend. So
when he came we started off at six and we arrived at eleven. Upon reaching the border
1994
there were two roads and the one we wanted to take had a light and his girlfriend
suggested that we use the other one, because the light meant that there were soldiers
on patrol. So we followed the other road, and when he dropped us, we crossed the
border at around eleven in the night. There were two cars that were approaching each
other in the clear space at the border, so we decided to go where these cars would
pass each other, and as soon as they passed, we crossed. We moved on, and we saw
someone wearing white and we took cover; this was the first time we practised
taking cover. From there we came to a large farm with grass so tall that someone
moving in it could not be seen. In the farm we looked for a road and tried to hear
out where we could detect car sounds because we feared that we would come to a
river and because we were far from a road, have difficulty in crossing. We detected
the car sounds and walked by the roadside for about a kilometre and came to a river
and we crossed. We however, didn’t know that we were still in South Africa. At about
four in the morning, we ate our food and agreed to walk on, even though it was
down and we were tired. We heard some sound like a car coming and we hid but
some of us hid in the railway line that was near where we were. It proved to be not a
car but a train! One boy whom we were with said he was inside between the rails; we
told him to get away from there but he argued that the train would not overrun him.
We moved on and came to the border.Although it was the Botswana border, when we
saw the police my heart missed a beat once, and I told my colleagues that we should
not show ourselves to the police as it was dangerous, and they agreed. We
approached one woman and she told us that we were looking at the border into
Botswana we were still on the South African side; so she directed us and we
followed her directions and crossed into Botswana.
In Botswana we arrived at a farm and we met a person at about one o’clock in the
night. We had bought press button knives in South Africa, so we opened them and
asked him how far the nearest police station was, and he directed us to the one at the
border, but we told him we did not want to go to that one, and he said we could reach
there at five in the morning. We went back to the road. A police car passed us and we
tried to stop it but it moved on. We tried about thrice before they stopped and asked
us where we were going. We were wearing black T-shirts written ‘Black is
Beautiful’ and black berets so they asked us if we represented the Black Power, but
we said we did not. The police refused to ferry us, so we walked on until we came
to a shopping place where we boarded a car, of which the wife of the owner was
Ndebele, so she understood our situation.
We arrived at Lobatse, the nearest station at one o’clock the following morning
by car. While we were there we were told to wait for others before being taken to
the shopping mall to change our money as we had rands rather than pulas to buy
food. We boarded buses to another station of which the soldier whom we had
waited for paid. In the bus I saw one white being pushed in the queue by a black and
wished this could be done in Zimbabwe as well. We arrived in Gaborone and we
were taken to a place where we could rest. The room we were made to sleep in, had
one blanket while there were five of us. It was on Friday and we were told to wait for
others. On Saturday
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more Zimbabweans came from WENELA but there was still one blanket. On
Sunday they took our documents and gave us money to board the train; on the train
one Tswana tried to steal our bags and we beat him up.
We arrived in Francistown and we were taken to a refugee camp. There we met a
girl who had arrived with two hungry children, and we gave them bread and
powdered milk. We were told not to have sex with the women at the refugee camp.
I saw one old man who looked very young, but it was the war and you could only
tell his age by his beard. People were overcrowded at this camp. Though women and
men stayed together, the difference was in the places where they slept.
The problem was how to get to Zambia We were told that we had to dress smartly
and look as if we were visiting, because Smith was aware of the influx of people
into Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia to join the struggle, and he was trying to
stop that. We boarded a plane and flew to Zambia. In Zambia, looking at the car
that was supposed to carry us, I thought that probably it was going to be towed by
another car, because it did not appear that it could move at all. To my surprise it
moved through the bush for some time, and we noticed figures emerging from the
ground as we moved towards the camp. The freedom fighters had dug holes in the
ground as a security measure, as we were still far from the camp. When we arrived
at Nampulu, the camp, we could see that the situation had changed; we were greeted
by painful exercises and we were given new names. I was called Temel Nkomo. We
were taken to Lusaka for check up, to find out if we had any diseases; when
returning our car broke down and we delayed. When we arrived at the camp, we
found that it had been bombed and we had to stay in the bush until we were able to
move to a new camp. In the new camp we found Zimbabweans who had been
trained by Zambians and they started to train us. We were not given any uniforms.
Training was once stopped because of shortage of food. I recall at this base we
started walking at about 12 and would be in groups of four and you would carry a
90kg bag of maize, until you exchanged it with another group that would have left
at six and they would carry it. One day in the afternoon after we had come from
collecting our maize and we had not eaten for 3 days, our instructor told us that the
enemy was coming and that we were to get out of the base. I and my section agreed.
Some people were disgruntled because they thought now that the food was cooked,
the instructors wanted to eat the food by themselves. We got out of the camp and
got to where we
kept our mahewu which we brewed from the sadza that was left over. Since we were
about to eat I suggested that we drink and finish the brew and as I put back the paper
which we had been keeping in a hole under a fallen tree; I thought it should not be
seen by the whites. As I bent to cover the paper, planes filled the sky and I managed
to lie under the log. The place was near the river, and we could not hear the sound,
but we could see before hearing. The planes came with one in the front, and others
flying one on top and one at the bottom; after the one in front signalled they began to
scatter and drop bombs. I watched as they dropped bombs from under the log. One
of our guys with the anti-aircraft, fired as the plane in front signalled, probably
giving a sign
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to the others to fire, and he shot the plane in front. Unfortunately where it dropped
there were many people so some people were killed and injured in the process. When
the other planes saw where the firing had come from, they shot at the anti-air and
cut its barrel and killed the shooters on the spot. His companions were at the river
bathing and when one heard the bombings he rushes back without even a shirt on
and when he got there he replaced the barrel that had been cut and pushed aside his
dead companion and began shooting at the planes.
We mostly used the Zeck U and Zuck and this time the Zeck U was the one which
had had its barrel cut off and this comrade who had come was shooting them from
a distance, when they had passed. As he shot one, and it fell down two others
would bomb it so that you could not see where it was made. When they came to
drop the bombs, the comrade shot the other planes so that at times the three planes fell
together. He gunned them so much that out of the 17 planes only about 8 or 7
returned, as the rest were gunned down. After the bombardments it then became
dark before sunset, and there was terrible smoke from various gases. I saw bones
sticking out from a tree due to the bombs. They used bombs that once they
exploded would dig a hole that a house could fit into. We set off to try and see those
who were hurt, but because there was nowhere we could take them to, it became
difficult.
The following morning we started rescuing the injured and discovered that more
people than we had expected had actually perished. We carried a blanket between
every four of us, and we placed the injured on it, but once they died we left them.
The enemy had a sketch map of our bases but luckily we had changed the places
like Logistics, Medical Centre, Armoury and Kitchen. They had bombed places
which they thought were significant according to their sketch and as we moved in
the area we found a stomach and a hair stuck to a tree, then we realized that it was a
splinter which had nailed them to a tree. Later we decided to get away from there as
we thought there would be other bombings but we met the Zambians carrying our
commanders to the camp, and they told us not to leave as they were coming back to
ferry us by car to the new base. As we hid along the road three planes came and
they bombarded the camp, but did not kill many people as they had gone out. So we
took off, knowing that there was nothing to wait for because the path was already
marked, indicating that the people had started to move to the new camp long before
us.
At this new camp there were three of us from the same family. After the attack I
met one of my brothers, and he was bandaged around the stomach and on one of his
hands; he did not speak to me but gave me a signal to carry on. He had been hurt
maybe because when we were told to move, perhaps their company did not do so
forthwith. I began to look for the other brother who I found not hurt. We were then
made to go to another base which did not have any big trees but only small shrubs.
People coming from a bombardment were such hot heads, that we refused to stay
there for long thinking that we would be sold out again.
We moved to another base where we were selected to go to Angola for training.
En route to Angola a helicopter flew above our cars and we asked the Zambian
escorting
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us about the origin of chopper; he first thought it was theirs, but later realised it
was not. We became suspicious and stopped the convoy and looked for cover while
the Zambian sought refuge at a home nearby; and yet he was supposed to be our
bodyguard. When it did not return we got back and carried on with our journey.
We arrived at Makanje the following morning. At Makanje there was only rice
and no any mealie-meal; so this was hard because we were used to eating sadza.
The training was tough, as no-one treated you like an egg; we were told that if we
were treated like that the whites were not going to treat us like that. So the training
was difficult and harsh, but for our benefit. After we finished our training we had
problems that led to the death of others because it wasn’t only the gun that killed
freedom fighters. During training if not a single person died, then it was not seen as
effective. I did training in Regular warfare, which was for large ammunition; after
our training, Josiah Chinamano came to inspect the pass-out parade, but he did not
let us finish all that we wanted him to see, because he had seen enough. We were
then ready to be deployed; I passed through Lusaka, Zambia, and I was assigned to a
group of 70 people to operate in Hwange. We used dinghies to cross the Zambezi,
and then we slept at a place that was some distance from the border. At about four
o’clock in the morning we woke up and realised that we were near a white camp and
we fought with them. As we left the Zambezi into Zimbabwe there were so many
gorges that it was going uphill.
Fortunately we did not come across any whites on the way. We met a group of three
comrades with about 200 people; they said that they wanted to help them across,
but I asked them how they were going to resist if attacked, and they said they
could. We offered to accompany them and while on the way a spotter plane came
and I suggested that the people should remove any red or white clothes that they
were wearing and that since we were near a swampy opening they should run for
their lives. We and the comrades got into the surrounding opening to defend them,
and the whites’ attention was diverted to us; therefore the civilians had a chance of
survive. The spotter plane was being followed by a helicopter. As you know a
chopper can only fire while it is tilted, and it uses one side, and once they saw us,
they started shooting, so due to the shooting some impala were frightened and began
to run. The whites had the belief that we change into animals, so they shot at the
impala, avoiding us; and we aimed at the propeller because once it was shot the
chopper would fall. Unfortunately one comrade was shot in the arm but the bone
was not affected. We continued shooting in that directions and so we were saved by
this. We continued in our quest to get to Hwange. On the way we encountered some
whites but because we knew some guerrillas in the region had strategies to take
them down we avoided them until we reached Hwange.
We had been taught to liaise with the elders; and we learnt that In Hwange there
was one white man who had killed many guerrillas at his homestead, after pretending
to give them hospitable welcome. So we wanted to find out how he had been doing
that, and to punish him for doing that. We headed for his farm and we found him
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there. Upon seeing us he received us like a friend, and told us he was happy to see
us fight for our country. He asked us what meat we wanted and we told him that we
wanted a female impala. At that time he was at a place where he was irrigating
beans; he got into his car and went to hunt for the impala about a kilometre away
where there was a small hill. We had binoculars and we observed the hill; our
binoculars came into contact with binoculars being used by some whites who were
at the hill. They had touched each other, so we lowered ours. We realised that they
were coming down to attack us and that this had been the cause of the deaths of our
comrades, before us.
When the white farmer returned we told him to roast and prepare the meat and
that we were going for a bath at his dam at the west of his farmhouse; the whites
were in the north. We moved and laid an ambush, and the ancestors guided us, such
that the whites fell into our ambush. We designated our marksman to shoot the
person in front with just one shot. The area had guinea fowls so we imitated their
sound, as a signal; when we heard the signal, our sniper shot the white man who
was in front, in the chest. Death is painful, because the white jumped to the sky
when he was shot, and as he fell to the ground, his colleagues returned fire. They
fired recklessly, and when they realised that we were not firing back, they stopped
to inspect their dead colleague, and removed some grenades from his body, as they
could explode. After doing that, they began firing again, but we did not fire until
they stopped; we waited until they moved three steps towards us, then we began to
fire at them.
All in all they were nine, but only one survived. We took their radio, and we
could overhear them mobilising reinforcements to come and attack us. We went back
to the white farm owner who thought we had died. When we asked him about our
other colleagues he said he hadn’t killed any. We searched the house and
discovered that
he kept his NATO with full ammunition under the wooden tiles of the floor. We
requested for his radio, and although he declined having one at first, he later gave it
to us. We told the farm workers that they were to leave, because if they were caught
by the whites they would tell the truth, or even lies; and we went with the farm
owner. We were seven, and three went with the white in the bush while we walked
on the road. Then we saw a car approaching us; we stood in the middle of the road,
aiming a bazooka at it, and we realised it was the white man’s wife. Upon seeing us
she failed to control the car and raised her hands leading the car to stop at the
roadside. We took all the supplies that we wanted from the car. We took the white
husband and wife, and left the car there. We walked for about two and half hours
and then started to question them on the number of comrades they had killed and
they denied having done so. So we began to beat them up and one of suggested that
we leave the white woman to go; as she was moving away, he shot her in the back.
The husband wanted us to kill him too, but we refused to, because we needed him.
We moved on and lit a fire. I didn’t know that one comrade had got plastic bags
from the farm and he began to drop the plastic on the white man’s head. We tortured
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him so much that he said he had killed 13 guerrillas and he wanted us to get killed
through the same way. We told him to go, but shot him afterwards.
We operated in Hwange and when there was an order for people to go for advanced
training in Angola, in 1979, I was among the group that went there, and I was in
Angola, right up to independence in 1981. We had no transport from Angola to
Bulawayo so we came back late. News had spread that I had died, because I had
come back late from the war; although I had sent word home that I was alive, it got
there late. When I went to war I left behind a wife and two children; no other
children were born after I had gone to join the war.
I boarded a bus to our home on a Friday and I arrived at around 12 midnight,
knocked but there was a delay in response, and then my mother answered. When I
told her it was me, she was scared as she had heard that I had died but I told her I was
alive and everyone was woken up and we celebrated my return and some even cried
because if you become too happy you end up crying. I told them about my experience.
Unfortunately my wife had gone away because she had heard that I had died, so I
sent for her and we were reunited again. I returned back to Llewellyn Barracks
where we had been integrated into the national army. I worked at Inkomo barracks,
and I was deployed at Nyazura, guiding the 5th Brigade as they trained.
Before going to Mozambique we were graded ZIPRA and ZANLA; ZANLA
were left on parade and they were told about the assignment to go to Mozambique,
and they went, leaving us, ZIPRA, behind. On their return we asked them how things
were where they were coming from, and they told us that things were bad, because
the RENAMO was killing them. We told them that it was nice because they had
selected to go and get killed; leaving us behind as they thought it was going to be
easy. Due to the deaths they also integrated ZIPRA to go to Mozambique although
at first they had left us behind.
There were many deaths when crossing the Zambezi, as some were killed by the
whites, but some were killed by the crocodiles and hippos. As for the crocodiles we
threw grenades into their mouths, and there were some local people who transported
people across. Nampundu was a male only camp so there weren’t any instances of
rape. At Francistown women had their own camp, but you know that there were
temptations when one stayed for long without having intercourse. So there were rare
cases of rape, possibly when people went out for food, because the security was
tight. We believed in seeking help from ancestors and mediums. As we operated in
areas we were not familiar with, we consulted the mediums of the area and were
told the norms of the places, and we believed them. There were too many cases of
being sold out to mention. I remember we once came to one homestead. There were
four of us who used to drink beer, and three of us who did not. There was a local
brew and they put Mziligozini in it, which paralysed the limbs, and whoever drank
it became so drunk that they did not know what was happening. Those four drank
the beer, and on realising what had happened we knew that we had been sold out,
and that the enemy was bound to attack any moment. We carried our colleagues
and placed
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them some distance from each other and took their guns away from them and hid
them before moving for about 15km and laying an ambush for the whites in case
they came our way and it was just three of us. We waited and the cars came and upon
arrival we managed to disturb them so that they couldn’t get to where we had left our
comrades and we fled away going back to our comrades. We made them drink milk,
and then we disciplined the people. We didn’t want to kill sell-outs because we
would not achieve anything by killing them. We just asked them how they would
feel had it been their sons who had been sold out. So we just beat them up. We
encountered a lot of sell-outs. There were seven of us from my family in the
struggle; three were at the same camp. My father was victimised because of having
sons who had joined the struggle. I remember he had a misunderstanding with his
young brother and he joined Smith’s forces in order to kill my father. One day he
was coming with soldiers to our homestead, but he did not get there because of a
breakdown. On the next occasion when he was coming to our home in Zhombe
with some soldiers to kill my father for having children who were guerrillas, their
car trampled on a landmine and exploded. He was killed in the incident; and
because he was the one who knew our home, the mission was abandoned. So you
can see, God and the ancestors work sometimes. My father had four wives and we
were many children. After that, there was no one in our family who was victimised
because of our whereabouts, in the course of war.
I and my section did not conduct any pungwes because of our experience; we
met many civilians we realised the risk associated with them coming face to face
with the enemy. We just gathered up the people and told them what we wanted them
to know, and left them. It was not always that we were in battle, but there were jovial
moments when we roamed about without our guns, but with pistols and grenades. I
remember one day we went to the stores and people were drinking; you would think
there was no war. There was a misunderstanding about women and people started to
throw bottles at each other; we fired a gunshot in the air and everyone lay down, and
we then took their paper money after having cut the phone cable there. We did this
so as not to be identified because people would follow us thinking that we were
ordinary people. We had not gone there to cause havoc, but that came by accident.
When leaving we hijacked a car to flee from the scene of the controversy, and the
owner drove us till the fuel ran dry. We gave him the money we had taken from the
store for fuel to refill his car. There are so many stories that we might talk till
tomorrow.
Thank you.
stories
Mahere, Mark
[Mkoba, Gweru; 25 March 2008]
Mark Mahere, right. Iwasbornin 1965 in Makomoin Rusape.
Hejoinedtheliberationstruggle just after Grade 7, and went to Mozambique in August
1975. In Feb 1976 he left Mozambique and went to Tanzania for training at Mgagao,
where he was trained up to the end of that year. He came back to Zimbabwe in 1977 as an
active member in the liberation struggle.
My name is Mark Mahere, right. I was born in 1965 in Makomo in Rusape. That area
was called Tanda Tribal Trust Lands in Mahere Village, under headman Makumbo.
I grew up when Rhodesia was still under white colonial rule. I remember in 1968
or 1969, when I was just a small boy, I remember there was ZAPU, ZAPU for the
old people. During that time we were not conscious of what was happening, I went
to Chikanda School and Gogoma School for primary education I did not go for
secondary education but I joined the war just after Grade 7, in August 1975. I
joined the liberation struggle not because I had met a comrade, but I went to the war
because I did not like what was happening in Mt Darwin.
News of the war started infiltrating the area; and that was when we heard about
the war. I was motivated and I thought of joining the army and becoming a soldier.
So when I heard about the comrades I thought of joining the comrades so that I
would become a comrade. Why I wanted to fight the Rhodesian Army was because
my father was arrested in 1972. He was working at a farm and he was just
working for free without any pay. He would just work so that he would be given a
cow by the farm owner, so he was just working for a cow. After a long time he was
then given his cow by the farm owner so we were very happy that at last our
father had managed to get a cow so we decided to go and collect that cow from the
farm passing through other farms up to our area. As we were busy opening farm gates
in order to let the cow pass through we saw white police officers approaching us;
they just came and told us that we were guilty because we were walking through
farms without permission. My father was arrested and taken, and we heard that he
was in prison, but we did not know where exactly. He spent almost three months in
prison, but we had the cow with us. I was very confused and touched by the fact
these people had just arrested my father for no good reason. That gave me the spirit
of revenging and of fighting them. My father used to tell us about his past
experience. We used to ask him how come he had ended in the area we were now
staying, and we he told us that he migrated or relocated from Mutungagore. I
always asked him how and why he ended up there and he told us that they were
forced to relocate by the whites. He used to recall that, saying that was our area of
origin, and it was a good place because the soils were very fertile. Water was not a
problem but in this area there is no water. So all those factors motivated me and it
got into my blood stream that I needed to fight. We also used to hear news from
Mozambique that the Mozambicans were fighting for freedom. There was Radio
Moscow, which was broadcasting that some Zimbabwean sons were
1994
already in Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and China, being trained to
fight the white man back home. I joined the war and went to Mozambique in 1975,
before Mozambique was independent. Mozambique finally got its independence in
1975, if I can still remember.
From home I went via Bulawayo using the train, I arrived in Bulawayo and went to
Mpopoma. In Mpopoma I met a certain guy who was a Mozambican and he listened
to Radio Mozambique everyday and we always heard that there was training taking
place in Mozambique. I did not stay for a month and I returned home to Rusape. I
had my uncle who was in Mutare; he was working at a certain white man, so during
that time he was in Chipinge. That was the time I got a chance to go. There was
this company which was doing borehole drilling. I talked to them and they agreed
that they would take me to Chipinge. That was my first time to see areas such as
Birchenough and Chipinge itself. On the following morning we went to the border
where my uncle was staying. He became suspicious and he told me that the area
was not good for me to get a job so I had to go to Mutare and get a job there and I
said it was okay. I went back to Mutare and got a job at a certain company, Waltro
Company, which was specialising in making furniture. At the end of the week I got
my salary and I bought my things.
When I was in Chipinge I had a chance to meet a guy who was from Mozambique
and he told me that when I finally make up my mind he would go with me and
he actually gave me all the information. So when the time came he took me to
Mozambique via Beira. When we arrived in Mozambique he told us that he was
going
to leave us in the hands of the camarada. So after some distance we arrived at his
homestead and he told us that it was his home and that I was going to stay with him
until camaradas came. So during that time, that was when news started circulating
that Mozambique had attained independent.
The camaradas came took us and we walked away together; they were armed but
we were not. They told us that Mozambique was now free and independent. When
we started mixing with the camaradas, that was when they started to tell us about
independence. When I came from Rhodesia I did not have any contact with the
comrades and that was when questions started to be asked about why we wanted to
fight with Smith, because I only knew Smith by then. So they also asked me who
was supposed to become the president; and the only person we knew was Tongogara
and Sithole. We went into Mozambique and trained along the way to Chimoio and
then in Manica town. We stayed in Manica up to the end of 1975; we were then
moved from Manica to Nyadzonia, if you know Nyadzonia. I stayed in that area.
In February 1976, we went for training and there were so many Zimbabweans at
Nyadzonia. We built our own houses using poles, dagga and thatched grass. As there
were so many of us, we ended up roasting munhondo beads or seeds and eating plant
roots because of hunger. We also caught wild animals with our hands. It was very
difficult and in the event that we caught a wild animal we would then surrender it to
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the leaders. We were advised not to eat everything we got. We later realised that it
was good practice, because most of our comrades had died as a result of that.
There was also the problem of sell-outs and spies in the camp. I witnessed a certain
incident when a certain guy used his jean jacket to communicate with Rhodesian
forces back home. There was also someone who used snuff containers to put chefu or
poison. At Nyadzonia people were stranded as a result of overpopulation and hunger,
to the extent that am surprised when people say there is hunger in this country now.
We witnessed hunger and starvation at Nyadzonia. I believe in self-reliance, not in aid
and assistance; so we ended up having gardens and growing vegetables. We roasted
maize and up to fifteen people had to smoke a single cigarette. In Feb 1976 I left
Nyadzonia to Tanzania for training at Mgagao, where I stayed up to the end of the
year. I met Ambassador Mbita, whom you are talking about at Mgagao; he was a
Lieutenant by then, maybe he is now a brigadier, I don’t know. He was working for
OAU trying to unite ZANLA and ZIPRA. All the unity you see these days did not
start recently; the old guys knew all about unity. They started advocating unity a
long time ago.
I remember, when we finished training and we were preparing to come back home,
in January 1977, we were more than 700 ZANLA forces trained at Mgagao from
Mozambique to Tanzania. We used a boat called Mapinduzi, it ferried us from Beira
to Tanzania. We spent almost a week on the boat. So towards the end of our training
ZIPRA were being trained in its training camp, and ZANLA were doing the same.
So Ambassador Mbita played a big role during the Nyerere leadership. J Chissano
was a Foreign Minister of Mozambique; Benjamin Mkapa who ended up as the
President of Tanzania, was the Foreign Minister, if I am not mistaken; I know that
towards the end of our training they came and tried to unite ZIPRA and ZANLA.
About 800 ZIPRA cadres came to join us at the Mgagao camp, so we planned to
come to the operational zone together. It was successful in one way or the other,
though it failed. On the other hand we managed to stay together in the camp, though
we failed to come together in the front finally.
In Mozambique the same project was implemented and it was successful. 15
ZANLA and 15 ZIPRA were to form a battalion or a platoon. That happened after
a long time, but I am trying to explain to you so that you may realise that unity
started long ago; it did not start in recent days. After the training at Mgagao I was
selected to remain behind as a trainer at Mgagao. Do you to know some of the people
who trained me? I know this leader, today he is still alive. When I arrived at
Mgagao there was this instructor Chaitezvi, he was the Camp PC responsible for
country affairs and the leader of the army; General Chiwenga, we used to call him
Huggin Kambeu, retired Chimombe, I remember Amon. Perence Shiri who is the
Air force Commander, was one of our instructors. There are many, I cannot
remember all the comrades. I just know him as Perence Shiri. He never changed his
name at training unless if he changed when he came back but at training he used
Perence Shiri. There is also, Edwin Munyaradzi, he was Camp Security
responsible for the security of
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the camp. There was Comrade Zheppy, he was specialising in landmines; we had
Goronga, Chibage. I think he is now doing Youth Service training. He was one of
my instructors of terrain training. I was trained in guerrilla warfare. The instructors
I mentioned were helping or assisting the Chinese instructors. The locals assisted
the foreign instructors with language. At Mgagao Camp there was a Chinese camp
for instructors; on the other side there was Tanzanian Defence Forces, but they
were not a part of our instructors. So I can say that those were some of the things
which transpired during training.
I can safely say we arrived in the country, January 1977, we passed through
Chimoio before it was attacked on our way back home. Sorry for taking you back
after remaining at Mgagao I once told you that I was chosen to be the instructor but
I had a passion for going back home to fight the white soldiers. I believe up to this
time we were the best trained ZANLA forces because that base had the most
trained forces I want to believe up to now that we are one of the best trained forces,
in spite of all the problems we encountered during training such as hunger,
starvation and death. The Chinese also told us to remember that the former
colonisers were also training counter-revolutionaries and the enemy was never
going to accept defeat; they were going to use another method that was different
from the gun, like economic warfare, mainly targeting re-colonisation so that the
country would be a neo-colony.
We would say we were independent but in actual fact we would not be independent.
So what we see these days, I think is an economic welfare, changamire, is it not
true? In Rhodesia I operated in Gaza province along the Limpopo River in
Changani, Venda, Basutho; that was along the South African border. We relaxed
and played in the Limpopo River. In Beitbridge along Gwanda, that was where we
mixed with the ZIPRA forces. Sometimes we fired at or fought against each other.
ZIPRA patrolled in large numbers, or in big groups. Our provinces were in sectors
and I was in Sector 4, we had leaders such as Rex Tichafa, some died, for example,
Chiweshe, Stopper Chiridza, they are many; some are alive but many are dead.
We got food from the people around the area, I talked to the Venda, Changani
and Sotho; most of us were not used to the languages, but we were in good books
with those people. We managed to quickly recruit the local people and taught them
the elementary knowledge of firearms, then we worked together; they helped us
to understand the local language and other things. We taught the parents mainly.
There were different training bases because there were many of us in Zambia and
Mozambique and we did not have enough clothes. It was mainly the masses who
provided us with everything, like food, clothes, even needles. You know, the masses
were responsible for the war because we depended on the masses and compared them
to fish and water. The Chinese used to teach us about unity with the mass. So we
got all the information we wanted from the mass, all the secrets. In Gaza
transportation was by donkeys, so the masses helped us to carry weapons and other
things using their donkeys.
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During the war for liberation the main problem we encountered, was with those
people who were not cooperative. Sometimes the ‘povo’ would spy against us. The
other problem was of diseases because medicine was very in short supply. We had a
few doctors in the struggle, who assisted us. Also in Beitbridge we had problems of
keeps towards the end of the war 1975; our masses were now in protected villages
and we faced the problem of lack of information and food. In this area there are no
rivers, and there was a problem of getting safe water; the only boreholes there had
been poisoned by the whites. The other problem was the people in Beitbridge were
not good farmers and we ended up educating them that they had to farm so that they
could get food. We walked for long distance, and that was a problem but lucky enough
we had been trained. I remember 1978 there was a heavy downpour, and because we
were sleeping in the bush, heavy rains disturbed us a lot. Another challenge was the
helicopters which sometimes chased us, but that was the war. These were some of
the problems we encountered.
The first battle we fought when we reached the front was against the Selous Scouts,
not the white soldiers. They were captured by our forces; that was our first battle. I
will not forget that battle, because it is the only battle where I got injured. It was a
battle to remember. Our masses did not know that the people they were showing us
had been captured by soldiers so they got in the mass. It was our first battle; a section
was composed of ten to fifteen people, with a section commander, section PC, and
security. The command will be at the centre as I indicated to you. We always had
parades before we departed or got into the battlefield.
Thanks.
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Mariyo, Timothy
Comrade Timothy Mariyo
[Kwekwe, 4 May 2008]
Timothy Mariyo, was born in Mutare, Manyika Province on 11th June 1959. His father
worked as a driver who travelled a lot. He went to school near the Zimbabwe-
Mozambique border where he could see the movements of FRELIMO. He also had school
mates from Mozambique. He joined the Zimbabwe freedom fighters in Mozambique
My name is Timothy Mariyo; I am from Manyika in Mutasa District. I was born on 11th
June 1959 in Mutare. I did my primary education at Elly Mission in Penhalonga.
My father was working at the mine called Independence Mine. For Grade 3 I
transferred to my rural school called St. George in Mutasa again. My father was a
driver at Independence Mine. However with time my father changed and got
employed at Mikiri (Meikle) or what was called Mountain Home, which was a
wattle company. There he was also a driver; he drove those trucks called tipper. He
could travel about 10-11km from their workplace to collect what they termed
mottle at the Zimbabwe- Mozambique border. He travelled nearly on a daily basis
and he could tell us how they were working with the whites.
So I did my Grade 3–5 at St. George. St. George is near St Augustine Mission at
Tsambe.When we were there,around Grade 7 we could see makamaradha,FRELIMO.
It used to get into our place.We also had schoolmates from Mozambique since it was
near Mozambique. By then they were still waging their war in Mozambique, the war
was not yet over. I then proceeded for form one at St. Augustine. When I was in Form
1, in fact
the first person to tell me that there was war was my mother because she used to talk of
the late Dr Joshua Nkomo. I could hear them saying, they should give him his country.
So I developed the interest to know the situation about the country. My mother would
tell me that the likes of Joshua Nkomo are fighting for the blacks to rule themselves,
look at what your father says about how the whites ill-treat them.
Moreover we could also see the treatment ourselves. Some parents could not send
their children to school, while some had to brew beer, kachasu, for selling. The
money they were given was not enough. They worked from 6am to 6pm, but the
pay was not enough to buy anything. The whites did not want us to go fishing; they
could fire bullets at us. So whilst at St Augustine we met some children who were
older than
us, and who by then understood the politics better and they told us what was going
around the country. In my view, when we were at St. Augustine we had just the same
perception, because as ZJCs we were influenced by the Form Fours and there were
some camarades who sometimes came and inspired us that to win back the country,
we had to fight.
One day I decided to go and join the freedom fighters. I told my mother’s young
sister but she discouraged me, pointing out the fact that I was young. But I remained
bold, at first she refused, as well as the second time. It was on the third time that
she
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appreciated my move; but she still said I was young, and what I was talking about
was for mature persons. So one day we agreed with my friend to go ahead. In fact
one of our classmates was a son of a businessman who was called Pswarayi. The
others were called Charles Madhumbe, George Nyamunokora and Misheck
Nyamunokora. Those were the people I teamed up with and crossed the border,
since it was just nearby. We just went along, playing our paper ball. In an hour’s time
we were already on the border. When we arrived at the border we met the camaraders
and it was in the month of June. It was 2 June, because the independence celebrations
for Mozambique were held on the 5 June, and I was there. So the camaraders took us
and asked us why we had decided to join them. They did not suspect anything bad
about us, since we were very young men. We told them that we had decided to join
our brothers and sisters there.
We walked together and slept in another household. The following day we were
ferried by a motor vehicle to Manica, it was called Villa Manica. So at Villa Manica
we saw that there were comrades there; they were not too many, they were around
twenty. We were five, so we became twenty-five. We stayed in the camp of the
camaraders. Whilst there, that was when the independence ceremony for
Mozambique was held
on the 5 June. We attended the ceremony and celebrated with them. We admired that.
They told us a lot about how they fought against the Portuguese. From there we were
carried to a place which was called Villa Peree, which is Chimoio today.
We arrived at the Zhunda base, where we met many comrades. There were many
comrades including mature ones. There were many women, and we realised that for
sure we had joined our fellow countrymen. There were some we could identify, but
some we could not. We used to think that to join and train as a freedom fighter was
easy, but when we were there, we realised that the living conditions were difficult.
Still
this base belonged to the camaraders. It was a camp and we lived in the barracks which
were there. When sleeping some would be on top and others on the bottom, even in
schools in boarding schools I think that is what happens. We were troubled by things
like, food problems, lack of bathing soap; the blankets and clothes we used could
not be washed and so there were a lot of lice and diseases were rampant. There were
some people who were sent to Tanzania for military training, but only the mature
ones were selected. By then we were still young, we were in the ‘toto’ where the
young lived, because of our size and youth. We moved from there to Nyadzonia.
But before that, that’s when President Robert Mugabe came there, Cde Tekere and
the late Chief Tangwena. Most of us did not know them, only a few knew them.
The one whom we knew very well was Father Zimbabwe, the late Josh; that was
the one we used to hear of. We had not heard much about the others. I think the
problem during that time was that there were no radios, because of suppression; I do
not know, may be whites did not want people to know what was happening. So
when Comrade Mugabe, Tekere and Tangwena arrived there, they just arrived and
entered in the crowd and could not say anything. With time, I think after a day or
two, there were
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some people who were observant, and they said there were some important people
who were there, but did not know them or their identity.
So some people asked them who they were and that is when they said, “I
am Mugabe, the other Tekere and Tangwena”. And people said, aah, ‘mashefu’, and
then people came to know that they were superiors. Some of us thought that they
did not belong there; in fact they as superiors should have gone elsewhere. You
know, the quality of leadership; if they were other people they could have arrived
and showed off for people to recognize them. But they did not do that, they
arrived so humbly and joined the others. I just wanted to comment on such an
arrival; that was so good.
Then we were carried from Zunda to Nyadzonia. I can say I and other comrades
were the first people to reach Nyadzonia. There were camaraders who were there
but they were very few. Then we started from scratch to establish the base. We
started doing concurrent activities, building houses, and the barracks using tree
logs. Some were cutting down trees, some cutting grass, some building and that
is how we
worked. Some made plank beds, and others made grass mattresses for the people to
sleep in comfort. Like I mentioned earlier on, I was in ‘matoto’ where the young
men were confined. So many things happened there. Motor vehicles came and
carried the superiors and the mature men for training. But there were other soldiers
had already been trained who were there including Cakeston, Everisto,
Dzamatsama, Tsuro, and
Comrade Charlie Saudi (the late), Gutura, Bombadharu, they were there. Some I
have mentioned are now late but they were the mashefu at Nyadzonia. That is when
I started to realise that life had changed. What I used to think and what I was seeing
on the ground were different. Hunger haunted us, because we could go for two to
three weeks without sadza. Sometimes we were given emergency porridge, the
one
that was already prepared and we just had two spoons. In fact even the spoons were
not there, so we ate using two fingers. We felt better for a short while, but within no
time, in fact, in about two minute’s time we could felt the hunger again. So since we
were in large numbers, things could not be sufficient. Diseases troubled us, they
were in different forms, the women were often affected by what we termed hiccups,
or ma- a, what do we called it, I have forgotten, but the most rampant was the
hiccups, and even the hurricanes. The hiccups, could be heard when someone
walking and made sounds like barking, but could not walk normal steps. It took a
long time to reach their destination. There were no medicines, food was not there,
of course there were clothes, but some got and others did not.
We saw the mature guys go for training and we wondered when we would also
go. We stayed there, our barracks were on the downside and the barracks for the
mature on the top. There was also a hospital there. We got water from Nyadzonia
River, and prepared our food in the kitchen. Sometimes food was brought in trucks
in 50kg mealie-meal, and we celebrated‘kuti vakomana isadza here iri?’ because
when it came, it was us who started to eat. We went there and joined the line and
we were given our sadza. So what would happen is that the relish we could get was
bakayawa (a type of fish) with a lot of salt or dried meat. A lot of salt was put in the
relish so that
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a little of it could exhaust the big portion of sadza. So some people could eat sadza
with salt, and those who exhausted the piece of meat or fish, but at the same time had
lots of sadza, could exchange sadza for salt. Some clever ones got a lot of sadza,
some went for sadza twice, but it was a serious offence and if caught one was
beaten. We stayed for quite a long time there.
In 1976 another man called Kanengoni came, he was sent by the DA of Buhera
who was called Kanengoni. He came with five snuff bottles (nenhekwe dzake). Of
the five, four were poisoned and one was not. So when this man arrived at
Nyadzonia he said he had arrived at Buhera searching for a job, and that is when he
met the DA. He was
asked if he wanted a job, and he was offered the job which the DA required
someone brave but with lots of money and was given part of the amount. He said he
asked what the job was and was told that they wanted to send him to Mozambique
and poison the food, then when he got back they would have given him the
remaining amount. The man agreed and he was carried to Forbes Border Post, and
he arrived like a genuine comrade wanting to fight for his country like the others.
The man was received by the camaraders, so when he arrived at Nyadzonia, there
were some people who saw him
and went together into the camp, and they realised that he had his ‘fodya’ because he
used to ‘puta’ some of that which was genuine. By then there was not any security
mechanism whereby people arriving went to the security and got searched. There
was some security, but not strong enough so that the enemy infiltrated. That is what
happened there, the guy arrived and got into the camp and he joined the company of
the elders, for the compounds differed. There were A, B, C, D and seniors, who
were the first to reach there and had the experience. The companies could alternate
and rotate when it comes to fetching wood, and people could just throw the
firewood at the kitchen.
The kitchen was not protected by fence, so the guzinyero could cook; they are the
people we called cook’ today. The kitchen was called guzinyo. So this man could
study the whole situation, he realised that the guzinyero relaxed at some point, and
they rotated according to the company. The advantage was that when your company
was on duty you could feed yourself well on that particular day. So the man studied
all this and had his poison hidden. So one day his company went to fetch firewood,
and he thought he could now have the chance. He also went to collect firewood and
brought
his load. He came back and saw the guzinyeros relaxing. He then took his first nhekwe
with poison, for he had already collected them from where he had hidden them in the
forest. So he successfully poisoned the first three pots, but on the fourth he was burnt
by steam and the nhekwe fell inside the pot. So as usual at night we went for our
meal and ate and went to our barracks to sleep. Within no time we heard the
emergency signal. So when we heard the emergency signal we had to respond to
it; even when
suffering from diarrhoea you could sacrifice or even mess up. It was better to miss a
parade than not to respond to emergency, because emergency was very important.
So we were told that we had eaten poison; some were vomiting and so on. When
we got there some people were already preparing salted milk to enable some
comrades
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to vomit. So people took the milk and vomited but some could not; there were some
who even died.
I did not vomit; even after I drank the salted milk I could not, so I had to put my
fingers into the mouth in order to vomit. The poison could not be cleared. So people
asked what had happened. What really happened was discovered by one comrade
who had seen that nhekwe in his plate, because the superiors were the last to eat. That
is when they became suspicious that something had happened. The following day we
were called to a parade to expose the person who was responsible for the
poisoning. So there was this myth that if a bullet was fired in the air it would turn
and drop on the person responsible. Charles was the person to fire the gun. That
person who had poisoned us was afraid that the bullet would drop on him and be
identified, so he panicked and quickly confessed that he was the one responsible.
He was arrested and asked to explain how he had done it. He was taken away, but
we did not know where he was taken to. Some comrades who developed stomach
aches were taken to Chimoio for treatment.
So it was not a matter of being clever. In my life I had never known that the gun
kills, and it was my first time to hear the sound of firing guns,.And I do not think I will
not forgive that because I do not know if my mother, father and grandfather saw it. So
what happened is that I saw Nyathi before he came with the whites. He came and said
he was one of the survivors, but not because he was clever, but those who died
made the others survive; because the bullets which shot the others were the ones
which protected them so that they did not die. He was someone well-respected on the
front, because he actually led the comrades. But because when he came to
Mozambique he lacked discipline, he was summoned to appear before the parade
and he was beaten as punishment. There were many of those who were summoned
because of their indiscipline on the front, and others in Mozambique. There were
many things which were not encouraged in the war. Discipline was very important; it
was a reflection that people knew what they were doing, because wherever people
were, control was very important. So if one lacks discipline he/she was supposed to
be punished accordingly. So it was not only Nyathi who was beaten; the likes of
Charlie were also beaten, and some of them were trained personnel. They were all
beaten and embarrassed in front
of people, and they were reduced to the expected levels. But after the beating one
was supposed to sit up and clamour ‘pamberi ne ZANU’ and ‘pasi nevatengesi.’
That was what was done, and it was a sign of acknowledging the wrong-doing and
that nobody had victimised you. What came to be known as ‘chirenje’ happened
many times, even in the camp.
Chirenje was an illegal practice by some soldiers who could steal clothes or shoes
of the other fellows for barter trade with the communities in Mozambique. We would
give them trousers and they could prepare chicken and sadza for us, and one would
know that it’s okay. Those who smoked were given tobacco. It was barter trade,
money was not very important; some were given beer like ‘vhinyu’, or something
like that. But when such things were exposed the culprits were beaten and locked
up, where
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they spent a number of days to show others the consequences of indiscipline, so that
other people would not do the same. People were forced into such practices
because of insufficient food.
There were activities we did in the camp before we went for training, because
we were young. We were trained to march, as it instilled discipline in us. We called
it ku’fora’. We were taught politics, and the philosophy of ZANU. Each and every
one of us went to Mozambique, but some of them did not know of their mission
there, so
they went with the idea that when they came back they were going to kill the white
person who was troubling them, or they were going to fight the neighbour who was
their enemy; but that was not to be the case. ZANU’s mission was not to hate the
skin of the whites, instead we wanted to eradicate the system which they were
using. So, we were engaged in political orientation under the trees. We were taught
why we had gone there, the aim and the focus of the ZANU Party. They told us the
aim of the party, when it was formed, where we came from and where we were
heading to; everything. Our personal aims of retaliating against the enemies at
home were all brushed aside; we were all told to focus on one enemy. For political
orientation, we all gathered in one place and the political commissars sensitized and
taught us. Those who had talents sang national songs. As I said, we went to war in
different groups; there were some who went as thugs who were going to
Mozambique to run away from crimes. Some were school children; you know, some
children from school did not have much on other minds. There were others who had
the experience which we did not have because we were still very young. So when all
these different groups met, there was need for political orientation, for them to have
the same objective.
Reverting to Nyathi’s story; Nyathi was later assigned to go back to Zimbabwe
since he was operating in the front. He was someone with a big position, but I do not
know what his position was. I like to say things I know. So after he returned home,
that was when he came with the whites. It was on the 9th August when they arrived,
because on the 8th August we had activities we were doing in celebrating the day
ZANU was formed. There were various competitions including marching and
playing soccer. We really enjoyed and even forgot that we were in war. So on the 9th
August 1976 we had to continue with the activities we had not completed and we
were preparing for that. We were expecting our team called ‘matoto’ to win against
‘madhara’, in the marching competition. We wanted to show the skills we had learnt.
We had not undergone military training but we had done some drills which we
displayed on that day.
What usually happened in was that motor vehicles came to collect people for
training. People were happy to go for training, because it meant that they were
graduating from one life into another. Everyone wished to get trained such that s/he
could go back home to fight the enemy. So there was the tendency that when motor
vehicles came everybody ran to the vehicles, regardless of whether one was going
or not. Some thought the vehicles had brought mealie-meal, or came to take people
for training.
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So the day it happened, that day for Nyathi, we were in our marching competition
and we started hearing the noise of the moving vehicles. We just heard the sound of
moving vehicles and we were happy. We heard people the people who were near
the Nyadzonia River where our barracks were situated, cheering. The barracks
were a distance from where we were holding the competition, and people started
running to get there. There were already other people at the competition who were
preparing to display their skills as well. So it became more like a mass target,
because the people went there in large numbers; and we also wanted to go there.
We were being trained by Cde Teddy on our‘matoto’side, and George Serima was
the chief of ku’Matoto,’ but we had also the likes of Garfield who however died on
that day, and another guy called Mujoma, whom we called Sam. He was very smart,
and he had a complexion like that of the boys from South Africa, the Sotho guys
who are handsome. Then Teddy is the one who was leading us in the running that
day, and he said that we should not get out of the track. Those who had gone out of
the track went back. So I think he was the person who made us survive; there we
talk of discipline. When we were back on track he said, where were you going?
You should remain in the track. As soon as we went back, that was when the guns
started being fired. We then said asked what was happening. We slept on the
ground. We then heard it was gun firing through and through; we then crawled to
towards the back of the barracks, and started running towards the Nyadzonia River,
where we were to cross over.
When we got to the river we saw comrades who were there bathing and some
clothing themselves; they were women comrades. We told them that things were not
okay. They asked us what was happening, and we replied that we did not even
know. Where we had come from it was just smoke, the barracks were on fire and
there were guns being shot. We crossed the river and having travelled some
distance, that was when I realised I was bleeding. I was surprised because I did not
even know that I had been shot. I only noticed it later because of the bleeding. The
wound was not deep, but I realised that I had been wounded, though my condition
was better than my colleagues’ who had been severely wounded. Then people
askew started asking what had happened? The survivors, who were nearby said, it
was Nyathi, who came and said,‘The comrades have turned against each other.’ and
started firing bullets. He was with some whites in armoured cars. We later
discovered that many people had died, simply because people were crowded in the
open ground and many of them had gone there running. Our people were not armed
while those who came with Nyathi had machine guns which fired many bullets.
So we walked on, and met other comrades who had been severely injured. We
helped to carry them and arrived at Pungwe River. Pungwe River has fast flowing
water and it is wide. When we were thinking of how to cross the river, that was
when we heard the sound of the bridge being destroyed. The bridge was destroyed
because Nyathi and company had to ensure that there would be no reinforcement
from other camaraders to come and help in the fighting. People wondered what had
happened and we did not know that it was the bridge that had exploded, and we
were still
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thinking of how to cross the river. So what happened there was that there came the
povo from Mozambique with ‘zvimwadhiya’. I remember the two old men who
came there. One chimwadhiya could only carry four people, three of us and the
owner of the chimwadhiya. So it could carry two injured comrades, one uninjured
and the owner. But at the same time, some comrades did not listen, and thought
they could swim across; none reached the other side, they all drowned. So we had
to stop the others because we realised that we could all perish. The water was
forceful, it was not a joke. So those old men helped us to cross the river, two injured
and one uninjured until we all crossed.
Having crossed we travelled in the night. I do not know where the camaraders
were coming from, wanting to go in the other direction, where we were coming from.
So when they heard our footsteps, they asked themselves what it was. They
thought, maybe it was the enemy. That was their own thinking. Some wanted to shoot
in the air, but others advised that if they fired in the air, the other side might fire back
thinking
that it was i fight that had started. So what happened was that the camaraders fired
shots in the air, and with what we had experienced where we were running away
from, we made a u-turn, and started going back to where we were coming from.
We were in full speed; I collided with a tree, a big tree, and fell down but got up
and continued running.
They started shouting that they were the camaraders. We went back to see that
they were really the camaraders. They asked us what had happened. Those who had
witnessed because they were near told them what they had seen, because some of
us were far when it happened, and we only heard guns being fired. So we had to
go separate ways, we went in opposite directions. They gave us directions, on how
to reach the place where we were to wait to be collected, by the, to go where we
were going.
We travelled during the night, in darkness, until we found where to sleep. There
were no houses, we just found where we said, “Guys, let’s sleep”. We mixed,
women, men, young girls, the big boys and the elderly; we slept like, a man
followed by a woman and alternated through and through in a line. In the morning we
had to travel
to the tarred road. On the way, we passed through the povo fields where people had
just finished harvesting so we obtained some mealies left accidentally in the field;
we could feed on that because we had nothing else to eat.When we reached the
appointed place, we were ferried to Masengere base by vehicles. Masengere was in
Chimoio and we stayed there for a few weeks. Life was just the same as where we
had come from with the war and the hunger. We also got some harvest residues
from the field when we went to fetch firewood.
Collecting harvest residues was not allowed, but because of hunger we were
forced to do it. It was not supposed to be known at the base that one had collected the
harvest residue because he could be punished for that. The way they used to
discipline was that when caught, one could be given strokes equivalent to your
crime. I remember when we were at Nyadzonia the prisoners could wore distinctive
clothes. They came
1994
in groups of about five, wearing something like zvimburuchisi and did not have their
trousers on. They were beaten to the extent that if one did not mess up the pants, he
was not released. They were beaten until they told the comrade that they had now
messed up. The comrade and the person showed to everyone that there it was. So
it was a way of ensuring that discipline prevailed, because where there is war there
should be maximum discipline.
Then having stayed at Masengere, we then moved to Doroi. Doroi was a farm, and
someone called Caetano stayed there.We started to build a base at Doroi. The situation
at Doroi was just the same as in previous camps, there was hunger, no houses, there
were diseases, and no clothes to wear. I need not repeat because I told you
previously how the situation was. So while we were at Doroi, we could not go for
military training due to our young age, because only the mature ones were selected to
go for training. It was difficult for one to go for training, but we already had political
orientation in our heads. What was left was to have military training. It was difficult,
and some had came back home without being, some could hide from going for
training since cowards were always there. Some did not want, they knew that once
trained, when back from training they were to be sent back home to fight. Others did
not want to go and fight so they pretended to be sick. Such things were there. So
various intakes took place but still one did not go.
One day they commanders asked for able bodied people to go for manoeuvre
exercises. A group of young boys just decided to go, and we mixed ourselves with
the grown ups. Then we travelled, we walked a long distance. When we arrived at
the railway line, we saw a motor vehicle already waiting.We did not know that the
vehicles were waiting to carry us to go for training. So the idea was that they
wanted to see people who were strong, who could travel to this point, and
considered for military training. So those who were left behind thinking that it was
for the manoeuvre were left out of the training just like that. When we got there we
found ourselves in the group of mature people. Some tried to say that we were too
young, but others said that we were young men, and we had come from Zunda and
Nyadzonia together. Personally I had a large body and I was tall, which was to my
advantage, so I found myself in the crowd. So that is the way we went to Beira. We
arrived at Beira and got into a ship and went for training in Tanzania.
When we got there we settled and stayed at Farm 4 in Nachingwea where we
were trained. I did artillery, some Mortar 2, Mortar 60 and 12,7 anti-air and others.
After training we were supposed to come back again by sea, but a security
discovery was made, and it was recommended that we should not return by sea. We
were told that, it was suspected that there were submarines to attack us, and we
could all perish, so we were flown by plane to Mozambique. When we got to
Mozambique, I knew I had the opportunity to go to Zimbabwe to fight. Some of us
came and stayed at Mubhanana, but I did not know where the others were posted to.
I managed to be in the group which was supposed to go to the front; we were
driven to this mountain called Tsetsera. When looking at it we saw as if it was a 90
stories
degree elevation; the mountain was so high that if someone reached the top he could
see most of Zimbabwe, especially the Bocha side. So that is the point from which
we entered Zimbabwe. We entered through Tsetsera into Bocha, but we were destined
for Hwedza. We left some of the group in Bocha, in Zimunya, but the others,
including myself, were asked to go to Hwedza. We went through Muzhambe, and
arrived in Hwedza. We were given reception by the comrades who were there and
whom I had worked with before, including Soweto, Major Edmore now in 3
Brigade, this Makuriya, I last knew him as a Captain; I don’t know his position now.
We called him Knox Chapera. Then there was comrade Masunga, who was a
Lieutenant-Colonel at Air Defence, but is now retired. There was also Blaster, who
has also retired but we worked together in Air Defence. Others were Masara,
Mabasaehondo, Matsika, they are so many. There was Mannex Mulongosi, Periperi
Shungu, some are late, with whom we met in these battles in Hwedza. We also had
Mike Nyambuya, who was our Sectoral MO of Tangwena Sector. When I got to
Hwedza, there was what we called Tangwena Sector in Manyika Province, but it
was Hwedza Detachment.
Our commanders in Manyika Province were Cde Dominic Chiningi (now General
Constantine Chiwenga), then Tonderai Nyika, who was the provincial commander.
At the sectoral level we had Cde Mike Mutare (Mike Nyambuya) and also Comrade
Mahovhorosi (late now, he died on the way to Mozambique with their reports). When
I got to Hwedza in 1977, it was when I came to know how to use the gun, when
faced with the enemy; when we were still recruits or new in the field, like this, we
panicked. During the first battle I panicked, because we conducted surprise
attacks and ambushes; and the same was done to us. Sometimes the enemy
surprised us at our bases. They came with planes and others came using ground
forces, or things like that. In the third battle I knew what to do; I knew how to fire
the shots. It was barrel to barrel and was now different with the front style. So we
could see that it was really war. All in all, I encountered fifteen battles; both those
that involved us attacking the enemy and those which the enemy attacked us.
While I was in Hwedza, I worked very well with another person who was doing
logistics in the detachment, called Mhiripiri Shungu. He loved working and
walking with me. I worked well with him, but at some point I had to leave him
when I entered into another section of Comrade Masanga Black Africa. I also
worked with the sections of Liberty Gavadya (late now), then Dhuze Bonde (also
late) and Master Blaster. We changed sections every now
and again.
Whilst in Hwedza, we operated in areas like Zhombe in the African Purchase
Areas, those small farms. From there we could enter Gangare, Bhingi, Chitida,
Pasina, Chidhenge, Zenda 1, Zenda II, Chigondo, Garabha, Bhasvi, Mukurumure in
Chinonga, Chisasike from there to Shava, Gonese, Musami, Rocha and other areas. I
knew the whole of Hwedza, even the Kraalhead, I knew them all. In 1979 we went
to Chiduku when sent to collect supplies. I passed through Chiduku and entered
that side of Ruda and entered into Kambudzi, and went down, collected the supplies
and came back. The supplies included bullets, rockets, the telescopes which were
put on
1994
the smart semi-automatic rifle, and all the other materials we used. We covered the
distance I am talking about from Hwedza to Mozambique, by foot; sometimes we had
letters written to us by the chiefs, that by such and such a date we should be back,
so we did exactly as stated.
People like Chimbwidos and Mujibhas worked very hard during the war. The
mujibhas carried letters; they were the ones who did all the security work, to see
where the whites had their bases and the type of weapons they had. Their work was
tough; the girls involved did the cooking. At times the whites arrived while they
were cooking and burnt them in their houses. So such things were difficult. I
experienced the war and I really knew what it meant, and we knew our aim. When we
entered into other areas not entered before by other comrades, we saw the kraal
head and chiefs and introduce ourselves, as soon as we arrived there and explained
why we came and the reasons for our mission. Sometimes they started with
resistance but with time, it was swift. As it were we talked politics and explained
the mission of the party; we listened to their grievances, worked together and things
went on well.
Anyway, there were sell-outs, of course. In any revolution sell-outs and things
like that are always there. In 1979 we were asked to go to Chihota, and the comrades
who went to Chihota or Sadza area in Charter came through our hands, since we
knew the area. We led them to cross Save, and came back; we knew the area well,
the crossing points, the shallow areas and the deep ones where people could drown.
When we were asked to leave for Chihota, I sweated, because in Hwedza we
could go for about six months without encountering the enemy. We were in sort of a
semi- liberated zone, the whites were afraid to come there. They knew that if they
came to Hwedza, bullets would be fired; and we had set landmines in the area had
roadblocks. That was how we worked. So the enemy took about six months without
exchanging gunshots; so we tended to relax. That is why you could see people
panicking when ambushed. But still at times they came and disturbed us and
went back. Chihota where I was going to, was an area where comrades had not
been to. The people there did not know what a comrade was, so we had to start
afresh. We also knew that at night we could actually see the lights in Salisbury. So
Chihota was going to be difficult. So on the very day that we were told we were
going, a letter was written to us, which was received by the Attachment Logistics
officer, with whom we worked. It instructed us that by the following day we were
supposed to leave for Chihota. In two or three days time, we were supposed to
report to Chihota with a letter which we had to give the Attachment Commander
called Prosper. At one point we resisted and we said it was a difficult area,
‘kunehondo mbishi.’ But we could do nothing except to go; so we
said to ourselves, “Guys, let’s go.” When we crossed Save, I met another young man
I grew up with. He was called Big Azemba. He was gonna poshito, he was an
assistant to another comrade called Serious (now late). He was an Attachment
Commander. At one point we worked together in Hwedza but was later transferred
to Mhondoro. But he only took a few days in Mhondoro and he passed away. So
this young man was there, and for someone who had come from an area without hot
war, things were
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really tough for him and he ran away. I met him in Charter and I asked Big, what had
happened? And he said he was no longer going back because things were tight. I
told him that was the war. I asked him what had happened, and he told me. And I
told him that we were going to Chihota and Mhondoro. I think you know they are just
the same. He then joined another section with other comrades.
Our Section was received by other comrades who we had met, and they guided us
to another area, where others did the same until we entered Hwedza, and from there
we entered Chimbwanda, the farms in Chihota. When we reached Chimbwanda, we
were received by comrades who were there. They called us Comrades and said to
me, “Young man, that is the real war you have entered; this is where we are.” Some of
them I had met before in Hwedza; there was Culture, the late Culture, he died in that
zone. I liked that guy so much, because when I arrived in Hwedza he was one of the
people I met first. They had about six months in the front and those were the
people who taught us how to operate. Since we had not been in the area, we had to
listen to them. We had just spent two days in Chihota, and he told us that while
we were there we should always stay prepared because no hot sadza is eaten here.
In Chihota there were no bushes like in Hwedza, so we practiced daily basing,
staying in the villages. We could allocate and distribute ourselves in different
households in a given village and we stayed there. We got away from there at
night; we slept in the contours. We took two days and we were already entrenched
in an attack. It was very hot; it was not a joke. We could not eat hot sadza. Chihota
was difficult, and there was no terrain, there was nowhere to take cover. The trees
were so small, so we operated in areas like Chimbwanda, Landas, that side of
Mahusekwa, in Mudzimurema, Jirisa and other areas I have now forgotten; you
know, it has been a long time. But the areas are the exact areas which we operated
in. At the bases in the night, some people who had not seen comrades came, and
we talked to them about the aims of the party. Some went back to Harare and came
with others, so that they could see comrades as well. We talked to them, and they
brought us clothes and other things we needed but we did not have. They brought
shoes and they gave us money; but we were not allowed to handle money, so we
surrendered it to the chiefs. I do not know where the chiefs surrender the money; I
do not know if it was in Mozambique if it was confiscated, I do not know. But what
we knew was that we had to give to the chiefs and it was taken to Mozambique. We
were left with the clothes and we shared with other sections. In Chihota the war
was the more serious compared with Hwedza, because in Hwedza we could lay
ambush where there was good cover. We could also do our operations
while being hidden, and we were not exposed.
In Chihota we were easily seen and people were there. A lot of things happened,
you know, during the war. The other thing I saw, I was told by another old man
in Gandanzara, who was called Sakureba, who was a spirit medium, vaisvikirwa
nemudzimu. Personally I started smoking when I was very young, and I travelled
with nhekwe. We woke up in the morning and asked the spirit mediums to lead and
protect us. At night we went after sunset, to thank them for protecting us the whole
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day, and asked to be protected the following day. But some of the chiefs did not
like that, especially Mahovhorosi and Matipa; they took away everything we used
in connection to that and burnt them. So what happened was that we could pass
through and consult Sekuru Sakureba when we were going or coming from Matidzi.
He guided us; told us the path to adhere to. They emphasized things like not to
commit adultery and other unnecessary things. We were told not to do such things
even when we came from Mozambique. We were told the aim of our fighting, so
they emphasized that it was a reminder for us not to forget about them. But the issue
which was heavily emphasised was women; they emphasized that we should
not‘play’ with women and not to get drunk, not to loot people’s things and all such
bad things that would derail the progress of the party. So there was that Eight Points
of Attention we used to sing, which goes like, “Kune nzira dzemasoja dzekuzvibata
nadzo.” They were guidelines which guided us and helped us not to go out of track.
One controlled himself and came back on track on his/her own, and we reminded
each other as well. So Sekuru Sakureba used to tell us many things about the
proceedings of the war; he told us that we were going to win the war and repossess
our country, if we followed what the mediums of the country required you to do.
Those were the things we did.
During the struggle there were temptations, especially to us young men who
were handsome, you know. We could see that when we were there in Hwedza,
some
chimbwidos tempted us to the point that one defied the rules and regulations. Some
comrades did that, so the chimbwidos thought that all comrades did that. Adultery
was something that caused some people to die. Personally I never did that; I saw
beautiful women, very beautiful chimbwidos who loved me so much. They played
around with me asking me to tell them when I started being involved in the struggle,
what happened? This also involved being friendly to each other at the bases, may
be discussing after eating. Personally I never entertained that. Of course the girls
brought
in blankets and prepared where to sleep for us, but I never got involved. There were
some chiefs we knew very well that they were interested in women; but I am telling
you, it cost people’s lives. You might think I am joking but it really happened. I still
remember of one comrade who was burnt in a house. We were at the base and whites
arrived at the other house where sadza was prepared and saw the girls not there. They
had gone with sadza to the base. This comrade had come to this house from the base
to see his girlfriend. So they locked themselves in a house and by then the whites
were following everything. So the whites set the house on fire and they could not
escape from the house. We later heard that the comrade was set on fire in the house.
We were at Makanga base near Ruzawe in Hwedza. So such practises like
entertaining girls caused problems. It was not good because some comrades even
reached the extent of fighting for the girls, and had to be reminded that it was bad.
Some dated many chimbwidos and these women got angry about it, and poisoned
the comrade. The girl poisoned some eggs she brought and one got carried away
to believe that the lady loved him so much, without knowing that the food was
poisoned. I remember that this happened to another comrade and he went mad. So
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I avoided such things. I never involved myself in such practises. Up till now I do
not like women. I made my choice of the one I married, and I knew that she is the
woman I love and up to this day, that is the woman I have. So I am saying in
Chihota the environment was different from that of Hwedza, because it was a new
area to us, and there were also girls who were beautiful and with ginger (verve,
passion), who were smart, coming from Harare. So some tried to lure us, some
were even introduced to us by mothers, that this is my child (daughter), assuming
that we were interested in women. But we told them that, we were just
concentrating on the war and nothing else. So in Chihota there were those issues.
When we got into battles, the battles could not end quickly because we ran after each
other for long distances; the land was bare so each side could see where the other
was. So we stayed for about two to three weeks and that was when the ceasefire was
proclaimed; when we were still in Chihota.
I asked myself what that meant. Some told me that there was a Lancaster House
Conference, and people were talking about ceasefire; they agreed that the war should
stop. While we were in another township at Randamu, we got the Herald newspaper.
In fact we did not buy it, but we were just given by povo. Going through the paper,
we got the news that Cde Josiah Tongogara had died. It caused us pain; we asked
ourselves why it had happened and how? It was so painful to us because he was the
person who inspired us and made us brave all the way. We heard that he had died
because of a car accident, but we could not believe that. It pained us so much. All
the comrades found the news painful, and had bad moments in the front, but all the
same we heard of the ceasefire. We however continued to question ourselves, for
the war was just over, why had that happened? We wished he was with us to see the
liberation. But that is what happens in war, not everyone lives to see the liberation;
some die and some are injured. So there was a real ceasefire. We then went to
Mahusekwa where the buses were. The buses came and carried us to Dzapasi and
to Chiururwi where we had to settle first. But later there was problem with water,
and we had to move to Rout Dam in Buhera, where there was this river; from there
I went to Bulawayo at Entumbane.
While we were in Entumbane, things were not okay, because there was a war
which broke out, and we moved to Gozhwari. Then from Gozhwari some people
were transferred to Chipinge, in Chibuwe. I did not go to Tongogara, but we went
to Llewellyn, for integration. From Llewellyn we went to Mbalabala, to 4 Infantry
Battalion which was in Zaka, in Mutamba. I did not stay long in Mutamba; I was
posted to Air Defence here in Redcliff because Smith did not have air defence.
That is where I worked from 1981 until I retired in 2000. I retired on medical
grounds. I have some medals; that of liberation I have got it, that of DRC, that of
Mozambique, and also of Angola.
I have also got a silver medal for my long service. I think I have got six of them.
The way I see things is that, when we joined the army, or when we got to the APT
surrendering the weapons; when we had our country, I think we fought for the
people, all the Zimbabweans, in general. We said we had brought independence for
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the country, and the country was ours. When we joined the army and police, we were
told that we were now apolitical, meaning that we were no longer active in politics.
So that was when the others got into the picture; some of those we fought during the
war, penetrated into the structures of ZANU (PF), and we were no longer there.
Having now retired from the army we are now being asked to start from below
ranks or low ranks. Anyway, it is not bad; that is what the party likes for us to start
from low levels. But to be honest it is fair. People, whom we taught politics under
trees, taught them the aims of the party and the mission of ZANU PF. Those people,
whom we educated, are the ones who are in actual fact leading us, but I have got this
vast experience. I told you the route I travelled from Mozambique going for training,
involvement on the front, mobilisation of the povo, up until people came to
understand what they were fighting for and where they were going. But now that
we have retired from the army, you realised. If you look at the chiefs; he is
Brigadier, when he retires he is absorbed into the Politburo. Some are members of
parliament, some Deputy Ministers and others Ministers, but on our level, we
even have our colonels who have retired but now they are destitute. They have not
been given any place just for him or her to have.
In other countries such things do not happen, even if you go to America, there
is no person who rules the country without having been a soldier, they know what
that means. But in Zimbabwe it is different; but we are saying at our level, because
if you ascend or raise yourself to higher level, what about at the middle? Whom do
you think will be left? Look at it, the problems we now have, the country is now
going; it is going because of the people who assumed positions in these structures.
Eeh, I heard other people saying that if you want to make money join ZANU PF.
There is now another system. Some ask me, is it still the ZANU PF people used to
know? Is this the ZANU we knew? This is because people knew the aim of the
party from the grassroots from long back. But what is happening is that people no
longer understand it. The party is manifested and infiltrated by criminals. People
who are hungry and greedy. I am now referring to what is happening these days; we
are done with the war. We have the country now. If you look at it, someone stands in
front of the people asking them to vote him into power and says, he was going to
do this and that for them. There is nothing like that; that is lying to people.You could
be promising people things which they do not want! Instead you should tell them
that that you would like them to work with you, and ask them what they would like
you to do for them.
About the elections. In the last elections, we saw the MDC gaining majority of
seats in parliament. Those who were elected by the people to represent them in
parliament could not go back to the people. They were afraid the people were going
to ask them where they had been, because some of them had abandoned the people
who had elected them; they forgot about them; they forgot the war veterans; they
forgot the mujibhas and the chimbwidos. If you forget these people you also forget
the party.You see that they are now left exposed alone, because they are just greedy,
at the expense of the majority. When it comes to the war we are facing, it is
difficult. It requires involving the people in all things that are being done. Again, it
is important that the
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people are told the truth, because they can see what is happening. They keep records;
they know today this was said, tomorrow something else was said, but nothing is being
done. They have created a problem for the party, and ZANU PF appears to be shaking
because some of the people who entered into the system have been infiltrated by the
enemy because of greed and they no longer have followers. People track all these
things, that is why the NGOs are giving people food, but Member of Parliament never
went there. NGOs are now gaining mileage, they are working for the opposition; they
give them food and promise to give more, saying ZANU PF does not do anything for
the people. So, that way certainly we are defeated. This time, we should look
forward and evaluate where we came from and where we are heading, because the
party is for the people.
Cde President has remained alone, if you look in 2000 when we got involved in
the land issue, these people said that it was not possible. But if you look now, they
are the very people with large farms, with centre pivots, and beautiful houses. They
allocated the good areas to themselves, and we were given those places that were
underutilised, and were not used by the whites. We got there and started clearing the
land; at that time they argued that it was not good. We left some whites with some
farms and co-existed. But these people were sitting in the comforts of their offices
and viewing from afar. They argued that it was not good, it was anarchy, and that we
were causing havoc in the country. But now this time around, they are now the very
people who are well-settled because they went to confiscate all the things, like the
beautiful houses, good farms and everything, doing whatever they wanted. They are
seen going to GMB to collect food, saying it is for their workers. But there are
some elderly, in fact, who go to the GMB to fight to get even a 5kg to survive. Those
are the people we fought for, they just want 5kg to survive but they cannot find it,
because other people come and collect all the grains claiming that it is their own
workers. So we ask them if it meant they were no longer farming, while they have
got the centre pivot, with farms of 30 to 300ha. Why were they not farming? They
should farm. The maize these people claim is for their workers, finds its way to the
black market, and is sold to the ordinary people. People track everything, and end
up saying it is ZANU PF which is causing all this. They do not say that these are
actions of certain individuals. We have
so many culprits in ZANU PF who are greedy. If we go there and advise them that
what they are doing is bad, they say that we are wapanduka.
They use this word, because they know how that word pains me. If I am referred
to as mupanduke, I start thinking a lot. I ask myself what the others are thinking
by saying that. That is why even if the opposition comes with huge sums of money,
while I am this poor, I will just tell them go away and to take their money with
them. This is because, first, we have the objectives of the party, and secondly, we
have the agreements we made with the dead, who died fighting for the country.
They said, “Comrades, I am dying but you continue with the struggle.” So I cannot
sell them out today! What shall I say I am doing? It is impossible! it is better for me
to die poor, knowing however that ZANU PF is in order. If you go to rural and other
areas, you
1994
feel for those who say they were once the freedom fighters. They have torn
trousers, no shoes and nothing. Instead of people to sympathising with such people,
they are told they fought for nothing! What did you fight for when they are suffering
like that? However, it is wrong, you are shouting at people who endured for quite a
long time, so that we are now saying we have freedom. This is because of us
freedom fighters, we delivered what we wanted, that was the freedom;
liberation. That was a great achievement. What else did you want? To see me with
a flashy car then you would appreciate that I fought the struggle? No, it is not like
that but what I am saying is that we must be recognised for the job we did. If you
go to Kenya right now, there were whites who were given farms in recognition
for what they did during the Second World War. But here in Zimbabwe it will
never happen; if you say you are a war veteran, even the help you wanted will
never be given to you. I do not know the crime we committed. Was it a crime to go
to Mozambique? Was it the crime of liberating the people? What is it? Even in the
party, when we go to ZANU PF, that is where our father and mother is; so we will
never get out of ZANU PF.
Some got out, but not us, we were born there, that is where our mother and father
are. We will never opt out of the party; but they try by all means to victimise us and
tell us painful words, to frustrate us and to stop us from reaching where they are
doing the deals which tarnish the party. There is something that these young ones of
today do; they go near the chiefs who they know are very powerful, and they lie
that the war veterans are saying this and that; this is to ‘feed the chief with poison’.
That chief will never realise that they are lying and all what they need is money. If
another party was formed they will shift to that party, because they know very well
that if the war veterans work closer to the chief, they will tell him the truth. They
will tell the chef the truth about what they discussed, and these young ones do not
want that. Even when we have genuine problems and we want them to reach the
president they are blocked, they do not reach there. Even today they are going and
telling him that things are okay! Now look at what happened in the elections; they
lied to him that things were okay on the ground. We used to tell him, “Chief, the
ground is not level.” This is because we know what the people want. We are the
political commissars; we get information exactly as it is but in terms of politics no
political commissar can stand there more than a war veteran, because we actually
drank that; politics is our food. So people must stop lying. If they want the truth
they should travel and get the truth, and not what they are doing now. People must
respect the party, because if you do not respect the party it means you are not
respecting the people. The party is for the people, nobody can say they possess the
title deeds of ZANU PF. I have never seen that person; but they are going around
lying that they are pro-ZANU PF while they are not, and doing things that tarnish
the party. The fact that people voted for the MDC does not mean that they do not
love ZANU PF. There are members of ZANU PF going out of the party, condemning
what others are doing, and what they see. Only the president alone stood his ground
and by the truth; all the others are being bribed by the British. Some are given
money and others do espionage.
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In other areas if you do espionage, you are hanged by the neck, but here in
Zimbabwe they are forgiven, and things are just allowed to go on; but sometimes
they reaches extremes. Personally I am not happy with what is happening. Surely
people who fought in the struggle are being insulted.What we need is only
recognition.What the young people are saying that takes back the country to where it
was tied, is wrong. A country cannot be treated like that; like a goat. It is very
difficult. The children no longer have guidance; I don’t know who is causing that. I
think what I want to say is so much that we can spend five days or so in this
discussion. Other issues I leave out. But briefly, in terms of my own history of going
to war I explained to you. I was called Comrade Tafirenyika Aleck. Tafirenyika is
my liberation war name. In Hwedza or in any corner of the country they know I am
Cde Tafirenyika; those were the people I worked with in Hwedza, and the povo in
Chihota. And the comrades I mentioned, some are still alive today and some are
dead. But I think we should keep the spirit that gave us back the country going.
I wish you many years; please you should keep and guard jealously the country.
Okay.
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Matete, Sabina R.
Comrade Sabina R. Matete
[Kwekwe, 13 May 2008]
Sabina Matete, whose war name was Fungai Hondo, was born in 1963 in Mutoko. She
had her primary education at Kagande. She joined the freedom fighters early in life, when
she was fourteen years, and had her military training in Romania. After independence, in
1981, she was employed in the Zimbabwe Armed Forces, where she was a Medical
Officer.
I am called Sabina Matete. I was born in 1963 in Mutoko. In 1972 I attended my

primary education at Kagande Primary School. My liberation war name is Fungai
Hondo. I did my education at Kagande, it was a keep. We could be searched to find out
if we had not something, then we would enter the school. In 1973, the whites came
and forced people to dig contours, and could do whatever they liked with us. In 1976
I ran away to Harare when the situation was tight.
I stayed in Mabelreign with my sister. The white man she worked for did not want
to see her staying with anyone there. One day he came to the servants’ quarters,
where we stayed, and asked what we were doing there. We had to run away jumping
over the ‘durawall’ and stayed outside till he left; my sister called me and said we
should sleep over that night and go away early in the morning. So we had to go
back to the rural
areas in Mutoko, but when I got there things were even worse.
One day the Rhodesian soldiers came to our place. I was there with my friends
Rhoda and Meila preparing the sweet potato beds. They asked us what we were
doing. We replied that we were working so that we could earn money to pay for our
fees. The other soldiers left but one remained standing. He loved one of us. And I
told her to tell him that she loved him. I reminded her what the comrades had
taught us. They had taught us that we should accept them so that we could get
information from them. So Rhoda did likewise, she told him that she loved him,
and that we were her younger sisters. We then left for home. I then requested him to
hold the gun. He had FN 1976, and he gave it to me. We then asked him to go to our
place, and when we got home we entered into the house. I then instructed Rhoda to
cook for him. I also asked Meila to go and call the people because we now had the
opportunity to get this guard pinned down.
After some time I realised that he was becoming suspicious. I had to run away from
the house holding the gun. It was not easy for him to get hold of me. By the time he
attempted to catch me, people arrived and had the opportunity to get hold of him.
He was captured and we went with him to the comrades at the base. The comrades
asked for the people who had planned and captured the guard. The comrades were
surprised to hear that it was Moila and I. We told them that we did exactly what
they had trained us to do. That guard force was severely beaten to the extent that he
promised not to go back to work for Smith, instead he asked the comrades to take
him. However he guard force was tried, but he fled at night and went back to his
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camp. The comrades came and told us to wake up quickly and follow them. They
thought he had not gone very far, but unfortunately he was already at his base by then.
We tracked him down the road from the house, but when we were just approaching
their base, gun shots were fired in our direction, so we fled and went back to the
mountains. We were surprised that the man was already there.
From the top of the mountain we saw that a red flag had been raised at our home.
They had already beaten my sister, whom they found at home, with the back of the
gun until she was unconscious. Within no time helicopters came and my sister was
tied to the plane and the whites went away saying they have killed a gandanga. I
told my friends that it was not safe to go back home, so we should go and join the
liberation struggle instead. We travelled from Kagande, where we were, to
Chikekete in Murehwa, Maramba-Pfungwe; we found the comrades in Chikekete.
They were surprised and asked us what had happened. We told them that people
back home had been killed, so we could not go back home, and instead we should
go with them. The comrades told us that the group which they wanted to go with
was already fully staffed, so we should wait for another group from Uzumba; once
that group arrives then could join them.
It took two weeks for the group to arrive. During the day we would go into the
villages and pretend to be ordinary villagers, then at night we would go back to the
base. We practised this till the people we were waiting for arrived. We then
proceeded with the journey towards Masarakufa. When we got at Masarakufa
clothes and shoes were bought for us from a local businessman. The comrades said
they suspected that the clothes had been poisoned and instructed us that we should
not wear them. It was decided that the clothes had to remain behind, and they
should be boiled in salted water and would be given to the next group.
We then proceeded to the border where we met the whites; the comrades and
these whites started shouting at each other. The whites then proceeded with their
patrolling. When this was happening we were hiding. After that we were sent to find
out how far the whites had travelled, and the route was cleared. So the comrades later
came back and said they had cleared the route and that we could proceed. They had
to do that because there were these ‘bacoons’ that were set and could explode if we set
foot on. Our group was huge and we crossed. Just after we had crossed, the soldiers
arrived and started shouting at us again, saying that a lot of chimbwidos had
crossed the border. They said that the war was never going to end soon.
We then arrived at Shangara base and later moved to Katumba. I fell sick, and
the comrades suggested that they should take me to Shangara hospital, since they
were now proceeding into the interior. So I was left at Shangara for treatment. I
spent two days there guarded by the Camaradas. From there I was taken in an
ambulance to Zambia at Bahariyawo where injured people were kept. I stayed at
Bahariyawo for two months. Comrade Makasha later suggested that since I was no
longer sick I was supposed to be taken to Tembwe. When I reached there, people
were on training, but I had to be kept with the security, and be certified that we
were not sell-outs. I
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explained to them that we were not being sent by the enemy; but we had come to join
the liberation fighters.
We were allowed to stay and started training; but we were later removed from
training under that group because we were still young. I was 14 years old. I was
then taken by Comrade Makasha and became his assistant. The issue that young
people should not be trained, but instead should go back to school persisted. The
motor vehicles came to collect us, and took us to Mavhudzi School, in 1978. We
stayed there, but towards the end of 1978, were taken for training. We started
training in Samakweze in Inyanga, in 1979 until the time the country was liberated
in February 1981; that was when we were declared to have completed training.
When returning home and I went through Mutare. When we arrived in Mutare we
were instructed to go to an assembly point, and we were sent to Chitungwiza
assembly point. We stayed there in Chitungwiza. Later we got attested into the
Zimbabwe National Army. We worked in the army; I was a Corporal employed as a
medical officer. By then there was what was called European Scale. We were paid
less compared to the whites. So some blacks thought of giving themselves English
names, hoping to get more money because the whites by then earned more money
than blacks. In the National Army whites were given heat allowance; if we went
anywhere, whites were given the heat allowance, but we were not given this heat
allowance. Among the issues that pain me, is that people want this country to be
colonised again by whites, considering the effort we made for its liberation.
I would therefore like to remind the youth of today that this country can never be
colonised by the whites once again. This is because a lot of people died in Chimoio,
Nyadzonia, Tembwe and Mavhudzi, that is in all the bases we stayed in. They died
for this country so that we could liberate and govern ourselves. So we strongly
dispute the idea of giving back the country to the whites. We urge the youth that they
should hear from the elders who eye witnessed the war, so that they can appreciate
what happened and hence rally behind President Robert; he is our leader and it is we
who elected him into power. We should allow him to lead because we have not yet
accomplished the bigger aims; we are still under the rule of the whites. That is all I
have to say.
As a lady in the liberation struggle, the major problems I faced were from the
Kamaradas at Shangara. You know since I was the only lady at that camp I was
always afraid that they would rape me. There were no sell-out issues at Shangara.
There was not anything of that sort because Shangara was a camp for the
Kamaradas only.
What happened in the keeps was that we could be taken into the keeps by the
mabhunu, and the comrades would also come and cut off the keep and let us out and
ask us to go back. So you would find out that the whole night would be spent
walking up and down. So these were the major problems we faced. School were
actually erected in the keeps, we could just get out of the homes and enter schools.
We could no longer study freely in an environment infested with soldiers because
once we saw them we were afraid that they have come to collect us. Of course there
were rape cases and they were so common. The Das intimidated us so that we were
not able to report
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the cases. Children of our ages were commonly raped. There were cases where girls
were abused by both the Das and the comrades; this was especially perpetrated by the
sell-outs. Comrades were not involved in rape cases and abuses. Not the comrades,
they could not do that. Maybe they did that in Mozambique; the chefs could just say
let’s go. As girls we could not go to school; we spent most of the time nursing
babies. I can say people effectively got education. People were taught all languages
including Ndebele, Shangani. Those who passed were even sent to places like
Libya.
The young girls did not get pregnant, but instead the grown-up ladies were the
ones who were impregnated.
During our training we had three companies for women; Company A, Company
B and Company C. The problems we faced included shortage of food and clothes.
There was nothing like sanitary pads and cotton wool during the war, sometimes we
just used leaves. Girls in the camps during the liberation struggle could not undergo
menstrual cycle periods. It is true. We only started in 1981, that is when we started.
But during the war we could not, personally I started when I got here after the war.
There was this friend of mine who died in 2003. She was raped by the DA after
we had refused to tell them where the comrades had hidden; the comrades were just
besides the road. The whites were just passing along the road when the comrades shot
them. We were captured and the Das went to the keep with us. My friend was taken
and raped, until she started bleeding. We were trained to pretend being in love with
the enemy, and of course it was risky, but we had no option but to do what we were
asked to do by the enemy.
I would like to tell the youth in Zimbabwe that during the liberation struggle we
worked without being paid at the end of the month. We did not even know when the
war would end; we also did not have the mind to return home, even when things
became extremely difficult. Many people died because of the war. So the youth
must not take the liberation war as something cheap. They pain us so much when
they say, “It is better you go and tie the country where you untied it from.” It is not
good to say such words. Instead they should work hard to protect the heritage, that
is their land. They should not value money than their country. Does it mean that
without money they would sell the country? They forget that we fought for no pay.
They should therefore sacrifice their lives like we did.
I thank you.
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Msipa, Cephas
Cephas George Msipa was born on the 7th July 1931, in Zvishavane district under Chief
Masunda. Hehadhisprimaryandsecondaryeducationin Dadaya Mission from 1944 to
1953. He taught in several schools in the rural areas before moving to Kwekwe in 1955 to
teach in the first government school in the area. This is where he met Joshua Nkomo in
the same year and later, in 1957, became his contact in political issues. In 1980, he
became the Deputy Minister of Youth, Sports and Recreation, and after about a year he
became the Deputy Minister of Manpower Planning Development. In 1992, he became
the Minister of Water Resources and Development. He was the Minister of State
Responsible for Indigenisation from 1995 to 2000. In 2000 he was appointed the Governor
and Resident Minister of Midlands Province. He also worked in the private sector and in
parastatals as the chairman of several boards
My name is Cephas George Msipa. I was born on the 7th July 1931, being the first
born in a family of ten children consisting of seven boys and three girls. I was born
in Zvishavane district under Chief Masunda. Eeh, for my early education I went to
a primary school called Skuzer School. I was not there for long because the school
went to about Standard 2. So for my Standard 2 I went to Dadaya Mission which
was owned and run by the Church of Christ New Zealand; that is where I did my
primary and secondary education. I was at Dadaya from 1944 to 1953; with a break
of one year in 1950, when I did some, teaching. I started teaching before being
trained.
After that I taught at various schools, first at Mzimbane, we had trained to teach
what was called higher primary. So I went to open Standard 4. I was at a school
called Mzimbane in Zvishavane for a year before I transferred to Skuzer for another
year. I felt I should move out of the rural areas, so I came to Kwekwe, where I was
one of the first teachers to open the first government school in Kwekwe in 1955; the
school was called Amaveni School. So, until about 1954, the government at that time
was not taking a very keen interest in African education. It was all left to missions;
that is why up to 1954 there was no government school in Kwekwe. It was while I
was there, in 1955, that I got to know Dr Joshua Nkomo. He was selling some books
when he came there and we had a long chat with him. Somehow he recognised me,
because after the formation of the ANC in 1957, he visited me and asked me to be
his contact as far as politics was concerned.
I became very active in politics although I was a teacher. Teachers were not
allowed, to deal with politics; it was specifically stated that they were not allowed
to take an active part in politics, so I could not hold any position, but still I played a
leading role for the people in Kwekwe, as their leader. In 1957 I decided to, put my
name forward as a member of the Advisory Board, while I was still a teacher there.
Africans there were not allowed to be councillors. Instead we were called Advisory
Board members. I stood for election. I was the youngest member by then, at 26
years, and I won; being perhaps the most educated at the time, they made me their
Chairman. So I was the Chairman of the Advisory Board in Kwekwe from 1955 to
1958, two years.
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While in Kwekwe, I also did a number of things. For instance, I was the reporter
for the Daily News. Cde Nathan Shamuyarira was my editor. In fact at one point he
wanted me to join him, as assistant editor; that was in 1957, but I could not do it
because in that same year I was promoted to be the Deputy Headmaster. So the fact
that I was the Deputy Headmaster looked more attractive. I also formed a football
club while in Kwekwe called Springbox, which trained quite a number of people,
some of whom ended in the national team. I was proud of that, people like Richard
Chiminya and others came from my team in Kwekwe.
I was very active in Kwekwe, as I said, but in 1959 I was transferred to Mbare,
Harare, to head a small school called Shingirai. It was part of Shingirai
Kindergarten. I was there for a year. In those years, schools in Mbare were meant
for whites and master and not for blacks. So at the end of 1959, my headmaster told
me that he had been promoted to be an Inspector. And I said to him, what about
myself? And he said he did not know. And I told him, tell them that if I do not get
promoted I am leaving, because I cannot stand the idea of being under another
white man again. Fortunately, the following year I was appointed the Headmaster;
that was in 1960, of Mhofu School. It was while at Mhofu that I Cde Mugabe
joined me. He was coming from Ghana, where he was teaching and he had no
accommodation when he came from Ghana. And somehow, I was staying with his
homeboy, so he joined us. We were still bachelors then. We were together in my
house for some time, something like six months. That was when the NDP was
formed, and the party offered, or asked him to take the position of Publicity
Secretary of the NDP. We used to spend every evening discussing politics with Cde
Mugabe and we became very close ever since. Because of that relationship, we
developed a very close relationship and some understanding because every evening
we discussed politics.
It was at that time that he impressed me as somebody with a clear vision of what he
thought Zimbabwe should be, and I got more and more informed. In fact in that same
year I became an election agent for Dr Ian Polly, a white man who resigned from
the, Dominion Party, because he was opposed to detention without trial, and he
decided to stand as an independent candidate in Highfield. I offered to be his
election agent because I admired his courage, despite the fact that he was standing
against blacks. I was happy that he won the election. Dr Polly won, so that was that.
The teachers elected me as their president in 1961, because of my interest in their
welfare. I was now the Headmaster at Tendai School, the first Headmaster in Mufakose
Township; I was the first Headmaster there. I took a very keen interest in teachers’
welfare despite the fact that I was a Headmaster of a government school. This perhaps
impressed the teachers and they appointed me as their president. I was president from
1961 to 1964. In 1964 the government blacklisted me from teaching. The Secretary
of Education said to me, as long as the Rhodesian Front is in power, I was not going
to be allowed to teach. So the teachers then met, you know the Teachers’
Association, it was called RATA (Rhodesian African Teachers Association). They
met and said that they did know that their president could not teach. Because the
constitution of our
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association said the president shall be a serving teacher, I was disqualified because
I was no longer a teacher, and they appointed me as a full time Secretary-General
of the Teachers Association. So, from the 1st Jan 1965 I was the Secretary General
of the African Teachers Association, and I remained in that position until
immediately after UDI when I was arrested and then detained. I was arrested in
December 1965; I think it was three days after UDI.
What happened was that, I was, called by the Police; the Deputy Commissioner
of Police called me and accused me of being involved in some political activity and
warned me that if I did not stop I would be arrested. He also offered me something.
He said,“Look, if you can agree to inform us of the activities of the people in
Zambia, and If you do not want to be arrested, all will need to do is to inform us
when these people are coming.” They knew that I was connected to Chikerema and
Nyandoro. I knew what they were doing. In fact they had sent a message to me
that they were going to send some boys to fight, and asked me to organise to
receive them and to deploy them. I think I must have been taped because they got
that, and they said that they knew what we were planning with Chikerema. I said to
them, that they could forget! In fact, I took off. I felt offended and told them that it
was an insult for them to think that a man of my stature could be an informer. I then,
told them of my anger, and that I was angry with them.
So they gave me ten days, they said that they were giving me ten days to think
about it. I thought it was just a threat, but on the tenth day I realised they meant
business, when I was in the cells. They came to arrest me; they arrested me in my
office in Harare and took me to various cells waiting to send me to Gonakudzingwa.
So I eventually ended up at Gonakudzingwa. I was there for a short while because I
decided to run away from Gonakudzingwa with the others, of course. We organised
that we would run away. The reason being that we wanted to test the legality of our
arrest, because we had been arrested on the 11th of November, after UDI. So we had
discussed with friends like Didmus Mutasa , and we said we should make it a test
case because the British had said that anything done after 11th November was
illegal, therefore because we were arrested around the 15th November, our arrest
was illegal. Somehow we managed to escape from Gonakudzingwa and we got to
Harare, we were four. One was arrested in Mvuma so he did not get to Harare. Three
of us got to Harare. When we got there we were told that, there was no way they
could stop us from being arrested. So we had two choices. One was to leave the
country and go and join the others in Zambia, or something like Beit, and that if that
was our choice they could facilitate our movement. The second choice was that we
go underground.
They then said, as far as the second choice was concerned, as sure as fate you will
be arrested because you cannot be underground forever.
So I said in my case I had no choice but to go underground. Yes, I was aware that
eventually they would catch up and arrest me, but I said when I left Gonakudzingwa,
this is what I promised the young chaps who helped me to escape so I am quite
prepared to take the process to its logical end, to be arrested and go to court and prove
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that my arrest was illegal. The other two, I can understand were university students,
preferred to leave the country, and one, Byron Hove, managed to do it; unfortunately,
Hebert Musikavanhu was arrested when he was just about to cross into Zambia, so
he could not make it.
The fourth chap, Shakespeare Makoni, was the one arrested in Mvuma. He had left
us earlier in a truck. And his truck was stopped and they searched it and found him
and he was he was one of the persons they were looking for; they had discovered
that the four of us had escaped from Gonakudzingwa and so they were looking for
us and so they were happy to get hold of Makoni.
There were several camps at Gonakudzingwa. I was in camp number six, so we
were restricted in our camps, you know. In camp 1 we had people like Dr Joshua
Nkomo, Josiah Chinamano, Joseph Msika, and many others. I think people like John
Nkomo, Dr Sikhanyiso Ndlovu were also there; there were hundreds of us who
were detained there under harsh conditions. You know, I was a headmaster, and
when I got there I found conditions hard but I was able to put up with the
conditions, and I surprised many people. They thought I would cry, because when it
was my turn to cook, I was cooking. We were in groups of six, and so we arranged,
who was cooking on that or on the following day. It was extremely hot in that part of
the country, along the border with Mozambique.
But I was able to put up with those conditions. I knew that was the price we had to
pay. Like I said, when I escaped from Gonakudzingwa, it was not to run away from
the hardships but to test the legality of my detention, and also the sincerity of the
British. By their saying that it was illegal, if I was arrested what were they going to
do. So really that was the reason for leaving.
So that was interesting, I got arrested after 10 weeks. I was working at a farm
which was run by Cde Didymus Mutasa, 10km from Harare. I remained there but the
police, CIDs and the Special Branch did not recognise me because I was putting on
overalls, working in the garden. They came looking for me talking to Mutasa,
asking him about me and Mutasa pretended to know nothing about me. So every
morning I was working in the garden with my overall. One of the people working in
the garden, I do not know if it was Cold Comfort, informed them and eventually
they arrested me. I do not know how they got to know about it. I do not know, but it
was a long period, 10 weeks. It was even stressful because every time you hear a
car coming, you think it’s coming for you.
So I got arrested and because I had run away from Gonakudzingwa I was taken to
Masvingo, it was called Fort Victoria then. I went there and spent a few days in the
cells, in remand prison. While I was there I fell ill and I had to undergo an operation
for appendicitis. I do not know who told my wife and sister that I was in hospital,
so they drove all the way from Harare to come and see me in hospital. I had some
leg irons on me. So can you imagine, the operation was painful, the leg irons were
also painful. So my wife and sister came all the way from Harare to see me, but they
could only see me through the window.
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They said, “He is there.” And all I did was to wave my hands and say, “I am ok.”
You know, each time I think about it I feel bitter. Even the nurses were telling the
guards, “But really do you think this man could run away after this operation?” And
their answer was that those were the orders, that they were told that I should have
some leg-irons after the operation. But of course, what they did not know was that
they were really promoting my cause, because some people were saying,“Why is
that man in leg-irons, why?” Others thought that I was a murderer, that was why
they had to take those precautions, but eventually, they got to know the truth and I
became a hero, you know.
People were coming to me to ask, as their leader, why I was arrested; what was
the future, and so on and so on. Anyway, eventually I got well, went to court, was
tried and fortunately the magistrate found me not guilty. He said, yes, in terms of
the law, and according to what the British government had said, he was arrested on
the 11th therefore he has no case to answer. So that was in early 1966, and from
there I was then transferred to Gweru Prison, and I remained here from 1966 up to
the end of 1970, that is when I got released.
We were quite a number of us who were detained at Gweru Prison. Some were
old and so on. And I remember some who were detained with us, were taken for
trial, found guilty and were hanged. It was quite a painful time when you know that
somebody you have been with is hanged, because he has been found to have recruited
people to join the liberation struggle and to cross to Zambia. You know, people were
hanged for that! I know Robert Bhebhe is one of them. He was very close to me, it
was very bad, and I felt very bad and angry about it, that they could hang him for that.
While in prison again, we were classified into Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3. Class 1
were whites, could get good food, good bedding and so on. Class 2 were coloureds,
they got food which was slightly better than our food, much better, but slightly lower
than that of the whites. In our case, it was sadza and beans, sadza and beans and
vegetables all the time. There was no tea, and no bread. I remember in my case,
they said if you want to sleep on a bed you should apply and have a doctor who
should certify that while you were outside you slept on a bed, and that you ate rice
and bread. We said, no way, we would not apply; we will not do such a thing. So for
the five years we were just sleeping on the floor, and eating what was meant for
blacks, and that was like anybody else. Anyway, eventually, I got released from
detention, I think, I did other things. I had to look for work. I worked for the people
who make bread; I joined Lobels.
While I was in detention I organised classes for the inmates.We had classes
ranging from Grade 1 up to Degree level, and I was in charge. Mind you, I was the
Secretary of Education of ZAPU, PF ZAPU. So I organised classes for people like
Chigudu, the now Governor for Manicaland. He was a student and also a teacher. He
taught those classes below his, and at the same time took up his A Level studies. So
we kept ourselves busy. I was able to do a degree and majored in Political Science,
Public Administration and did another degree in Public Relations. Fortunately I
completed all those by the
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year I left detention. When I was released I joined Lobels for a short while, because
I met Aleck Banda who was Minister in Dr Kamuzu Banda’s government. I knew
him when he was a school boy in Kwekwe, and we had a long chat. I told him that,
if his President did not want to be involved in the armed struggle by giving us arms
and so on, why does he not promote dialogue between our leaders and the Smith
regime so that the situation could be sorted out. He asked me, if I was prepared to
meet Dr Banda, and I said, yes, I was. He went to Malawi, and the next thing I got
was an invitation to go and meet Dr Banda. I went there, took with me Prof George
Kahari, because I was told that I could bring a friend to accompany me. I had a long
meeting with Dr Banda, lasting over an hour, and he said that he had some contact
with the South African government and with the Smith regime. So I asked him why
he does not play a part to bring about some discussions to resolve our problem.
So he undertook to do that. That same year, when the Malawi Congress Party was
holding its conference, he invited me again. And this time he said, bring two more
people. So I invited Prof. George Kaharie and Michael Mawema,… I took with me
those people with their wives and we were well looked after by Dr Banda. We were
the guests of Dr Banda. We were even introduced at the banquet, as special guests
of the President. When we came back, the management at Lobels decided they did
not want me. They said I was dangerous. So they sacked me, and I lost my job for
being a guest of Dr Banda. They said they thought I was no longer involved in
politics, that is why they had employed me; but it seemed I was still in politics, and
they said, they were sorry but they could not have me as their employee. So I was
given my week’s pay and I left Lobels. Before long I got a job with Edgar
Whitehead. The Managing Director felt sorry for me, and thought I should be
employed; but they did not know what to do with me or what job to give me. They
were afraid to give me a management job because they thought the whites would
not approve it.
I was educated and had a lot of experience which they could use. But eventually
I got employed as a Public Relations Officer; that was one of the jobs given to
blacks during that time. The idea was for me to promote their fabrics in the rural
areas. I am very pleased I took that job because I was able to promote areas like
Gokwe. I used to visit all shows, agricultural shows, rural agricultural shows
throughout the country. Eventually, when I was a Minister I could tell what areas
were dry; what crops were growing in which areas, and so on. I gained a lot of
experience, and so it was good, in a way.
My experience at David Whitehead was helpful in many ways. When in 1974,
because of the Detente exercise, these people were released, my Managing Director
was keen to meet all of them as they came out. So I was able to introduce them;
Mugabe, Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo, they all met my Managing Director.
In between we had the Pearce Commission, and I think it is also important to talk
about it. I had been released, Chinamano had been released, Michael Mawema was
out, Edson Sithole was out; so when the British announced that they had appointed the
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Pearce Commission to find out the views of the African people on Smith’s
proposals, the four of us met, two from PF ZAPU and two from ZANU.
We said we should not just sit back and let these people do what they liked, and
so we consulted our leaders who were in detention in various areas. So eventually
we agreed to form an organisation that would oppose the acceptance of Smith’s
proposals. There were four of us, and when Edson Zvobgo was released he also
joined us. We ended up being five and our strategy was to bring in ministers of
religious groups, and workers’ representatives, but we were going to play a
secretive role. We were not to be seen in the forefront, because the authorities were
going to say that the people who had just come from detention were causing
trouble. We could then be easily arrested, and the world would be given that as the
reason why they were arresting us. But if we brought in the people of colour, they
would find it difficult to justify their arrest and detention. That was when we brought
them in; I was personally tasked to approach Bishop Muzorewa to ask him to lead
us. So I went to see him. We had a list of people like Bishop Muzorewa, Rev.
Canaan Banana and many others; some of them are late now. We also included
trade unionists like Plenius Sithole and others. We approached them, and I
remember some of them saying that politics were deceiving, if they joined and led
the ANC. It was called ANC deliberately, because we wanted people to think that the
African National Congress had been resurrected. But this ANC was African
National Council.
When I approached him, Muzorewa asked for a week after I had said, “Look, we
are only asking you to lead in the rejection of the Pearce proposals. After that we
shall not need your services at all. All we want is for you to lead us on this
particular point.” He then said to me, “Give me a week, I need to pray.” After a week
I went and he agreed. We launched the movement and it spread like veldfire, and
when the team, the Pearce Commission eventually came into the country and visited
various areas, it was a ‘NO NO NO’ Report to the proposals. We were happy that we
achieved what we wanted to achieve. I must say PF ZAPU and ZANU PF worked
in unity. We did not even worry about who holds what position, we were only
interested in achieving that goal. We did it very effectively; we used ZANU PF and
PF ZAPU structures, and the whole population and all people united and rejected the
Pearce Proposals. That was a landmark that involved Bishop Muzorewa. I thought I
should include that.
After some time, my Managing Director was keen to meet Bishop Muzorewa,
when he had broken from the other people, you know, there was a short time when it
seemed we were going to work together but we then broke away because, at that
time my Director said he wanted to see him, so I introduced them. My Director
introduced Muzorewa to Ian Smith, and hence his Government of National Unity. In
a way I felt guilty that I introduced Bishop Muzorewa to Mr John Hills who was
my Director, who then introduced him to Smith and eventually there was this
Government of National Unity.
What was interesting was that after that they asked me if David Whitehead people,
were still involved in politics, and if we still supported Mugabe and Nkomo? I told
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them that as far as they were concerned that was the government which we were
supporting, and I asked them what they had to say. They told me that I had to decide
whether I wanted to continue supporting them, or I was going to support the new
arrangement. Which meant if I supported Muzorewa then I would continue to work
them. I said no, there was no way I could support Muzorewa because as far as I was
concerned, it was just a step in the right direction but it was not complete. Of course I
was working with Chief Jeremiah Chirau; I said it was not complete, and it could
only be complete when Nkomo and Mugabe were involved in whatever we had
gone into. If those people were not involved we would continue. So as far as I was
concerned, I was still with Nkomo and Mugabe. So we parted company.
So fortunately Hebert Munangatire started a newspaper called Zimbabwe Times.
And he asked me to be the Assistant Editor of that paper. But eventually I was
really running the paper because he was not there most of the time, so I was editing
this paper from 1976 to 1978 when I got arrested again after the downing of the
Viscount in Kariba. I was arrested and detained at Whawha here. So I was in prison
from 1978 to 1979. I was only released because Dr Nkomo wanted me to join the
Lancaster House conference.
I had been told in 1970 when I was released that if something happened
politically you will be arrested (he laughed). It was clear that if there is some
robbery, for none will touch anything political, you are in trouble. I did not even
ask, but I knew why I was being arrested. They just came in the middle of the night
and took me. For three days my family did not know where I was, and yet I was at
Norton. I too did not know where I was, because they drove me to various places
that night, merely to confuse me. And eventually I ended up at Norton but I did not
know I was at Norton because it took me some days before I asked one policeman
where I was. I was told I was at Norton, so that was that.
By the way, in 1965, when I was first arrested, my detention order stated, it was
written, “You are likely to cause trouble politically”, something like that. That was
the crime I committed, to be likely to do that. And at that time I asked,“You people,
when am I likely to do this, and really you can arrest me for something that did not
even happen, because likely means that it may happen or it may not happen.”
Anyway, I was told that, they thought that was likely to happen. When they talk of
the rule of law, I sometimes wonder because to them that was the rule of law when
someone could be arrested for something that was likely to happen, which may not
happen anyway. So that was that.
I ended up in the Lancaster House Conference, and I attended halfway because Dr
Nkomo asked me to come back and, prepare for the elections. He was quite convinced
that a settlement would be reached, so he said, go and prepare for the elections. And
what was also interesting, Smith came back, about the same day with me, and one
day for the first time, I got a telephone call to say, Mr Smith wanted to see me. So I
went there and he asked me, if I was communicating with Dr. Nkomo, and I said I
was. He asked what the Patriotic Front was still doing in London. He said,“As you
know I have
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surrendered, Muzorewa is finished, so they are going to run the country; why are they
wasting time talking about the land? Do they not know what being in government
means? They will make laws concerning the land, so why are they asking the
British to make the laws for them, instead of coming here?”
He told me to tell them. So I phoned Nkomo and told him what Smith had said.
I said to Nkomo, “Smith says he agreed with you, when we take over, we will make
laws concerning land. So why are you going into detail with the British?” That is
what Smith is saying. Nkomo said, “”That man might have something up his
sleeves! Why is he saying that?” I said,“No, to me it makes sense what he is saying.”
I am saying this because after this, he had a few problems at his farm and he called
me to go and sort them out, so he was saying, “What is this?” So I said, “Mr Smith,
do you remember what you said to me?” He asked what he had said, and I told him,
“You said when we come back we will be free to make laws, and this is what
Mugabe is doing.” He said, “Not in the way he is doing.” We came back and I was
the spokesperson for the Patriotic Front for some time, telling people what
happened in London. Eventually the agreement was reached, and we came back.
When Nkomo was coming back he asked me if I could organise to receive him.
In 1975 PF ZAPU said they had done everything possible to talk to these people,
but they were not willing to listen. So they were in a war situation; they were living
in this country to prosecute the armed struggle. But then, Nkomo asked me to
remain in the country to look after the party. He said, “Look, you will remain
behind, we know you will be arrested from time to time, but we think it’s necessary
for you to remain behind, and you are the man who we think can do this
effectively.” So this was my base; while others had their bases in Zambia and
Mozambique, my base was here. So when Nkomo was coming back I had a
problem, I had asked some chaps in Harare who had more than one house if they
could accommodate him. They had agreed, then when the day was nearing they
apologised and said their family had refused for fear that their house could be
destroyed. So I went to hotels and asked them if they could accommodate Nkomo
when he arrived, and they said they could not. So I phoned Nkomo and told him
that I had a problem, of finding accommodation for him. He asked me, if I did not
have a house. I was staying in Lonchivar, I told him so; he said, he was coming to
stay with me.
I said, it is only a three bed-roomed house, my family, and you. He said, he was
coming and, he came and I accommodated him. When I showed him his bedroom,
he said, what about his secretary and nurse? And I said, you know, I will give you
the second bedroom. And he said, what about his security and people like Simon
Khaya Moyo? And I said, you know, if I give you the third bedroom, I will have no
bedroom for myself, He said, that was my problem, but I must have these people
with me. So it created problems for me and my wife. Fortunately my wife was quite
understanding, so we ended up staying in the servants’ quarters because Nkomo had
taken the whole house.
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Then when people were coming as refugees they came to my house, so at some
point I would have 600 to 700 people there. The toilet blocked and everything, you
know, it was really a mess. But we managed, it was like a receiving camp, everybody
as they arrived, we sent them to Bulawayo or wherever. That was how we cleared
them. I was on the committee that received the freedom fighters from Mozambique.
It was the first group from Mozambique, that I accompanied to the University to show
them where they were to stay; and the second group was from Zambia, so I did the
same. And you know, I have never seen so many people at the airport as on the day
that our freedom fighters arrived, like, sand in the sea.
Literally there were thousands, but there was no violence, there was no incident. The
police wanted to stop people from going to the airport, I remember they confronted
me and threatened to shoot me, and I said, look, I am not going to stop these young
people from going to the airport, they are going to meet their brothers. You are not
going to stop, if you say you are going to shoot, and I said you should start with
me. There was a confrontation. Fortunately at that time the BBC were there so they
could not shoot me in the presence of the cameras, and so on. And people came from
everywhere in Mbare, Highfield, they were just running to the airport.
It was the South African Embassy which phoned me and said, “Your people have
won.” When I asked him, “Why?” He said, “The massive crowd have come to the
airport, which made their message very clear. So we know who is going to rule this
country. I have already told my government in South Africa that they can forget about
Smith, it is the Patriotic Front which is going to run the country.” So that is what
happened on arrival of ZIPRA and ZANLA forces.
I was a teacher and I could not have a post, but everybody knew that I was their
member, I was part of them. And even in Mufakose I was in charge of the youth, but
I had no official post as such.
It is interesting that you ask me about the 1963 break –up, because, we had been
talking with Cde. Mugabe about the need for a change of leadership, so, once they
broke away, Cde Mugabe came to see me. In a way he knew my views about the
change of leadership. Personally I was for Dr. Parirenyatwa, but then in 1963, he
was no more. So he said to me, “Sekuru, we have decided to get rid of Nkomo.” I
asked him, “If you get rid of Nkomo, who are you going to have in his place?” He
said, “Ndabaningi Sithole.” I told him I was sorry, I was not joining him and I was
remaining with Dr Joshua Nkomo, because there was no way I could accept the
leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole. Mugabe was disappointed. Anyway, we said that
should not affect our relationship, we were to remain friends; he went there and I
remained here. The whole idea was that there were people who were saying that
Nkomo was no decisive enough; they wanted somebody more decisive, somebody
who could say, “We are going to do this.”
They thought Nkomo was moderate; and was just a man of peace when there
was need for violence; he was not very keen to act violently. He still preferred some
peaceful resolutions of the problem when the situation demanded that we go for
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violent means to take over the country. That was what some people were saying;
and well, in a way, although I was not impressed. That was why I said, if he was
having Ndabaningi Sithole I was not going with him, because I knew Ndabaningi
Sithole, in my view, was the kind of man who always wanted to be the leader. He
was Sir Garfield’s right hand man. In 1947, he tried to remove Sir Garfield Todd.
He had come to parliament and Sithole remained active as Headmaster, and incited
us to go on strike, because, in my view he wanted to take over as Principal of
Dadaya High School, but to me he made the wrong impression. Later on he was
invited to conduct devotions as guest of honour at a Teachers’ Association meeting
in Mutare, and he agreed to stand as president, and took over as President from CD
Mhlanga. So, to me, those two events left the impression that he was not a man to be
trusted. Imagine you are invited, and you end up taking the position of the man who
invited you. You are, Deputy Principal, and you end up wanting to take over. So
those two events made him unsuitable; that is why I said, they had chosen a wrong
man and I could not join them.
Well, in a way there was an element of tribalism in the breakaway of ZANU
from ZAPU, because there were those people who looked at Nkomo as Ndebele,
especially those who wanted him to remain. They were saying if we remove
Nkomo, we will cause a division between the Ndebele and the Shonas. That debate
had been going on for a long time. So he was there as a unifying force, and the idea
was that Nkomo will remain president so that the Ndebele remain in the party. You
remove him; the Ndebele will feel that you have removed them from the party. So
to that extent there was some kind of tribalism. Of course there were some within
the party, and not everybody, who felt that the Ndebele were a minority and why
would Nkomo lead, and these were really a minority. In the early 1950s Nkomo was
the man of the people, the whole country was solid behind Nkomo and so the
majority of the people did not think tribally, it was those who harboured ambitions
for leadership who were using tribalism as a tool to get to the top. But as you know
people like Josiah Chinamano, Willie Musarurwa, Dany Madzimbamuto, even
James Chikerema, and Nyandoro, who at the time the break-away occurred,
remained with Nkomo. So that sort of, showed that it was not completely based on
tribalism. Of course on the ZANU side there were very few Ndebele, the most
prominent being Enos Nkala, who really did not hide his dislike for Nkomo as a
person. So far as Nkala is concerned, it was almost personal, he hated Nkomo, but I
do not know for what reason. I think that was the position, really.
So, they were, on balance, when you look at the line-ups of the two parties it was
tribal in a way, you cannot deny that. This again was reflected in the results of the
results of the 1980 first elections. In the Midlands, PF ZAPU had almost half-half
with ZANU. Then in the Matabeleland, except for one, all the seats went to PF
ZAPU. In the Mashonaland, it was one or two seats that went to PF ZAPU and the
rest went to ZANU.
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I think tribalism or ethnicity is an important political factor in African politics. We
can try to say no. However, the truth of the matter is like I am showing you. As the
results were coming out in 1980, Dr Nkomo sent someone to call me. He was
alone, and he said, “How can you leave me when things are going bad like this?” I
told him that we did not think the results would be as disastrous as they are turning
out to be. He asked me the question I still remember: “Is this how the people thank
me for all the sacrifices I made?” He was in tears. I could not answer the question.
He asked me “Do you know how much I have sacrificed for this country? Is this
how they thank me?” I told him that in politics there are many factors that come into
play, the people knew of the sacrifices he had made; they knew what contributions
he had made, but when it came to elections, there were other factors. So he should
not think that people did not know. He belonged to a wrong tribe.
I think somehow people see some protection in their tribes, and that is what
happens during elections. As I told you, when I did my degree I majored in
Political Science and Administration, and yes, tribalism in politics is a very
important factor, you cannot ignore it. You saw what happened in Kenya recently, it
is all but tribalism. We can try to ignore it, but the fact is that it has some bearing on
the people generally, when it comes to an election.
You know, Nkomo was a man of peace, and that is why I supported him, because
I also believed in peaceful negotiations. We were talking earlier, on the role I played
in the unity between ZANU and PF ZAPU. Cde Canaan Banana, who was
Reverend and President then approached me. In fact it was interesting; Clifford
Slayer, who was an aide to Dr Rev Banana, phoned me when I was attending a
meeting in Triangle on a Thursday morning, and he told me that the President
wanted to see me urgently. So I told him, “I am Sorry I am In Triangle just now and
there is no way I could see him today.” He said it was very urgent. And I said,“Tell
him I will see him tomorrow when I come to Harare. I cannot drive, I have just
arrived from Harare to Triangle now, and I cannot come there. I have come for a
Board Meeting.” I was Board Member for Triangle Company.
The following day, Friday, I went to see him, and he said, look, I have been
trying very hard to bring Nkomo and Mugabe together, and I have not succeeded. I
have tried using several people but they have failed. I have been advised, but I
won’t say who advised me that you are my last hope; if you cannot do it, no one
will. So I asked what the problem was and he told me that Dr Nkomo was keen to
meet Prime Minister Mugabe, but Mugabe was saying he could only meet him if he
agreed to unite. If he does not agree, he was not meeting him. The President then
asked me if I could do something about that. I thought that was queer, but anyway I
said I was going to try, because there were certain conditions which were spelt out
to me. So I phoned Nkomo, and I asked him if I could go to see him and he said I
could go.
I went there, and I can remember it very well. I felt at home. He was not feeling
well that day. I told him I had gone to see him about unity; that I had been sent
by President Banana to talk to him so that ZANU and ZAPU could come together
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and be one party again. He told me that those people were not serious and he made
some accusations that they were threatening him. He said that Nkala had made a
threatening statement that day; threatening to arrest Nkomo. He asked me if I had
read the Herald; and when I said yes, he said what Nkala did. I told him that Nkala
did not know what we were doing, and he should know, no one knew except him,
Reverend Banana and Prime Minister Mugabe; those were the people who knew
what we were trying to do. The rest of the people did not know. I said, that was why
I said we needed to unite. Knowing what he had done, I did not think that was the
kind of thing that should be said about him. So we went on talking about that, talking
about various things; it was not an easy thing. We talked about the leadership, the
composition of the top leadership, and so on.
This went on for weeks; it did not take one day. Eventually I was almost
giving up because we were not making progress, particularly on the name. Can
I go to Bulawayo and say we are now ZANU PF? Then I sent my report to Rev
Banana, that today we reached this far, and agreed on this point and not that point,
and went on and on like that. Of course I also negotiated with some other people
whom I knew could convince Nkomo, telling them exactly what Nkomo was
denying. These people went and talked to him, but without saying that they knew
Nkomo was negotiating with Msipa. That was the strategy we used. He had friends
like Willie Musarurwa and Ariston Chambati; these were the people I used, and
they could talk to Nkomo, just like stories. They could perhaps say,“Mr Nkomo, do
you not think that if we get united it would help?” Nkomo said what he thought, and
they came back and informed me. It went on, and eventually I used some tactics
which worked in a way. I explained to him how much he had suffered for this
country, what could have been if he had to be where we were, and why he deserved
a better status that he had by then. He said, as long as you are the leader of the
opposition you will never get the recognition you deserve. I said, he must know in
African politics, everyone in the opposition is an enemy, so he will continue to be
regarded as an enemy, and so he will be treated badly. Do not be surprised, but of
course I emphasised the importance of PF ZAPU and ZANU in bringing prosperity
to the country, and in developing the country. I said we needed to work together
as we worked together to free this country; we had to continue working together to
develop this country. That, I think, impressed him, because he ended up asking me
to go and asked me if I had been talking to some chaps in ZAPU leadership. I said I
had not. We agreed that this should be kept confidential, and he then suggested
some three people who he said I should go and speak them individually not as a
group. He told me that when I go back, he would be able to tell me the way forward.
So I went and spoke to the three people;, they were all from Matabeleland. They
were Welshman Mabhena, former governor of Matabeleland North; the late
Sydney Malunga, and Nassa Ndhlovu, those three. What was interesting to me and
what surprised me was that the answer was the same, as if they had met to discuss
about it. They all said whatever Nkomo decides they would go along with it,
because he
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was their leader. They all said he knew what was right for PF ZAPU and the
people of Matabeleland. So I went back to Nkomo and told him what they had said,
and he asked me,“Are you sure?” I asked him,“Well, have I ever told you a lie?” He
said,“No”. I told him that it was a very important issue, and I was not going to
mislead him, and that was what they said. So it was entirely up to him. He said to
me, that it was okay for me to go and tell Banana that he had agreed. So I went and
told Rev Banana; I was very happy because it was a very big achievement on my
part. Rev Banana passed on this good message to Prime Minister Cde Mugabe.
Mugabe’s reaction was to ask Rev. Banana if he had asked Nkomo himself, and how
did he know if Msipa was giving the correct information or not. Why did he not get
it from Nkomo himself? So Banana came back to me and asked me to arrange for
him to meet Nkomo, and I did that. So my job was completed after organising the
meeting between Nkomo and Banana. After the signing of the Unity Accord,
Nkomo called me one day and said, “Hey wena mfana, I want to thank you for
what you did. When you started to talk to me I never thought that this thing
would work. What can I do for you to show your appreciation?”So I told him fact
that he accepted my advice was a way of thanking me, and I will remain appreciative
of what he did because to me it was a big achievement. So I could go down in
history as having brought about the unity. Of course it was not easy because I
remember Cde Mugabe one day saying to me,“You are talking of unity in the midst
of all this violence; does it make any sense?” So I said, “But how do you end
violence? You have got to talk at some point or other.” He said, “Anyway, you are
right; Go ahead and see.” So that is what I can say about.
The Unity Accord, to a great extent brought the people of Mashonaland and
Matabeleland together, people who had fought for this country, ZIPRA and ZANLA.
It brought the leadership, that is, Nkomo, Mugabe and their lieutenants, together. So
really, it meant that instead of using our energy to fight each other as was in the early
1980s, we really directed our energies to building our country together. I think it was
a good thing.
Well, the present difference is, of course taking a new dimension in a way. This
is so because there are ideological differences, whereas ZANU and ZAPU had no
differences in ideology. Perhaps the differences were more on personalities, as to
which person should lead the country, is it Nkomo, is it Mugabe? In a way you
could reduce it to that level, but presently, when you look at the MDC and our
party, there are certain differences. It appears that some of the people, and I said it
appears, think they can still rely on the western countries to achieve what they
want. This is what I do not understand, when people like the British Prime Minister
Gordon Brown talks of regime change. Why is he interested and why does he want
to use our brothers to bring regime change? When Gordon Brown writes to
Tsvangirai to tell him what he is doing, I say what is this all about? Because these
are the people we fought against in order to be free to manage our country in the
way we like as Africans. Of course I am for democracy; I want people to be free to
form their parties, as long as it is a genuine African party, I have no problem with
that. When we are divided, there is also
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a tendency to spend your energies on things that do not really bring about prosperity
to the country; there is also the danger of engaging in violence, as it happened in the
1980s. So we try to avoid that. While we are saying let us remain united, but we
should not prevent freedom of association and freedom of speech in the name of
unity. Let us unite, let us have what we consider to be national interests. As long as
we have national interests, we can differ on other issues, how we reach there, how
to achieve national interest, I have no problem with that. So really unity with
diversity is what I am talking about.
The differences between ZAPU and ZANU in the 1960s, especially in the high
density suburbs, resulted in a lot of violence between ZANU and ZAPU. That was
a terrible time; I think it was some kind of madness. I remember in 1963 I was
travelling to Brazil, and I passed through Lagos, Nigeria, and there was this
big headline, “ZIMBABWE IS ENGAGED IN SOME WAR OF
DESTRUCTION.” That was what was happening in 1963/1964. But again, in a
way the people were guarding their unity. They did what was being initiated by
those who formed ZANU PF, and they were prepared to fight in order to remain
united. But it was a vicious fight, really, because people lost their lives; some were
burnt alive and I saw it with my own eyes; friends became enemies. Of course it
was like when friends turn against each other. That kind of enmity can be vicious,
that was how it was. What was interesting was that, literally, friends were prepared
to kill friends.
I know in my case Edson Zvobgo was my friend but the in the name of ZANU he
sent some people to destroy my house and my school which I was heading. In fact
we talked about it later and he said,“I gave them a drum of beer to drink so that they
got drunk, and I told them to go and stone. When I went to look, I told them that they
had not done enough, I gave them another drum the following day and they went to
do what they did.” But I also organised the ZAPU Youth and they literally
destroyed his house completely, and he had to leave Mufakose. It was as bad as
that. But the good thing about it was that we had time to talk about it, and to say,
that was foolish, and even question why we did that. That was why some
individuals never wants to see it happening again. People learnt to make the petrol
bombs and were using them so many times to destroy life and property. It was bad
and I hope we won’t do it again.
Well, I must say, on the ZAPU side there were those who felt that we should
allow ZANU to succeed; they should be allowed to succeed. As I said, that fight
was a way of safeguarding our unity jealously. So really, it was commitment on
unity, and the only way was to beat up all those who were supporting this breaking-
away group. But ZANU too was determined to get away, they were not prepared to
accept the comeback to PF ZAPU. So that was the thing. The leadership was to
blame in a way, because ZAPU were saying, do not allow these people to succeed;
ZANU was saying, don’t be cowed, continue to organise. They challenged the
people. In a way the leadership was to blame.
The effects of the violence on children was really bad, because I know a number
of children who got burnt and injured, and grew up with terrible scars as a result of
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the petrol bombs. It traumatised them and I think it was not good for these children
when they saw these running battles. In fact, at one time the whites brought barbed
wire around the whole of Highfields, and surrounded all of Highfields, and kept all of
us there. They realised they had to let us go but we were using one way to get out
of Highfield. They were saying that they were doing that to protect us against each
other. They were, I think in a way, watching us killing each other, literally watching
us doing that, it was indeed a terrible time.
I think during that time, we stopped the fight against the whites, which was
unfortunate because it was like we had forgotten what we wanted to achieve. We
decided to settle our own differences first. We did not care about the whites. In a
way they liked it, when they detained us at Gonakudzingwa and so on, the excuse
they gave was we were killing each other, and they wanted to stop this killing! In a
way, it was a period of madness; but as I said, all in the name of guarding our unity.
Well, I think although Dr, Banda did not report to me, you saw that as time went
on, the South Africans were bearing more and more on Smith to talk, which resulted
in the meetings. For instance, in 1974, there were the Zambezi River talks. I think that
is the role he played. I told him, “Look, you do not have to support us with
weapons, but you can support us by encouraging these people to talk to Nkomo and
Mugabe.” We had, a long discussion lasting over 70 minutes, and I think I was quite
pleased with him. I said told him that some people were thinking that he was not
supporting us; but there were so many ways of supporting us, one of which was to
get those people to think seriously and talk to us. He assured me he was going to do
that, and I think he did that. I did not follow him to ask him what he had done. You
cannot do that to a Head of State.
I said, first I met Muzorewa to ask him to lead the African national Council in order
to reject Smith’s proposals. At that time he impressed me as a very devoted
Christian, because he even asked me to give him time to pray. He was also worried
about being involved, and the effect it would have on his church. He said he had
people belonging to different political parties, and he did not want to be seen to be
leading a party. So he only agreed when we said it was only temporary and it was not
even a political party, but just a movement to reject what we thought was not in the
interest of the people of Zimbabwe. It was on those grounds that he agreed.
When I introduced him to Smith, through Mr. John Hills who was my Director, I
did not think he would go to the extent of an agreement which would involve a
government of national unity. I just wanted to give him the opportunity to speak to
Mr Smith and tell him as others have said, that in order to bring about a settlement,
you need all parties to come together. I thought it was an opportunity to impress on
that. By the way, even as early as 1978 I was tasked by my party to talk to him
about the importance of going to an all-party conference; the one which took place in
1979. He was not keen, and I met him for 3 hours; and he was saying, “You Msipa, I
do not know what kind of man you are. You are the one who introduced me to
politics, now you want me to get out of politics.” I said, “No-no, I am not saying
get out; all I am
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saying is that let’s go to this All-party conference, and whatever agreement we
make together with Nkomo, Mugabe, then we can come and fight for votes from the
people. If you win, good luck to you. If Mugabe wins, that’s it, if Nkomo wins, that
will be it. That is what we are saying; no-one is saying get out.” I reminded him that
in any case, when we asked him to lead us, it was meant to be temporary, but he
could still continue.
He then made a stupid step, because he asked me, “Are you aware that there are
people who are willing to die for me?” I answered him that was a shocking
question, coming from a bishop like him. He said, “Do you want me to wait until all
those who are willing to die for you have died?” I said, “Are you aware that
Mugabe has more people willing to die for him than you? Are you aware that
Nkomo has more people who are willing to die for him than you? And Smith has
more people willing to die for him? I said are you not aware that you have the least
number of people willing to die? but anyway, as a bishop you should be praying for
the war to end, not for the war to continue until final victory which means many
more people were going to die. He did not realise this blunder, and he said, “Well,
okay, let’s pray.” Then then asked me to give him a week and he was going to tell
me whether he was going to the All- Party Conference or not. I agreed to him a
week. Within that week I was arrested and detained. I do not know whether he was
behind it or it was just Zindoga and Anderson who did their own things, without a
clear link to him. While I was waiting to be called I got arrested, so I did not have
time to say, are you coming? Anyway, eventually he went to the Lancaster House
Conference, and that was his doom.
At some point I came back and if you look at the papers I was described as the
spokesperson of the Patriotic Front. I think they were those in ZANLA or ZANU
who wanted us to stand for elections as one, that is, ZANU and ZAPU. There was
also a strong group which thought the election could be used to decide as to who
should be the president of the party, of the country, is it Nkomo or Mugabe? Of
course eventually it was Nkala who announced that we should stand separately. He
made it very clear. I was advocating for telling everybody, yes, we would come and
stand as one, as the Patriotic Front. I knew that there were people who were opposed
to that, and so I was not surprised when Nkala announced that ZANU was going to
stand separately. So I think that was the position. People felt that there was need to
use the election as a way of determining who should lead the country.
The Lancaster House Conference involved the fighters and the leaders. The
delegations included ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. So you cannot say they regarded
the agreement as a sell-out; of course in any organisation there are extremists who
felt that the battle should be fought to its logical conclusion, and ZANLA and
ZIPRA were no exception. We were winning anyway, so there was no need to talk
but, the majority, I think, agreed that by talking we saved lives. We also reached
some respectable agreement and that is what we did. I think Frontline States were
behind the talks; our leaders were behind the talks; and I think generally we did not
think it was a sell-out because in any negotiation, there is some give and take.
What was
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important was that we got a constitution which brought about majority rule; that
brought about sovereignty to the people of Zimbabwe. That was all that we wanted,
and I think no-one can convince me that the Lancaster House Conference did not
produce that.
It is all history now. There was some fight, which involved ZIPRA and ZANLA,
and in a way brought about some misunderstanding between PF ZAPU and ZANU.
This resulted in the creation of what was known as ‘dissidents’ in Matabeleland
after some fight at Entumbane and other places in Bulawayo. It resulted in some
dissidents operating in Matabeleland and Midlands.When we took over in 1980, the
government that was formed was a government of national unity that included
ZANU PF and PF ZAPU. Because of the misunderstandings and killings which I
have referred to, the President and Prime Minister Mugabe, relieved Nkomo and
others of their positions in government, that was in 1982. But some of us remained
in government. When I was asked to remain I asked under what name? And they
said ZANU, of course. And I said, as long as you understand that I am in the
government representing ZAPU, I have no problem, so I remained in government.
In 1980, I started as the Deputy Minister of Youth, Sports and Recreation. After
about a year I became the Deputy Minister of Manpower Planning Development. I
was in charge of compiling our manpower base. I think that was an important exercise
because I was leading the team that we wanted to find out what was the manpower
position throughout the country; in the private sector and the public sector, so we
could plan for our future requirements. Then in 1992, I became the Minister of Water
Resources and Development. One of the projects I introduced was the piped water
schemes. At that time, in 1992, there was a very serious drought and I was tasked
by the Cabinet to come up with a ten year dam construction programme. I was
given two weeks to do it. I am glad I did it. My only disappointment is that some of
the dams, although they were accepted as what was supposed to be done in 10
years, 28 years later those dams are not yet complete. That is my disappointment.
But there are a number of dams that were done; the good thing was that during that
time I had a lot of friends. The Dutch, for instance, decided to give us money to
build dams; their minister came here to see what we were doing with their money,
and they were very happy and said that they were going to give us more. Examples
of dams that were built include Hwedza dam. Towards the end of 1984, after the
killing of a senator in Beitbridge, Cde Nkomo and I, who had remained in the
government, were also asked to resign. It was all part of this fight between ZANU
and ZAPU or ZANLA and ZIPRA. But I think it was between them. So we were
accused of being accomplices in a way, although personally I had nothing to do with
it. But we left the government and of course I went into the private sector.
But the government appointed me to head parastatals, such as the Grain Marketing
Board. In fact at one point I was the Chairman of the GMB, Cotton Marketing Board,
and Dairy Marketing Board. So I was happy to play that part; I remained in those
positions for ten years. During the 1992 drought I was in charge of the GMB and
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I was responsible for the importation of grains. It was the worst drought in living
memory. We had to import everything to feed our people and we did it successfully.
I was out of parliament from 1985 to 1995. Then the people of Zvishavane called
me back and said they wanted me back, so I went back and I was the Minister of
State Responsible for Indigenisation from 1995 to 2000 In 2000 I was appointed
the Governor and Resident Minister of Midlands province. That was the part I
played in government.
President Mugabe was a nice man, very simple and down to earth. My brother
was our cook, but cooked for us; he was not selective when it came to food like
other people do when they have been out of the country. It was clear he came back
from Ghana with a mission, and the mission was to liberate the country; I tried to
interest in finding getting a job, but he just smiled and said nothing. He did not say
he was not looking for work, but you could see, his main interest was to get
involved in the liberation of the country. He came back with that zeal, determination
and commitment to liberate the country; to get into the struggle and join others into
really liberating the country. So when people like Nkala came to see him and asked
him to accept the position of Publicity and Information Secretary of the newly
formed NDP, he saw it as an opportunity to get deeply involved in the liberation of
the country. I really liked him for we understood each other; we never had any point
of disagreement.
He can be very kind. We were staying in Canaan in Highfield. One day I bought
a car, but I did not know how to drive, the following day, on Friday, I decided to go
to Harare Hospital, we were bachelors by then. I wanted to go and impress the girls
that I had a car. So when he came he asked, “Where is sekuru Msipa?” He was told
that I had gone to Harare Hospital, and followed me there. He came to me and said,
“But why did you do this to me? See the trouble you have put me in? I had to come
all the way here just because of you.” He drove me back and it was nice. I always
remember that. The point I am making is that he cares about others; I found him to
be a caring person. When we meet, the two of us talk about it, yes we do.
Being close to the people who went to form ZANU and also being close to Dr
Nkomo, created problems for me. In 1984 I was elected Secretary-General of PF
ZAPU, and before that I was the Secretary for Education. This meant I was number
three from Nkomo, he being president, Msika, and me being the Secretary-General.
That was being high indeed. So people were asking how, I could be the Secretary
General of ZAPU, while I was ZANU. So it created problems for me because the
ZANU people knew that I was ZAPU, but the ZAPU felt that I was too close to
ZANU, so I could not be trusted that much. However, I maintained my position.
Personally I do not stop talking to people because they belong to different parties.
There is a lot to talk about in life, not just politics. There are other things; like I
said, Mugabe was
my ‘muzukuru’ despite the political differences. That is why in 1974 when he was
released, the first place he came to was my house to say,“Sekuru, I have been
released. Can you take me to various places?” So I drove him to see his friends, and
I knew all those were ZANU people, but I was helping my friend to see his friends.
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There are many lessons, but the main thing is commitment and your convictions.
If you think what you are doing is the right thing you should stick to it to the
logical end. I was a Headmaster by that time. Headmasters were comfortable but to
me that was not the case. I was convinced Zimbabwe was to be free. As a young
person I had met people like Benjamin Burombo, who left an impression on my
life. He was not educated but he used to tour the whole country. He was a man who
came from Bulawayo, and was visiting Kwekwe and everywhere. When he was in
ZVishavane, he stayed with my father, and he went to various places to address
people against what the whites were doing to take their land. He brought to my
attention the evils of the white minority regime early, by taking away land from its
owners and people. They were talking to my father throughout the night, and I was
listening. Sir Garfield Todd also influenced me during the Second World War; he
lectured to us about how evil Hitler was. He showed us that Hitler wanted to
dominate the world, and almost every day he told us how far the war was, who was
winning and who was losing; he made a point of telling us at the Assembly.
In a way, he was in a way telling us that people had the right to rule themselves.
So in many ways he played a role, because he was really showing that if Hitler
succeeds we would have been dominated by one person and that was why there was
the Second World War. Then the way the whites treated us was such that any self-
respecting person could not have just sat back and do nothing. We were being
treated like third class citizens; I told you that when we were in detention we were
treated like third- class citizens in the land of our birth. Going back to the lessons,
the lessons are clear that when people are united they can achieve their goals. We
freed ourselves because there was unity of purpose; not only those who were
carrying guns, but all the people in the country fought. It is wrong for people to think
that only those who carried guns fought. There were people who sheltered the
fighters, dangerous it, but they managed to shelter the freedom fighters and feed
them, when it was dangerous to do so. So the people of Zimbabwe taught the world
that you cannot subjugate the people all the time; people will eventually rise and
claim what is theirs. That was the lesson the world learnt. All we did was to ask the
rest of the world to help us. We fought inside and outside and with our blood we
were able to liberate ourselves.
I am saying history repeats itself and people do not seem to learn much from
history. That is why we I am saying, if we learn from history we shall not be
repeating the same mistakes we made, we shall avoid them. But we repeat them
because we do not learn much from history. That is unfortunate, but it depends. In
1963, when ZAPU was in the driving seat, ZANU were on the receiving end, and
were dissidents, of course. That was what we regarded them as. In the early 1980s
the tables were turned, ZAPU was on the receiving end , and the late Zvobgo used
to say, “We are doing what you were doing in 1963, so what’s the matter? We are
doing exactly what you were doing to us. You used to beat us, so we are now also
beating you.” But the good thing is that we were able to talk to each other again and
came together. That is the lesson we learnt. We discovered that what we were doing
was not working. We
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had to come together and work together for the good of the nation, hence the Unity
Accord of 1987.
Somehow ZIPRA’s contribution in the liberation of Zimbabwe is underrated or
under-estimated, but it was immense. There are even some distortions, in my view,
about who started this war of liberation. For instance, there was a fight in the Hwange
area, which involved ZIPRA and the ANC of South Africa; way back they were
together fighting the Smith regime. At one point the whole of Mashonaland west was
under the control of ZIPRA, spreading to Matabeleland. Of course their terrain was
more difficult than the Mozambican one.
But I think, when you look at the downing of the plane, that as you know, was
the work of ZIPRA. That really frightened the whites, and it made them think. It
was a big, dramatic act and they wondered how they could travel when the skies
were no longer free. I think to sum it all, it was a joint operation, ZANLA and
ZIPRA to free this country. If the Smith regime was facing ZANLA alone, the war
could have taken much longer. They were over-extended because they were
guarding the Zambian border as well as the Mozambican border. So really it was a
joint effort; we should not really start to say who killed how many people, what is
important is that we all fought to liberate this country and it was because we fought
side by side, from various angles, that we were able to achieve what we achieved.
That is how I look at it. May be not be as many young people died as they crossed
the Zambezi from Zambia into the country; many thousands died in Mozambique
and also died as they crossed into the country; and they also died in the country
under the banner of ZANLA. But when you put everything together, they can all
rightly claim to have liberated us from the yoke of colonialism.
I suffered for this country, but I know others suffered more than myself, and I
am appreciative of the fact that 28 years later I am still alive. I had the opportunity
to work for my country. I made a small contribution, but all the same I am happy
that I made that contribution. I have seen some fulfilment of my dreams, such as
indigenisation, whose policy I was fortunate to formulate. I saw blacks owning
banks, owning means of transport. I saw all that. And now I see blacks owning
their land. My only wish is that we could improve on productivity on the land such
that we will shame our detractors, by regaining our position as the bread-basket of
Zimbabwe. As the Chairman of the Agricultural Marketing Authority, one of my role
was to market our farm produce, like maize and soya beans; in fact, we had surplus
of that. Mr Gumbo talks of mass production, now that we have the land, weather-
permitting we should go for mass production. I think I played my role, now it’s time
for the young people of this country. My generation played a role by liberating this
country. Now we must hand over the button to the next generation who must take
this country to greater heights. This is a great country with plenty of resources, and
we should plan how to make the resources for the prosperity of the people. We
should not waste time on things that do not bring happiness to the people of
Zimbabwe. And of course we
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must continue to guard our sovereignty jealously, and continue to maintain peace for
the development of this country.
Thank you.
1994
Musiba, Murairo Chikonye

[Chikwanda, Gutu]
Murairo, Chikonye Musiba was born in 1957, in Gutu. He participated as a mujibha
during the liberation struggle. His task was to do a survey of the area if there was an
enemy and provided information such that the comrades knew how to come and attack.
I am Murairo. I was born in 1957 here in Gutu. During the liberation struggle I
participated as mujibha. Our task was to do a survey of the area, if there was an
enemy, and provided the comrades with information so that they could know how to
attack the enemy. One day we were caught by Muzorewa’s soldiers, called the
auxiliaries. After being arrested they took us to their camps and used us to perform
various tasks; we were also beaten severely. Later we were taken from there to
Joko in Masvingo, and after that to jail. If one went through Joko and then to jail you
knew that you had survived. At Joko people were severely beaten, so people were
very grateful to survive. During the interrogation they asked about the duties we did
as mujibhas. So if we were asked whether we knew the comrades and we denied
knowing them we were severely beaten. One was required to tell the truth and name
the comrades, if he knew them. After that we were taken to jail, but we could not be
taken to court. People were detained in jails for long periods. We were released from
the jails after the liberation
war had been won and people were now going to the assembly points.
We were caught by the auxiliaries when the comrades had sent us to Murairwa to
collect items like tobacco and other things they wanted. The auxiliaries knew that we
were the mujibhas. So they travelled with us from Murehwa to near Gutu; we slept in
the bush until we got there. People caught included Happy Vhemba, David Vhemba,
Saul Chikonye and Murairo Chikava. There were four of us. Later another guy was
also caught and joined us. We were not beaten along the way but we were later
beaten in their camp at Mhazha. They beat us and started probing statements from us.
When caught it was difficult to deny that we did not know the comrades, because
they asked us where we grew up, because the comrades operated in our area.
Certainly we had to tell them to save our lives.
In the camps, we were forced to work, like in feeding the pigs or cattle, guarded
by the soldiers. We slept in a hole; there was a hole which was dug there which
looked like a deep well and got down the hole using a ladder, and then they
removed the ladder before we went to sleep. In the event of any rain we were
soaked by the rains. The hole was not closed, and we had no blankets; we just slept.
In the event that we wanted to use the toilet, there was nothing to do; after someone
entered the hole he could not do anything. I do not remember how many of us were
in the hole because we met other people there, and we could not sleep because the
space was very small.
When the auxiliaries captured people, they tried to force them to enrol, but people
refused. However, there were some who were enrolled as auxiliaries, but in our
group
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nobody accepted the offer. At some point they asked us to join them, but we refused.
After we refused we were beaten, and threatened to be sent to jail forever.
There were no such instances of people being shot when the camps were attacked,
but the comrades sometimes attacked if they thought of attacking, and people were
severely beaten to the extent that some were disabled. You see this tree trunk? They
could use it to beat us. Some girls were captured, but they were taken as wives by
the auxiliaries. We found them living in their houses. They slept with them. The girls
were isolated from us.
Okay, when we came from Mamhazha, we went straight to Joko in Masvingo.
From there, on the second day we proceeded to the Central, in Masvingo. We stayed
in jail for quite a long period there. From there they said we were going for Martial
law at Mutimurefu and others were taken to Chikurubi. When we got there, we just
stayed there and we were given some food. We were given sadza, vegetables and
meat, just once a day. In the morning we were given tea in the morning, with a slice
of sadza.
We were given small whites shorts and wore red shirts drawn a white spear on
its back. I did not know what it meant exactly. In most cases red clothes are given
to people considered as criminals, so we were considered as criminals. We were
not allowed to mix with other prisoners, we had different cells. There were neither
mattresses nor blankets. There were lice, but in our camp there were no people
who contracted diseases and died. But in other camps that happened. We were not
frequently beaten, except on some occasions by the soldiers who guarded us. We
were only given newspapers to use in toilets, and not to read. When we were sick
we were taken to hospitals. We had toilets inside, so in case of diarrhoea there was no
problem. Some prison guards were ruthless, they could just assault indiscriminately.
My parents knew when I was captured but they could not do anything about it,
except visiting us. The fears that one day the authorities would wake up and kill us
always haunted us. When we were released, the people did t not take us as
criminals; they could not do that. The community received us well and treated us
very well. People were happy with us.
Before I was arrested I can recall that there were two people who were shot dead
at Murayiro by the soldiers. The soldiers just came and rounded up people who
were around. We were then surprised to see two men being shot. When such things
happened it was painful because people were unjustly punished for no meaningful
reasons. We were not involved in crossfire when the comrades and the Rhodesian
forces were fighting each other. The tasks the mujibhas executed were difficult
because, for instance, it was not easy to access the white areas to assess the
weapons they had or how they were positioned. All the same, the comrades wanted
the information and failure to do so could result in being beaten. Looking at the
relationship between the comrades and the chimbwidos, of course some were
impregnated. But it all depends,
some were not abused, but some comrades did abuse the chimbwidos.
The war is not something to play about. You can only like it before it erupts but
thereafter you never want to hear about it. The war does not take sides, anyone can
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die anytime. The youths say they want war because they do not know what it is.
War is very bad. If they need war they should only be happy about it when one is in
possession of his/her own gun. Considering the work I did, I was not meaningfully
rewarded, and it is very painful. But however the government later remembered us as
the war detainees and they give us money; it is not enough, but at least it relieved us
a bit, considering the pain we went through during the liberation struggle. So we
were just happy that they gave us those few cents.
It is painful today when I see the whites whom we fought and who caused a lot
of suffering to us, especially considering that they caused some permanent injuries.
We are angry about, it but because of law we cannot retaliate. To me, injuries are the
scars of the wounds caused to us because of the beatings.
Thank you.
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Ndlovu, Dereck
[Mabhidu, Kwekwe]
Dereck Ndlovu from the ZAPU Ex-Political Prisoners and Detainees organization, was
born in 1928 and grew up in Zhombe
My name is Dereck Ndlovu and I was born in 1928 and grew up in Zhombe up to
1939 when the Second World War began. I also wished to go but I could not
because I was still young. I worked for the whites and at one point went to Zambia
with the whites whom I was working for and experienced life there. As a result of
that experience, when I came back to Zimbabwe in 1960, I began to be politically
active as an organiser and mobiliser for NDP in my area, that is, Tombankala,
Zhombe. Based on the differences that I had noted in Zambia, and the hardships
that Rhodesians at that time succumbed to, many people joined NDP due to my
activism.
In 1964 ZAPU was banned and I was arrested and given a year’s restriction at
Gonakudzingwa; after my return home I stayed for 21 days and got re-arrested and got
restricted for five years at Gonakudzingwa. In 1967 I escaped from
Gonakudzingwa with the intention to run away to possibly Zambia, but got arrested
at Villa Salazar and stayed at a prison there before being relocated to Khami. While
at Khami I received news that my wife was no more and hence I wrote a letter to the
Minister of Law and Order Maintenance requesting to go and attend the burial of my
wife but he refused. Therefore I stayed in detention until I was released in 1971,
and it was then that I remarried. We stayed until the joining of ZAPU and ZANU, but
we were beaten so much that as I am seated here, I have wounds and bruises from
the liberation struggle, which are permanent. There are many encounters with the
whites that are painful to me, but all I can say, in short, is that this country was hard
won.
What led to my being arrested for the first time was that I was the organiser in my
area, encouraging people into politics. I revealed my experiences about the injustices
practised by the whites. When I got arrested, the white CIDs came to my homestead
and stated that when they heard about me they thought that I was probably educated,
but to their surprise my head was nothing more than just a fingernail; and surely I
was not educated at all, and it was Taylor, a white CID working at Kwekwe, who
said that. When I told him that you did not need to be educated to realise the
injustices being practised by his counterparts, he told me to shut up and swore at
me. He said that due to the fact that I underestimated the whites, he was arresting
me; he then handcuffed me and put me into the car.
Life was so difficult at Gonakudzingwa, such that when I escaped, I spent a week
in the bush, with lions. I intended to flee to Zambia, where I had heard life and
politics was easier. When I saw lions going in a particular direction I changed
course and went in the opposite direction. I ended up in Mozambique, in a town
called Villa Salazaar, after moving backwards whilst fleeing from lions. I climbed a
tree and slept
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there, as they roamed about. It was due to this that I was picked up by an ambush
which had been set up, and was sent to Villa Salazaar prison.
I was relocated to Khami and they stated that it was lighter at Gonakudzingwa, but
at Khami it would be much harder. At Khami it was tougher as we were placed at
what they called Penal Block, which had a passage and had women adjacent to
each other and there was no space or room for anything else. The rooms there were
small and there was a single toilet bucket for everyone, which sometimes, when it
was full was not emptied or replaced. That, I can say was one of the problems that I
encountered during my stay in prison.
When I first embarked on politics, we did have women in politics, even at
Gonakudzingwa although they were few I can remember Mrs Chinamano, three from
Gwanda, and from Gweru there was one maMguni; so all in all at Gonakudzingwa
there was a total of six women in number.
During the struggle we credited spirit mediums so much that even in prison there
were some people who were known to be possessed; and those who were given
time to move around the prisons saying whatever they had to say to the people.
These people represented the culture sect.
I was harassed a lot, for instance after my release, the whites came to my
homestead twice a week looking and checking if I was still there, and they thought
that perhaps I entertained guerrillas. In fact I was beaten up on uncountable
occasions. It should be noted that at this time there were sell-outs from our area,
because people feared that once the guerrillas came they would suffer for their
actions. I remember one day gunshots were heard from behind my house and these
guns were guerrilla gunshots. So the whites came and asked me what type of
gunshots had I heard and I told them that I did not know and they beat me up
because I had failed to identify the gunshot
sounds and that I had referred to the whites as mabhunu. They mentioned that I can
call them whites, and beat me up for that.
The union of ZIPRA and ZANLA to form PF was such that, say from my area,
and the whole of Matabeleland, it was the ZIPRA boys who operated in this area;
in the other provinces ZANLA operated there. So the union came after realisation
that both military wings had actively participated in bringing about independence.
The elections which were won by Mugabe necessitated the union, so that the role of
either ZIPRA or ZANLA should not undermined the struggle; as we saw some
elements of ZIPRA resisting in the bush. With time we told them to admit to unity
b it meant equality; at least we saw it in that way.
Well, when we were leaving for Gonakudzingwa and when we were still at
Kwekwe prison we were kept indoors for four days without being let out.We boarded
the plane with two others from Harare and in Masvingo we were joined by the
others namely Madhandara and Nyakunhuwa; at Chiredzi we relocated into cars,
and upon arrival there we were greeted by others with drums and music who had
been arrested before us and we were conscripted into Camp 3. This camp was for
new recruits and here we were given pots to cook for ourselves and the firewood
was sometimes gathered
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for us although sometimes we went into the forest under the supervision of armed
guards to collect our own firewood. When I was relocated to Khami I was not
allowed to mix with other prisoners as they feared that I might spread evil to them.
There I was met by two whites who shifted me to a new cell which had replaced
Ingutsheni, which was a prison for mad people but Khami was between medium
and maximum security. It is here that we were ill-treated and they would come
asking us how we felt or whether we were now ready to surrender but none of us
surrendered. There was ill-treatment because we shared our cells with mad people
and the sanitation as I mentioned was deplorable.
I also need to add that during my years after release, up to 1980 we used to hide
our mealie-meal in a hole which we covered on top and our pots sometimes stayed
in the bush, in preparation for any attacks, when we could run to the bush for refuge.
I think that is all I can recall.
1994
Shoko, Abias Pelice

Abias Pelice Shoko, whose war name is Shoko Zvombo, was born in Pelile area. In 1977 he
left and joined the war with a group of about 100 others with the intention of crossing the
border and entering Mozambique. He was trained in Mozambique and in Bucharest and
later came back to work in Air Defence where he is still working.
My name is Abias Pelice Shoko. I was born in chief Mudavanhu’s area under
headman Pelile’s area. I left and joined the war on 26 August 1977 under the
companionship of comrades who operated in our area; I was 24 years old. As youths
life had become difficult in Rhodesia and we used to be gathered up by the whites
at Hombami which was their base and we used to be beaten up as they asked us
where we left the comrades. So this forced me to go to war than continue to be
oppressed by the whites. Others would just go to war.
We were a group of 100 and rested at Maranda area. We saw planes when we
were near Chikombedzi and all the other people ran into the river Mwenezi and
sought refuge there while I and another guy remained behind. We later joined the
others after we had crossed the Mwenezi River. We stayed in Masuku’s area for
almost a month because we were told that the border was not crossable due to the
enemy’s activities, as there were booby traps at the border, as well as landmines to
deter people from crossing into Mozambique.
We once thought of finding cattle to use as guinea pigs to detonate booby traps but
we couldn’t get them and by the time we crossed there were fifty of us. I am not sure
if the others perished from our attack. One comrade joined us later in Mozambique
and told us that he had gone back home after we had been attacked. We were
transported to the railway and to Mabaraji area near the Limpopo River after
having crossed there; from there we went to a base called Shaishai, still near the
Limpopo and the ocean. This time we were commanded by Cde Marikunaka. We
stayed there and most comrades who came from South Africa’s WENELA used to
pass through there. We then went to Pungwe III near the Malawian border.
We began our training and from there we went to Mudzingaidzi, where I first met
comrade Mugabe when he told us to go ahead with training. We went to Masengere
with Comrade Hamunyari as our commander. We then went to Doroi Base 12 where
those who had been trained stayed. And from there we went to Sofala Province,
where we stayed for a long while, awaiting deployment back home. Hunger was the
most eminent problems as we were given sadza and powdered milk which was not
enough. We ended up having to eat leather as long as you put salt on them.
We had women but they trained separately and lived separately at different bases.
We were treated equally and though there were diseases like hiccups which affected
women, they would be affected by this disease and would spread it to their
colleagues and as they walked they would act as if they saw something scary and
hence this disease was contagious to women only, not men.
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When we were near the Manica border, as we were about to come back, fifteen of
us including myself, were called out and we went back to Sofala and got
photographed. We arrived at Dodo Railway and went to Beira where we got on a
plane to Egypt, but en route we passed through Kenya. We crossed the Red Sea to
Bulgaria and to Bucharest where there was a base where Zimbabweans were
trained. There I met others like Comrade Shungu and Ropa; and for field artillery,
Colonel Chinyadzwa and Magocha. These had come before us and could speak
Romanian. We stayed there till independence. One day in August Banana came and
we thought we had finished the war but there I also met Cde Joshua Misihairambwi,
the late, and the President was Cde Mugabe; Banana told us that we were to undergo
further training of defending the country rather than taking it, and he told us that
the training had been extended but he did not know when it would end.
In February 1981, that was when we finished training and we came to assembly
points at Chitungwiza and then Tongogara. We then formed the Air Defence and I
am still working there up to now. The accounts are too many that I can’t finish them.
At Chimoio II we used to follow and believe in ancestors not like what they now
do. We were told to leave in the morning and as we left the place was bombed by
Smith and that is when we went to Pungwe III. In brief that was my account.
1994
Zvevamwe, London
[Gweru, 10 April 2008]
Comrade London Zvavamwe was born on 1st of April 1958 in Chivi. He grew up in
Gokwe, and joined the liberation struggle in Zambia at Mambishi Training Centre. He
was deployed in the northern front where he operated until 1979.
I am comrade London Zvavamwe I was born in 1958 on the 1st of April in Chivi. I
grew up in Gokwe. I left the country in 1976 and went to Mutengwani. We were a
group of about 22 boys and we left school, because Smith had proclaimed that all
school leavers should go to the national call-up. There was this radio, Voice of
Zimbabwe at Time Service Radio Zimbabwe. We used to listen with some
schoolmates; most of us were in form three. I joined the first group of the liberation
struggle in Zambia at Mambishi Training Centre.
It just happened that one Sunday we decided to join the liberation struggle; and
instead of going to the service we stayed in the dormitories. At night we prepared our
beds as if we were sleeping in them, so that when the other people came in from
the service they would think we were asleep; by then we would have gone. So we
utilised that opportunity and left the country. We went through Botswana and
arrived in Francistown, at Jere; and that was where a Transit camp for people going
to the war was situated. Tickets were prepared for us and we flew to Lusaka. And
then we joined others in Mambishi Training Centre.
Basically I can say there are several issues which inspired me to join the
liberation struggle. Firstly we were not comfortable with the presence of the
Rhodesian soldiers always roaming in our school, as if they wanted to protect us;
also there was the issue that all school leavers were supposed to go for call-up. We
said, “No call-up to fight our own brothers. It is impossible!” So I decided to join
the liberation fighters.
When we arrived in Zambia, we had to change our names. We could no longer
use our home names; those who had Ids had to surrender them at the first camp,
which was called Nyamupindu. We were then given Chimurenga names. My pseudo-
name was London Zvevamwe, which actually meant that London should hear from
us, and it was not for them to tell us what to do. I can say we were quite a big
number of us in Zambia. There were companies A to H, and we were around 800.
We were trained in guerrilla warfare, hit and run tactics; then there was training
in terrain
features, to be able to use the terrain, to the extent that people believed that‘vakomana
vanonyangarika.’ Actually we were trained how to manoeuvre the terrain to an extent
that the soldiers said we had disappeared, but it was not ‘kunyangarika.’ We were
trained by instructors like, Sigoge, who was the commander then, Cephas, Doug, and
even the Army Commander V. P. Sibanda, he was my instructor.
War in the northern front, spanned from Villa Kazungula, which is Livingstone to
Kanyemba; all that was in the Northern Front. But I am not at liberty to disclose the
detailed battles; it is more classified information to me. Really war in the Northern
stories
Front was not easy. The first obstacle was the Zambezi River itself. At times the
enemy ambushed us at a crossing point when we were in dinghies, because we used
the dinghy to cross the river. The enemy would hit that tube while we were in the
middle of the river crossing. Sometimes in the units we belonged to there were sell-
outs, who communicated with the Rhodesian forces that there would be people at a
certain crossing point, crossing into the then Rhodesia. Besides being ambushed at
the crossing point, we were also attacked by hippos in the river, and a lot of property
and people would be lost that way. People who could not swim drowned, so in most
cases we had to put on life jackets in the case that there would be need to swim
across the river. Basically that was the first obstacle. From there, if all went on well,
the second obstacles would be thickets. We took four to five days before reaching
the populated areas. So for those days we had to manoeuvre in the game reserves,
which were full of animals including the rhino,‘bhejani’. That was the most
notorious animal because at times it could attack you; buffalos were also notorious.
The lions were not a big deal; it was like they respected us. The rhinoceros and the
buffalo were so notorious that we ended up firing bullets at them. That was the
second obstacle. In the reserves we reached some points where we had to climb
mountains, especially the Zambezi Escarpment. That was another obstacle; that at
one point when crossing the Devil’s Gorge it took us the whole day climbing,
because we had to carry a lot of materials including guns and food. Unlike the
Rhodesian forces that relied on planes we had to use our backs. The after that we
had to cook our food, eat and sleep. The following morning we had to climb down;
climbing down was a bit easier, and it took half a day. Then the fourth obstacle was
hostile masses. In the beginning the povo could not understand the purpose of the
liberation struggle and so they could sell-out. So before we politicised the peasants,
we could not rely on them; but as time went on, having politicised them, they got to
understand and appreciate our efforts. At the end of the day we were the fish and
they were our water.
I came from Zambia back into Rhodesia at end of 1976, around Christmas. I
was then deployed in the northern front and operated there until 1979. I can say the
guerrilla warfare was very difficult to comprehend; it was difficult because you
can’t harness guerrilla warfare as it was hit and run. They had protected bases in the
northern front. So we had to quickly arrange the exit way, because within no time the
helicopters arrived and surrounded us.
We did not use pungwes in the northern front, we could only mobilise the masses
house to house, and they brought food to a central place, but we had no pungwes
in the northern front. The Northern front was the one that had predominantly
ZIPRA forces, though at times they could meet with ZANLA forces and execute
joint operations. ZIPA was the combination of the two forces. But what I am saying
is that in the northern front if we needed reinforcements, we could group together
with ZANLA and as a joint venture, attack the camp we found necessary to attack.
It was not necessarily difficult to come together, because we were in good working
relations; we never faced that problem. Of course women were trained, but very
few got to the
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front. They probably brought the supplies like the bullets, explosives and landmines,
but were not necessarily fighting on day to day basis. On our side there was no
such set-up.
Muzorewa is one of the leaders who caused other people to suffer because he
entered into the agreement with Smith, which was a treasonous; such that, the
Rhodesian African Rifles, who were Smith’s soldiers, ended up with Pfumo
Revanhu,
who were called Dzakutsaku, were poorly trained and had such poor and inefficient
weapons that the majority of them fell by the wayside. ZIPRA was from
Kazungula, from Livingstone to Feira which border Zambia, Zimbabwe and
Malawi and Mozambique. From there onwards, as we proceeded further eastwards,
that was where the ZANLA forces operated. The ZIPRA forces came from
Livingstone Stretch to Lupane, Gwanda, Beitbridge and across Mberengwa. ZANLA
also went either side and we could meet around Beitbridge. The mission of the
liberation struggle was to dismantle the discriminatory rule of the time, in which
the whites did not want to hear of one man one vote. So we had to resort to an
armed struggle to attain that right of one man one vote to be able to choose the kind
of leadership we wanted. The battles I was involved in were many, but as I said, I
am not at liberty to outline them because I am not comfortable with that. I am not at
liberty, like I mentioned earlier on that while in joint operations with ZANLA we
attacked big camps and garrisons like Livingstone and some garrisons like Kariba,
Chirundu and Kanyemba. All these garrisons were subjected to our firepower.
We travelled mainly on foot and we could carry our food with us, but we could get
supplementary food in the bush. In later stages we had to rely on supplies from the
peasants. On clothing, we had our own uniforms and with time we had jeans supplied
from businesses, they were bought and brought to us in the front. The Rhodesian
forces could poison water points, because water was one of the of the obstacles in
the game reserves. We first observed the water to find out if the microorganisms
found in water were there before drinking. When we could not find them, it implied
that the water had been poisoned. They also poisoned canned beef. So they used all
kinds of dirty tactics. I have scars from the liberation struggle; not only physical
scars but also
the mental scars; that was the first injury subjected to mwana wevhu. Then on scars,
there was this battle from which I was affected by splinters. They used grenades
and some of the splinters pierced me on my right side; on the very day I was injured
by the splinters, I was also hit in my ribs, and as we speak, it is still deformed. I
would say, we should keep on keeping on with the revolution, because revolution is
not an event, it is a process. So since it is a process, I urge all the youth to harness
themselves, tighten their belts and then continue in our revolutionary way until the
whole of Africa is liberated, until the whole world, and each and everyone goes
back to his or her own position, as God created the world and put boundaries.
Rumours that there is probably more history about the ZANLA than the ZIPRA
are not true. It’s only publicity that is biased on one side, but it’s not true. Since it
was a protracted war, no-one could say he was fighting better than the others
because it
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was not a race as such, or otherwise. But it is a fact that AK47 or the bazooka could
be used the same way across the board; so I think it was more of publicity than
anything else.
Towards 1980 we were in the front, and that was when we were enjoying the war,
as we had started establishing the liberated zones, which was a no-go area for the
enemy. We were in the process of infiltrating the urban centres and we were about
to start urban guerrilla warfare. Then we heard about the Lancaster Agreement issue
that our leaders had agreed upon. We were kind of suspicious in the initial days, and
some did not even go to the assembly points, because they failed to understand the
situation. But at the end of the day we assembled at the assembly points, after our
nationalist leaders pleaded with us. Assembly points were scattered throughout the
country.
There were no keeps in the northern front. We only heard about them around Mt.
Darwin area, but from Veira to Livingstone there were no
keeps. Thank you.
1994
Chamunorwa, Abel
Abel Chamunorwa’s war name is Teverai Chimurenga.
I was born in 1958 in the Nyumbu area of Chivi district. I went to Chirogwe
School, then proceeded to Hippo Valley, where my father worked, and I completed
my studies (there) at Gaba School in 1977. When I finished school, I had a friend
callled Manasa Rukono. In December, we left Hippo Valley intending to go and
join the Chimurenga (struggle). We would hear about the war from the village. I
had actually visited the village sometime in 1976, where we were given an
orientation about the struggle one evening at a pungwe at the Machingura base. The
comrades who were at the pungwe included Teverai Chimurenga, whose name I
later adopted when we got to Mozambique.
The three of us, with my friends, wanted to go (and join) the struggle, but we
could not find anyone to go with us. But there was teacher Chigome who helped
people to cross (to Mozambique). Then one of us said he had a sister who lived in
the Save River area. So we went to Chiredzi, and we got into a roadblock on our
way to the Chitsva Keep, where our friend’s sister was married. At the roadblock
we produced our identity papers and we said we were students, and that we were on
our way to look for Form 1 places at Hippo Valley. We were allowed to proceed.
Our plan was to get help from our friend’s brother-in-law to cross the Save River.
We spent one night and then we were helped to crossed the river. The brother-in-
law advised us to keep walking straight ahead. After walking for a while, we saw a
raw of (Rhodesian) soldiers with guns, and we lay on the ground, taking cover.
The soldiers passed and we proceeded. We got to a homestead where there was a
woman. She asked us where we were going and we told her that we wanted to go to
Mozambique. Then she said that we would be shot by the soldiers. We were
already in the Mahenye area, in Chipinge. We continued walking, then we saw a
man who was walking, carrying a hammer. We told him that we wanted to go to
Mozambique, and he said we were almost there, it was a short distance away.
When we got to the border we were taken to Sangadhara, whom I think was the
village head. Then he called the Mozambican soldiers. The militia came first, and
they asked us where we had come from. We said we had come from Rhodesia. It
was already sunset, so they took us to a house. There we met an elderly man who
used to work in Hippo Valley Section 12,who knew each other with one of my
friends. He then said (to the militia) that he knew us and that he used to work with
my friend’s father.
The following morning we were taken to a (Mozambican) comrades’ base, where
we spent two days being interrogated, being asked about who we had come with. That
place we arrived at was called Machazi. We were then taken to a police camp, where
(the police) were told that we wanted to go for training, and we were asked to confirm.
We were then taken to Chipungabeira, where we saw others who had come from
Zimbabwe, who were waiting to be moved further. We were put in that group and
were questioned by the (Zimbabwean) comrades. The fighters would make us do the
toi-toi drills. By then it was 1978. We were then taken to the Goigoi base, then to
Musengezi, until we arrived at Chibhawawa or Toronga. This is where the refugee
camp was. We could actually walk about in the afternoons and evenings, and there
was even a river where we would wash ourselves. Then we were put in a battalion
called Parirenyatwa. stories
There were many problems at Chibhawawa. Food would come once a week, and
we would only eat twice per week. There were many diseases and infections, such as
jiggers known as matekenya which would barrow into your feet and buttocks. We
would remove the bugs when we went to wash at the Budzi river. Then there were the
ticks called zvifesani which would infect your leg, and get deeper and deeper until
your leg would almost get torn apart.
When there would be no food we would go into the Mozambican communities to
look for logs to build our shelters, then the people would give us work to do in their
fields, then they would give us food, after which we would go back to do our work in
the camp. While there at Chibawawa, in 1978 we received the information that we
would be going for (military) training. Then vehicles arrived with comrades who had
come to tell us that we were going to go for training in (countries such as) Romania
(and) Yugoslavia. We were taken away in groups.
We arrived at a camp called Samakweza, and we were put in groups. My friend and
I were put in the group that was going to Libya. We were then taken to Beira, from
where we proceeded to Libya. We arrived in Tripoli and were taken to a military base
where we would stay in tents. Our instructors were comrades Simbi, Hamunyari and
Magorira, who were from Pakistan and could speak English. The ZIPRA trainees also
had their own separate camp.
We started training on infantry warfare, regular warfare, and also on how to use big
guns, AK47, bazooka, as well as the LMG (Light Machine Gun), and we even had the
guns which our enemy used. We trained for a full year. We did not even stop training after
the ceasefire was agreed on, because we were worried that the Rhodesians could renege
on the agreement. We returned to (Zimbabwe) in 1980, in phases, going to assembly
points.
Our first training was basic infantry training. It was about small arms, such as LMG,
60mm mortar, AK47. You would start with small arms, then field craft, ambushes,
patrols, phases of war. As for ambushes, we were taught how to work out the direction
from which the enemy was coming and where he was going. And how you would lay
your ambush at a suitable point, where you could fire your guns and attack the enemy
with maximum effect.
After theory we would then go to positions and lay the ambushes. Small arms were
for you to shoot the enemy in close contact or during an assault, getting closer to the
enemy, giving you accuracy. As for drills, we would do foot drills, marching without
guns. We would also learn about position of attention, salute on the march, for
celebrations, while marching past the superiors, while saluting, saluting while holding
your guns. Holding means stopping and saluting. We also did bayonet fighting drills.
(In a battle) if you end up too close to the enemy you may not be able to fire your gun,
so we were taught other ways of hitting the enemy effectively.
After the small arms, we learnt about anti-tank attack (and) anti-air. I personally
focused on anti-tank training, which was the training programme called “classical
warfare”. We were taught how to destroy the enemy’s planes, as well as the tanks.
Others did anti-air rifles. The instructor I liked most was comrade Magorira. He
helped us to quickly grasp what we were being taught, especially foot drills and arms
drills. There was also another Libyan who would entertain us with samba (music)
during training. The one I liked most when it came to training on how to strip the rifle
was Comrade George. He was so good at dismantling the gun that you would learn
quickly. 1994
The day we were told that we were going back home we were so excited, but we
were also anxious because we were going into assembly points. We thought we were
going to form our own army. We were also worried about how we were going to be
put together with the ZIPRA forces, who were fighting together with us. Long back,
there was one university; long back, there was no black person who could vote or be a
president.
stories
Chingoo, Mai
[Nembiri]
My name is Mrs Chingoo. I live in Nembiri. The war was hot here in Chikwira. My
husband was shot by the soldiers in 1976 when he was taking food to the comrades.
He was taken away in a vehicle by the soldiers. My husband was hurt on his leg,
while two others died on the spot. So in (Mount) Darwin they took us to the witnesses
houses. They (the soldiers) shared our property while we were watching. We didn’t
sleep, as they kept calling us wives of terrorists, ordering us to go outside in the rain.
It was in February, and it was raining. We were ordered outside until sunrise.
The following morning they took us again and asked us to show them our people’s
dead bodies. We showed them. They then took us to a house where they interrogated
us, saying that we were wives of terrorists. They asked us the names of the people
who had died. They then took us to a house where dead bodies were kept in coffins,
awaiting burial. Back here in the village they put us in keeps the week after we came
from the prison in Mt Darwin. They put us in keeps while the rains were pouring.
They ordered us to destroy our houses because the terrorists would stay in the houses.
So we moved into the keep and built new houses. But food would still be smuggled
out of the keeps (to feed the comrade) while the soldiers were guarding us. We didn’t
even care about the soldiers or DA’s. The comrades would also even get into the keep.
We were determined and we were prepared to die because what we wanted was to
liberate our country. We lived in the keep from 1976 to 1980. We would sweep
around the fences while the DA’s guarded us. We were given (identity) cards. When
you would go out of the keep, you would leave your card at the gate and pick it up
when you come back. If you lose the card, you would be thoroughly beaten. But we
never gave up. We would smuggle food out of the keep and take it (to the comrades)
because we wanted our independency. We would wrap buns in a cloth, then wrap the
clothe around the waist, then wear a coat and walk out. Before the keep had been
fenced, we would carry sadza (in containers) on our heads, covering it with leaves so
that the soldiers in helicopters would not see the sadza.
There were people like Topedza who had cars. We would load sacks in the car,
then cover them with cow manure. On the way out of the keep we would say it was
manure and yet beneath there would be mealie meal and sadza. We would also
smuggle cooking oil from Harare and hide it, then use it to cook the relish. So our
keep was very good at feeding the comrades. In 1976 we were all surrounded and
ordered (by the soldiers) to go there at Guradzimu. They said they were going to teach
us a lesson. Jets flew in from Harare and they were circulating above us. We could not
take anything out, not even a teaspoon. Mr Chidengu was shot all over. His wife was
shot while she was in the house. That is the battle that was fought at headman
Chibaya’s place. Some (survivors) were later taken to Bindura for treatment, but God
refused/ forsook us on that occasion.
In 1973 I got into yet another keep in St Albert, where people really suffered.
We would be forced by the soldiers to clear human excreament with bare hands.
People were beaten badly, then got released later. But the war never stopped. In
1974 they moved people from Chiweshe to Muzarabani, but we remained resolute.
That’s the year they changed identity cards from paper ones to the (metal ones)
with pictures. We were taken back to the keep, but we never gave up, because
people were united. We would all keep secrets, we were against the white man.
We initially voted for Muzorewa, but the war intensified. Muzorewa was hiding
1994
ahead of (behind) Smith. The war was fought so well that all of us regretted why
we didn’t go and join the struggle. We then voted again after getting explanations
about the way things were. We voted for the cockerel (Zanu PF) in 1980. We head
on the radio that whoever won should not say bad things to the others. The cockerel
won and we celebrated. We didn’t sleep. It was independency. Here in Mt Darwin
we saw the war, the battle which my husband was shot, and the one at headman
Chibaya’s place. Aah, I feel sad because Mrs Chibaya ran away, but she was shot
in the house. That’s were one comrade was killed, at Chikwira, a tough battle it
was.
Another battle was fought there at Siyamachira, and another one at Chamboko, and
at Maripfonde. I saw with my own eyes Michael Maripfonde’s house being destroyed,
people being forced into Maripfonde’s house, being beaten in there. I was on my way
to see my husband who was in Bindura. These battles were fought because people had
realised that our country had been taken away by force, and they said let’s see if we
can’t take it back. The white man was sitting pretty, while we were here, a rocky area
where you can not grow crops. Here in the rural areas, we were not allowed to sell our
crop at the GMB (Grain Marketing Board), our children could only study upto
Standard 6, without further education. We got to understand about the war after the
comrades explained to us and we realised that this country was ours, it was snatched
away from us, so we must fight.
Our problem was that of sell-outs, because you would have to make sure that around
you there was no one whom you didn’t know. You would not take food (to the
comrades) before someone had looked around, checking wether there were people
watching. Muzorewa’s militia (Dzakutsaku) and the Selous Scouts worked together
with the whites. The Dzakutsaku came, and they were called Muzorewa’s soldiers.
They wore brown uniforms. Their slogan was: “Dzakutsaku ehe, huru yadzo
dzakutsaku.” (Dzakutsaku ehe, the big gest of them all, dzakutsaku.).
The Chimurenga songs were such that even those who were not understanding
(about the war) would end up knowledgeable through the singing. If you would sing,
“Nehondo nyika taitora” (We take this country through the war). Or the song that
goes:
“Zimbabwe ndeyeropa baba Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe ndeyeropa ramadzibaba
Nyika yeropa remadzibaba”
(Zimbabwe is the land of our fathers’ blood)
Even a person who would not understand (the objectives of) the war would end up
knowing that our country was our fathers’ country, it belonged to Chaminuka, Mbuya
Nehanda, Kaguvi, so the war had to be fought.
The spirit mediums, being the voices of the ancestors, would usually advise the
stories
comrades on how to conduct themselves, giving them the traditional laws that they
had to follow, so that they would not misbehave. They would also give them the
assurance that things would eventually end well and that they should remain
determined. In the time of the war we were forbidden to work in the fields on Fridays.
In the Hwata area they were forbidden to grow round nuts. We were not allowed to
wear red clothes. The comrades were forbidden to have love affairs, and had to focus
on the war. Those who broke the laws and fell pregnant perished. Any female
collaborator who broke the laws was taken to be a sell-out, for example if you would
not deliver food to the comrades on time, or if you would not even deliver the food at
all. They would say you didn’t do your duty because you were busy planning other
things (against the struggle). So you would be taken to a base where you would be put
on trial and if you didn’t have satisfactory explanations you would be beaten
thoroughly in front of the people. If you were late to bring sadza to the comrades they
would order you to eat and finish all the sadza, no matter the quantity. Many sell-outs
had their lips cut, many actually died. The comrades would ask the sell-out to go with
them, and he would be excited to follow believing that he was being taken for
training, not knowing that they were going to kill him.
People should not take a war lightly, because it is dangerous, it has no production
because you will be full of fear in whatever you will be doing.
The comrades used guns and landmines. The enemy used aeroplanes to bomb, but
the comrades won. Do you think it was possible to use bombs to attack someone who
was walking on foot, even when the (Rhodesian soldiers had) help from the whites who
were brought in from South Africa and ended up dying here?
The objectives of the war were met because now we have land, schools are
everywhere, we have clinics, we can now till the land, people are selling their farm
produce, which we were not allowed to do because we were said to be baboons. We
didn’t want another war. But others were injured (in the war) and never got any
compensation. Like my husband there, who is not getting anything, yet he lost his leg
in the war. We joined the ZLWCA but we are not getting any money. We attend the
meetings and we pay the required subscriptions.
The first comrades we worked with were George Rutanhire, Matambanadzo,
Tonderai Kufa, Chingwa, Farirai Hondo, Teddy Marikiti. These are the ones we were
with (in the struggle.) Bid Tamai’s name was changed to Muronda. We would cook for
them and our husbands would take the food to them. My first son, Njodzi, was given
his father’s name by his grandfather.
1994
Chingoo, Sekuru
[Nembiri]
I am Sekuru Chingoo. The war started in 1972 on 25 December. I started seeing
helicopters, not knowing what was happening. The soldiers were fighting on their
own, then they realised that they were not going to win the war without the support
of the people, then they came to us. The soldiers would move during the day, and
the comrades would move at night, each side hunting the other in the forests. The
soldiers were once ambushed at Maripfonde and they were thoroughly beaten. That
was in 1973, when I was working at a garage at St Alberts. I met the soldiers in the
evening, their long line of vehicles with punctured tyres. In 1974 there was the
second battle at Nembiri,where all the people of Marara Nyakutsongwa area were
put in keeps.
Yes, in 1973 there was a time we spent a whole week being asked if we knew
terrorists, and how they looked like. Many were beaten, such as Muchageza,
Mutinhima. We abandoned our livestock in the bush, but we came back and found
our crops (still) in the fields because it was in the month of March. Our livestock
were devoured by wild animals right in our homesteads.
In 1975 there was no battle which was fought, but in 1976, on 2 February,
that’s when I was shot on the leg when I was on my way to give the comrades food
in Nyamufutagomo (mountain/river). I was taken to Mt Darwin hospital where my
leg was amputated, then I went to Bindura where I spend three months. Others
were arrested in Maripfonde. All from Kadonje, (the likes of) Dhiziriyo Simuka,
participated in the war, carrying guns. I remained in our area, working as a
collaborator, being the head of the bases, going that far where the comrades would
stay, bringing them food in the bases..
In 1977 we were then put in a keep at Chikwira, in Keep One. We could not get to
the bases, it was in the middle of the arrival of ammunition that came from the east,
arriving in the Nembire mountain. The ammunition was removed from there and was
taken behind the mountain. After that, still in 1977, a battle was fought right in the
keep.
The soldiers and the comrades fired guns at each other. The comrades had entered
the keep looking for food. But the comrades did not fire back because they were
worried about harming civilians. From Nembiri to Mafusire we worked with many
people, united as one people. We would also go around, hiding/burying bullets,
especially at the battle in the keep. But after ceasefire,we met with the comrades and
we gave them (the) bullets. After the war, we had a party at Wilson Maripfonde’s
house, we had (won our) independence.
In the war we worked with Rex Nhongo, Matambanadzo, Kambunda, Jet. These are
some of those that worked from village to village. In Maripfonde there were the likes
of Tonderai. At Nembire there were the likes of Matambanadzo, Pfumvu, Jet. We
would know that on this particular day the comrades would be at which place, and (we
would know) when they would be coming back. But we were not allowed to accept a
group of comrades if there wasn’t a single comrade that you knew. You had to know
certain comrades. Being a collaborator, you would be send to certain places, but you
had to assess whether you would be able to get there (safely), and if you couldn’t you
would tell the comrades that it was not safe for you to go there, because you could die
or other people would think that you were a sell-out. You could be asked to bring sadza
stories
(food) during the day, which is the time the soldiers would be patrolling. So you would
know what to do. So these are some of the challenges that we would meet during the war.
It was not a problem for us to meet with the comrades when we were in the keeps because
there were some people who would get out of the keeps and meet with the comrades. We
stayed in the keep from 1976 to 1979, and got out, going back to our homes around 1980.
At that time we were united with the collaborators. There were times when the
collaborators would be send to the shops to buy such things as tobacco. They had to know
how to bring the parcel and who to give so that he would then take it (out of the keep) to
the comrades.
There could be young people who would make balls using rugs, then put the
goods inside the ball, then kick the ball (outside). So you would not tell anyone.
Word would spread as if people had phones. Night rallies were rarely held in this
area. The rallies were held during the day in 1977, and young people were taken to
Mozambique for training. Wilson Maripfonde, Gonzo and many others had rallies
during the day in the bases. Some ended up dying when the soldiers laid an ambush
in Chikwira mountain, in the Sekeramayi area. One lady was shot and the comrades
took her away. We sang traditional songs in support of the struggle ans some of
these songs were sung after the ceasefire. We sang “Maruza imi, vapembepfumi”(
You have lost you plunderers).
We sang when they (the soldiers) lost. We fought because they never thought that
we would win because we were walking of foot while they would fly in aeroplanes and
drive in vehicles, using dogs, horses, motor cycles. But we won because of the strength
of our ancestors’ spirits. Spirit mediums led the war, because in each group of
comrades there would always be one wearing spirit mediums’ regalia, which means
there was someone who would guide them as they walked or fought. There were also
some creatures, such as birds like eagles, which would help. When you would see an
animal running from a certain direction you would know that there was danger where it
was coming from. You would then go in the direction that the animal would be going.
This means that the animals were guided by ancestral spirits. The spirit mediums that I
know are Nehanda and Chaminuka.
All the civilians where now knowledgeable about the war, including even women.
As such, if those people were still around it wouldn’t even be necessary to have
elections because people were united, with one goal. Even the headmen were united
together with us. Those who would betray the struggle would be beaten, then shot dead.
Some would be shot while people were watching, and others would be taken into the
bush and shot there. A collaborator who would make a mistake would be given to a
commander who would discipline him. He would first be given a warning, but would
be beaten if the fault was excessive. The comrades used bazookas and anti-airs (in the
war).
In 1976 we took sadza to the comrades at Nyafuta, but the sadza was not enough
because the numbers of the comrades had increased. So we cooked (more sadza) and
took the sadza to the comrades. We didn’t know that we had been sold out. We didn’t
make it to the comrades’ base because the soldiers had laid an ambush. That’s when I
was shot on the leg. Two of my colleagues, Petros Chibaya and Petros Nyamachira,
died on the spot.
The people called “Mapuruvheya”
1994 or “Madzakutsaku” were blacks who were working under
the government of Smith. They were sell-outs, some were DAs and policemen. They would
harm people under the guise that they were comrades. We expected the enemy to be white.
But once you are a sell-out you are also an enemy. All Smith’s soldiers were enemies because
they did not want us to progress with the war. Life in the keep was hard because if a battle
happened outside, we would spend the whole day locked up in the keep, without getting out
until the following day. Grinding mills were closed and people had to use motar and pestle to
grind maize for cooking sadza. We fought the war because our children who had completed
Form 2 could not get jobs, and at work we would be beaten by the white man, which pained us
in our hearts because we were being treated like slaves in our own country.
After the war, the objectives were fulfilled, but other objectives cannot be fulfilled because
they take time.
People should know that war is painful, we should avoid it because it kills.
stories
Dumbarimwe, Elizabeth
My name is Elizabeth Dumbarimwe, born in Chimanimani. That’s where my father
lived, but we moved from there to Bikita. I was born in Musikavanhu, because that’s
my origin. My father moved to Bikita because he was pursuing his business interests.
He reared pigs, so he needed inputs for him to be able to rear the pigs, so that he
would be able to send us to school. But he was also a small trader, running small scale
businesses. I did my primary school in Mutare. I did Sub A to Standard 1 , then I was
transferred, (and) it was still in the Smith regime. Then the Grades system was
introduced, so I started Grade 3, after I had done Sub A and Sub B, and I went up to
Grade 7. I then went to St Augustine Mission, which was an Anglican Mission School
in Penhalonga, where I started Form 1. When I was in Form 3 I had an English
teacher called Stanlous Chigwedere, who was a prominent civil servant. I can say I
was politicised in my classroom because our teacher was politically oriented. When
we were studying that book called Animal Farm, by George Orwell, our discussions
would end up being political.
I am sure you understand that George Orwell’s book has political connotations. So
from there, that’s how it started. We got more and more interested in what it (the
book) was talking about, wanting to know what he was really talking about. I can say
that’s when I began to see the basis of political orientation. What really touched me
was that there were some characters that were mistreated, being given labels such as
“Stupid”. Other characters were being pushed, but others were able to stand their
ground. But what I can say about Animal Farm is that it gave me a picture of the
dynamics of life, that you find in life that there is a saying which says that ‘there are
animals which are more equal than others.’
That gave us the scenario that was in our country. Young as we were, we started
opening our brains, we became more politically mature. We started being politically
mature in the sense that we noticed the discrepancies between the blacks and the
whites. For example, I remembered that my uncle, my father’s older brother, was
arrested because he had been found with a beer bottle. He was arrested and stayed in
prison (for some time), which was something which got into my mind as to why a
person could be arrested for a simple thing like a beer bottle. But I couldn’t see the
crime behind that. Then I started linking things with what I saw and heard at school,
then I began to realise that there was something wrong somewhere. Then with the
discussions which we used to have with the English teacher, Mr Chigwedere, it
continued to make us more politically enthusiastic, making us understand what was
really going on. From there he was able to give us (more) in small doses suitable for
our level so that we would understand the situation.
These discussions were done in the classroom, with us asking questions
continuously. This led us to form a smaller group which was even more interested,
and we would ask questions during break, lunch hour, (and) study time, wanting to
know more. We would give our own experiences, the way things were in our home
areas. So that’s how we were able to see what was happening around us. As we
were at a tender age, we could see what was happening, but we could not see the
meaning behind it. Later on he (our teacher) started explaining that there was a
struggle going on, explaining bit by bit until we realised that this was the situation
on the ground. That is why there was this talk about people who were said to be
leaving the country. I had1994 not heard about students leaving school to go out of the
country. But we later heard that at schools like Marist Brothers some students had
disappeared. The information that we were being given was that the students had
been taken by terrorists. But then, speaking with our teacher, we then discovered
that these people were not terrorists but were freedom fighters and were fighting to
liberate us, (fighting) to end the experiences that we were seeing. There was a deep
racial division between the blacks and whites. It was also then that we learnt that
we didn’t have the right to vote. Then we decided to find ways of seeing these
people (freedom fighters) so that we could talk to them.
That was our interest but then our teacher told us that the only way you could
talk with them was to go to them. But we wondered how we could get to them,
imagining the set up of a mission school and a boarding school for that matter.
Girls had there own separate residences, female teachers also had their own
separate residencies. Interactions (between boys, girls and teachers) were only
during school lessons. But he (our teacher) said there was a way we could see these
people and talk with them. We left (school) as a group of 16, that is 13 boys and 3
girls. We left in broad daylight. I don’t know where we got the courage and the
instructions. (We had) this guy, who is now in the army, called Daniel
Muchongoma. He had all the instructions on how we would go about it, and the
directions we had to follow. (We were told that if asked) we would say we were
going to Muchena primary school. There was a soccer match at the school, so we
would say we were going to support the Muchena school team. But this had never
happened before. We left school without carrying any extra clothes or provisions.
We were just told to wear warm clothes because we could come back (to school)
late.
So we were instructed to wear shoes and jerseys that would keep us warm. The
shoes had to be flat because we were going to “run about, cheering up”. We left
around 3.30, using a path near Muchena. After passing Muchena, we took a route
which led us to Nyafaru. I think this was the late Chief Rekai Tangwena’s place.
When we got there, we went to the homesteads where we were supposed to go. The
guy (leader) knew exactly where we were supposed to go. Because he was in Form
4, he knew that if we got to this particular place we would see which person, and
the person who would take us to the next stage.
We were very fortunate because no helicopter followed us, or any security forces, until we got
to the place we were supposed to be left, so that Chief Rekayi Tangwena would then fetch us. In
the evening, around 6.30, that’s when we saw a very elderly person who came to talk to us, saying
“Greetings my children.” He then said we had to follow all the instructions that he was going to
give us, so that we would be able to see the people that we said we wanted to see. He was with
three other men of varying ages. So we walked for some distance, then Chief Tangwena
disappeared. We didn’t see were he went. We continued walking with the three other men, until
they helped us cross the border.
We crossed the border at night. The men knew which path we had to use. They gave us
instructions, and warned us to be careful about what were called booby traps, as well as
what were called landmines. We didn’t know what these were. So we had to follow the
way they walked and stepped, until we crossed the border. And they said we were now in
Mozambique. We were surprised that we were already that far. We did not know how the
(school) soccer match ended. We were given more explanations on how things were.
They said from there, they were going to take us to the people who could answer the
questions we were asking (at school).
stories
Chief Tangwena was a very humble man (from what we saw) in that short period we
were together with him. What came into my mind was that he was down to earth on
dressing, talking. He appeared as a fatherly figure to me. He was very welcoming, you
wouldn’t even feel scared. He would say “Feel free to talk with me because I can give you
all the information that you want”. Before he disappeared, he took bananas from a nearby
banana tree and gave us, and said he would catch up with us soon, but he didn’t follow.
Before we got to the border, we saw him again when we were being given instructions on
how to walk. He had some very sweet oranges, and he gave us two each.
In Mozambique, we were handed over to a certain villager who spoke ChiManyika. He
walked with us until we got to a small base of the (Mozambican) comrades, and he left us
there. I went in September 1975, from St Augustine, where I was doing Form 3. I started
Form 1 in 1973. We were told that these were (Mozambican) comrades, who were our
friends, but whom we could not talk with a lot about our issues. They were friends of the
people whom we wanted to meet and talk with.
After staying there for about three days we walked until we got close to Manica, there
in Mozambique. We were then told that we would be given time to rest since we were
young. Some of us had swollen legs, others were tired because we were not used to this.
We rested for three days, then we saw a vehicle coming and we were told board the car
together with the comrades.
That’s when we began to ask ourselves where the difference was between soldiers and
(Mozambican) comrades, only to find out later that it was one and the same thing. (Those)
comrades were the Mozambican soldiers who fought for independence under FRELIMO.
That’s when we got to know that there was something called FRELIMO, and that there
was Samora Moises Machel, and that Mozambique had gained independence.
We stayed well with the comrades. They made us do what were called drills, and
that’s when we started realising that there was something military about that
environment. We were given food and clothes, and would be asked to wash our
clothes. Some of our friends were beginning to wonder what would happen with school
now that we were in the war. But they (comrades) said we would be given
explanations. So we stayed for the three days, then we were collected by avehicle, and
we were told that the people who had come to pick us were the (Zimbabwean)
comrades, so we were going to their base. That’s when we saw the (Zimbabwean)
comrades in reality for the first time. Among the people who came to pick us, I noticed
one person whom I knew who had been a senior at my former school, who was called
Comrade Zororo Duri, or Willard. When I saw him we realised that this was well
arranged so that some of the school going people like us would feel comforted. They
told us about the purpose of the war. These were the first people to explain to us that
our country was called Zimbabwe.
We were then taken to Chimoio, where we stayed at a certain small base for a while,
then we were taken to a hospital because some of us had blisters. The blisters were
caused by the walking. That’s where we first met a female comrade, who was called
Comrade Mbune, who was actually a member of the General Staff. She started talking
with us girls. Comrade Duri also spoke with the boys. They explained to us how things
were. We stayed there for a long time. I remember another comrade who was at this
base who was called Comrade Grey, but now he is called Comrade Maronga. He is one
of those whom we later started talking with. That’s when we realised that this was a
countrywide thing.
We were then told that1994we were going to leave for a training base in Chimoio. We
arrived there and we were put in different sections. We were then told that we were
going to be given names that each one would use. I chose the name Kudzai
Takauyanetsoka, because I appreciated that we had come on foot, and we went
through a lot of pain. Our shoes were torn, and clothes were tattered because of
walking in forests. I was with Comrade Victoria Mamvura, who gave herself the name
Vickie, and Thelma Mangwende, who gave herself the name Praise Nehanda, because
by then we knew that there was Nehanda, because we had been given some
orientation. There are also the boys, the likes of Daniel. We all changed our names.
Vic Rufaro also gave herself that name because she was happy to arrive in
Mozambique, as the journey was long and dangerous.
When we were at the base, we saw others whom we had been at school with, such as
Mutsvangwa, Matarutse, Casper Tarumbwa…..it was a big group. But the living standards
were critical. We got to Chimoio when there was not enough food, which was very difficult
for us because we were used to having enough food in boarding school. It was rather difficult
in the first days, but we adjusted quickly. One of my friends cried at some stage because it
was difficult. But comrades Duri and Mutsvangwa placated us, talking to us about the war
situation. We were then put in groups, being taught about why we were fighting the war, why
we were in Mozambique and about the rewards we would be given after the war. There were
different levels, depending on when you came. We stayed in barracks, in thatched pole
houses. We were given duties to sweep. The beds were made of poles, while the mattresses
were made of grass. The living standards were different from those at home. We were given
provisions such as blankets, but they were not enough and we had to be content with sharing.
Even soap, you had to share. There was a genuine spirit of comradeship, so much that even
ladies could exchange underwear. We learnt that we had to be there for each other.
Before training, I was send to the medical department. Responsibilities were given
depending on your skills. The supervisor at the medical department was Columbus,
but the department was under Sydney Sekeramayi, Herbert Ushewokunze and
Muchemwa. There, the Mozambicans called us “maforomera”. We were taught how
to treat soldiers coming from battles. It was basic, but actually helpful. You were
supposed to treat wounds and clean them, to avoid infection. We were also taught
about the drugs and injections that we had to administer on the patients. That’s when
we got to know about antibiotics. Comrades would actually be healed. We also treated
malaria.
I was the first to master the skills because I was a fast learner. The others were
send to the political department. If you were good at cooking, you would be sent to
the Home Economics department, depending on your talent. We then went for training
in Mapinduzi, where the training was rough. There, there were people like Keith
Nyika, Joshua Ras or Mark Dube, who would supervise us. That group had a mixture
of boys and girls. I remember comrade Beauty Zivai, who was a very cool (female)
trainer and a role model. She could do things like crawling, doing it in a way to
encourage you to do it better than her. The training was hard, but we were determined.
I remember there were some obstacles that we had to find ways to overcome them, so
that you would learn how to work your way out in the event that you were trapped in
the enemy’s territory.
So you needed to find a way to go through. It is amazing how we managed this at
our age. That’s when you realise that some of the things that happened in the war
were hard. You would be told to climb a fence right up to its top, and yet you were
very short and young. There would storiesbe fire or a pit on the other side of the fence, so
you could not afford to fall. It was not a small fire. In some cases you had to jump.
You were supposed to be resilient. Then there was the crawling, whereby you had to
crawl while at the same time you would be firing at the enemy. You had to know how
to crawl on your elbows, which was something we were not used to. Our elbows were
hurt, but they had to heal because you were supposed to do the exercise again the
following day. Thighs were bruised, but you had to carry on. But we managed to
complete the training. So I would say these were the difficulties, because you would
be hurt, but you had to continue with the training.
I remember my friend called Lucky who liked reggae music, who was a funny
character. When we still had wooden (dummy) guns, he would hold the gun (like a
guitar) and sing reggae music, entertaining people, keeping the spirits high during the
difficult times of food shortages. After training, we were deployed. I did my training
with Margareth Dongo. We went to stay at Nyadzonia, where we were with the likes
of Comrade Ziso. Then we were moved back to Chimoio, and it got bombed (soon
after). We were near the river, where the gates were, on the Western side. The
strategy was to keep patients at the furthest side from the gate, the rationale being that
if the enemy attacks he would enter through the entry point. So we were the furthest
from the entry point, on the Eastern side, near the river so that we could wash the
things that we used, or wash blankets if a (sick) comrade had spoiled them. We heard
gun fire. We had been told that in the event of gun fire, we had to make a quick
decision whether it was an attack or training. But because the training camp was far,
we knew that this was an attack.
As the guns were being fired, we immediately knew that these were not the
ordinary rifles that we knew. So the patients who were still able to run were the first
to flee. We carried those who could not run. We consistently checked how far the
soldiers had advanced. We were fortunate because the river was shallow at the point
where we were, which was the strategy (to place patients there) to make it easy to
cross. Ninety five patients managed to cross. The ethics were that, as a medical
officer, you would not leave patients behind because they were close to you.
I survived, but others died. It was Nyathi who had sold out. He was one of the
leaders, but had turned against the struggle. They had long range guns, so we could
tell that something was happening as they were firing. A plane had also flown past, so
we knew that the enemy had come. You were supposed to have your life-line, which
was your medical kit. The shots got to where we were because they were using long
range guns. One of us called Comrade Togara, who was my homeboy from
Macicaland, was shot and he lost a lot of blood and died.
When we left Chimoio, our priority were the patients. We were taken to a base called
Mabhanana. That’s where the patients were, with FRELIMO soldiers. Then we where
given our own small base which was secure. We were put in a farmhouse, because this
was a banana plantation. We treated the comrades who had been injured, getting medical
supplies from the FRELIMO soldiers. At Chimoio there were people who died of
cerebral malaria, and others who died because of vomiting blood.
We would see them die, young as we were. It was something I had never seen or
done before. But this made us brave, knowing that people die in a war, whether by
food poisoning, sickness, malaria, diarrhoea. It was educating us towards maturity
because the situations were beyond our age. After the Chimoio attack, we were
taken to Tete where there had been an outbreak. We were taken to a place called
Tariao. We were on transit,
1994 on way to Tembwe base. I think it was five days after
we got into Tembwe base when the base was attacked. That was the second attack
that happened whe we were about to go and wash. Our training insisted that you
always had to be alert, and know where your clothes, shoes, kit were every time. So
because we had been trained, this was not a difficult situation for us. Planes
bombed near where we were, but we took our clothes and kits, and we would let
our medic know where we would be.
The attacks at Chimoio and Tembwe were another experience. When the enemy
struck, he struck big. He was not teasing, but really meant to kill. So we would see
comrades with ripped tummies, with their intestines in the open. We had to learn. You
had to be able to assess how to save life. You would see a comrade whose remains
would only be ribs. You would see that there was no hope of life, but you would still
try to help. You had to improvise. If you were wearing a skirt, you just had to tear it
and use it (as a bandage) to stop loss of blood, so as to save the life of a comrade.
This was the life in the war that we saw.

stories
Hondo, Rangarirai
[Rusape]
In 1977 my father sent me to the village to check how things were at our
homestead. In less than ten minutes after my arrival at the homestead, I saw people
moving up and down. I didn’t know what these young men were doing, and, as
they were young, I thought that they were my friends. I didn’t know they were at a
different level.
At sunset, they called me and I followed them. I asked them where we were
going, and they asked if I didn’t know that there was a war going on in the area.
They said I was not going to lazy around like we did in Harare. What happened that
day was unbelievable. I was taken to a place they called GP, where sadza was
cooked for the freedom fighters.
After they had eaten, around 3am, the whites (Rhodesian soldiers) came to the place.
There was a serious battle. Eight girls died, here in Tandi, near that mountain called
Machinya, in headman Makarutse’s area. The fighting was fierce, eight girls died, and
one comrade. I don’t know how many soldiers died. As for me, I just found myself in
Rusape. I don’t know what happened. I just came to only to realise that my hands and
legs were tied together. I spend ninety days in prison, carrying dead bodies. Some of
the people would have been dead for a week. There was a big park behind the prison
where the bodies were put. Sometimes we were ordered to stay in that park so that we
would see how bad the war was. If you were not strong you would miss home, because
the situation really needed you to be strong. When the bodies were rotting, that’s when
we would then be ordered to carry them and bury them. I got arrested because I was
caught in that contact, that’s why I was put in jail.
When I was released, the comrades refused to let me go back home. So I joined them
and moved around with them wherever they were going. I started moving with them.
Things were bad for me because I didn’t have a gun, while the person I was moving
around with had a gun. I was moving without anything at all. I slowly got used to it as
time progressed.
It was when we were in Chiendambuya that I was given a gun, after a long struggle.
They said it was dangerous because if we would encounter the soldiers I would not be
able to defend myself. The comrades had guns and could defend themselves, but I
couldn’t do anything without a gun.
We fought the white man until the end of the war, until we were told to go to
assembly points. What I will never forget about war is that you can go for even up to
three days without eating anything.
You could get to a place
1994 and as people were dishing food for you, you hear gunfire,
and you leave the food, (because) you can’t even carry it. Then you get to another
place and you cook, but when you are just about to eat, the soldiers arrive and you run
away. It could go on and on like that for many days. It needed resilience. We
remained resilient until we got into the assembly points.
Some of us we never went for training in Mozambique, we got our training in the
battles. You would get your instructions in the middle of a contact, while fighting.
When the commander orders you to withdraw, you had to follow the instructions
immediately, because if you didn’t you would be left there alone. You had to learn
fast because if you didn’t you could be shot and get injured, or even die. People who
were trained in the battlefield like me were more brave than those trained in places
like East Africa and China because it was difficult to get training in a raging battle,
and you would still be able to master the skills. You needed to be strong, that’s why
we are still around up to now.
In most cases, when you got to a place, you would start by asking the elders, then
they would show you the spirit medium of that area, who would appraise you on the
situation, as well as guide you as to traditional processes that had to be followed. You
would be told if you made mistakes, and if you didn’t follow the medium’s
instructions, things would not go well for you because the ancestors would be angry.
You were also not able to use a medium from a different area in another area. Each
area had its own medium who knew what was supposed to be done in that particular
area, so you had to follow all his instructions. You had to ask the elders of the area,
who would then show you the medium, then you ask him. So those who skipped these
procedures would actually pull our progress backwards, and you could tell if some of
you had not followed the instructions, especially when someone sleeps with a woman
(which was not permitted). If someone breached the instructions, and was found out,
he would be tried and punished.
One of the numerous problems that we encountered was that we would meet some
people who did not like us, who would then go and sell us out to the whites. This was
a major problem because you could be confident that you were safe in a hideout, not
knowing that you had already bee sold out. Then you would suddenly realise as you
were moving that the enemy was waiting ahead of you. Then you won’t have
anywhere to go. A spirit would then come up from among yourselves, or from the
elders in the community, who would advise you on what to do. Once you follow the
instructions, you would find yourselves moving out of danger. So I can say we fought
this war with the help of our ancestral spirits.
In the war, we moved during the night, while the collaborators from the particular
area moved during the day. The collaborators were usually people who had not yet
been trained. If a collaborator would meet the soldiers he had nothing with which to
fight them. The collaborators also gave us information and supplied us with the
provisions that we needed, and so did other reliable elders. In most areas that we
operated in, there were DAs, Auxiliary (forces), support unit, blacks stayed in
separate quarters. But the camp helped white in their operations.
I did most of my operations in Tandi and Chiendambuya. When we moved at night
we knew that if we encounter the white men it would be a proper fight, because they
would not be able to use planes, so we would move knowing that if we encounter
them it would be a ground force battle, without any air power. We would fight to the
bitter end because we were determined. There were no wild animals that attacked
freedom fighters. One day I woke storiesup in the morning to realise that my head was
resting on a very big snake, but it didn’t do anything to me. So there were so many
other things that were part of the war. We were no longer afraid because we were also
as good as wild animals. As for food, we ate very well, because sometimes if you
requested for specific food, the people in the community would do their best to find it
for you. It also depended on the situation, because when things were volatile, you
would only eat in the evening, but when it was relatively stable you would eat
whenever you wanted. So the situation determined everything.
In the war, the major drawback was that our enemy had air power, while we didn’t
have, and only depended on our feet. We were satisfied with our weapons. The
challenge was that the enemy had motor vehicles and air power, but we were not
worried much because we were determined to fight the war. I joined the war when I
was young, when I was a bachelor, so I had no child to worry about. The only people
I would think about, now and then, were my parents, and not everyone else.
When I was send to the village, coming from Harare, I was supposed to come back
and write my ZJC examinations, so my circumstances were messed up because I did
not write my examinations because the war caught me. So that was the end of my
education, I never went back to school until this present day, which is another
problem. Once you got into the war there was no going back, because it was also
getting interesting, and we did not want the war to end because it was now interesting.
There were some people who did not want us to win the war, who hated us. If we would
get clothes, or if they gave us clothes themselves, they would put poison on the clothes.
When you put on the clothes you would then develop rash. Some of the food, if you would
give it to a dog first, the dog would fall sick and die (because of poison). So these are some
of the problems that we met. So it took us time to trust people most of the time. But we
needed the people, but sometimes some of the things that they did made it difficult to
understand them. Sell-outs were plenty, there was no village without a sell-out. Wherever
you would go you would hear that there were two or three sell-outs. So when we found a
sell-out we killed him so that things go on well. On the other hand if a sell-out found out
that you were on your way, he knew that things were going to be bad. So most sell-outs
survived by running away.
The whites put landmines in their farms. So we had war collaborators who would
pretend to be farm workers, who would then spot the landmines and remove them. They
would tell us the safe areas so that we wouldn’t get injured by the landmines, because a
landmine could break your legs if you stepped on it.
So we had different types of collaborators, with some of them working for the
whites. They would know where the landmines were laid or were removed,
pretending to be workers for the whites.
If one of us was injured, we would make a stretcher bed using poles and reeds, tied
together by fibre from bark, so it took a lot of time finding trees with bark that had
fibre. We would then carry the comrade and leave him at a safe home where we were
sure that he would get treatment until he heals. Medicine could also be found, among
us some were trained in health.
As regards water and food, when people brought it to us, we would ask them to eat
or drink it first. If it was poisoned, then they would die first. Most of the time what
was very painful was the death of your comrades, because if you were nine and four
die, you would begin to wonder if you were going to win the war since you were
getting finished, getting fewer. But because of the good leadership that we had, and
the backing of the ancestors,
1994 we would get replacements quickly.
After the war ended, the people who are now enjoying are not the ones who fought,
which is one of the things that are painful. They were giving each other land, because
if you look around you will notice that most of those who fought in the war do not
have land. The small pieces of land that we have are not befitting of war veterans,
while crooks have vast tracts of land. What is also painful is that you are just dumped
on the land without being given any farming implements. So what do you do? The
government sourced tractors, cattle, seeds, fertilisers, but these things are given to
those who already have plenty. So how does that help us who do not have anything?
Those people who remained behind, working and amassing wealth, while we were
fighting Smith, are the ones benefitting. I don’t have anything, where do I expect to
get something? Everything I had was destroyed during the war. After the war, I am
being denied resources.
I am harvesting tobacco, I need a cart which I can use with my oxen (to carry the
tobacco). I don’t even have cattle. Some of us were war collaborators who ended
up fighting, so we were not given the war veterans identity cards. Collaborators
never got any compensation, we are just paupers. Right now the (party) youths in
towns who never fought in the war are being given fertilisers and seeds.
All we are just asking for is for them (government) to pay school fees for our
children. If they could give us projects that we will run and raise money for us to
pay school fees for our children. Is it right that I didn’t go to school, and then my
children won’t go to school as well? Farming inputs are being taken by those at the
top, those with big bellies. Everything gets finished there at the top. If programmes
are meant to benefit everyone, they should benefit all of us.
Our lives are harder now after the war because you can’t even get a job because
you didn’t go to school. And those who were injured (in the war) cannot take care
of themselves without any meaningful support. If your shoes are worn out you
can’t even afford to replace them because things are difficult.
So if only they could help us by solving this problem of farming inputs being
stolen from the GMB, then we would be left with the single problem of sanctions.
It’s time those with big bellies should respect us so that we survive, because our
suffering is too much.
We have an association that we formed, that is called ZILIWAKWA. If only it
could be managed well, with members being vetted, and we would also be given
allowances like those that were given to the war veterans. Even running projects is
better. But we don’t have any resources. No one is noticing us because we are
graders that were used to make the road. After the road is done, the grader is not
allowed to move on the road. If only they could just try to see us as human beings.
When we came back from the war, we found our homesteads burnt. Some of us
don’t even know where our relatives are .They were harassed and tortured as
punishment for the fact that we had gone to join the war. So we came back only to
find that homesteads had been destroyed and our parents had fled and were living
in other places. These are the other problems that we met. Even up to now we are
still struggling to find out where some of our relatives are. Which is why you find
that some relatives are in Mozambique, some in Zambia. It’s another problem to re-
build homes. Even if new homes were to be built for us, a lot of time has passed, it
has been a long time.
The way people were beaten and the manner in which others died, it took a long time
for the pain to end. Sometimes you would just find yourself suddenly startled, for no
stories
apparent reason. It was painful. Your mate would be killed when he was right by your
side. They could tie someone on a Land Rover and drag him all the way to Rest Camp.
If he would be still alive by the time they get there, they would continue to torture him.
It was really traumatic to witness that, because the person being dragged would be
screaming in pain. On the other hand, if you were a sell-out and the comrades caught
you, they would not let you go free, because if a sell-out was given the opportunity, you
would know that the soldiers would bomb you that very same evening. So we would
kill the sell-out.
If the whites catch you, knowing that you had something to do with the war, they
would take you to the Auxiliary Forces or DA, where you would be punished so badly
that you would remain loyal to them. It was those people that they used to get
information about the freedom fighters. If someone would be caught we would
immediately change all our strategies. We would change our movement and way of
living, adopting new strategies which the caught person didn’t know about.
The killing of civilians and their placement in keeps was so painful to us because it
was as good as having our numbers reduced. If we had been 10, it meant we would
have been reduced to 9. We would be short because civilians helped us immensely.
There was nothing easy in the war, everything was tough. It was only that everyone
was committed. The civilians were our strength because they provided us with clothes,
food, morale. So it was like a fish in water. Without the civilians we would have been
like a cat in a sack.
We would spend the whole day sleeping, resting in the base. In the evening that’s
when we would patrol and move. But in 1978 – 1979, if it was drizzling and cloudy,
we would move during the day, because the situation was now bad. We could even
move when there was lightning, because lightning was not a bother compared to the
white man. We never worried that there was lightning because I had never heard that
there was a collaborator who had been struck by lightning.
There is nowhere we could find any vehicle to use during the war, even a car,
because you would never know the person who would have given you a ride, or the
person who could have send him to help you. It was much safer to walk than using a
car. So I never got in a car from the day I joined the struggle right up to the end. During
the first days, the legs would get swollen because of the walking, but eventually you
got used to it. Your feet would also develop blisters between the toes, for example, after
it had rained, and water remained on your feet. But you would end up used to it.
What we want is the upkeep of our families. It’s the A2 farmers who are getting
loans, fertilizers, seeds, while we A1 farmers are not getting anything. If they could
arrange that in each province, the Member of Parliament be a war veteran, and the
deputy be war collaborator, our concerns would be heard. The problem is that we have
been dumped, we are graders.
1994
Hondoyedzomba, Brighton
[Mt Darwin]
My name is Nicholas or Brighton Hondoyedzomba. I remember in 1972, in the
harvest season, when we were in Chiweshe, at Chigede, when I was learning at
Gunguwo Primary school. We started seeing a convoy of vehicles which were
travelling very fast in the direction of Centenary. A few days later we heard that
some murderers had been spotted in the area where those vehicles were rushing to.
But I didn’t understand what murderers were since I was still young. As time went
on, in that same year, rumours started circulating, about people who would
disappear, people who stayed in forests. Some said they were killers, others said
they were murderers.
Then in 1973 that’s when we heard that there was a war in the country. Towards
the end of 1973, one day, at sunset, we heard that we were wanted at Jeranyama.
We went there and we were told that there were boys in the area. We wondered
what kind of people these boys were.
In front, there was one guy who had a gun slung on his shoulder. Then we
suddenly heard him shouting the slogan. “Forward with the struggle.” Some
people responded to the slogan, and we joined them. “Forward with liberating the
country! Down with the enemy!” The guy went on to explain his aim, his objective
of liberating ourselves through the struggle, so that we would have good lives. We
had to have the right to vote and to have wealth. So on that first day, those boys
then just disappeared, and we returned to our homes. From then on, we knew that
things were not well and it was our first time to see someone called a soldier,
wearing military fatigues. (Army) Vehicles were now moving up and down, and
we would hear guns being fired. We were still young. We were usually sent to buy
tobacco at the shops. By 1974 we could see that the situation was bad because
schools were closed, grinding mills and shops were closed. We were taking turns to
pound maize using mortar and pestle, for us to be able to cook sadza.
Our duty was to keep watching the road, checking on the movement of the soldiers.
We also had to know the difference between soldiers and freedom fighters. One day,
during the afternoon, while I was home, I suddenly saw someone running through our
homestead and I asked others if they had seen the person and I was told to keep quiet
because it was not allowed to talk about those people. After a short while, we heard
guns being fired in the mountain in the Nzvimbo area, at Gonhi. A little later, we saw
helicopters circulating around the area. The gunfire was frightening.
In that same year, 1974, we then saw lorries coming, and we were all carried, being
removed from our homes into keeps. When we were in the keeps, no one would get
out if guns were fired. No one would take cattle out of their kraals, and if cattle
strayed into the gardens, no one would stop them from eating the plants in the
gardens. We, the young ones, once in a while, went to play with our home made balls
outside, and sometimes got information that the freedom fighters wanted food. We
would put the food in the balls and take it outside through the gate, where the DA
(District Assistants) would be guarding. We were still young, we would kick the ball,
passing to each other, kicking it past the DA, taking the ball outside. Then we would
get there, and the freedom fighters would then eat the food in plates which were kept
outside.
Then they would ask us how things were in the keeps. In 1976 we had chief
Chiweshe Makope. One day westories heard gunfire. The following morning we heard that
the fence was cut and chief Chiweshe was killed. The chief passed information on the
movement of the freedom fighters to the police at Chombira police camp, and that is
why he was killed. For a whole week, no one could leave the keep. Every now and
then, the keep gate would be opened. Things really got bad in 1978. The main reason
for this was that our senior war collaborators were caught. Some of them were forced
to work as DA’s, guarding the keep, and others were put in the (Rhodesian) auxiliary
forces. These boys knew all the bases that were used by the freedom fighters, and they
knew all the movements of the freedom fighters.
From that time, some groups started moving around, masquerading as comrades. They
even got into the keep, and we could even spend time with them. Then they would come
back the following day dressed in military gear, then demanded to know the people were
had been with the day before. We would deny, and then they would beat us heavily. I
was also beaten, but others were beaten more extensively. They felt pity for me because I
had a small stature, so I looked like a very young boy.
We were later told that some of these people were not genuine comrades, although
they acted like comrades, carried the same type of guns, and used the same slogans. So
the problem was how to distinguish genuine comrades from the fake ones. That’s when
the freedom fighters taught us to be wary about Selous Scouts, who included former
collaborators who had joined the Rhodesian Security forces. It was now even difficult for
the freedom fighters to eat food.
In 1979 we suddenly heard that there was a ceasefire, but from mid-1978, we never
imagined the possibility of a ceasefire because the war was really bad. It was difficult to
understand the way the comrades were now moving, on the other hand the security
forces would come masquerading as comrades, then come back dressed as soldiers and
ask us about the movement of the comrades. Those of us who tried to protect the
comrades were punished, but those who told the truth were not harmed. So this was like
selling out. Most of the time if you said the truth you would be forgiven, but if you lied
you would be beaten. We have some boys who left to go and join the struggle who have
not come back up to now.
In 1980 we celebrated the end of the year and Mugabe’s victory after the elections.
1994
We returned to our homes only to find that they were now ruins. There some people
whose lips were cut because they were sellouts. The freedom fighter I met properly for
the first time was called Tears Chimurenga. He was light skinned, slim, tall and
moved with a gun which he nicknamed “Vhala ngebhechu.” The gun was short and
could folded. He would fold the gun and put it under his arm pit, then wear a jacket,
and you would not notice that he was a fighter. He could actually move around with
others and you wouldn’t be able to tell that he was a fighter. There were freedom
fighters I worked closely with, who would also come to our home. There was a guy
(fighter) who made a big mark in the Chikombero farming area who was called Kid
Mawrongwrong, and another one, Solomon Ngoni. As for the female fighters, the one
who was well known was Teurai Ropa Nhongo, but I never met her. In our area,
before we were put in the keep, we never met female fighters. Most of them were
male. Then later on came the likes of Vhuu, who came from the direction of Chidewu
and Chigwida. There so many of them, freedom fighters.
The freedom fighters used bazookas, AK47, landmines and big guns called anti-aircraft.
On one occasion I actually helped to move an anti-aircraft from Chombira to Naruya. It
would be dismantled into many small parts, which means it would require many people to
move it. One person could not carry it. They said that that gun was used for shooting down
planes. It was always protected by other smaller guns because it was the weapon for final
destruction. They also used grenades. We would study the behaviour of the enemy,
because he was someone who did not have any interest in liberating the country, and
would go and tell Smith and his people about the comrades’ activities. Those whose aim
was to disrupt the smooth progress of the war were the enemies, and they had the same
agenda with the whites.
Some whites who helped us were our friends. The enemy used 303 (rifles), which had
wooden parts, which were (the guns) used by the DA’s. Later on they were using G3
(rifles). These are the guns that we saw. It was in the air that the comrades faced a lot of
problems because (the enemy) used a small plane called Arumanya, which was V shaped
at its end. It was used for surveillance, then it would alert other faster jets if it spots the
comrades. But the plane which caused a lot of problems in the war was called
“Chikopokopo”, which had no wheels. It could land on top of trees or on rocks. Its wings
could clear tree branches, leaving the space so open that even if you would have been
hiding you would have to come out in the open. The type of gun in that plane was very
powerful. It was not possible to hit the plane. The plane was said to have come from
South Africa. It was a complex plane.
If a collaborator made a mistake, he could be disciplined by the comrades. We the
collaborators could also discipline each other. Sometimes you could be beaten, or be
send on an errand a long distance away, or be given a heavy task. You would be
ordered to come back in a very short space of time from the errand. And you had to
come back with evidence that you got to the place where you would have been send.
These were the types of punishment that were given. A sellout was punished
extensively. Some would have their lips cut, leaving the teeth in the open
Some females would have a burning log put in their dresses, while others were burnt using
plastic paper. The other time at Matsororo, a girl had her hands tied at the back. The hands got
swollen and she fell down. Usually the punishment was administered because the girl would
have had a love affair with a DA or a soldier. They knew the comrades’ activities and they
would tell the soldiers. The soldiers or DA’s would then bomb the comrades. Some of them
(sellouts) would actually be killed. stories
But in some cases some people would lie to the comrades
because of hatred between them and someone else, (to get revenge). So the comrades started to
investigate first, before punishing the accused, and they realised that they were killing innocent
people.
In the Chehasha area, the soldiers would call the person who would have made a report and
the accused, and both of them would be questioned until the truth was established. That new
system was very good because some people died for nothing. At the beginning wrong-doers
would be beaten (by the comrades) while the public watched, especially those who were
disciplined and left alive. But those who were disciplined and were later killed, everything was
done in private. Disciplining people in public was meant to discourage people from making
mistakes.
Most of us supported the people that had guns because we had not been taught properly
about the war. We the civilians were in a difficult position because the comrades would
come and tell us about their objectives, then the soldiers would also come and tell us their
objectives. We could not refuse to listen to any of them because they all had guns, and the
power of the gun ruled. Most people just had to respect the power of the gun. It was only
after the war had ended that we remembered that their aim was for us to get schools, land,
and comfortable lives. Life in the keep was difficult. It was so crowded, even rats do not live
like that. Toilets were a big problem. You would relieve yourself in a paper, then dig a hole
and cover the excrement. Water was a problem. You had to walk during daylight, walking
in a single file to fetch water at the river in buckets. No one would go out to wash at
Chipfuriro river. They made us suffer. Children fell sick and died because of stomach
problems. They kept excrement in plastic papers and throw it away the following morning.
The advisors, the spirit mediums, such as Chipfeni, (and) Chidyamauyu, would give the
freedom fighters laws, like those forbiding sex in the struggle, emphasizing that the laws
had to be adhered to. Those who needed advice would also ask the ancestors (through the
mediums). In most cases, the comrades who broke the laws perished. I personally never
met them (the mediums), but we would hear that they were in the Dande area, and we
would be told about them by the comrades who would have gone to consult them.
If you would sleep with a woman who was not your wife and then go into a battle you
would die. But those who fell in love and got married did the correct thing. There was a
guy (freedom fighter) whose first appearance in this area was at Chetsoro mountain. He
was called Rex Nhongo and he moved around with an axe on his shoulder. I hear that his
home area is Buhera. (Then) Teurai Ropa comes from around here, in Dotito, in Mt
Darwin. She is from the Kambaza family. But imagine that besides the long distance
between these areas, these two got married during the struggle. It was said that if you agree
between yourselves, you could get married in the absence of your parents, and the
ancestors were able to guide you. Those who agreed to marry were fine, but those who
engaged in pre-marital sex were breaking the law.
The songs (that we sang) taught us lessons, while some entertained us, and the others
helped to sooth our minds. The songs that taught lessons were like the one which said
“Musaite zveupombwe muhondo yechimurenga; Musaite zveupombwe muhondo
yechimurenga.” [ “Don’t fornicate in the chimurenga struggle”. ] It was an educational
song, which is still relevant today when you look at the HIV/Aids situation. Some of the
songs made the situation exciting. They raised the morale, so much that even though we
were facing death, we would forget about dying. Songs which raise the morale were like
the one which said, “Comrade kana pane mhiko yawakanganisa; Comrade unoshingirira
muhondo, unoshinga.” [Comrade if you make a mistake, comrade remain resolute in the
struggle, and you will achieve.”]
1994 Such songs would strengthen you, lifting you to a higher
level.
The all night rallies were there, and that is where people were educated at night, at the
bases, about the war and the laws. We had these rallies at night so that the enemy would
not notice and also because the civilians had to attend to their chores during the day. The
collaborators were the ones who would keep watch during these gatherings. We would
have passwords that we would use when getting to the rallies, so that the others would
know that you were not an enemy. If someone would miss the password, then you would
know that he was an enemy. The word “comrade” means my close buddy in the struggle.
Your ideas and the ways you went about were the same. You were inseparable, and would
rely on each other in difficult times.
Most people of my age we couldn’t go far with our education. I studied at Cyrene
Mission, but the school got closed because of the war, and I moved to St Phillips, at
Magwenya, in Guruve. And that school also got closed, and I moved to Hwedza, to St
Annes, at Goto. That school was also closed, and I moved to Howard Institute, in
Chiweshe. The school was also closed and the situation was difficult for me. I went back
to school after the war.
We are not seeing any of the things that we agreed on during the struggle. Life is harder
than it was during the colonial time. We should be united because war kills. People should
talk to each so that we remove the rotten elements, because things are now difficult.
1994
Jumbi, Gibbs
[17 March 2008]
Gibbs Jumbi, squadron leader in the Airforce of Zimbabwe, went by the
war name of Joe Tichagarika. His operation area was Uzumba.
My Chimurenga name is Joe Tichagarika. I joined the liberation struggle in 1978.
My home area is Mutoko. We were taken by the comrades to the Pfungwe area,
near the border with Mozambique. We were a group of young boys. We did our
internal training there in Pfungwe, in the forest, for two months. We were 18 in our
group, and all of us completed the training.
The first reason why I joined the Chimurenga struggle was the white men’s
repression. Secondly, the land, the Zimbabwean soil. My aim was to liberate the
country of Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian soldiers harassed us, especially we, young
boys. They would arrest and beat us, asking us where the freedom fighters were. It
was prestigious to be a comrade, it was prestigious to hold a gun, we grew up
admiring this.
There were many problems at the Pfungwe training base: it was difficult to find
water, it was difficult to find food, but we took it as part of the war lessons.
Physical training was done in the mornings: running, press-ups, and lifting logs. In
the afternoons we had political orientation sessions which were led by the political
commissars. These were the two main lines of the training. We learnt how to use
the gun, how to assemble and de-assemble it. The third phase (of the training), in
the third month we did practical training. We would travel long distances with our
guns, doing operations, but still under training. We did route marches and compass
reading.
We then left Pfungwe, which was a liberated zone, and I went to operate in
Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe, in Detachment D, Section 3. I operated there from
May to December 1979. Uzumba was hot. I remember the battle at Kangara. A
few comrades and many enemy soldiers died. We lost a number of our youths, but
a good number of us managed to escape.
We mostly ambushed the enemy after getting information and studying the
Rhodesian soldiers’ movement. We laid a couple of ambushes. One (ambush) was
at Marove, another one at Nhakiwa. We would also ambush vehicles. We would
select a suitable terrain near a mountain which was close to the road, and lay our
ambush. As the vehicles were passing, getting into what we called “the killing
bag”, we would then hit the leading and rear vehicles, so that the convoy would be
trapped, and we hit them hard.
The whites also had places where their guard forces stayed. These are some of
the places that we attacked. We hit the guard forces based at Mashambanhava. You
would not be able to know how much damage you would have inflicted because
they would be in a wall, and you just threw a grenade inside. At Kangara, the
enemy came unexpectedly.
I was very good at laying landmines, which was one of the best operational
methods. A bull was killed by a landmine in Uzumba. The landmines came from
Mozambique; we were given by other countries. The boys in the border area
around Mutoko took the landmines that would have been laid by the white men at
the border to trap the comrades. Then the ZANLA engineers would take the
landmines and give them to us, and we would then lay them in the roads.
stories
During the training at Pfungwe we never had any problems with diseases. We
would take some of the minor ailments as part of the military training process.
There were no girls at Pfungwe. Some girls had come at Kangara, and so (the
soldiers) wanted to capture the girls. After that incident, the girls were ordered to
go back to the rear because of the problem they had caused.
There was high morale in the front. We were given clothes by the civilians.
Clothes would come from Harare, to us, the comrades. We wore farmer’s shoes,
boots, tennis shoes. The civilians helped (a lot). The battle at Kangara lasted the
whole day. In the front, we operated in sections, with each section having 7 – 8
people. Two sections made a platoon.
In Uzumba, the civilians worked with the comrades. The youth would do
surveillance patrols. The girls, the female collaborators, cooked food and washed
clothes for the comrades. The parents sourced the food. In the evenings, people
gathered for the all night rallies, were people were given lessons about the struggle.
People gathered and had fun, singing and dancing at the all night rallies.
ZIPRA and ZANLA clashed whenever they would meet. ZANLA operated from
Mozambique, and ZIPRA from Zambia. Their encounters could cause serious
problems. But I never experienced this. We just left for war with the comrades. We
got our training as we were moving around with the comrades.
My love for my country and my participation in the liberation struggle is what
made me get into the Air Force of Zimbabwe.
1994
Kakweza, George
[25 March and 25 July 2008]
George Kakweza, also known as Comrade Bvuma Zvipere, operated in
the areas of Mutoko and Chihota.
My name is George Kakweza. I was born in 1961 in Mutoko, at All Souls Mission.
I joined the struggle in 1976. I went to Mozambique and proceeded to Tanzania for
my military training. In 1977 I came back from Tanzania and went to Chihota, in the
Mahusekwa area, in the Tangwena Sector. That’s where I operated in during the war,
until the end of the liberation struggle.
I met many problems in Tanzania, in the training camp: food was a problem;
jiggers barrowed through our feet, causing wounds. Clothes were difficult to get. We
survived on donations. But we persevered because we had an objective.
Life in the front was better (because) we were within the people and we would get
support. At the rear, food was such a problem that we would go for days and weeks
without eating anything. But in the front, food was provided by our parents (the
civilians). The women stayed in the liberated zones where the enemy did not come often.
The female freedom fighters would remain in Chihota. In Chihota we actually lived in
houses. We would only move at night because there were no forests, and it was difficult
to move during the day. There were laws to be followed in the struggle: fornication was
not allowed; you could not take things from civilians; we had to return all things
captured from the enemy; we had to speak respectfully to the civilians.
We taught the people about the activities of the comrades, (and) we would tell them
about the aim and expectations of the struggle. We were the first (fighters) to get into the
Chihota area. It took a long time for the people to understand the objectives of the
comrades. Also because of our young age, I was 18, so people could not accept that we
were comrades. We were young, but people eventually understood us after our
explanations. But it was not everyone who agreed; others remained adamant.
We used force to get help from the people. We would get to people’s homes and
ask for clothes, saying that some of our comrades needed clothes, and people would
give us the clothes. In other places we would find food and clothes ready for us by
the time we got there. My Chimurenga war name was Bvuma Zvipere. We were not
given names, we were told to choose our own names and then stop using our real
names.
Clashes would occur between the ZIPRA and ZANLA forces. I never
encountered these clashes, but in 1980 and 1981 these two forces fought in the
Intumbane assembly point.
The battle I will never forget is the one we fought in Chihota in headman
Wazeza’s area. The Rhodesian soldiers came to us on horses, and they had dogs.
We thought of fighting them. We were surrounded . We fought and we managed to
down one Dakota (plane). They had planes as well as vehicles. We were few of us.
The whites were many. I and the other comrade we were with, called Dewas
Magamba, ran to the dam and we hid. Guns were fired but we remained hiding in
the water. Although I fought many other battles, I won’t forget this one, it pained
me. Three comrades were hurt and one was captured. About twelve collaborators
were killed.
What made me go to the struggle was the repression that was there. In Mutoko
there was only one school. The chances
stories of going to school were limited. Only three
students would be selected from the primary school to go for secondary school
studies at All Souls. In Mutoko, there were baboons and our fields were in
mountainous areas, and yet the white farmers had good land. We had problems in
moving around, we were suffering. That was what inspired me to go and join the
struggle so that we would liberate the country. And also there were keeps at the
time I was going to school, and we would be locked up in the keeps, and be let out
on limited occasions. We could go for two weeks without attending school because
we would be locked up in the keep.
Parents would be harassed, being interrogated when you went to join the
struggle. Parents would lie that their child had gone to work in the farms. There
were some people who were close to the white men and they would go and tell
them that so-and-so had gone to join the Chimurenga struggle. Parents would be
harassed, even getting arrested. In Tanzania I was taught tactics by the Chinese.
Others were taught medicine and many other things. My experience in the
liberation struggle led me to join the army. I thought of going back to school, but
others suggested that we join the army.
1994
Matoyi, Evelyn
My name is Mrs Mazanhi. I was born in Chidza, in Zaka, in the Nyakunhuwa area.
Evelyn Matoyi is my maiden name. I was born on 5 June, 1959. I did Grade 1 to
Grade 6 at Chivigwi Primary School. I met the comrades in 1976. We started off
hearing rumours that there were some freedom fighters, and eventually we got to meet
them. There were the likes of comrade Chando, Muchena, Dick and Zimwaya. Then
they sweet-talked us into joining the struggle. We were five girls and two boys. One
of the boys who was studying at Jersey said he would show us the way.
We told the comrades that we wanted to go on our own. The (bad) things the
whites were doing in areas like Jerera and Zaka made us go to the struggle. They
harassed people, and we realised that we were oppressed. If you were a girl, you were
not allowed to go far with education. They said all that you needed was the ability to
read letters. We left for the struggle at the time schools were opening, with that
(Jersey boy) pretending to be going back to school. I lied to the people at home that I
was going to Zaka. We got into a bus and left, but comrade Zimwaya had said that
one of us was going to be caught.
We got to Dewure and were searched. We all got back into the bus and proceeded
to Birchenough where we met a convoy (of vehicles) escorting a soldier who had
benn shot by the comrades. There was a very tough roadblock at Birchenough, and we
were all ordered out of the bus. I was never asked anything. But Newman had wounds
on his hand, and the soldiers said he was a terrorist, and we had to leave him there,
with the soldiers pointing a gun at his chest. We proceeded and arrived in Chipinge in
the evening, and we slept there.
In 1976 the DA’s were a menace, asking people to produce their identity papers.
We didn’t know and were not worried about the dangers of war, because at the time
we left our home area, there was no war. We wrote letters back home to say that we
were gone, and people should not bother to look for us. Then there was a fire, and a
certain man advised us to move away because we could be accused of having
started the fire. We then got into a bus headed for Jersey, the six of us. We divided
ourselves into twos, and we started walking (through) the tea estates. We met
people who would ask us where we came from, and some boys thought they had
found girls. We got to a dry stream, and we crossed. We continued walking in the
grass, but we no longer knew where we were going because that boy only knew
how to get as far as the school. We walked through the night. Towards dusk, we
crossed a fence, and walked for another 2 to 3 km, then crossed a very high security
fence.
Each one of us made a slogan the moment he/she crossed the fence, thinking that
the whites would not shoot you if you were in another country. As we were
walking, the people in the villages ran away from us. We then agreed to put
ourselves in groups. (The people who were running away from us) they were
actually going to report us to the headman. Then some (Mozambican) comrades
came to us, asking what we wanted. He said that we were lucky because there had
just been a heavy battle a few days before. They then took us to the chairman’s
house, and we were given food. We were then taken to another homestead where
we slept. The following morning we were taken to the (Mozambican) comrades’
base and we were interrogated, being asked why we had come. We spent two days
there.
We were taken to another (Mozambican)
stories comrades’ base, then we were later taken
to the (Zimbabwean) comrades base called Goigoi. We stayed there for a long time,
then we were moved to Muchenedzi. We were then carried to Chibhawawa, at
Toronga, a place which was frightening. You could easily see that this was war,
because some people were like skeletons because of starvation. Others had wounds
which were scary, while some girls would bark like dogs, while others crawled. Our
arrival place was the security area, where there was no food, except some type of
beans.
I was given the beans and my tummy got bloated after eating them, and was
advised not to eat them. So I would be given rice, which was a preserve for the chiefs,
and I was removed from security to the general area where others were. I had no
option but to eat the beans. My stomach got so bloated, like a pregnant woman, but I
just had to eat the beans because there was no option. With time I got into the
leadership, starting from section, to company, and I was taken to the security
department, watching over offences and supervising the entrance. I was then taken
back to company together with Comrade Letwin, staying at her house, working as her
assistant. She then moved with me to Tembwe, where I was taken by comrade
Makasha, and I got my opportunity to get into training in 1978.
The training was tough and painful. Food was scarce. We were beaten, and we thought
the likes of comrade Shingi were cruel, yet they wanted us to be strong. If an emergence
whistle was blown, you had to leave everything, including food. They did that so that we
would be quick in whatever we were doing. Comrade Shingi was hated by people because
he was cheeky. He would scare you. He was so frightening that you could even confess to a
crime you would have not committed. Since I was staying with a high ranking officer, I had
enough food at home, and I would even steal some of the food to give to others. I also got
favours (because I was staying with a senior). We separated in 1979, and I moved to
Nehanda, then later came back to Zimbabwe, at Goromonzi, in Base 1. I then moved to
Base 2, then got married and moved to the village. My husband’s parents said I shouldn’t
go back and live in a (military) camp.
There were many diseases. When I was in the security department I was in charge of
the detained people. Up to now I am afraid of one of them because we beat him so
badly. He was a Rhodesian agent. We had gone on patrol and we found him at the base
when we came back. We asked him which area he was operating in, and he said he was
operating in Gutu, using a NATO (gun) and a walkie-talkie. I got so angry, I thought
of my relatives who had been killed in Gutu.
He then said that he had been sent, and that he was number three from Chirau, which
meant he had a top post in the (Rhodesian) system. He had been sent to assess the base.
He was someone who did not care about people being killed. I really got angry.
Another one was found with a small walkie-talkie that was fastened on his collar.
That made you angry.
Up to now, I like singing the song that says:
“ We buried many many people

Because of the love of our country
Which was taken from us by the colonisers
Nehanda bless the family of Zimbabwe”
That song touches me as I remember the many people who remained (died),
1994
especially the part that says:
“ When I remember the relatives that we buried

Tears roll down
When I look at the situation
Nehanda bless the family of Zimbabwe”
When you remember that we were together with so-and-so (who died), then (you
think of) the others you don’t know about, and those who perished at Nyadzonia who I
never saw. What about those who died at Chimoio and at Tembwe, and here back
home? How do their spirits feel about sellouts? Many were buried unceremoniously,
just making sure that at least they had been buried.
stories
Mugumiri, Freddie Chikona

[26 March 2008]
Freddie Chikona Mugumiri played the role of Mujibha, in the operating
area of Mhondoro-Mubayira.
I was born in Mhondoro, in the Mugariri area. [Editor, please check correct
spelling] We just met the comrades, and they said we were going to be mujibhas
(collaborators). We were trained on how to carry out surveillances and how to
move information. Sithole’s people and ZIPRA were not wanted in our area,
Mhondoro. As a collaborator, you were not allowed to be a sellout, you had to keep
secrets in your heart. I was different from many others who were send by Smith’s
soldiers to go and spy on the comrades. I was given a very high position, being
responsible for keeping the comrades’ plans. When food was required, I ran around
and organised. Even beer, at the beginning they were not drinking, but as time went
on they were drinking. You were not allowed to wear a watch. I had six girls under
me who were responsible for cooking. There were many boys I sent on errands,
arranging their duty roasters. I collected clothes from people, and take them to the
comrades.
The time we were growing up there was Chikurubi (prison). During the war,
Smith’s soldiers looked for me, saying I was blocking people from attending
meetings. Muzorewa and Smith’s people wanted to kill me. I ran away and I was
living in the forest while they were vigorously looking for me.
During the time of the war, the women who fought the war were very few. Women
got in the struggle around 1979, towards the end of the war. The day we were given
guns was a tough day. Three hundred whites had come from South Africa. (The
battle) started at 6 in the morning, until 6 in the evening. Many whites died. We
carried guns and put them in a cave at Mubaira. We were beaten up by the white
soldiers. They came in about seven Puma trucks, and we had planted landmines. The
comrades shot the drivers of the trucks.
The leaders of the comrades in Mhondoro were Takemore, Takesure, Trymore,
(and) Everest. Takemore was the one who would go to Mozambique to collect bullets.
My war name was Chikonan’ombe because I was capable of thinking much better
than everyone else. My parents and relatives were harassed, that’s why they wanted to
kill me. We didn’t want it (the country) to be called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, we wanted
it to be called Zimbabwe. In Mhondoro I never encountered any diseases.
Blacks worked in a very bad way in the white men’s farms. There was no tea time.
You would start at 3pm and work until 6am. That time, most of them (workers) were
from Malawi and Mozambique, so they did not care about earning more money.
Towards the end (of the war) the comrades were sleeping with the female
collaborators. They would just leave their guns. I say we should not have another war
because many people will die, especially the young ones. I remember when I was
send to carry out a surveillance on some whites who were drinking beer. I got at the
beer outlet and bought my Shake-Shake (opaque beer) at Chikwaka. Meanwhile, I
was counting the number of the whites, and I noticed that they were many. I went and
told the comrades, and we went and destroyed the whites. We took them by surprise
and we wiped all of them out. After that, we took their ammunition.
What made me interested in being a mujibha (collaborator) was the realisation that
I had no freedom, and 1994
I had to fight to liberate ourselves. The whites would only beat
or shoot young men whom they suspected to be collaborators or helpers of the
comrades. You could only get identity papers when you were 18 and above. The
curfew regulations were that no one was not allowed to move after 6pm. Anyone who
would move after 6pm would be shot, being labelled a comrade.
Some were told lies in 1979 that the war had ended and they went to Harare, and all
those who went were imprisoned by Smith’s soldiers.
stories
Munetsi, Nolbert
[Senga, Gweru]
I was born on 18 July 1956 at Chiduku, in Rusape. My father worked at De Cock’s
farm, who was a member of the Rhodesian Front. My mother worked in that white
man’s kitchen, so I got to know the people who would visit the house, such as
Douglas Smith. De Cock was the Minister of Information. After some time, my
father left the job and we went to the village. I got the chance to study at Chiduku
Primary School, were I started Sub A in 1966. In 1968 I was in Standard 1, and my
teacher was John Chimuka, who came from Rukweza, in Rusape. On the Country
Affairs section of the General Paper the teacher talked about Mbuya Nehanda and
Kaguvi, and how they were hanged (by the whites). He also talked about Selous,
who was a hunter, and about Rhodes, and how the country was colonised.
When he talked about these things, he would be so angry, and that kept me
wondering why. He would also talk about his elder brothers who had gone to
Zambia, where there were political activities going on. In that same year, 1966,
there were talks on radio about political issues. You could only hear about these
radio broadcasts from those who were well up (who had radios). It would be said
that there had been a fight in Sinoia, where there were some terrorists. When I was
in Standard 4 I was now aware, and could even read the African Times newspapers
that were brought by Smith and his people. You would see (in the newspapers)
chiefs being installed by those whites who used to come to De Cock’s house. When
I would go home, my brother who had gone to St Annes Secondary School in
Hwedza, would meet with his friends, who included Moven Mahachi who was
once Minister of defence (after independence), who came from Devedzo, in
Rusape. They discussed political issues.
I could understand spoken English since I had grown up playing with a white
man’s child. I then heard about the Internal Settlement, and I would ask my teacher
about it. I completed Grade 7 in 1973, and I passed with high marks. But Our
education system was different from that of the whites. Then I went to St Annes
Secondary School in 1974 to do Form 1. The Pearce Commission reached as far as
we where, and we were told to vote ‘NO’. I didn’t understand about this, but we
would just say ‘NO’. Older people moved around wearing bangles. Everyone voted
‘NO’. It’s purpose (the commission) was to find the opinion of the Africans about
the political situation. The outcome was ‘NO’. Then we saw people moving
around, the likes of Muzorewa, Canaan Banana, Elliot Gabela, Silas Mundawarara,
people we knew as church leaders, but were now meeting with people.
In 1975 politics had now entered our heads. There was a teacher who taught us Latin
who was called Christopher Nyangoni. He was harassed by the (Rhodesian) soldiers, and
would sometimes be taken to Hwedza camp. Then there was another one who taught us
Biology who was called Mr Mudzindiko, who would also be taken, with us not knowing
what was happening. We could not get out because we were in boarding school. Our
principal did not want to hear anyone talking politics. It was only when we would ask
why the teachers had been taken that we would know what would have happened. Then
there was another one who taught us History, who is the one who properly opened my
mind, who was called Takawira Muronda. That one was arrested and never came back. It
was said that the government had arrested him. Word said that there were some terrorists
that were moving around, so probably he talked with them, and that was why he had
been arrested. 1994
In March we heard on radio that Herbert Chitepo had died. He came from
Manicaland, and I knew about him. The person who talked a lot about him was Edgar
Tekere. After his father would have finished his church service, he (Edgar) would then
speak about his real position, saying that it was through the Bible that our land was taken
(from us). Moven Mahachi’s younger brother had remained at school, but he would go to
play at Didymus Mutasa’s place, a farm called Cold Comfort, where he would also work
some times. That is there where his brother, Moven Mahachi was now staying. He then
asked me if I knew that people were going to Mozambique. His brother, Moven, was
actually the one moving people (to Mozambique). We started to discuss, and continued
talking in the evening while indoors, drinking beer. They said that the previous evening
some freedom fighters, Edzai Hondo and others, had actually been around. We became
interested, and we said we wanted to see those boys. One day, on a Friday, we got
naughty and sneaked (out of school), going for a beer drink at Michael’s shop. We found
the freedom fighters there, drinking beer. They started putting fear in us, asking us where
the soldiers where and accusing us of being sell-outs , demanding to know what we had
come for, and ordering us back to school because that place where we were was not
school. Then they said we could no longer go back, because if we would go back we
would go and report to Hwedza Camp.
stories
Vadzvanyiriri, Disperse
[Rusape]
My (war) name was Disperse Vadzvanyiriri. I came from Chikore. I did my
primary education at Nyangozi. After that I went for my secondary studies at St
Peters Kubatana, in Glen Norah, where I did Form 1 and Form 2. In 1975, when I
went to the village, where my father was headman, I met the comrades. He (my
father) was called Headman Danga, an area which was in Chikore. So the comrades
usually came to our homestead. So when I arrived from school, I was told that there
were some boys who were there. Then I asked who the boys were. They had not
come to fight, but to talk, explaining that they were sons of the soil. The first one
whose name I caught was called Joboringo. Then there was also Mbudziyadhura,
(and) John Kurambakupetwa, and these are some of the comrades I saw and caught
there names.
This made me interested in being in these people’s company, since they were
people who had come in our area, and their first port of call had been in my father’s
village. That made me interested in joining the struggle. Then there was a song of
theirs that grabbed my heart, a song that they played on a cassette player and they
would sing along. The song was about the war. The song said, “Mhoroi mhoroi
mose aye, aye makadini aye, nerufaro, tonosangana muZimbabwe.”(Hallo
everyone; how are you; we will meet in Zimbabwe.) I could not work out what that
Zimbabwe was, since we were in Rhodesia. So these are the things that made me
interested in going where others had gone. That group of comrades immediately
took four of us with them, saying because they were moving ammunition into the
country. So they would bring ammunition and stockpile it at the border. So we
moved with the others from Chikore and got into Nyanga. From there we went to
what was called Fombe, at Nyakomba, which was a base for the (Mozambican)
comrades. They had just got there independence. A stayed there for a while, then
moved to Nyama, where a big pig had just been killed. From there I went to a place
that was called Guru.
I went to Guru Sector in 1975, and in all those movements we didn’t have any
(Zimbabwean) comrades with us as we had left them at Nyakomba. We were now
moving with the (Mozambican) comrades. And so these comrades told us to remain at
Guru. There at Guru, it didn’t take long before the (Mozambican) comrades told me
that I was under arrest. I couldn’t understand why I was arrested and what the
objective was. They said we had run away from Smith in Rhodesia, what was our aim
in coming to their country? So we were put into a place that was called Chipidigu,
which was full of maggots. We ate sadza cooked with maize chaff, and we were fed
by the Mozambican comrades because we were said to be prisoners.
We stayed there from 1975 to 1976. Around May 1976, that’s when we were
ordered to head cattle. As I was heading cattle, I got to be taught how to use a gun.
They took me as one of the FRELIMO fighters. They first trained me on a gun that
they called Peperture, and then on to Mugiyadhori, Motor 60, RPK, M90, and RPG
7. All that happened when we were at Guru. It really troubled me that now I was
working with the Mozambican comrades. Then they also told me to guard the gate.
While I was there I started seeing Zimbabwean comrades. The one who came first
was the Chief of Operations, Comrade Rex Nhongo, and another one who later sold
out, called Hambakwe, as well as, Zino, Sheba Gava, and Josiah Tungamirai. They
were passing through, 1994
on their way to Tembwe. So I managed to talk with them, and
they realised that I spoke Shona, although I was in Mozambique. They then asked what
we were doing at that place. We told them our whole story and they said we were lost.
They then said they would talk with us when they got back from Tete. When they came
back, we managed to talk with them because we were manning the gate, about seven of us.
We stayed at that place until 1976. In October of that year, those same men came back.
This time they were also with Nhonho, Gutsa, Ndoda, Hambakwe, Hamadziripi, Dzingai
Mutumbuka, and Mayor Urimbo. They were able to come to us and we would discuss.
Eventually they asked us to go with them, and we left in their (Land) Cruiser.
They actually took us away without telling the (Mozambican) authorities, and we left
with all our guns, leaving the gate with no one guarding it. We got to Chimoio were I
immediately went for training. After three weeks of training, I was moved to the firing
(division), after which I was told to join those who had been deployed to Mt Darwin. I
joined that group in 1976 and we went to Mt Darwin, to Centenary, where there were
keeps, from Keep 1 to Keep 11. The keeps made it extremely difficult fot us to find food,
because we could only get food from the people in the area in which we were operating.
We walked all the way from Chimoio. We walked to the border, then left stocks of
ammunition there, then walk back to Chimoi to collect more. We got to Nyakomba and
left our the ammunition, and then walked back to the border to collect more. We then got
to Mutoko, and did the same. Our backs were the only means of transport that we had for
moving ammunition to the front. So you could carry a cache with 150 bullets, a rifle, and
an RPG rocket launcher. So if you managed to carry four items, you would have done a
great job because you would also be carrying your personal AK47 rifle. The gun which I
couldn’t carry was a rifle, because I was still short, and it would make it difficult for me to
walk. So I actually used the rifle called AK Kafodin Bud. I was at the rank of PC. So I
was responsible for talking with the civilians. Even though I was young (small), people
had to consult me. While in Mt Darwin, I used the name Short Mutoto, and not Disperse. I
gave myself the name Disperse when we were in another (different) area. The reason why
I gave myself the name Short Mutoto was because I was short, I had left school at the age
of 19. So I got into the struggle when I was still very young. I operated in Centenary
through 1976, and my first battle was on 17 November 1976, and that is when I first
realised that in a war you could shoot or you could be shot and die.
That battle shook me because the person who was by my side was the first to be shot,
and I realised that he had actually died. I took his gun and I covered his blood. From that
day, I was never afraid, the experience made me strong. I said to myself that what had
happened to my colleague would also happen to me. I stayed with that (his) gun in
Section 11 where we were. Another three of our group members were hit, and eight of us
remained alive. We really struggled to get food in keep One because the battle started at 6
o’clock (in the Morning) and went on until 8 to 10 pm, with the (Rhodesian soldiers
using) searchlights. We eventually managed to hide in some place.
At 3am they (soldiers) came back with their searchlights. We went for two days
fighting with them. What was interesting was that we (most of us) were not seriously
wounded. Two members of our group who had been seriously injured died later. So I was
in Mt Darwin 1976 -1977, then I moved to Nyanga in 1977. While there (in Mt Darwin),
I operated in Rushinga, Rusambo, Gwangwawa, Marymount, and Mukumbura. While in
Nyanga I operated in Gotekote, Katerere, Sanhani, and Nyakomba.
In 1977 my leg was injured after palm bombs had been dropped on me. That
happened in headman Nyatowa’s area, and I almost got captured there. That was in
many mun’ando trees. The whites surrounded me,
November. In that area there arestories
but I didn’t move in the direction they expected. Suddenly there were some heavy
winds which forced the helicopter to leave me, and then I just found myself in a
ditch.
It was only then that I remembered that I was injured, and I looked at my leg,
and for sure, I was injured, and the side of my trousers had been damaged by acid.
So I had to move back to the rear. What we called the rear was Mozambique.
Zimbabwe was the front. When I went back to the rear, I was staying at Chimoio.
Then Chimoio got bombed in 1977 and we moved to Doroi, at Base 12. In 1978 a
mission came to select people who had to go to Romania for training, and I went
for that training. I went to Bucharest, and from there I went to a place called
Fragash. My wish was to train in airforce, but because I didn’t have much self-
control, I failed the test. So I ended up training in counter intelligence, which got
me into some (good) experience in 1978.
I then became an instructor, training Zimbabweans who were coming in 1978. From
1980- 81 I was in China, and I came back to Zimbabwe in 1982. I stayed in
Chitungwiza, in Zengeza 4, then I was moved to Chipinge, at Tongogara. Then I went
through the integration process, to enable me to join the national army, at Inkomo.
After that I got into the Zimbabwe Intelligence Corps at Brinz Barracks.
I later got involved in the war against Matsanga, helping the Mozambicans. So
these are some of the things that I managed to do when I came back from the
(liberation) war. At the moment I am working at the War Veterans Office in Rusape,
where I am responsible for building constructions. I was also involved in the land re-
distribution exercise in the year 2000. I managed to get an 83 hectare plot. I am a small
scale farmer, doing the best I can, because problems are encountered every now and
then.
There were many problems in the liberation struggle. When I joined in 1975, I
got imprisoned soon after. It was a problem for me from the onset. I was bitten by lies
in that jail, which was called Chikapidigu.
When we got there with my friends we encountered jiggers. Women also had hiccups
problems, which even affected the way they moved. Some of them (women) developed
wounds that were difficult to understand. If you saw the wounds you would really feel
pity for the women. So in the struggle the problems were caused by Smith. He could
deploy poison through the ammunition (that his soldiers used).
Botswana
Independent on 30 September 1966
5.3
Botswana’s Role in the
Liberation of Southern Africa
by Thomas Tlou and Part Mgadla, Research Team
Leaders
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 271

The Refugees ................................................................................................... 276
The Freedom Fighters ...................................................................................... 296
The Role of the Army and the Police ................................................................ 315
The Role of Women ................................................................................................. 321
Selected Experiences of Liberation Struggle Activists ...................................... 330
The Role of the Botswana Government ............................................................ 338
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 355
Abbreviations .................................................................................................. 356
5.3 botswana analysis 271
Introduction1
A common misperception is that Botswana played a minor role at best in the liberation
struggles of southern Africa. In part, this view derives from the fact that Botswana,
as a country, did not adopt, but some think should have, a militant stance against the
oppressive regimes that almost completely surrounded it—South Africa, Rhodesia,
and South West Africa. During the struggle, Botswana also suffered criticism
because it did not allow liberation movements to establish military bases within its
borders and because it prohibited guerrillas (we prefer the term“freedom fighters”) to
operate freely within its territory. And it is also true that freedom fighters who
violated Botswana’s laws or created security risks were sometimes incarcerated or
deported to other countries to the north.
The account which follows provides abundant information to demonstrate that,
contrary to perceptions based on such a limited yardstick, Botswana found numerous
ways other than militancy to play a significant role in support of the liberation
struggles of southern Africa, and at no little risk to the country and its people. For the
most part, support for liberation was carried on actively, though largely out of view,
by legions of sympathisers, by persons in positions of high authority as well as by
ordinary citizens in towns and villages, young and old, men and women, and persons
of all backgrounds, religions, and skin colour. And with its non-racial democratic
constitution and respect for equal protection under the law, Botswana stood out as a
beacon of the future for persons living under white racist regimes across all its borders.
Throughout the liberation struggles, Botswana was a major refugee destination in
the region. Botswana’s support to the thousands who fled from oppression into its
sanctuary is one of the unsung stories of the liberation struggle.
Botswana, now thought of as wealthy because of its diamonds, was anything but
rich through most of this period. When it achieved independence in 1966, Botswana
was one of the poorest nations in the world, not to mention the poorest in the region.
Until the early 1980s, it lacked resources, and what Botswana gave to the refugees
who streamed into its country was a generous act of sharing the little it had.
Starting in 2006 and continuing through 2008, oral testimonies were collected
by eight of the eleven-member research team based at the University of Botswana.
Working with research assistants (university graduates awaiting employment and
graduate teachers), they located informants, carried out interviews, and produced
typed transcripts and translations. In order to provide a holistic picture of Botswana’s
role in the liberation struggle of southern Africa, the oral project required that its
team members and their assistants fan out among the eight districts of the country.2
(1) The Research Team Leaders for Botswana were Thomas Tlou and Part Mgadla, and the team included G.B.
Barei, M.M.M. Bolaane, L. Mafela, C.J. Makgala, B.T. Mokopakgosi, M.G. Molomo, W.G. Morapedi, R.F.
Morton, and C.G. Ntau.
(2) Apportioned as follows: T. Tlou (eastern part of Central District), P. Mgadla (Southern District), M. Molomo
(Central District), L. Mafela (Gaborone), W. Morapedi (North East District), M. Bolaane (North West District),
C.G. Ntau (Kgalagadi District), and G. Barei (South East District).
1994
Interviews were carried out with two hundred individuals across the nation. In
addition, three researchers carried out archival work at the Botswana National
Archives and Records Services (BNARS), Gaborone. Their notes and reports were
used to supplement information from the oral testimonies.
Interviews covered both urban and rural areas.They included people of all categories—
ordinary citizens, activists (local and foreign), government officials, politicians,
chiefs, soldiers (and ex-soldiers), women, teachers, pastors, former refugees, and
Batswana who became freedom fighters in one of the liberation movements.
The research team chose to carry out “open ended” interviews, rather than use
questionnaire-type interviews (as often used by social scientists). Those
interviewed were encouraged to narrate their testimonies with as little interference as
possible from the interviewer, save where clarification was needed. After the
narration, questions were asked of the informant. Both individual and group
interviews were conducted as necessary, with preference for the former. Those
individuals who demanded pointed questions to save them time were given
structured questions, rather than expected to engage in “free talking.” Such
questions ranged from seeking information about why Botswana supported the
liberation struggle to relations with the liberation movements, the freedom fighters,
refugees, and how Botswana dealt with attempts by the surrounding settler regimes
to destabilise the country. Even those asking for questions ahead of time were
given the latitude to express their opinions and experiences, without having to
follow the pattern of structured questions. The type of interview in which
individuals were given the latitude to speak freely about their experiences
generated the most useful and interesting information. And it is these experiences
that constitute an important component of the content in this chapter.
In support of the oral testimonies of those who played a role in the liberation
struggle, and as a way of complimenting Botswana’s role in the liberation struggle,
the team delegated three of its researchers to gather documentary information from
the Botswana National Archives and Records Services (BNARS).3 The team
identified
128 files (mostly from the Office of the President collection) and 586 newspaper
articles, 380 of which were from the government newspaper, The Botswana Daily
News. Archival and official published information form an integral part of the content
of this chapter. Published literature on the liberation struggle in the region, with
particular reference to Botswana, was used to supplement the oral and archival
record.
The research, to a significant extent, has focused on communities along the borders
between Botswana and the white minority ruled countries of South West Africa,
South Africa, and Rhodesia, because those fleeing from oppression entered
Botswana through the border areas, and freedom fighters also generally infiltrated
their countries through those areas. Those interviewed were predominantly men, as
women in some instances tended to shy away from being interviewed, if not
preferring to remain anonymous.
(3) The archival team: R.F. Morton, B.T. Mokopakgosi, and C.J. Makgala.
Background
In contrast with Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, which
achieved independence through armed struggle against determined white-minority
regimes, Botswana won its independence largely through the agitation of popular
political parties. The relatively few white settlers in Botswana (between 1885 and
1966 known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate) were concentrated in the eastern part
of the territory where most of the Batswana (people of Botswana) also lived. Fairly
narrow strips of land known as “Blocks” (Lobatse, Gaberones, Tuli) were restricted
to white ownership, as was the Tati area in north-eastern Botswana. The vast
majority of Batswana lived in one of the many “native reserves.” In addition to a
small white farming population, whites living in Botswana were traders,
missionaries, and government officials. Arid and as-yet unproved in minerals,
Botswana offered little return for foreign investment, which kept economic
development at a low level. Such differences in the nature of colonial experience help
to explain why the decolonisation process in Botswana differed significantly from
that of its neighbours. Further, the Protectorate’s African subjects benefited from a
relative lack of ethnic conflict, due largely to the dominance of Tswana political
organisation and culture, which reduced internal rivalries during the nationalist
period.
After World War II, Africans throughout the continent demanded freedom, but in
southern Africa, the march to independence was delayed by white settler resistance
to African majority rule. Whereas by the late 1960s, most African colonies were
independent, of the countries now composing southern Africa only Tanzania (1961),
Zambia (1963), Botswana (1966), Lesotho (1966), and Swaziland (1968) had freed
themselves of colonial rule; meanwhile the wars to liberate South Africa,
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and South West Africa were well underway.
When Botswana’s political activists created parties calling for an end to colonial
rule, Britain had accepted that its African colonies would have to be granted
independence. In the late 1940s, Britain introduced legislative councils (LEGCOs)
in its other territories as a transitional step allowing the colonised to participate
in making laws for the country and to prepare themselves for self-government.
But in Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland, and in Botswana, such efforts to prepare for
independence were delayed by Britain which hoped to buy time and to merge them
with the white-ruled states.
In Bechuanaland, Britain delayed creating a LEGCO to appease apartheid South
Africa, which still held the long-standing desire to annex the Protectorate (along the
lines that South Africa governed South West Africa under the old mandate system).
Eventually, in 1960, Britain established a LEGCO, but determined its representation
throughelectionsthatwereraciallyandcommunallybasedtomaintainthedomination
of the governance of the Protectorate by colonial officials, white settlers, traditional
rulers, and other royals. It was the same year that Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
gave his “wind of change” speech in 1960 before the South African Parliament
which gave impetus to the march toward independence in Botswana and elsewhere.
1994
A year before the inauguration of the LEGCO, Leetile Raditladi had formed
a protectorate-wide political party, the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party
(BPFP). But the BPFP called only for reform of colonial structures, remained silent
about independence, and soon collapsed. However, among the prominent political
activists and members of the educated elite who had joined the BPFP, were those
who later formed the mass political parties that called for independence.
The first pure nationalist party to emerge was the Bechuanaland (later Botswana)
People’s Party (BPP). Credit for its formation belongs largely to Motsamai Mpho.
Deported from South Africa in 1960 for his ANC activities, Mpho led the drafting of
the BPP constitution and helped launch the party in 1960. Educationist K.T. Motsete
served as president, lay preacher and WWII veteran Philip Matante, as vice president,
and Mpho, as secretary general. The party grew rapidly, especially in the trading
town of Francistown in the northeast, where there was much discontent against land
alienation by the Tati Company. It appealed to the emerging sector of urban workers
in Francistown and in townships along the railway line, and to many landless
peasants in the northeast. The BPP aggressively called for an end to white racism,
the scrapping of communal representation in the JAC (Joint Advisory Council) and
LEGCO, and immediate national self-determination and independence through“one
man/one vote” elections.
The BPP faced serious limitations. It failed to mobilise support in other parts of
the country, particularly in rural areas, and remained essentially a regional party. The
BPP also suffered from feuding among its leaders, and in 1963 the party split, with
Matante emerging as the leader of the dominant faction. By this time, it had already
been overtaken by its rival, the Bechuanaland (later Botswana) Democratic Party.
The BDP, which led Botswana to independence, was founded by Seretse Khama.
The highly educated, wealthy grandson of the legendary Khama III, and heir to the
throne of the largest Batswana group (the Bangwato), Seretse rejected his royal
entitlement and entered nationalist politics instead. He was troubled by BPP
radicalism, which he felt weakened Botswana’s opportunity to create a united nation
that would embrace all the people of Botswana, regardless of race. In November
1961, he urged the African members of LEGCO to form a new political party in
opposition to the BPP. Like Matante, Khama called for independence through “one
man/one vote” elections. However, whereas Matante wanted immediate
independence, Seretse argued for an orderly transition to independence through a
negotiated constitution.
Deliberate moves towards independence began in 1963. That year, Peter Fawcus,
the forward-looking Resident Commissioner, began multilateral consultations with
representatives of all political parties, traditional rulers, and the white settler
community. Fawcus then introduced internal self-government, not through the
LEGCO as originally envisaged, but through a new democratic constitution, by
agreeing to a fully elected, non-racial legislature. A few Europeans opposed these
reforms, but they were easily eclipsed. The “Fawcus Plan” changed the nature of
the
political struggle, placing Botswana’s future in the hands of the politicians who
won the election that followed.
In early 1964, Fawcus announced that the Protectorate’s first “one man/one vote”
elections would be held in March 1965. In preparation, the BDP launched a
massive countrywide campaign to publicise both itself and the new dispensation
embraced in the “Fawcus Plan.” The party broadcast its policies and information
about its
leaders in a monthly newspaper, Therisanyo (consultation), headed by Quett Masire.
Masire also travelled throughout the country to spread the party message and recruit
members. BDP popularity was enhanced by Khama’s stature and charisma.
The BDP prepared well for the elections, fielding candidates in all 31
constituencies, and, with the other parties seriously weakened, it won a landslide
victory with 28 of the 31 seats. The remaining three went to Matante’s BPP. This sent
his BPP rival Motsete to oblivion, his lasting contribution being the composition of
the national anthem.
In 1965, self-government began with Seretse Khama as Prime Minister.
Botswana became independent on 30 September 1966, with Seretse Khama as
Botswana’s President and Quett Masire as the Vice President. The BDP has ruled
the country since then, maintaining a large majority in each election, held every
five years. The leader of the BPP, Philip Matante, became leader of the opposition
in Parliament.
Under the leadership of Seretse Khama, who died in 1980, and his successor Quett
Masire (president from 1980-1998), Botswana became one of the most stable nations
on the continent, after its large deposits of diamonds were exploited with mines in
Orapa (1967), Lethlakane (1977), and most importantly, one of its most prosperous,
Jwaneng (1982). Its diamond revenues enabled Botswana to enjoy a steadily high
rate of economic growth, and to raise an increasing proportion of its people out of
poverty. Independent Botswana also became an important centre for anti-apartheid
activity, and it served as a critical transit point for activists fleeing Mozambique,
Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. For many, it became a place of
refuge and for not a few, a permanent home. Botswana’s geographical location
played a significant role in its foreign policy and its approach in assisting the
liberation struggle. At independence, the country was surrounded by Southern
Rhodesia, South Africa, and South West Africa, all ruled by white racist minority
regimes, opposed to sharing power with the black majority. In dealing with these
regimes, Botswana adopted“tight rope diplomacy,” by supporting the liberation
struggle and simultaneously avoiding, as far as possible, attacks from the racist
regimes. Despite its cautious approach, Botswana was attacked from time to
time.4
As a poor, landlocked country, Botswana depended entirely on the transport and
communications systems of Rhodesia and South Africa; and its economy, in
particular its food supply, was heavily dependent on South Africa. Botswana’s only
link with independent African countries to the north was a narrow ferry crossing at
(4) Interviews with Festus G. Mogae, Botswana President (1998-2008), (Gaborone) November 2008; Legwaila
Joseph Legwaila, (Gaborone) August 2006.
1994
Kazungula, facing Zambia, where the Chobe River flows into the Zambezi.
Botswana had no choice but to face up to these constraints as a result of its support
for the liberation struggle.5 Given these limitations, Botswana nevertheless found a
number of ways to support the liberation struggle, especially by giving refugees a
safe haven and catering for their welfare, providing diplomatic, political, and
material support to the oppressed, and by working assiduously with the other
“Frontline States” to help the liberation movements in prosecuting the struggle.
The Refugees
Prior to Botswana’s independence in 1966, persons unable to tolerate the surrounding
oppressive, race-based minority regimes were already coming into the country from
South Africa, South West Africa, and (Southern) Rhodesia in search of refuge.
Some came alone, others with entire families. They were made to feel welcome,
and they were given the freedom to put their talents to use. Among these were
persons such as Bessie Head, whose novels and stories about Botswana helped
develop its literary tradition; Patrick Van Rensburg, who established schools and
launched the brigade’s movement; and Leonard Ngcongco, one of the pioneers in
establishing Botswana’s history in the literature. Along with many others, these
three arrived in the early 1960s following the South African crackdown on political
protest. Others who arrived in or passed through Botswana in the early 1960s
included Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Samora Machel, Samuel Nujoma, Robert
Mugabe, Jayson Moyo, Joe Slovo, Ruth First, and J.B. Marks. Mandela had been
spotted in Lobatse in January 1962, with the plan to charter a plane to Tanganyika.6
Robert Mugabe and Jayson Moyo arrived in Francistown in April 19637 and were
subsequently airlifted to Zambia, as were Joe Slovo and J.B. Marks two months
later.8 The administration knew about Mandela’s presence in Lobatse, but did not
inform the South African police as to his whereabouts. This period also
experienced a significant influx of South African agents into the country, especially
in places such as Lobatse in the south.
With each phase of resistance to white minority rule, such as the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia (1965), Soweto (1976), and the
United Democratic Front (UDF) campaigns of the 1980s, refugees poured into
Botswana in search of sanctuary. Even the anti-colonial war in Angola contributed
to Botswana’s refugee population. In 1967 and 1969, more than 4,000
Hambukushu
(5) Tlou, Thomas and A. Campbell. History of Botswana. Gaborone: Macmillan, 1997: See pp.380-381; Interview
with Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, (Gaborone) August 2006.
(6) BNARS OP33/2: Immigration to BP: Refugees, September 1961 - April 1962. Secret Report of the Special
Branch Office, Lobatse, 15 January 1962.
(7) BNARS OP33/7: Immigration into BP: Refugees, May - August 1963: Resident Commissioner to High
Commissioner, Mafikeng, 7 June 1963.
(8) Ibid. Commissioner of Police to Government Secretary, Gaborone, 19 April 1963.
fleeing the Portuguese campaign against Angola’s freedom fighters entered

Botswana at Mohembo.9
As a member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Botswana recognised
and supported liberation movements recognised by the OAU, especially by giving
safe haven to refugees of these movements. For its own part, throughout the
liberation struggle, Botswana maintained an unequivocal open door policy towards
genuine refugees (as opposed to agents of minority regimes claiming refugee status
to carry
out their spying activities). Botswana was a major gateway and conduit for those
wishing to go to countries to the north, for the purpose of joining one of the liberation
movements with their headquarters there. At the same time, Botswana prohibited the
use of its territory to launch attacks against the racist regimes. As a poor country with
a minuscule police force and without even an army before 1977, for Botswana to
do otherwise would have opened it to reprisals from those regimes, reprisals from
which it was incapable of defending itself. Although this policy was misunderstood
initially by the liberation movements, and even by some African states, gradually
they came to understand Botswana’s position. The Frontline States, formed in 1974
for advancing the liberation struggle, supported Botswana’s policy.10
Among refugees, nevertheless, Botswana’s position remained controversial in the
early years. Most of those interviewed stated that Botswana, given its precarious
geopolitical situation, supported the liberation struggle. A few voices, however,
held the view that Botswana did not do enough, because they did not allow freedom
fighters to launch attacks from its territory; in other words, Botswana should have
allowed liberation movements to establish military bases in its territory. Eventually,
Botswana’s no-attack policy was appreciated by the liberation movements and
others, who earlier had been critical of Botswana’s policy. Informant O.K. Menyatso
supported the government’s policy:
We assessed our situation and realised that offering our country as a base or spring
board for attacks would have been a great adventure… Ours was a principled position
that despite our precarious geopolitical situation, we supported the struggle and
suffered incursions but could not retaliate.11
Botswana’s policy was formed some years after the Protectorate had been dealing
with refugees on its own. In the 1960s, especially after the Sharpeville massacre,
many South Africans fled to the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and officials avoided
making refugees too comfortable as they might fail to travel on to havens in the
north. Protectorate officials also were leery of offending apartheid South Africa.
Many of these refugees were members of such liberation movements as the African
(9) Morton, F., J. Ramsay, and P. Mgadla. The Historical Dictionary of Botswana. Fourth Edition. Lanham,
Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2008: See p.285.
(10) Interviews with Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, (Gaborone) August 2006; Festus G. Mogae, Former President
(Gaborone), November 2008; Godfrey Tyolo, (Mahalapye) June 2007; Tlou and Campbell. History of Botswana.
See p.381.
(11) Interview with O.K. Menyatso, (Mahalapye) June 2007.
1994
National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC), the Zimbabwe African
People’s Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the
South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), among others. Officials
airlifted them to Zambia when the South African government protested their
presence in the Protectorate and continued transporting refugees by air in spite of
South African threats to shoot down the planes carrying them. Indeed, on one
occasion in Francistown, saboteurs bombed the aeroplane which was to transport
refugees to Zambia. It is suspected that this was the work of the South African
regime.12 To its credit, the Protectorate administration did not return these people
to South Africa. Professionals such as teachers and nurses found employment in the
country. Many became Botswana citizens and helped in the development of the
country, which had a serious scarcity of trained human resources, at independence.
The refugee influx discussed below is organised according to the regions where
they arrived, and represent persons coming from Rhodesia, Mozambique, South
Africa, South West Africa, and Angola.
Eastern and North Eastern Botswana
In the early 1960s, refugees from the south western part of then Southern Rhodesia
began trickling into the Protectorate. Most were Babirwa or “Basotho” as they are
called in Zimbabwe, who are ethnically related to the Babirwa of eastern Botswana.
They told of increasing oppression by the Rhodesian regime. They settled among their
relatives in the Bobirwa area in such villages as Semolale, Gobojango, and
Mabolwe. As war intensified following the UDI, many more fled into Bobirwa,
including whole families; others were taken there by ZAPU freedom fighters.
While some could find their way to Gobojango and Mabolwe, others were guided by
herdsmen at cattle posts or by freedom fighters who had crossed into Zimbabwe to
recruit some followers. Generally, they all travelled at night to avoid detection by
Rhodesian forces, and many who had abandoned their homes and property arrived in
Botswana in a sorry state. In the northeast the same pattern occurred. Refugees
crossed into such border villages as Maitengwe, where they were welcomed by the
Bakalanga of that area, who are ethnically related to the Kalanga of northwest
Zimbabwe. Guided by herdsmen and other Batswana to the villages inside the
border, they were hosted by the people of Maitengwe and hidden from pursuing
Rhodesian forces.13
Recollections from Bobirwa
When refugees arrived in one of the Bobirwa villages, they reported to the local
kgosi. Chiefs and village families received many refugees into their care by
offering them
(12) BNARS OP 33/2: Immigration to BP: Refugees, September 1961 - April 1962; Secret Report of the Special
Branch offices, Lobatse, 15 January 1962; OP 33/7: Immigration into BP: Refugees, May - August 1963: Resident
Commissioner to High Commissioner, Mafeking, 7 June 1963 and Commissioner of Police to Government,
Secretary, Gaborone, 19 April 1963; Interview with Festus G. Mogae, Former President, (Gaborone) November
2008.
(13) Interviews with Obed Itani Chilume, (Tutume) May 2007; Join Ngala, (Mabolwe) May 2007.
temporary board and lodging. In fact many villagers supplied food and clothing and
other necessities when they were able to do so. They cared for the sick as best as
they could until they were moved to health facilities in Bobonong and Selebi-
Phikwe. Some families requested permission to live with members of their families
who had also come from Zimbabwe. At Zimbabwe’s independence, they could
choose either to return home or remain and become Botswana citizens. Not all who
entered Botswana were refugees. A case in point is that of a Bobonong secondary
school teacher, in 1978, who was exposed by the Manama Mission students, who
knew him to be a policeman in Rhodesia. The students demanded his dismissal and
he left the school to return to Rhodesia.14
Refugees arriving in Gobojango were directed to the home of Motsumi
Mogorosi; and those who reached Mabolwe, to Join Ngala’s. Mogorosi and Ngala
played a major role in assisting refugees and freedom fighters. They were known to
Zimbabwean Basotho through their relatives. They had enough resources to care
for those who came to them, as they were comparatively well off; they also took
enormous risks in placing themselves and their families in situations that
endangered their lives. It did not take long before the Rhodesian forces heard about
Mogorosi and Ngala, and laid their own plans to eliminate them, because among the
refugees there were spies sent to determine the layout of their homesteads and then
to report back.15
The villagers at Gobojango and Mabolwe were always on the lookout for spies
posing as refugees. When strangers entered their villages on the quiet, asking around
as to the whereabouts of Motsumi Mogorosi and Join Ngala, suspicious villagers
sent warnings to these men, so that they had time that night to get out of their homes
and go into hiding. Such precautions, however determined, failed to prevent the
inevitable. In 1978, a dramatic incident occurred when a group of Rhodesian
soldiers entered Ngala’s village, approached his house and shot into it. Ngala
miraculously escaped by slipping into neighbouring Semolale, where he had
secreted himself on previous occasions. Nearby was a Botswana Defence Force
(BDF) camp, where, after hearing the sound of gunfire, the soldiers immediately
went into action. As villagers fled to the bush and streams nearby, BDF soldiers
arrived. The Rhodesians fled immediately. Meanwhile the gunfire had alerted ZAPU
freedom fighters in the area, who quickly located Ngala’s attackers and laid an
ambush.
In eastern Botswana, people still recall the time when a Rhodesian policeman
entered Botswana with a group of refugees, then disappeared to return to Rhodesia.
The freedom fighters soon learned of this. When the Rhodesian stopped to sleep at
a cattle post, he aroused the suspicions of the herdsman, who alerted the freedom
fighters who were nearby. They captured and shot him. The matter was reported to the
police who collected the body. Such incidents did not deter the people of Gobojango
(14) Interviews with Calvin Thunamo Sekwababe, (Bobonong) January 2008; Keitseng Morake, (Bobonong)
January 2008; Motsumi Mogorosi, (Gobojango) May 2007.
(15) Interviews with Join Ngala, (Mabolwe) May 2007; William Maziba Mathora, ( Mabolwe) May 2007; Kgosi
Mmirwa Malema, (Bobonong) January 2008.
1994
and Mabolwe from continuing to help refugees and freedom fighters. They provided
valuable aid until the end of the war.
The role of the people of Gobojango and Mabolwe was strengthened after the
BDF established a camp near Mabolwe, brought food supplies to the refugees, and
transported them to Selebi-Phikwe and elsewhere. A police station was established,
too, at the border village of Semolale. It was around this time that the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Botswana Red Cross
supplemented government efforts in transporting and feeding refugees.16 These
measures eased matters for the villagers, who, until then, had been the refugees’
only source of board, lodging, and transport. Caring for the refugees was a collective
effort. Men and women collaborated and shared the responsibility, with women
doing most of the cooking, tending to the sick and preparing sleeping arrangements,
while men fetched fire wood using donkey carts or trucks (the few who had them),
kept the local chief informed, and organised transport for those needing to proceed
further into Botswana. All this was done free of charge.17
The villagers of Gobojango and Mabolwe, like other commoners in other parts
of Botswana, contributed significantly to the war effort. Many examples of selfless
care can be provided. In 1977, Makgabane Mosogwane, a Gobojango school
teacher, noticed a very young girl who was scantly-dressed, among an influx of
refugees, and took pity on her. Ms. Mosogwane asked the chief to give her
permission to have the girl live with her rather than send her to Bobonong along with
the other refugees. She bought her clothing and enrolled her at the primary school
where she taught. When independence came in 1980, she returned to Zimbabwe, by
then having advanced to standard three.18
In the eastern part of the country, the transportation of refugees created what
might be called a “freedom trail,” which started from Gobojango and Mabolwe,
passed through Bobonong to Selebi-Phikwe, and reached the refugee camp in
Francistown. For those wishing to join a liberation movement, the journey continued
to Zambia. Later, when the Dukwi refugee camp was established, the Selebi-
Phikwe and Francistown camps were either closed or left to serve as transit points to
Dukwi. In the early days, virtually all transport from Gobojango and Mabolwe was
provided by volunteer tractor and truck owners in those villages, such as Motsumi
Mogorosi, William Maziba Mathora, Busang Ngala, Join Ngala, and Koma, the
village chief. The burden of transporting the refugees from the border villages to
Bobonong fell on these men because the police in Bobonong had very few trucks. At
times, these village transporters fetched those who were too weary or sick to walk
to the villages from the border.
(16) Interviews with Motsumi Mogorosi, (Gobojango) May 2007; Join Ngala, (Mabolwe) May 2007; James Molobe
and Michael, (Maitengwe) May 2007; Mmirwa Malema, (Bobonong) January 2008.
(17) Interviews with Motsumi Mogorosi, (Gobojango) May 2007; Join Ngala, (Mabolwe) May 2007.
(18) Interview with Mrs Makgabane Mosogwane, (Gobojango) May 2007.
In 1977, a large group was brought into Bobirwa by freedom fighters. They
consisted of 400 students with their teachers from Manama Mission, a Lutheran
Church primary school, not far from the border, together with nurses from the
nearby mission hospital. Most came willingly, but later a few of them said they
were coerced. The Rhodesian government alleged that the students were held by
the government of Botswana against their will. The Botswana government
arranged a meeting between the students and those parents who had travelled to
Botswana to try to persuade their children to return to Rhodesia. Most students
refused to go back. The meeting, which was well covered by the international media,
confirmed that most students refused to go back and had not been coerced into
coming to Botswana. Canon Burgess Carr, Secretary General of the All Africa
Council of Churches, who had flown from Nairobi, confirmed the students’
statements.19 Tsholofelo Morake witnessed the meeting and recalls that only a
handful of students agreed and went back to Rhodesia with their parents, but all the
others flatly refused.20 The villages of Gobojango and Mabolwe cared for them and
hid them when a Rhodesian plane flew low over the place where they were gathered.
After circling a few times, the plane flew away. No harm resulted. In 1978, another
group of 418 students from Tegwani Mission in Rhodesia, with their teachers and
headmaster, were found by Botswana Police at Ramokgwebana border village in the
northeast and were taken to Francistown. After a few days, 364 returned to
Rhodesia.21
Eastern Botswana was also the main area from which freedom fighters attacked
the Rhodesian regime. They stashed large amounts of war materials in the hills and
mountains in Bobirwa area. Ngala recalls that when the war ended, the leaders of the
guerrillas in his area told him that ZAPU required them to bring all the armaments
they had amassed to the border where arrangements were made to collect them.
One of the important figures to enter Botswana via Bobirwa was FRELIMO’s
(Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) Samora Machel, together with his
companions from Mozambique. They entered at Lentswe-le-Moriti village, where the
village elders arranged for the group to travel to Lobatse and stay with the
Kgaboesele family. Lentswe-le-Moriti resident Moatshe Dintwe recalled how this
was done.
We arranged for Moses (the name we knew Samora by, then) and the others and
got them a ride on a truck that was transporting cattle to Palapye. From there the
cattle were transferred onto the train to the Lobatse BMC. We hid them under sacks
and blankets in the truck, on the journey to Palapye. There, I was able to put them on
the train. It was easy for me to do this because it was my job to arrange for the
transportation of the cattle, and I was also able to give them a little bit of money
when I parted with them at Palapye.22
(19) Daily News. 8, 11, 14 and 16 February and 3 March 1977.

(20) Interview with Tsholofelo Morake, (Gaborone) 2008.
(21) Daily News. 16 February, 3 March, and 3 April 1977; Interviews with Kepaletswe Sekwababe, (Bobonong)
January 2008; Join Ngala, (Mabolwe) May 2007; Tsholofelo Morake, (Gaborone) October 2008.
(22) Interview with Moatshe Gabi Dintwe, (Gaborone) June 2008.
1994
In the northeast, James Molobe of Maitengwe transported refugees in his own truck
to the village kgotla. As the war intensified around Maitengwe and other north-
eastern villages, the lives of the villagers and their property were lost, and the
people were kidnapped for interrogation about the alleged operations of the
guerrillas in Botswana. Many people abandoned their arable lands and cattle posts
in the border areas and relocated deeper in the country. Livestock which strayed into
Rhodesia was never recovered.23
South African Refugees
The long border that Botswana shared with South Africa stretches more than 1,700
kilometres from Lentswe-le-Moriti in the east to Union’s End in the west (where it
merges with the Namibian border). Much of the eastern half of this border is marked
by the Limpopo and Madikwe rivers, and much of the western half by the Molopo
River. On the South African side, only a few towns existed, much of the territory
characterised by thick thorn bush. The several road passageways connected
Botswana’s small towns and centres to counterparts in South Africa, including
Lobatse-Mafikeng, Gaborone-Zeerust/Rustenburg, Mahalapye/Palapye-Mokopane
(Potgietersrust). The rural villages of Mochudi, Tlokweng, and Ramotswa were
also linked to rural settlements in the South African reserves across the border. The
Rhodesian railway entered Botswana from South Africa at Ramatlabama, south of
Lobatse. For the most part, refugees from South Africa found their way into
Botswana by avoiding the rail and using the road passageways, though after 1976, as
South African police and army units actively patrolled these roads, refugees, made up
increasingly of young men and women seeking to enlist in the ANC and other
organisations in exile, resorted to the thick bush to escape South Africa.
When Botswana villagers crossed into South Africa to shop, they were often
harassed at the border posts. They were asked by the South Africans if there were
freedom fighters in Botswana. The villagers suspected that either white farmers on
farms adjacent to these villages, or some of their Batswana workers, or even some
villagers, were informers for the South African and Rhodesian governments.
The incursions of Rhodesian and South African undercover agents into Botswana
were a constant threat, not just in the Eastern part, but in other parts of the country as
well. For example, in Lobatse, a town in the south of the country, South African
agents abducted an innocent person, who was later released after intervention by
Botswana police. It is alleged that among the South African police, who
collaborated with the Botswana police to fight crime along the common border,
there were spies. When their cover was blown by the Botswana police they
disappeared.
As in Bobirwa and the Bukalanga areas, local villagers helped these refugees to
cross. Villagers sheltered and fed them until they could proceed inland and make
their way north to Zambia. Those known to be on South Africa’s “hit list”were shuttled
(23) Interviews with Obed Itani Chilume. (Tutume) May 2007; Motlatsi Molapisi, (Francistown) May 2007.
north quickly, as it was not easy to protect them. Among those who assisted those
in flight was Gladstone Phatudi, a South African who was a headmaster at a
primary school at Good Hope in the Barolong Farms area (just north of the Molopo
River along the Ramatlabama-Lobatse road), and who had come to Botswana
himself as a refugee. Phatudi helped these South Africans cross into Botswana at
night, then in the following days transported them to Lobatse after dark and handed
them over to Fish Keitseng who ran an ANC underground operation, transporting
refugees from Botswana to Zambia.24
Fish Keitseng was among those private citizens in Botswana who provided vital
service to refugees; in Keitseng’s case, it was particularly those fleeing South
Africa as members of the ANC. Keitseng, who became an ANC member during his
years in South Africa, served as their undercover representative in the
Bechuanaland Protectorate.25 He also extended his hand to ordinary refugees. On
22 May 1964, twenty youth entered the country after being promised an
opportunity of studying abroad; eleven were illiterate. These youngsters came from
the Zeerust area, which, five years earlier, had been the scene of an uprising caused
by extension of pass laws to women. It was obvious to Keitseng that they had been
recruited for military training. Keitseng assisted them to get to Kazungula and cross
into Zambia. The Protectorate authorities knew about this passage, but they did not
interfere.26
In these early years, the Protectorate administration also assisted refugees to make
their way north. For example, in December 1961, nineteen nurses suddenly appeared
in Lobatse. Through the efforts of the ANC, they had been recruited from all over
South Africa, including Johannesburg and Durban, to work for the Tanganyika
government.When they reached the Bechuanaland Protectorate, they discovered that
no arrangements had been made for their transit to Tanganyika. The administration
could easily have sent them back to South Africa, but instead they offered the
nurses an unused house in Lobatse while officials made travel arrangements. On 17
January 1962, the nurses were airlifted out of the Protectorate.27
Klaas Motshidisi, one of the key people in rendering assistance to the refugees,
captures succinctly how he and colleagues in the Botswana People’s Party assisted
the liberation struggle:
It was individuals more than the state that helped the freedom fighters. We made
personal sacrifices by accommodating them in our homes.As individuals, we suffered;
I was declared a prohibited immigrant by the South African State in 1966. When
Samora Machel arrived in Lobatse, the Kgaboesele family accommodated him. They
literally moved out of their house to accommodate them.When Nelson Mandela
returned from
(24) Interviews with Gladstone Phatudi, (Good Hope) June 2007; Kgosi Letlamoreng, (Good Hope) June 2007;
Victor Kowa, (Gaborone) February 2007.
(25) Morton, B., J. Ramsay, and F. Keitseng. Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC Underground.
Gaborone: Pula Press, 1999.
(26) BNARS, OP 33/2: Commissioner of Police to Chief Secretary, 22 May 1964.
(27) BNARS, OP 33/6: Commissioner of Police to Government Secretary (secret), 7 December 1961; Resident
Commissioner to High Commissioner, 14 December 1961.
1994
military training, he landed in Francistown and Fish Keitseng stayed with him. Our
people provided the rungs of a ladder for these people to rise to prominence in their
own countries. Joe Modise, as one of the commanders of Mkhonto we Sizwe, would
tell us when their people would be passing through Botswana. Fish Keitseng
coordinated the southern part of Botswana and I [Klaas Motshidisi] handled the
central part of the country, the Tuli Block area. From the south they were transferred
to Palapye, where I and others, including Mpho and Matante, would assist their
passage to the north.28
The Soweto Uprising (16 June 1976)
In 1972, the period of rising student politicisation and activism began. At Turfloop
(then the University of the North) and on other university campuses, students in such
organisations as the Black Consciousness Movement led a number of students to
cross the border into Botswana, some hoping for a chance to further their education,
others to join the liberation movement in the north. After Soweto erupted, students
in their hundreds crossed the border into Botswana to seek political asylum or to be
ferried north to join the liberation movements. Most of the Soweto refugees were
primary or secondary school students with no qualifications and thus unemployable.
Moreover, it was often difficult to know who was a genuine refugee and who was a
spy of the South African government. Added to this difficulty, Botswana was under
the pressure exerted by the South African government whereby James Kruger, the
South African Minister of Justice, gave the students and the Botswana government an
ultimatum that students had to return to South Africa within one week.
The Botswana government reiterated its policy of assistance to victims of
oppression and asserted that no amount of threats would make it change its policy
towards refugees.29 Botswana took care of these new refugees to the best of its
ability. Many were enrolled in Botswana secondary schools such as Lotsane near
Palapye and Molefi in Mochudi. According to one informant, the Soweto group was
the most difficult to control.30 Most of them were urban youth who loathed the
rural Dukwi settlement.When persuasion failed, the government rounded them up
and took them to Dukwi. They criticised the government, alleging that they had
been ill-treated.
Ghanzi and Ngamiland
Assistance to freedom fighters and refugees entering from South West Africa and
Angola long predates Botswana’s independence. Since the early 20th century,
when refugees from the Nama-Herero uprising against the Germans fled into
Ngamiland and Ghanzi, north-western Botswana had provided a refuge from
German and South African oppression. In the 1960s, when a new influx of refugees
arrived, they came already having relatives to welcome them. According to
Gaerolwe Kwerepe,
(28) Interview with Klaas Motshidisi, (Palapye) June 2007.

(29) Diseko, N.J. “The Origins and Development of the South African Students Movement 1968 – 1972.” Journal of
Southern African Studies 18.1 (March 1992): pp.40-62; Interview with Potlako Molefhe, (Gaborone) October 2008;
“Refuges: Ultimatum answered,” Daily News. 17 November 1976.
(30) BNARS, OP 27/15: D.T. Mophuting for Commissioner of Police to Permanent Secretary, Office of the
President, 17 September 1979; Interview with Azarhah Moagi, (Ramotswa) June 2007.
refugees arriving in his own village were ethnic Herero and Mbanderu, some with
grandparents who had fled the German wars long before.31 Gaditshwane Mmutla
of Gumare compared the bond of people across the Botswana-Namibia border with
southern Botswana’s Barolong people, who had relatives across the border in the
Mafeking area of South Africa, and with the Bakalanga of Maitengwe and Jackalas
No. 1 and Jackalas No. 2, who had relatives in Zimbabwe.32 Relatives in various
villages of Ngamiland accommodated them for a while. Local people donated food
and clothes, especially in villages along the border.
In contrast to other parts of pre-independence Botswana, Protectorate officials
in the northwest were hostile to the freedom fighters and were keen to catch those
crossing into the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Nevertheless, Batswana continued to
support their fellow Africans secretly. Some Ngamiland individuals recalled
assisting refugees and freedom fighters in the 1960s at the time they were forming the
Botswana People’s Party. Kwerepe (a BDP member) recalled the message of
Motsamai Mpho (of the BPP) that the people of Ngamiland should help those
running away from their countries and seeking political asylum in the Protectorate.
One of the political
activists in Ngamiland, L.M. Setlhoko, narrated an incident where he and some of his
colleagues in Maun hid an ANC member in a goat kraal to avoid him being caught
by the authorities. Given the level of secrecy in handling freedom fighters in the
early 1960s, those interviewed told of cases where freedom fighters spent the night
at their homes and left the following day in the early hours without even bidding
farewell to
those who accommodated them.33
Incidents are recalled when the colonial Police Mobile Unit waited at a secret
place known as Samxu in Xhusa near Mababe to catch those accompanying freedom
fighters/refugees to Kazungula in route to Zambia. One of the founding members of
the then Bechuanaland Independence Party (BIP) branch in Ngamiland, Gaditshwane
Mmutla, was among those caught. Mmutla regarded this as harassment by the
Bechuanaland Protectorate Police. He narrated how in the early 1960s the police
followed them around and maintained surveillance of their houses on suspicion that
they were assisting freedom fighters. Such efforts failed to deter Mmutla and
others. In Mmutla’s words, “we first engaged in Botswana politics; we wanted to
strengthen our own political party in the country, but not forgetting our fellow
brothers who were oppressed in Namibia, South Africa and Rhodesia. So we
helped them to go to countries north of Botswana where they were going to train as
freedom fighters.”34
After independence, the situation improved. Upon refugees arriving in Shakawe
or Gumare or another of the villages, the chief was notified. He then welcomed them
at the kgotla and assigned individuals to accommodate them. Those interviewed are
quick to say that Batswana assisting freedom fighters and refugees were
unconcerned
(31) Interview with Gaerolwe Kwerepe, (Maun) September 2008.

(32) Interviews with Gaditshwane Mmutla, (Gumare) November 2007; Sekgwa Motswai, (Gumare) September 2007.
(33) Interviews with L.M. Setlhoko, (Maun) September 2007; Sekgwa Motswai, (Gumare) September 2007.
(34) Interview with Gaditshwane Mmutla, (Maun) June 2007.
1994
whether they were ANC, SWAPO, SWANU, ZANU, or ZAPU.35 They were aware
of possible attacks from the white regime forces, but supported President Seretse
Khama’s policy of not allowing Botswana to be used for launching attacks, while
accommodating refugees in spite of threats.
People of Ngamiland assisted with petrol for the cars transporting freedom
fighters across to Zambia. According to Mmutla, some of the vehicles were
donated to Motsamai Mpho by the OAU Liberation Committee through the Pan-
Africanist efforts of Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. Though donated for
Mpho’s political movement, his members used them to transport freedom fighters
when the need arose.
Sam Nujoma and SWAPO
South Africa had ruled the territory of Namibia (former South West Africa) under a
League of Nations mandate (“Class C”) since 1920. When it became clear after
World War II that South Africa was intent on imposing the apartheid system there, its
occupation was declared illegal by the UN. In August 1966, SWAPO initiated
military action to liberate the country and, during the 1960s, small-scale guerrilla
warfare continued in South West Africa between SWAPO and South African
security forces. In 1967, the South African government tried to break SWAPO’s
political organisation by putting thirty-seven prominent SWAPO members on trial in
Pretoria for treason. One of the co-founders of SWAPO, Herman Andimba Toivo ya
Toivo, was among those sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on Robben Island
under South Africa’s anti-terrorism legislation (Terrorism Act No. 83 of 1967).36 With
Toivo in prison, Sam Nujoma, who had established SWAPO headquarters and
guerrilla training bases in Tanzania, assumed the presidency of SWAPO, led the
armed resistance, and launched the Namibian war of independence. Meanwhile the
enforcement of apartheid continued and several SWAPO leaders, including Sam
Nujoma were forced to flee the country.37 Nujoma escaped by travelling via
Botswana, Tanzania, and Ghana to reach the United Nations, where he presented
their case to the United Nations Security Council.38
Several individuals in Ngamiland remembered clearly the events above and their
meeting with key political liberation struggle activists, including Nujoma. Ngamiland
elders talked about how they helped Nujoma after he arrived in Ngamiland soon
after he had assumed SWAPO leadership. The Maun elders and political veterans
Mpho and Mmutla are among the Botswana politicians who were in contact with
Nujoma. Mmutla remembered how he and others were summoned to Mamuno and
other villages near the Namibian border to receive political activists crossing into
(35) Interview with L.M. Setlhoko, (Maun) September 2007.

(36) Toivo served 16 years, most of it alongside Nelson Mandela.
(37) Like Toivo, Nujoma is considered one of the fathers of the Namibian independence struggle. They both formed
SWAPO in 1960. See http://africanhistory.about.com/cs/biography/p/bio_toivo.htm. Accessed 17 December 2008.
(38) The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), entry Nujoma,
Sam; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Nujoma. Accessed 17 December 2008.
Botswana. Mmutla and his colleagues found petrol, and drove long distances on
bumpy gravel roads in order to fetch the fleeing Namibians and bring them to Maun.
They also travelled to Ghanzi and on to Makunda, a village next to Charles Hill in
the Ghanzi District, where they met refugees and SWAPO members coming on foot
from the Mamuno border post. In general, freedom fighters crossing into the Ghanzi
district from Namibia travelled in small groups of four or five while refugees
arrived in groups of ten or more people.
The Sam Nujoma case is worth highlighting as it was mentioned several times by
those interviewed in Ngamiland.39 When “secret” word reached Maun that Nujoma
was at the border, Mmutla travelled with Daniel Munamava to Makunda to pick him
up. Munamava, a Botswana citizen who was the SWAPO party chairman of the
Ngamiland region at the time, coordinated SWAPO activities in Ngamiland and
Ghanzi, and linked people in Botswana with their counterparts in South West Africa.
Some of the Botswana ethnic Ova Herero/ Mbanderu like Daniel Munamava and
Edwin Kwatheri, who also had relatives in Namibia, were actively involved in
SWAPO politics and helped coordinate the cross border movements of the freedom
fighters and refugees. At the time that Sam Nujoma entered Botswana, the country
was undergoing a transitional process to independence, and the Police
administration’s mindset might have still been very conservative and Sam Nujoma’s
presence was likely to be perceived as a problem in the country40 According to
Mmutla, as soon as the Special Branch heard that Nujoma had entered Botswana,
they searched for him all over the Ghanzi district. Through their own local
intelligence, Mmutla, Munamava, and Kwatheri were alerted that the police were
looking for them and Nujoma.
Advance warning allowed Mmutla and his team to avoid arrest. Rather than stay
on the road, they spent a night at a cattle post called Motswere, in the vicinity of
Makunda, which the police failed to locate and therefore could not determine the
whereabouts of Mmutla. The police tried in vain to track them down from Makunda,
through to the Kuke gate (today the border area between the Ghanzi district and
Ngamiland). From Kuke to Maun, Munamava and Kwatheri rode on horses away
from the main road. Their purpose was to keep Mmutla and Nujoma, who were
travelling on the main road by car, informed about the whereabouts of the Special
Branch whom they suspected were still after them. As lookouts, Munamava and
Kwatheri helped Mmutla and Nujoma to avoid meeting the police.41
Refugees who crossed at the Mamuno border were transported to Ngamiland by
Batswana political activists often at their own costs. Some stayed with trusted
families in Sehithwa. In some cases, refugee groups of teenagers were kept in the
Maun prison for their protection. Freedom fighters were accommodated at Mmutla’s
house for security reasons. Nujoma stayed in Maun for two weeks. They gave
him a hiding
(39) For example, interview with L.M. Setlhoko, (Maun) September 2007.
(40) Members of the Special Branch were thought to be operating just as they had in the colonial period.
(41) Interview with Gaditshwane Mmutla, (Maun) November 2007.
1994
place, which those interviewed did not disclose. One of the individuals narrated the
kind of conversations they had with Nujoma during his brief stay:
We enjoyed discussions with him. We were new in politics and we liked to hear a
lot about politics of liberation struggle. Nujoma told us about problems experienced
by blacks in his country and that such problems affected Africa as a whole. We also
talked about how we wanted African countries to be liberated. We heard about Nelson
Mandela and Robben Island through Nujoma. We talked about Pan African legends
such as Nkrumah, Nyerere and Kaunda, who were great men of the nationalist
movement. There were newspapers like the Contact and New Age which we enjoyed
reading with Nujoma.42
Another prominent person to enter Botswana at Ghanzi, where she was assisted in
the transit north to join her husband, was Mrs Theopaulina Nujoma. She was assisted
by Lesedi Mothibamele, a police officer in Ghanzi. Years later, when Mothibamele
travelled to independent Namibia on official business, he was treated as a celebrity.
Mothibamele narrates the story:
I was in Namibia when I was leading the Salaries Commission delegation for
Members of Parliament. So, as I was talking to the late Speaker of Parliament, I
mentioned her [Mrs Nujoma], and you know that night there was a big party and I
was one of the celebrities. Some of them were remembering and saying“You were the
police officer in Ghanzi,” and I said ‘Yes, yes,’ and we were really recalling those
days.43
It is clear from the interview with some residents of Ngamiland that some liberation
movement leaders coming from South West Africa had foreknowledge of key
contacts in Maun, such as Mpho, Setlhoko, and Mmutla. By the time they arrived
in Ngamiland, they already had developed a sense of trust in these individuals, that
they would guarantee them security in their homes. However, during the course of
the interview, Baditshwane Mmutla was quick to note that when the Rhodesian war
of liberation intensified along the Botswana border in the 1970s, some Batswana
became suspicious that some freedom fighters were something else.44
Northern Botswana: Chobe
The eastern portion of the narrow Caprivi Strip (part of South West Africa), which
separates Botswana from Angola, was an avenue of sorts for refugees from South
West Africa, Angola, and Rhodesia. The eastern border between the Caprivi and
Botswana is formed by the Kwando River, which originates in Angola, and flows
south into the Linyanti swamps, before turning northeast and becoming the Chobe
River, the wide tributary that joins the mighty Zambezi at Kazungula after passing
the ferry point of Kasane. The people of the Chobe district living near the Caprivi
are ethnic Basubiya and Bayeyi among others, who, as often is the case near
Botswana’s borders, have relatives on the other side. Thus, in addition to freedom
fighters attached to

(43) Interview with Lesedi Mothibamele, (Hukuntsi) July 2007.
SWAPO and ZAPU, the refugees who entered Botswana in these areas were
fleeing the violence of the liberation wars in South West Africa, Angola, and
Rhodesia.
In the 1970s, as the war against the Smith regime in Rhodesia intensified, many
Zimbabwean villagers along the border crossed into the Chobe district as refugees.
And, as in other parts of the country, it was the ordinary people in Chobe, in such
places as Kasane, Kazungula, Lesoma, Pandamatenga, and some cattle posts, who
provided food, water, and tobacco to refugees and armed groups, some of whom were
their relatives. When refugees were moved to Francistown, those who had relatives
in the Chobe were received by family members. According to Kadimo Lopang, who
was once a builder for the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, and, since
1973, the Kasane Customary Court President, some individuals never returned to
Namibia after Independence.45 E.B. Maplanka, who trained as a paramilitary cadre
in 1975 before joining the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), which in 1977 was
reconstituted as the Botswana Defence Force, stated that, when refugees were
transported to Dukwi during the 1978 – 1982 period, some were resettled in the
villages of Etsha 6, in Ngamiland. They were mostly Angolans who ended up taking
Botswana citizenship, some marrying Batswana. “Their children cannot speak any
other language except Setswana,” affirmed Maplanka.46
Some were sent to the Dukwi refugee camp by the Botswana government.
Refugees rarely stayed in the villages for long because of the proximity to the
border, where their enemies were active. Villagers highlight the significant role of
the police in attending to the refugees, using government resources to transport them
immediately to Dukwi. Refugees, some of whom were coming with children, were
reported to the police and were given tents. Fumbani Sefako affirmed that they
even reported their own relatives to the police, so that they could be transported to
the safety of Francistown and Dukwi.47
Although the bulk of the interviews centred on the experiences of the Zimbabwe
war, some of those interviewed recalled events along the Caprivi border. Some
recalled that refugees from Namibia who crossed into Botswana via Kasane included
teachers, school children, and ordinary Caprivians; they crossed the Chobe River at
night using
mekoro (dugout canoes) and in the morning the villagers assembled at the kgotla
where they were welcomed by the kgosi and senior government officials, such as
the District Commissioner.48 They were accommodated in tents and given food
before
being transported to Francistown. Those interviewed recalled incidents involving
collaborators who tried blending themselves in among refugees crossing from the
Caprivi. For instance, Lopang Kadimo described the time when several Basubiya,
who were agents for the South African military regime, crossed at Mpalila,
pretending to be visiting relatives. Such agents followed genuine refugees into
Botswana in order to
(45) Interview with Lopang Kadimo, (Kasane) June 2007.

(46) Interview with E.B. Maplanka, (Maun) September 2007.
(47) Interview with Fumbani Sefako, (Pandamatenga) July 2007.
(48) Interviews with Luckson Sankwasa, (Kasane) December 2007; Lopang Kadimo, (Kasane) June 2007.
1994
find the hiding places of SWAPO’s military operatives, the People’s Liberation Army
of Namibia (PLAN). The Basubiya agents then crossed back to inform the white
soldiers about PLAN activities inside Botswana. Kadimo recalled another incident
in which these collaborators killed a refugee.49 Joseph Munisola, formerly of the
Northwest District Council, also reports that some Basubiya from the Caprivi
served as South African informers. Other informers were whites owning safari
companies. White soldiers slipped over in civilian clothing and pitched up for a beer
at the Chobe Safari Lodge, where they were informed about freedom fighter
activities inside Botswana. Munisola knows the name of one of these local white
informers for the South African Defence Force, who was working for a company
called Hunters Africa. A rumour went around the villages that this particular
individual was killed by the BDF after they followed him in the bush.50
Refugee Settlements
By late 1973, the Botswana Council of Churches and the Botswana Government
combined to form the Botswana Council for Refugees (BCR), as a way of
providing refugees with humanitarian assistance.51 Additional funding was
obtained from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and
the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). These efforts helped to support refugee
camps in Selebi Phikwe in eastern Botswana and in Francistown in north-eastern
Botswana. However, the steady, heavy influx of refugees put even greater demand on
these camps, and underlined the need for a larger facility. In 1978, a major refugee
settlement was established at Dukwi, two hours north-north-east of Francistown
along the Francistown-Nata road, as a result of the efforts of the LWF. At its peak,
the camp hosted more than 45,000 people from all over southern Africa. Most of
them were from Zimbabwe and South Africa.
Dukwi
Initially Dukwi catered primarily for refugees from Rhodesia, whose numbers rose to
about 23,000 in 1979.52 They came in such large numbers that there was nowhere
else where they could be safely settled. Refugees from South Africa, Namibia,
Angola, and other countries were also settled there. Located far from urban centres
and from the borders with neighbouring countries, Dukwi’s location provided some
security from attacks by the racist regimes from which the refugees had fled.
Dukwi was equipped with basic amenities that catered to families as well as
individuals, including primary schools, a clinic, a fresh water supply, food, clothing,
and other supplies. Refugees who found jobs in the towns, attended school or were
able to stay with relatives, were not taken to Dukwi.

(50) Interview with Joseph M. Munisola, (Kasane) December 2007.
(51) Dale, R. Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995: See p.39.
(52) Tlou and Campbell. History of Botswana. See p.381.
The Dukwi settlers were allocated land to grow crops and establish small enterprises
with the assistance of the UNHCR, the BCR, the LWF, and others. Some
successful settlers sold their produce in the nearby villages, in Francistown, and
in Tutume, using transport provided by the UNHCR. In general the refugees from
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola adapted to living at Dukwi quite well. However,
many South African refugees, coming as they did, from urban areas, disliked Dukwi’s
rural setting.
As a burgeoning settlement, some of Dukwi’s residents appear to have had a
share of troubles with law officials. Former Dukwi Station Commandant
Kangangwani Bathami describes the scene:
I would not say crime was high in the camp. However, there were cases of assault
and others, but these cases were not alarming. Zimbabweans were leading in the
crimes reported, followed by South African refugees, and then Angolans…53
As to their general behaviour and attitude, Dukwi refugees are recalled to have
lived relatively peacefully there, and accepted the goodwill of the Botswana
government, the UNCHR, LWF, and BCR. Order was also strengthened by the
method and structure put in place for distributing food and other supplies. Dukwi
resident and ex-refugee Stephen Tlou elaborates as follows:
The refugees resided in different zones, but these zones were meant to monitor
reception of food rations. Different zones received their rations on different days to
avoid overcrowding. Food rations were received on a monthly basis and family size
was taken into consideration when this food was distributed. Clothes were usually
given out after much longer intervals, something like every six months. Each zone had
a leader. If a refugee was leaving the camp, they had to notify the zone leader.54
Life in the refugee camp could be taxing, requiring resourcefulness on the part of the
refugees to take steps to cater for their own entertainment and social welfare. Stephen
Tlou again explains:
Refugees had different methods of trying to ease the stress of the struggle. There
were various forms of entertainment within the Camp, like movies, music bands, and
sports. There was even a very famous team, which was known as Bubezi, which
means lion. The refugees also went to church with Batswana…55
Another long-time Dukwi resident indicates that:
Refugees were allowed to practice their culture. During Dukwi Day celebrations,
we came together and displayed our culture through music and artefacts. We, the
Angolans, presented our traditional dance known as Shinganje. The Zairians presented
Kwasakwasa.56
(53) Interview with Kangangwani Bathami, (Dukwi) July 2008.

(54) Interview with Stephen Tlou, (Dukwi) June 2008.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Interview with Alvaru Pinto, (Dukwi) July 2008.
1994
While many nationalities acquiesced to the rules and way of Dukwi life, South
African refugees generally got into trouble with the Botswana authorities, or
generally were restless. As one resident put it:
The SA refugees were not happy to be at the camp at all. The difference between
them and other refugees is that they were still too involved in the struggle; always
singing and chanting. Most of the time they were lamenting the type of life in the
camp. They wanted relocation to countries such as America and Australia in order to
be exposed to various opportunities such as good jobs and scholarships.57
Apparently Dukwi became intolerable for some South African refugees, who
decided to relocate to other countries rather than remain. Among them was Dithole
Thebe:
I went to Botswana and lived in Botswana until the Botswana government decided to
send us to Dukwi. I left Dukwi to go to Kenya after living in Botswana for seven
years. I returned to Botswana after my studies in Kenya and moved to Zimbabwe
where I stayed for six years. I later, in 1991, came to the US…58
Many South African refugees may have fallen afoul of authority, but others abided
by the rules, and, together with refugees from other countries, they set up enterprises
with the support of one of the refugee offices in Botswana.59 According to Stephen
Tlou,
South African refugees kept rabbits, pigs, and chickens. Others were involved in
gardening and field crops. Refugees were agriculturally empowered and sometimes
students from other parts of Botswana toured the camp to gain agricultural insights.
As a result, they were able to raise money by selling these commodities to the
Dukwi community and the neighbouring villages and well beyond. An ex-South
African refugee recalls that:
Everyone was familiar with my orchard and I had customers in and around the Camp.
I could even sell as far as Francistown and Gweta. Of course transport was always
arranged by the BCR (Botswana Council for Refugees)… Batswana who worked in
the Camp had my flowers in their compounds…60
South Africans took advantage of educational opportunities at Dukwi, depending
on their age, and educational level. Siana Mothusi Slash, an ex-refugee who still
lives there, mentioned that “when I arrived at Dukwi Refugee Camp, I was doing
Standard
3. Our class was populated by Zimbabweans, Angolans, and a few South Africans
and Zambians… .”61
Another informant, John Manamela recalls that “some South Africans were well
learned men who were teachers and offered assistance to the refugee students…62
(57) Interview with Billy Moahi, (Dukwi) June 2008.

(58) Dithole Thebe to Lily Mafela, e-mail, 12 November 2007.
(59) Interview with Stephen Tlou, (Dukwi) June 2008.
(60) Interview with John Manamela, (Dukwi) June 2008.
(61) Interview with Siana Mothusi Slash, (Dukwi) June 2008.
(62) Interview with John Manamela, (Dukwi) June 2008.
Kangangwani Bathami, former Station Commander of the Dukwi Police Station

who currently lives amongst the refugees at Dukwi, had good things to say about the
early residents:
Refugees taught us to be self-reliant and make use of extra space in our yards.
Having a garden at the back yard has become a norm to Batswana who came into
contact with the refugees. Batswana were motivated by the refugees to do small scale
business.63
Thus, it would appear that some South African refugees were also able to integrate
well into, and became valuable members of the Dukwi society.
The assistance given by the Botswana government and some Batswana to the
Zimbabweans facing hardships and repression back home was expressed in a moving
and lengthy letter written by one Zebedia Mabandhla Silongomah, who had stayed in
Botswana before moving to Zambia in 1973. The letter was addressed to the
Minister of External Affairs and is quoted in full here without any editing:
In the name of God, Peace and Africa, I salute thee.
‘Your Excellency’ as I sleep in the hospital bed, only God the Almighty knows
my really ‘true-wholeheartedly feeling, about Botswana, as a young developing
country in Africa and the world. Without your government of Botswana today, I
writer ‘Zebedia Mabandhla Silongomah’, would be completely dead and forgotten,
but due to the kindness of your government here I am today, though still in pains,
alive and able to put a pen to paper.
Your Excellency I find it to be very hard as a human being and Christian to sit
and forget about Botswana. Tears roll down my cheeks, when I remember the state of
health I was in when I arrived in Botswana to apply for asylum and medical attention.
Your Excellency having been in a ‘Private Concentration Camp’ nine months in
Rhodesia, where I and some unfortunate people were tortured to the degree of ‘Electric
shocks’ (sic), without proper toilet or bathing facilities, being starved heavily, I find
it to be a complete blow, if I can not raise poor voice, poor as I am to say my true
and
wholeheartedly deep thanks to the Government of the Republic of Botswana.
Having escaped from a Private Concentration Camp in Rhodesia, on the 11h
November 1972 (Rhodesia’s seventh illegal Independence Anniversary), I arrived at
Francistown Police Station on 13th Nov. 1972. Dirty as I was, with rags on, without
shoes, unable even to eat, the fresh torture wounds, the Policemen on duty did their
best to keep me comfortable by giving me food and encouraged me to eat and gave
me a place to sleep.
The following morning they handed me over to the CID’s office. From there I was
driven to the Special Branch for an interview and Finger printing. They had to carry
me and put me on the seat in the car, as I couldn’t walk anymore with swollen legs.
After the interview they drove me to the state prison. At the state prison they helped
me out of the car, and explained to the prison authorities, who gave me food and a
place to sleep. The following morning, due to my health conditions, the Special
Branch men drove me to Jubilee Government Hospital where I was admitted. Due to
my health conditions, wherever I went, from the Police-Special Branch-State Prison
up to Jubilee Government Hospital, I was the centre of attraction, as sad faces of
people
(63) Interview with Kangangwani Bathami, (Dukwi) July 2008.

1994
looked at me, and although I couldn’t hear the language, I could see and hear that
they felt pity for me, and on the 22nd November 1972, I appeared before the
Refugee Advisory Board.
Your Excellency, the doctors and nurses at Jubilee Government Hospital were
really wonderful. With wounds, chest pains, unable to eat so much, and unable to
sleep even after [taking] sleeping drugs, they never gave up, but continued showing
me true love, kindness, mutual respect and understanding. While in Jubilee Hospital,
the Rhodesian Police held one of my sisters for two weeks, torturing her to say about
my whereabouts, till she died the third week in police hands. This was a blow to me
and a dark Christmas when I [re]collected of this incident (sic) but the nurses and
ministers of religion gave me courageous words and advice.
On the 26th January 1973, I was transferred to Lobatse Mental Hospital for mental
observation and treatment and care. There again, I was showered with blessings of
love by the doctor and staff. While at Lobatse Mental Hospital I had to be
transferred to Athlone Government Hospital, due to chest pains and vomiting blood.
The doctors and nurses were all the same, wonderful to me. It was at Athlone that I
met and fell in love with two orphan babies, Boitumelo Montsherwane and Moses
Pileng, and started sharing my refugee allowances which surprised most nurses, but I
told them as an orphan I was like them. I still write to Athlone to know the conditions
of those orphans. The news of my mother’s death became another blow while I was at
Athlone, but my aunt came from Rhodesia, and explained how tough the situation
was. Immediately I started thinking more of those orphans and spent most of my time
with them as I had realized I was already an orphan for sure and all. My father died
while under detention at Gonakudzingwa Restriction Camp’ as he was a staunch and
strong member of ZAPU in 1969. I am the only boy and last born in my family of
what was five girls and one boy, and now only four girls remain…
Your Excellency, your people of Botswana are really too precious to be forgotten.
As a I left Botswana on the 5th April 1973, for Zambia where I am undergoing further
treatment since the 7th April 1973 when I was admitted at University Teaching Hospital
until my transfer to this hospital where I write from, my heart is still in Botswana.
Your Excellency I believe I am quite fit now, though the doctors say I need rest,
and I pray that my dream comes true, and one day, I will still come back to Botswana
to work as a volunteer, in return for what the people of Botswana did for me. In
Botswana that’s where I first saw the really and true meaning of ‘Unity-Progress and
Peace in All Humanism’.
I still write back to Athlone Hospital as to be informed about those orphans, and I
gather there are all fine, having received the latest letter on the 2nd July 1973…
Sorry for the length of the letter, I hope you forgive me, and one day, when Rhodesia
is free I will write a book of ‘Love’.
Your worship, I still will come back as a volunteer worker in Botswana. Long
Live President Khama, the Government and People of Botswana. Keiitumetsi (sic)
Botswana.64
After Zimbabwean independence in 1980, and thousands left Dukwi to return to their
homes, South African refugees, who were neither in school nor gainfully employed,
(64) BNARS, OP 27/44 (also OP 26/4/1): Zebedia Mabandhla Silongomahto, Botswana Minister for External
Affairs – “Experience of a Zimbabwean Refugee and Feeling about Botswana, 1973.”
were sent there to Dukwi. The Zimbaweans had settled well in Dukwi. In contrast,
for the South Africans, Dukwi became a source of bitterness towards the Botswana
government, which some government officials still remember with consternation. As
one ex-refugee put it:
The average Motswana was receptive and civil. In Dukwi for instance, those on the
lower rung of society interacted with us freely and saw us as fellow human beings;
whereas the technocrats saw us as something indescribable. The ordinary urban folk
were most hospitable and accepted us as their kith and kin. The political heavy
weights, particularly after the passing of the founding President, were vitriolic.65
Bitterness was even more pronounced when the government declared some refugees
prohibited immigrants and used the Botswana Defence Force to force others to move
to Dukwi. In 1981, the hostility of the South Africans at Dukwi led the Minister of
Public Service and Information, Daniel Kwelagobe, to go there and address the South
Africans. “It is disgusting,” he lectured them, “to note that some of you look down
upon us and the humble facilities that we offer.” He told them that the Zimbabwean
refugees who occupied Dukwi until 1980 made the best use of the settlement, tilling
the land, which the South Africans generally refused to do because they claimed they
came from urban areas.66
The South Africans’ attitudes differed markedly from those who came from
Angola, Zimbabwe, and other countries and found Dukwi suitable for settling down
and beginning arable farming. After their countries gained independence, some of
the Angolan refugees remained and established permanent homes in Dukwi village,
as they regarded Botswana to be more stable than their home country.67
Etsha
Brief mention is appropriate here of another refugee settlement in the Okavango
region that seldom has been recognised as playing a role in Botswana’s treatment
of refugees, even in the standard works on Botswana’s recent history. During the
liberation struggle against the Portuguese in Angola, some refugees entered the
Northwest District of Botswana, but a much larger influx came during the civil
war between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).68 With the help
of the World Council of Churches (WCC), they settled at Etsha and built a school
for their children. The Northwest District Council provided teachers. They were an
industrious community that produced its own food. Many Angolans chose not to
return to Angola and about 2,000 of them took up Botswana citizenship.69
(65) Mphotseng Kgokong to Lily Mafela, e-mail communication, 31 March 2007.

(66) BNARS, OP 27/14: Confidential: “Criminal activities of Refugees with attached copy of Kwelagobe’s
speech.” 20 January 1981.
(67) Interview with Esther Liti, (Dukwi) June 2008.
(68) Interview with Mompati Merafhe, (Gaborone) September 2006.
(69) Interview with Matshwenyego Louis Fisher, (Gaborone) November 2008; Daily News, 30 April 1971, 28 June
1974, 16 October 1974.
1994
The Freedom Fighters

Let us be reminded that throughout most of the liberation period, Botswana was in
a precarious geo-political position, surrounded as it was by oppressive regimes bent
on maintaining white settler domination of the black majority and resentful of
Botswana’s non-racial policies. Though politically independent, Botswana’s
economy depended entirely on these regimes, especially South Africa’s.70 Until
1977, Botswana had no army, and for years thereafter, it was too weak to stand up
against the sophisticated military power of these regimes. Therefore it had no
choice but to tread cautiously in dealing with Rhodesia and South Africa, lest it
endangered its trade links, risked its own people’s starvation, and invited a military
invasion.71 Its support for the liberation struggle and freedom fighters was bound
to be less pronounced than what was offered by its independent allies to the north.
Rather its support for liberation was pragmatic and as subtle as possible. It
welcomed members of the liberation movements, along with refugees and all those
claiming to have run away from oppression. Botswana’s approach to backing the
liberation struggle had the support and understanding of the liberation movements,
the OAU, and such international organizations as the Commonwealth, the UN and
many independent African states.
Botswana’s major challenge was dealing with freedom fighters of the various
liberation movements, whose purpose was to launch attacks against the oppressive
regimes. For example, Botswana faced the dilemma of coping with the joint armed
ZAPU’s Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the ANC’s
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), which attempted to move their cadres through
Botswana to South Africa and to use Botswana as a rear base for guerrillas running
from the Rhodesian security forces, while Botswana was plagued in turn by South
African security forces along its border areas assisting Ian Smith’s regime.72
Though the Botswana government wanted to assist freedom fighters, they had
limited resources to do so, and at the same time they expected guerrillas entering its
territory to comply with Botswana’s immigration and security laws. Botswana’s
policy also made it distinctly clear to the liberation movements and freedom
fighters alike, that Botswana could not, and should not, be used as a military base,
“a launching pad” as it were, against any country at any time. Botswana’s insistence
on compliance with its laws gained it the condemnation of the guerrillas, even
more so when they alleged that the Botswana government arrested freedom
fighters, intending to hand them over to
(70) Rwelamira, M. Refugees in a Chess Game: Reflections on Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland Refugee
Policies. Uppsala: Nordick Africa Institute, 1990: See p.38.
(71) Mgadla, P.T. “A Good Measure of Sacrifice: Botswana Government’s Policies During the Liberation Struggle
of Southern Africa, 1965-1980.” Journal of Social Dynamics 34.1 (2008), pp.5-16; Molomo, M.G. “Botswana’s
Role in the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa.” Paper presented at the Hashim Mbita Workshop, Faculty of
Humanities, University of Botswana (June 2008): See p.l.
(72) See R.M. Ralinala, et al. “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns.” The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol.
I (1960-1970). Ed. B. Magubane. Cape Town: SADET, 2004: pp.479-540; Mokopakgosi, B.T. “The University of
Botswana and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa (1973-1980).” Social Dynamics 34.1 (2008): pp.33-45.
the governments of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Botswana had as its top
priority the safety and security of its citizens by denying South Africa and
Rhodesia any grounds for mounting attacks against Botswana, since it could not
defend itself against these militarily stronger regimes.
For taking this uncompromising position, Botswana was criticised by
some members of the liberation movements and leaders of their armies. They
accused Botswana of not providing enough support, prohibiting freedom
fighters from operating freely, arresting freedom fighters found in possession
of arms and ammunition, and imprisoning or deporting guerrillas by virtue of their
military activities.
Such allegations were not without foundation. Many were arrested and imprisoned,
only later to be declared prohibited immigrants and deported to such countries as
Zambia and Tanzania. One such case involved ZAPU and ANC guerrillas who had
entered Wankie Game Reserve in Rhodesia from Zambia and then crossed into
Botswana when their encounter with Rhodesian security forces became intense.
Botswana police arrested them. Among those detained was MK leader Chris Hani.
They were later deported to Zambia.
Arresting freedom fighters in violation of Botswana’s laws appears to have been
an attempt also to persuade South Africa and Rhodesia that Botswana was not
allowing its territory to be used for attacks against them. To some freedom fighters
and liberation organisations, however, this was viewed as assisting the white-ruled
states. Their conviction was strengthened by the fact that leading officers of
Botswana’s police force were white; some suspected that these officers were
providing intelligence to Rhodesia and South Africa. Secret communication
between Presidents Seretse Khama and Kenneth Kaunda shows that Khama was
worried about the stability of his new state.73
The foregoing criticisms levelled against Botswana notwithstanding, it is known
that freedom fighters operated from, and through, Botswana. Freedom fighters
crossed in and out of virtually every district and between Botswana and its
neighbouring countries. Freedom fighters were given sanctuary by Botswana
citizens. The government of Botswana and its citizens also facilitated passages for
freedom fighters for further training in other, “safer” countries, such as Zambia,
Tanzania, and Algeria. A sample of Batswana’s experiences with the freedom
fighters around Botswana will help illustrate the extent, or the lack, of Botswana’s
role in dealing with the freedom fighters.
The North East District
During the liberation struggle, particularly in the 1970s, increasing numbers of
people from south-western Zimbabwe crossed the nearby border into north-eastern
Botswana. Apart from ordinary folk fleeing the violence in their areas, refugees
(73) BNARS, OP27/3: Khama to Kaunda (top secret), 5 September 1967.

1994
included freedom fighters on clandestine logistical and military missions. Batswana
fed them and helped by giving passage to freedom fighters destined for military
training in other countries, and upon return from military training they were guided
and helped by Botswana citizens in re-entering Zimbabwe. Even the Botswana
Defence Force (BDF), on its daily patrols, provided transport and other logistical
necessities to the Zimbabwean freedom fighters it encountered.74 After crossing
back into Zimbabwe, the freedom fighters at times ran into fierce fighting with
Rhodesian security forces and were forced to return to Botswana, where some of
the wounded received medical treatment.75
Some Batswana actually participated as combatants on the side of the liberation
struggle. Meshack Mathumo is one such example. Mathumo developed an interest
in Rhodesian politics and then joined the liberation struggle. He received training
in Zambia and in Tanzania, along with cadres of SWAPO, FRELIMO, and the
ANC, including Chris Hani. After his training, Mathumo entered ZAPU’s counter-
intelligence unit as a spy. He returned via Zambia, flying from Livingstone to
Francistown, where he was arrested on arrival, as was the case with informers or
spies within the ranks of the freedom fighters. A lawyer and the Francistown
District commissioner intervened, however, and he was released.76 His residence
was placed under surveillance, but Mathumo continued working for the liberation
struggle. Covertly, he visited such places as Siviya and Nata making what he
termed “connections.”
Fleeing border clashes with Rhodesian forces in places like Wankie and Victoria
Falls, freedom fighters ended up in places like Nata and Manxotae.Another Motswana
called Choba used to hide freedom fighters in his cattle kraal, and then open the kraal
for the cattle to cover freedom fighters’ footprints. He also gave the Rhodesian
forces wrong directions regarding the whereabouts of the guerrillas.77
Other examples of private citizens assisting the struggle abound. A Motswana
mechanic (code name“Mbokodo,” or“Stone”) in Nata kept arms and ammunition for
guerrillas in his backyard and fed them. Such activity at his home was not conspicuous
because a lot of car owners frequented his place and his backyard was more or less
a scrap yard, littered with old cars. Mbokodo was not only the caretaker of the
guerrillas’ arms cache, but was also the conduit through whom they operated.
Botswana truck drivers also played a crucial role by ferrying arms and ammunition
from Zambia to Botswana. Together with the welders in Zambia, they cut open oil
drums, emptied the oil, packed them with arms and ammunition, inserted a seal
inside covering the stash, then filled the top with oil or water before resealing the
lid. Vehicles were also designed in such a way that they could be welded with
metal sheets at the bottom
(74) Interview with Motlatsi Molapisi, (Francistown) May 2007.

(75) Interviews with Michael Mugwai, (Maitengwe) May 2007; James Molobe, (Maitengwe) May 2007.
(76) Interview with Meshack Mathumo, (Francistown) June 2007. Mathumo’s mother ran a restaurant in
Francistown and provided freedom fighters with fat cakes.
(77) Ibid.
for stashing with weapons. Batswana Zionist followers of John Mashowe

(otherwise known as Vapostori) also hid freedom fighters. Other Batswana ran taxi
operations sponsored by ZAPU to raise the necessary funds. Some sympathetic
members of the Botswana police force also assisted guerrillas or just ignored their
activities.78
According to Mr Habano of Gumare, killings and abductions by the Rhodesian
security forces were rife in this area, especially along the Ramokgwebana River,
which forms part of the border. Many died in the Bukulanga area, and Habano
lamented the fact that few newspapers existed at the time and full coverage of what
was taking place in the North East was impossible.79 Habano cited the killing of a
man he knew very well and who used to grow vegetables along the
Ramokgwebana. He also cited the abductions of some young herd boys from some
villages in the North East. Others, according to Habano, died at Pobepobe between
Matsiloje and Senyawe.
Government officials working in this area frequently encountered freedom
fighters coming from as far away as Zambia. The guerrillas alerted immigration
and veterinary officers about their operations, and, before they launched their
attacks on the Rhodesian security forces, told them where to hide to avoid being
caught in the crossfire. Habano also described the bombings in Francistown, where
he lived before being deployed to the border villages. At the time, freedom fighters
lived in Bluetown township awaiting transportation to Zambia. Their intelligence
must have been efficient and they kept a step ahead of the enemy, because the house
where they stayed was bombed twice, but both times the bombs went off, they were
not in.80
Habano also recalled the bombing of the Mophane Club by Rhodesian forces. He
claimed that some of the white residents of Francistown and those who owned Tati
ranches around Francistown were Rhodesian agents and were responsible for setting
up the bombs. Habano alleged that some Batswana were also agents of the Smith
regime and were specially selected for planting bombs.As Habano put it,“as
Batswana, they knew a lot about their local environment, Bluetown, and it was easy
for them to set up those bombs targeting houses where freedom fighters were
accommodated.”81 Habano furnished no names.
Eastern Botswana
The people of eastern Botswana, in the Bobirwa sub-district, are the Babirwa, who
are ethnically related to the Babirwa, known there as Basotho, of south-western
Zimbabwe. Many families in this area have strong kinship ties in both countries.
Ethnicity played an important part in this area during the liberation war in Zimbabwe.
Many of Joshua Nkomo’s ZIPRA fighters were Basotho and found ready acceptance
among the Babirwa of Botswana.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Interview with Mr Habano, (Gumare) August 2008.
(80) Ibid.
(81) Ibid.
1994
Geography also played its part. Bobirwa was suited to freedom fighters because
of its rugged hills and mountains, especially near the Shashe River, which formed
the border between Botswana and Zimbabwe. In such terrain, freedom fighters were
able to hide from the enemy, stash war materials in the caves, and prepare for
periodic forays into Rhodesia. Moreover, only rudimentary development had taken
place in the area. Its gravel roads were poorly maintained, its streams and rivers had
no bridges, and the people lacked clinics, health centres, telecommunications, and
police stations. Only Booming, the headquarters of the sub-district, had any
facilities. For guerrilla fighters, the underdeveloped state of this area enabled them
to operate fairly freely, with little surveillance from the Botswana law enforcement
agencies. The Tswana settlement pattern lent freedom fighters another advantage.
Typically Batswana kept their cattle located far from the village in grazing areas
called “cattle posts.” Freedom fighters gained easy access to these cattle posts, often
using them as hiding places. Herdsmen assisted them with milk, alerted them to
enemy movements, and directed them to their destinations.
Join Ngala regards eastern Botswana as a major area from where the freedom
fighters attacked the Rhodesian regime. He points to their enormous stash of war
materials, uncovered after the war in the hills and mountains of Bobirwa. At the end
of the war, guerrilla leaders in this area told him that ZAPU required them to bring all
the armaments they had amassed to the border so that arrangements could be made
to collect them. They requested Ngala, Motsumi Mogorosi, Mathora, and other truck
owners to assist with transport. Over four nights, truck loads were carted secretly to
the border. Join and his colleagues had known for some time that the guerrillas hid
weapons in the hills, but until this point they were unaware that ZIPRA had so many
weapons and of so many different kinds.
Young men used Bobirwa as a “freedom trail” to reach Zambia and Tanzania for
military training and as their path of return to Zimbabwe. Some used Bobirwa as a
base to shuttle the cadres. Freedom fighter Joel Sijie lived with his relative,
Molapisi Masilo, in Gobojango. Sijie was the liaison between ZAPU officials in
Francistown and guerrillas who came into the area. Periodically, he slipped into
Zimbabwe to recruit new cadres and to determine places suitable for arms
caches.82 Sijie kept Botswana officials in the dark, because of their policy of
prohibiting arms from entering its territory. His task was made easier, because in
this remote area very few policemen were on hand to patrol the place.
Villagers could be counted on to feed freedom fighters at their homes, if not at
their arable lands and cattle posts. They warned them about enemy movements
when possible. Motsumi Mogorosi and Join Ngala assisted the guerrillas a great
deal, particularly when they had been injured in encounters with the enemy, by
having
(82) Interviews with Mmirwa Malema, (Bobonong) January 2008; Kepaletswe Sekwababe, (Bobonong) January
2008; Motsumi Mogorosi, (Gobojango) May 2007; Join Ngala, (Mabolwe) May 2007; William Maziba Mathora,
(Mabolwe) May 2007.
them transported to Bobonong for medical care. They also had rooms in their homes
where, from time to time, they hid freedom fighters.
The guerrillas operated in small groups, in Kezi, Mberengwa, and Beit Bridge
areas. As they passed through, they kept Ngala informed about their encounters
with the Rhodesian forces. On one occasion they reported ambushing a convoy of
fifteen trucks, and, on another, of annihilating a convoy of mounted soldiers near
Manama mission.83 They told the Batswana that they were fighting so that they
could be free and rule themselves like the Batswana did.
Generally, the villagers felt that the freedom fighters protected them as much as
possible from attacks and harassment by the Rhodesian forces, especially before
the Botswana Defence Force was formed in 1977. For their part, the villagers fed
and hid the guerrillas, alerted them about Rhodesian troop movements, cared for
their wounded, and got them medical care. Benjamin Mogorosi remembers
transporting two badly wounded guerrillas to Bobonong hospital; they had been
transported from inside Rhodesia to the border by donkey.84 Villagers, such as
William Maziba Mathora, transported their weapons to the Rhodesian border.85
James Maruatona, former MP for the area, hid ZIPRA weapons on his farm near
Francistown, at the request of his friend, ZAPU Chief of Intelligence Dumiso
Dabengwa.86
Maruatona happened to be one of the most important inside backers of the South
African liberation struggle.He had studied in South Africa in the 1950s and had friends
in the ANC. In the 1960s, he obtained travel documents for South Africans passing
through Rhodesia to Zambia. His obtained them from Isaac Gontse, Maruatona’s
friend who worked at the District Commissioner’s office in Francistown. Maruatona
lived with MK commander Joe Modise, who was based in Francistown in order to
identify areas that South African guerrillas could use to infiltrate South Africa.87
The few freedom fighters who became renegades invariably posed difficulties
for these villagers. A case is told of one known only as Robert who abandoned the
others and came to live in Gobojango, where he fell in love with Motsumi’s
concubine, and then threatened to kill Motsumi. ZIPRA administered swift justice.
They arrested Robert and took him away. Later, the villagers learned that he had
been executed.88
Central District
The Central District, which was some distance from the border, was less of a “hot
spot” than those areas, but it played its role in the liberation struggle. It received
and facilitated the movement of either refugees or freedom fighters. The main
Gaborone-
(83) Interview with Join Ngala, (Mabolwe) May 2007.

(84) Interview with Benjamin Mogorosi, (Gobojango) May 2007.
(85) Interview with William Mathora, (Bobonong) May 2007.
(86) Interview with James Maruatona, (Bobonong) January 2008.
(87) Ibid.
(88) Interviews with Annah Samuel, (Gobojango) May 2007; Ohaletse Mogorosi, (Gobojango) May 2007;
Benjamin Mogorosi, (Gobojango) May 2007; William Maziba Mathora, (Mabolwe) May 2007; James Maruatona,
(Bobonong) January 2008.
1994
Francistown road, primarily dirt, passed through this district, paralleled by the
Rhodesian railway, connecting South Africa and Rhodesia; the train was operated
by the Rhodesian Railway Company with headquarters in Salisbury. Mahalapye
and Palapye were the main stops for travellers by car and by rail. Serowe, the capital
of the district, lay west of Palapye, on the edge of the Kalahari. All the roads were
dirt and travel by automobile during the rainy season was virtually impossible.
This area played an important role as a through point in moving refugees north for
training as freedom fighters. “African statesmen the likes of Nelson Mandela,
Thabo Mbeki and Samora Machel, among others, either stayed in Botswana or
were given passage by train as freedom fighters.”89 Palapye resident Klaas
Motshidisi, former member of the BPP and later of the Botswana National Front,
was among those individuals who provided the middle link in moving freedom
fighters to Zambia and beyond. “Fish Keitseng, in Lobatse, coordinated the
southern part of Botswana,” recalled Motshidisi, “and I handled the central part of
the country, including the Tuli Block. From the south they were transferred to [me
in] Palapye while others who included Mpho and Matante [in Francistown], assisted
their passage to the north.”90 Motshidisi mentioned that when Nelson Mandela was
going for military training in Algeria he stayed with Fish Keitseng, who hid and
provided him with accommodation before Mandela moved north up the chain. MK
commander Joe Modise kept Motshidisi and others informed when the cadres of
the ANC were passing through Botswana so that they could be provided with the
necessary logistics and support. Palapye resident Kgosi Ntebele concurred with
Motshidisi and adds that providing for freedom fighters did not always make them
popular: “We were often accused of harbouring criminals and terrorists, but we
explained that we were helping these people because they were persecuted in their
own countries.”91
Another central district Motswana, Emmanuel Ontumetse, described how some of
the people from his country, the Ovaherero, had escaped German, and, subsequently,
South African oppression and found refuge in different areas of Botswana, the central
district included. A substantial population of Ovaherero resided in Mahalapye. When
SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma landed in Francistown, Ontumetse helped him by
borrowing Matante’s car and driving Nujoma to Palapye and on to Mahalapye, where
Ontumetse helped Nujoma make contact with his people. On the way back on the
gravelly, corrugated road, the car overturned and Nujoma sustained injuries. With
Ontumetse’s help, a sympathetic Afrikaner offered them a lift back to Mahalapye,
where Nujoma was treated and discharged. They then took the train to Francistown
with Ontumetse getting off at Palapye. Ontumetse had facilitated and helped Nujoma
(89) Interview with Godfrey Tyolo, (Mahalapye) 14 June, 2007. For details of some of the destinations of the
trainees see BNARS, 0P33/7: Immigration into BP. Refugees August 1963 -September 1964: F. R. Marten (British
Embassy) to PM Vorster.
(90) Interview with Klaas Motshidisi, (Palapye) 19 June 2007.
(91) Interview with Raditanka Ntebele, (Palapye) 19 June 2007.
achieve his mission, and later Nujoma secured scholarships for Ovaherero youth in
Mahalapye to further their studies.92
At the same time, residents of the Central District were sympathetic to Botswana’s
laws, which prohibited its territory from being used as a springboard for guerrilla
activities. “The Botswana government arrested the freedom fighters for entering the
country through ungazetted points and carrying arms illegally through the country,”
remarked one Mahalapye resident. “They were disarmed and then set free.”93 They
also supported Botswana’s position of condemning the oppressive settler systems in
the region, while not interfering in their affairs. As O.K. Menyatso remarked, “We
assessed our situation and realized that offering our country as a base or springboard
for attacks would have been a great [mis]adventure. Ours was a principled position
that, despite our precarious geo-political position, we supported the struggle and
suffered incursions, but could not retaliate.”94
The South East District
The south-eastern region of Botswana shares a border with South Africa. It contains
two large villages, Mochudi and Ramotswa, and the town of Lobatse. Mochudi is
the capital of the Bakgatla ethnic group with the satellite villages of Sikwane,
Malolwane, Mabalane, Mathubudukwane, Morwa, and Bokaa. The first four of
these are known as the “river villages” and are positioned along the Madikwe River,
which forms the border with South Africa. Bakgatla have kinship ties with those
Bakgatla living in the Rustenburg district of South Africa, but also located on the
South African side opposite the “river villages” were cattle and game farms owned
by the Boers.
Ramotswa, capital of the ethnic Balete, is situated immediately next to the South
African border, which is delineated by the Ngotwane River. Inside South Africa,
the Balete have their distant cousins, the Bahurutshe, located some distance from
the border at Dinokana, Mokgola, and Lekubu. The intervening countryside is
predominantly Boer-owned farmland. Prior to the liberation struggle, people
frequently moved back and forth across these borders, and, even during the struggle,
movement continued.
Lobatse is a rail town close to the South African border with several related
groups residing in it and across the border. Among the town dwellers are Barolong,
Balete, and Bangwaketse, while their cousins, the Bahurutshe and the Barolong,
live on the South African side, with kinship ties on either side of the border a
common feature. Lobatse, too, was the base of ANC operative Fish Keitseng,
already mentioned. Klaas Motshidisi cited another Lobatse resident,Motswana
Kgaboesele,who accommodated FRELIMO leader Samora Machel. The Kgaboesele
family literally moved out of their house to accommodate Machel.95
(92) Interview with Emmanuel Ontumetse, (Serowe) June 2007.

(93) Interview with Tshepo Moleko, (Mahalapye) June 2007.
(94) Interview with O.K. Menyatso, (Mahalapye) June 2007.
1994
During the 1960s and 1970s, an influx of South African refugees poured into
south-east Botswana. Some went on for training in other countries to become
freedom fighters. Meanwhile, south-eastern Botswana became an important base
for their operations for penetrating South Africa. Mosielele Moatshe claimed that
the Botswana government was aware of some covert activities against South
Africa, which were undertaken by freedom fighters, but denied any knowledge.96
Another informant asserts that prominent officials turned a blind eye to activities
aimed at attacking South Africa.97 South Africa itself, which had good intelligence
within the country and the region, often reminded Botswana of constant alleged
guerrilla activities within its boundaries. In fact, South Africa accused Botswana of
providing sanctuary to freedom fighters and that it had the right to launch pre-
emptive strikes if Botswana was unable to contain guerrilla or freedom fighter
presence and activity within its territory.
Mr Chand of Sikwane, a Motswana of Asian origin, became an ANC operative
during the liberation struggle.98 Chand owned a business in the village, and freedom
fighters going into and coming from South Africa passed through his place. Sikwane
was among the many covert routes used by freedom fighters for their operations.
Freedom fighters from Zambia or South Africa came to Chand, who provided them
with money, food, and also transport to their point of entry or departure. Chand
facilitated the MK route connecting the north with the south and vice-versa.
Eventually Chand’s role was exposed by South African intelligence and Chand’s
fate was sealed. He and his family met violent deaths. A squad of commandoes
came to his homestead in the dead of night, killed his dogs and night watchmen,
planted bombs around the house, and detonated them. The whole family, six in all,
perished.99 Other Batswana met a similar fate for their involvement or association
with freedom fighters or even refugees. For example, Andries Ntunyane Moatshe
was murdered by agents of the South African regime for transporting ANC
refugees into and out of South Africa.
Freedom fighters, in general, just like refugees, were placed in protective
custody, cautioned to uphold the movement’s integrity while in Botswana territory,
during and after their operations before returning to Zambia. Protective custody
was a punitive measure, as much as it demonstrated to the South African regime that
Botswana was serious about preventing guerrillas from using its territory. However,
freedom fighters temporarily placed in custody were soon released, because of an
understanding between the leaders of the liberation movements and the Botswana
government. Without Botswana, their operations could not succeed, so it was
necessary to be cautious that their activities did not come to light.
(96) Interview with Mosielele Moatshe, (Malolwane) June 2007.

(97) Interview with David Aphiri, (Mochudi) June 2007.
(98) Interview with Archie Aphiri, (Mochudi) June 2007.
(99) Interview with Mosielele Moatshe, (Malolwane) June 2007.
Southern District
The Southern District includes such major villages as Moshupa (home of the ethnic
Bakgatla ba ga Mmanaana), Kanye (Bangwaketse), and Good Hope (Barolong).
Moshupa and Kanye are somewhat distant from the South African border, though
Good Hope is located near to the border crossing at Ramatlabama, and the Barolong
have historic ties to the Barolong of the Mafikeng and other areas of the Northern
Cape. As with the other border areas, people with kinship ties moved back and forth
frequently.During the liberation struggle,Good Hope and its precincts were important
points of entry for freedom fighters and refugees. The people of the southern district
sympathised, knowing their relatives and neighbours were being oppressed and had
no opportunity for a fair political settlement in South Africa.100 It would have been
un-African to stand by and watch while the neighbours were attacked and their
house burnt.“If you don’t help in putting out the fire of the house of your neighbour,”
they remarked,“the next house that burns might be yours.”101 In spite of prohibitions
on guerrilla operations, Batswana in these areas secretly supported them. They
were their brothers and sisters and thought of themselves as one people.102
Barolong gave freedom fighters accommodation and food, hid them, facilitated
their movement north, and helped them pass through on route back to South
Africa.103 They did so with the connivance of government police and soldiers.
Former BDF Major General Pule Motang confirmed that “Botswana had its own
intelligence, the Special Branch which interrogated these freedom fighters, gave
them protection, and eventually gave them help to reach Zambia and Tanzania. If
the South African regime asked the Botswana government if it had seen such
people, the answer was that we have not seen them.”104 Government officials,
along with many others, were fully aware of the presence of the freedom fighters,
but understood that their overt presence would have endangered the safety and
security of Botswana citizens. As former permanent secretary Nathaniel Mmono
stated,“We were aware that members of the liberation movements passed through
this country and, in order to avoid attacks we could not contain, we protected them
and urged them to move on to other countries that were not so close to South Africa.
That would make the enemy not to attack us. We, however, gave them assistance as
they went through Botswana.”105
There were limits to which officials were prepared to go. Botswana discouraged
carrying and using weapons within its borders, in order to deprive the enemy of an
excuse to attack Botswana, Mmono added. Major General Pule Motang recalled
that if the freedom fighters were seen in possession of arms, they were arrested,
later
(100) Interviews with Nathaniel Mmono, (Barolong Farms) July 2007; Gladstone Phatudi, (Barolong Farms) July
2007. Mmono was Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government and Lands; Phatudi was a former
headmaster and political activist during the liberation struggle.
(101) Ibid.
(102) Interviews with M. Sekgororoane, (Good Hope) July 2007; Seepapitso IV, (Gaborone) February 2008.
(103) Interview with Lotlamoreng II, (Good Hope) June 2007.
(104) Interview with Pule Motang, (Good Hope) June 2007.
(105) Interview with Nathaniel Mmono, (Hebron) July 2007.
1994
released, and urged to return to the country of their training, usually Zambia or
Tanzania. “I remember,” said Motang, “that once we arrested some in Francistown
because they were in possession of arms and ammunition and we sent them back to
where they came from. Chris Hani, one of the top military commanders of MK of
the ANC was one of those who were once arrested and put in prison because he was
carrying weapons of war. He was later released and helped to return...to
Zambia.”106 In the Southern District, various individuals became very active in the
liberation struggle, sacrificing their time and risking their lives. Messrs. Mmono and
Phatudi confirmed that ordinary people acting on their own hid freedom fighters in
their houses during the day until they could move on during the night.107 Mr
Phatudi himself was among those who helped the liberation struggle in various
ways. His experiences will be articulated later in this chapter. Some helped freedom
fighters bury their arms. According to the kgosi of Good Hope, villagers recently
unearthed a cache of weapons buried sometime in the 1980s.
Kgalagardi and Ghanzi Districts
These two districts, the Kgalagardi facing the northern cape of South Africa and
south-eastern Namibia and the Ghanzi facing eastern Namibia, represent the most
barren parts of Botswana and the mostly thinly populated. Their difficult terrain,
remoteness, and poor communication networks made political activity extremely
difficult. Of the two districts, Ghanzi was a fairly busy transit point for refugees,
whereas Kgalagardi was too remote from the sources of refugees and too barren a
place to make it attractive as a base or transit area. Little activity was reported in
Kgalagardi during the struggle. The little evidence available demonstrates that the
people in this area were committed to the cause of the liberation struggle, providing
accommodation, protection, and transportation. Even here pro-liberation activists
could be found operating against the odds.
One such case was the refugee Phillip Ratlhagane. An educated man, Ratlhagane
was employed by the Kgalagardi District Council as a planning officer and became
a popular figure among the residents of Tsabong. He became close to the
Motheelesi family108 and married a Motswana woman. Although allocated a
government house, Ratlhagane lived with other people in various households, his
strategy to avoid detection by the South African intelligence. Eventually, however,
South African authorities learned of his whereabouts. Thanks to Dick Selebalo, a
black South African policeman, Ratlhagane got wind of the danger. Selebalo
warned his relatives on the Botswana side of the border that the South Africans were
tracking Ralthagane, and he was able to escape to Gaborone by using a council
vehicle to get through some very treacherous roads.109 Meanwhile South African
commandos had crossed
(106) Interview with Pule Motang, (Good Hope) June 2007.

(107) Interviews with Nathaniel Mmono, (Hebron) July 2007; Gladstone Phatudi, (Hebron) July 2007.
(108) Interviews with Hilda Motheelesi, (Tsabong) June 2007; David Toto, (Tsabong) June 2007.
(109) Interview with Ditira Gaowetswe, (Tsabong) June 2007.
over and sought an audience with the chief. They claimed they were looking for a
“black sheep” that had crossed the border and was rumoured to be among “some
sheep” on the Botswana side. A local policeman, a Mr Chabanga, was assigned to
the commandos to help them locate the “sheep” only for them to disclose that the
“sheep” they were looking for was a guerrilla.110 Selebalo’s warning had been on the
mark: the “black sheep” the commandos were looking for was Ratlhagale. This
episode shows that the people of Tsabong and their local administration, the
Kgalagardi District Council, supported freedom fighters. Apart from giving
Ratlhagale employment, they understood his cause and protected him from his
enemies.
In the Ghanzi area, most refugees entered Botswana via Karakubis, seventy
kilometres east of the South West African border on the road to Ghanzi. SWAPO’s
Sam Nujoma and his wife passed through here. As per normal procedure, they were
taken to the Karakubis chief, and then to the police at Tshootsha (Kalkfontein),
where arrangements were made to move them to Francistown for transit north. The
kgosi at Karakubis, Tlhophane Botshake, played a significant role in facilitating the
movement of the Namibian freedom fighters. He protected them, arranged transport
away from the Namibian authorities to Tshootsha, Ghanzi, and other safer havens.111
Kgosi Botshake used his own vehicle to ferry them and made other personal
sacrifices that endangered him and Karakubis residents. His experiences with the
liberation struggle are discussed later in this chapter.
The white farmers of the so-called Ghanzi Farms, all Botswana citizens,
included a few who provided logistical support for freedom fighters. Cecil Kriel of
D’Kar owned a helicopter which he used to transport freedom fighters, gave them
money, and helped with other necessities.112 Another white farmer, Mrs Keith
Thomas, also helped the freedom fighters almost by chance when they broke into
her house. She provided them with what they requested, including transportation.113
Her encounter with the freedom fighters is provided later in this chapter.
The North West District
The North West District (Ngamiland), bordering northeast Namibia and its Caprivi
Strip along the northern border, is inhabited by many ethnic groups, including the
dominant Batswana with their capital at Maun. Others are the Bayeyi of the western
Okavango Delta, and in the areas between the Delta and South West Africa are found
the Hambukushu, Ovaherero, and Basarwa (San, Bushmen). Kinship connects some
people of this district to Namibia. The Ovaherero, who escaped German oppressive
rule in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, are found on both sides of the border
in significant members.114 The many distinct groups of Basarwa, who constitute the
(110) Interview with Ms. Kedimotse, (Tsabong) June 2007.

(111) Interview with Tlhopane Botshake, (Karakubis) October 2008.
(112) Ibid.
(113) Interview with Mrs Keith Thomas, (Tsabong) June 2007.
(114) Interview with Gaerolwe Mesho Kwerepe, (Maun) September 2007.
1994
region’s oldest inhabitants, extend their activities into Namibia. A few Batswana are
also found in Namibia. Namibian freedom fighters and refugees entering Botswana
for the first time may have been crossing into unfamiliar territory, but they were
familiar to people there because of kinship, cultural, and language ties. Many years
prior to Botswana’s independence, Bechuanaland Protectorate colonial authorities
arrested freedom fighters and refugees and handed them over to South West African
authorities. During those years, therefore, Ngamiland residents’ support for their
fellow Africans was clandestine. Relatives in border areas provided shelter, food,
and clothes. Some of those interviewed testified that they protected an MK member
by hiding him in a cattle kraal. Protectorate authorities used the police to place
under surveillance and arrest those found assisting freedom fighters to move
through the area, on route to Zambia. Such attempts failed to deter people in
Ngamiland from stepping forward. “We wanted to help them to go to countries
north of Botswana where they were going to train as freedom fighters,”115 said
Gaditshwane Mmutla, who recalled how they helped a young freedom fighter from
Mozambique move northwards for military training.116 (For more of Mmutla’s
experiences see “Selected Experiences” below.)
After Botswana’s independence, the attitude of the authorities changed for the
better. Freedom fighters and refugees arriving in a village reported to the kgosi,
who welcomed them at the kgotla. Here they were then assigned trusted individuals
who took them to such villages as Shakawe and Gumare for accommodation.117
President Seretse Khama issued a statement to the effect that, although Botswana
could not
be used as a spring board for launching attacks against its neighbours, the people of
Botswana were expected to assist those fleeing from oppression. Ngamiland
residents aided the freedom fighters in key ways. They bought petrol for their
transport, drove them to Zambia in their own cars, or, like BPP’s Motsamai Mpho,
used party vehicles for this purpose.
As South Africa stubbornly refused to end its illegal occupation of South West
Africa, guerrilla warfare intensified between SWAPO’s PLAN units and South
African security forces. SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma set up a guerrilla training
camp in Tanzania, then used Lusaka as his headquarters to coordinate armed
resistance against South Africa’s presence in Namibia. He used Ngamiland to
engineer his own flight to Zambia and subsequently to Tanzania. Elders of the district
talked about how they helped Nujoma: when he reached Makunda at the border,
they picked him up and helped him to reach Karakubis.118 In Maun, he was hidden
for two weeks while awaiting an opportune time to proceed. Other freedom fighters
entering Ngamiland via Ghanzimovedingroupsof five, four, or
fewertomakedetectionof theirmovements difficult. Networks of committed
individuals inside Ngamiland coordinated their

(116) Ibid.
(117) Interview with L.M. Setlhoko, (Maun) September 2007.
(118) Ibid.
movements and established a route that refugees and freedom fighters followed to
reach safety. Gaditswane Mmutla accommodated freedom fighters in his own house.
Generally, freedom fighters in this, as in other districts, were regarded as an upright
and disciplined lot who interacted well with people. A strong bond grew between the
Namibian freedom fighters and the “team” in the district.
However, it was always the case that a few lacked the necessary discipline and
over- indulged in alcohol, harassed women, or adopted an attitude of superiority
toward the locals. The war also brought spies and impostors pretending to be
freedom fighters, while working for the enemy. Their presence made it difficult for
the ‘team’ to
distinguish between genuine freedom fighters and bompimpi (sellouts).119
The Basarwa of Ngamiland added their own dimension to the liberation struggle.
Many served the interests of the enemy rather than identifying with the struggle.
Theirs was a case of being “doubly oppressed” by Europeans and Africans on both
sides of the border. Basarwa were recruited into the South African Defence Force
(SADF), ostensibly as trackers to locate PLAN fighters.120 Some of the Ju/’hoansi
situated along the Mohembo border joined the Omega battalion, a significantly
large group of San soldiers in the SADF.121 In short, they were citizens of
Botswana employed by a foreign army to track freedom fighters. Basarwa residents
of Gudikwa and Beetsha testified that Basarwa in these villages served in the South
African army.122 Remarkably, some Basarwa SADF veterans are now in the
employ of the BDF at the Maun Second Brigade Camp.
Chobe District
The lightly populated Chobe District, which shares borders with Namibia’s Caprivi
Strip, north-western Zimbabwe, and a snippet of Zambia, has only a few small
villages—Kasane (Chobe headquarters), Kazungula, Lesoma, and Pandamatenga.
Its central feature is the two massive game reserves (Chobe, Moremi). Chobe’s
people are mainly the ethnic Basubiya (also Bekuhane). Some Amandebele live on
either side of the Zimbabwean-Botswana border, as do the few Basarwa. The Chobe
District experienced a great deal of movement before the liberation struggle, due to
kinship ties, but, during the struggle, the area was even busier, especially because of an
increase in Amandebele relatives arriving from the Zimbabwean side. Along with
refugees, freedom fighters made the area a hive of activity.
Chobe and particularly Kasane were important crossing points for freedom
fighters involved in the Namibian and Zimbabwean struggles; just as many used
Mpalila when entering from the Caprivi. Some had Basubiya relatives to give them
accommodation, protection, and food. Nevertheless, Zimbabwean freedom fighters

(120) Interview with Sekgwa Motswai, (Maun) September 2007.
(121) Parker, L. First People: The San of Africa. Minneapolis: Lerner Publications Company, 2002: See p.21.
(122) Bolaane, M. “The Impact of Game Reserve Policy on the River Basarwa/Bushmen of-Botswana.” Social
Policy and Administration: An International Journal of Policy and Research 38.4 (2004): pp.400-415.
1994
created fear and tension in the border villages. Their attempts to gain refuge in
Botswana and their secret crossing back into Zimbabwe attracted Rhodesian security
forces. Many villagers, civil servants included, feared for their lives, as they had
no protection should Rhodesian forces decide to invade the area. Mrs Fumbani
Sefako of Pandamatenga saw freedom fighters being looked for by white
soldiers at the border.123 Her experiences with the freedom fighters are discussed
later in the chapter. The north-eastern border area of the Chobe district was infested
with Rhodesian security forces and freedom fighters alike, when the war in
Rhodesia spilled into Botswana. The first freedom fighters, known locally as
magandanga, first entered the region in 1967. They were first to be seen in the
Pandamatenga area, carrying guns, but wearing no uniform.124 They moved into
the agricultural lands (masimo), where the Batswana peasants provided them with
food and shelter. From 1970 onwards, their appearance and character had changed.
As Chiziyo observed, “These ones were now in uniform and they were friendly
people. These are the ones who were called guerrillas” because of their hit and run
tactics.125
Though Botswana emphasised that its territory was not to be used as a military
base, some freedom fighters ignored this law. They built make-shift bases inside
Botswana in the thick bush. Lopang Kadimo and other individuals noted that despite
the prohibition, local communities, and the police for that matter, knew of these
rudimentary military bases and their whereabouts, but kept quiet.126 One such camp
was set up at Sebuyu on the outskirts of Pandamatenga. Rhodesian forces carrying
out intense searches in the villages, during the day and in the night, failed to induce
the villagers into divulging any clue that might point in the direction of the freedom
fighters. They supported the freedom fighters, even to the point of volunteering to
take their injured to the hospital in Kasane for treatment. The police were strongly
sympathetic. Some freedom fighters reported directly to the police station in Kasane
upon arrival as did refugees and were transferred secretly to guerrilla camps.
According to Lopang Kadimo, the police visited these guerrilla camps at night in
order to provide them with food and other necessities.127
Freedom fighters were very subtle in their interaction with people and tactical
in their operations. For instance, they found part time jobs even in white-owned
businesses and at night contacted fellow “comrades” to provide them with food and
vital information. For example, during the day, a man known as Mkhwananzi was
a builder, but, at night, he was in touch with freedom fighters. Somehow his role as
an intelligence agent was uncovered and Rhodesian forces shot at him while he was
driving in his car. Mkhwananzi survived and continued with his espionage
activities on behalf of the “comrades in arms.”128

(124) Interview with Kaki Chiziy, (Pandamatenga) December 2007.
(125) Ibid.
(127) Ibid.
(128) Ibid.
Just as in other areas, South African informers came in pretending to be refugees,

bent on gathering information about guerrilla activity; similarly, they crossed back
with information for the South Africans by pretending they were visiting relatives
in the Caprivi. Some of these collaborators were later exposed and secretly killed
by freedom fighters.129 Some Basubiya working for white-owned Safari companies
also served as Boer informers, just as their employers were informers for their
counterparts in Namibia and Zimbabwe. White plain clothes policemen patrolled
the border and secretly crossed rivers into the Botswana side of the border.130
Those interviewed recalled many acts of espionage.
The extreme danger present in the Chobe District was epitomized by the
“Lesoma incident.” In 1978 at Lesoma, fifteen BDF soldiers and two civilian guides
were responding to reports that Rhodesian forces were in the area. The report
was accurate, but the BDF unit were not prepared for the ambush set for them.
Rhodesian security forces massacred the entire contingent, save a few. The Lesoma
incident was the first of its kind, and it left deep scars in the minds and hearts of
many Batswana.131 The Rhodesian soldiers were apparently aware that the
Botswana Defence Force (BDF) soldiers interacted with freedom fighters from that
country and were intent on punishing the BDF for the position it appeared to take in
relation to the freedom fighters.
The death of the fifteen soldiers at Lesoma is regarded as an enormous sacrifice,
not just on the part of the BDF, but on the part of the nation at large. A monument in
commemoration of the fifteen soldiers was erected in Lesoma. Batswana in other parts
of Botswana were to suffer the same fate, through bombs, shootings, and kidnappings,
all for supporting the freedom fighters.
Gaborone
Gaborone became the nation’s capital just prior to independence. Almost throughout
all the pre-independence period, the Protectorate had been administered from the
Imperial Reserve in Mafikeng, across the border in South Africa. In 1964,
Gaborone was built from scratch in preparation for independence and for years it
remained a tiny town. In 1974, it had only 18,000 inhabitants and not until 1986 was
it gazetted a city. Gaborone was located on freehold land adjacent to the ethnic
Batlokwa, Bakgatla, Bakwena, and Balete. The primary reason it was located here,
as one might expect in this drought-prone country, had to do with the potential
water supply, and a large dam was built to harness the Ngotwane River for supplying
the new capital. Gaborone also sat astride the main railway line. Nevertheless,
Gaborone was situated perilously close to the South African border (a mere 20
kilometres away), and more than once its vulnerability was apparent when nearby
South African forces crossed the border to attack residents in the city. Yet,
Gaborone was also easily accessible to refugees,
(129) Ibid.
(130) Interview with Joseph M. Munisola, (Kasane) December 2007.
(131) Interview with Esther Katukula, (Lesoma) July 2007.
1994
and it became an important jumping off point for freedom fighters, especially those
of the MK, penetrating the South African border to carry out their anti-apartheid
campaign.
As the capital, Gaborone was also the site of the nation’s international community.
Embassies and high commissions from around the world were posted there (including
those of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China), as were the UNHCR
headquarters and the offices of government and religious NGOs, such as the LWF
and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), which
supported refugees in the country and organised scholarships abroad for members of
liberation movements. Though small, Gaborone was an international, cosmopolitan
centre, unique in the region and one that carried on, without fuss, Botswana’s non-
racial ideal in full view of the white racist regimes on its borders. Gaborone
attracted citizens from around the country who came there for employment, higher
education, government positions, and its lively cultural scene. In Gaborone,
ordinary folks, diplomats, government officials, refugees, professionals, professors,
freedom fighters, and persons of all hues (Africans, Europeans, Indians, and many
admixtures thereof) worked and socialised together on a routine basis.
In the 1970s, Gaborone became, covertly, a freedom-fighter base. This was
especially so for South African freedom fighters, particularly the ANC and the PAC.
The former created cells inside Botswana to facilitate their cadres’ movement in and
out of South Africa, to cache and smuggle arms and explosives, train MK operatives,
and to launch cross border operations.
The Botswana government became aware of these operations through its police
intelligence and through citizens associated with members of the liberation
movements, who themselves were suspected of helping to smuggle arms.132 Yet,
police were unaware of the covert ANC cell structure and could not produce the
evidence with which to accuse ANC higher ups in Lusaka that their cadres were
violating Botswana’s laws with regard to freedom fighter activity.
When operatives became known, the Botswana government had everything to
gain by working quietly with the ANC to evacuate them. In all likelihood, they
were probably known to the South African intelligence already. South Africa
frequently threatened Botswana about the presence of cadres in Gaborone. When
Botswana arrested these cadres and deported them northwards, it did so for their
own safety. The ANC often saw it differently. They interpreted deportations as
evidence that Botswana was communicating with South Africa. As a result, the
ANC in Lusaka and its operatives in Gaborone and elsewhere in the country kept
the Botswana government in the dark, thereby endangering Botswana’s
security.133 Botswana naturally disliked being victimized by South Africa for the
acts the ANC had not
(132) E.g., BNARS, OP 27/1: Secret Communication, n.d. May/June 1982 re torture of Felix Ngwenya.
(133) BNARS, OP 13/96: Confidential debriefing before President Masire by John Melamu, Botswana High
Commissioner to Lusaka, 16 October 1981, Melamu stating that ANC leaders seldom contacted him except to
request visas. The same was the case with the PAC.
consulted it about. As President Masire said to the ANC’s Oliver Tambo at one of
their meetings,“[Botswana] was in an unenviable position of having a dual obligation
to the people, on the one hand, and the liberation struggle, on the other.”134 Botswana
was repeatedly in conflict with South Africa, which accused it of harbouring
“terrorists” and threatened action against it. South Africa’s bullying led to
Botswana’s appeal to the ANC in Lusaka to avoid putting Botswana at risk.
Apologies and praises for Botswana’s role in the struggle were then followed by a
quiet period before the ANC guerrilla activities resumed operations.135
Among the active ANC cells in Gaborone was a cultural organisation front
headed by Wally Serote. Known as the MEDU Art Ensemble, it became an important
component of the ANC’s poster propaganda campaigns in aid of the ANC surrogate
United Democratic Front (UDF)’s resistance to apartheid and attempts to make
South Africa ungovernable. Given official ANC status, MEDU injected art, music,
drama, literature, and other forms of culture into the anti-apartheid struggle. MEDU
artist Thami Mnyele, a trained freedom fighter, designed the ANC logo, and with
a silkscreen technique created a team to generate political posters for distribution
among UDF supporters, helping to mobilise protest inside South Africa.136
By 1982, MEDU had become an MK conduit, led by Mnyele and Tim Williams,
operating from separate cells. The volume of freedom fighters entering South
Africa through Botswana increased at this time because South Africa had closed
the Mozambican and Swaziland routes. By 1985, the South African intelligence
had discovered the real meaning of MEDU and started issuing threats to attack
ANC locations in and around Gaborone. The Botswana police warned MEDU
members of the looming threat and encouraged them to leave the country. On the
14th of June of that year, a well coordinated South African commando unit entered
Gaborone at night and attacked what it claimed were ANC targets. Fourteen people
lost their lives, including Mnyele, MEDU treasurer Mike Hamlyn, and some
Batswana citizens.137
MEDU was a popular cultural organisation that joined political and armed
struggles. Political activists and freedom fighters in the organisation used it to further
their ideals. Arms were ferried, missions carried out, intelligence gathered, and
logistical plans clandestinely implemented under the banner of this organisation. It
was an important base located in the heart of the capital town of Botswana.
Some citizens of Gaborone who were interviewed also had something to say
about their relations and or encounters with freedom fighters. They either knew
about, or
(134) BNARS, 0P 27/1: Record of Discussions, 27 May 1981.

(135) Masire, Q.K.J. Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of an African Democrat. Gaborone: MacMillan Botswana,
2006: See pp.269-272.
(136) For details on MEDU, see Elizabeth Morton, South African Cultural Exiles in Botswana: MEDU Art Ensemble
1976-1985. University of Botswana: M.A. Thesis, 1997; E. Morton and F. Morton, “Gaborone and the ANC Struggle
for a Free South Africa: The MEDU Art Ensemble 1978-1985,” paper presented to the University of Botswana
History seminar, November 2007 (submitted for publication).
(137) Michael Hamlyn was a South African refugee studying at the University of Botswana. In his honour, the
university established the Michael Hamlyn prize for the best second-year science student.
1994
assisted freedom fighters in their missions to and from South Africa. Victor “Two
Minutes” Kowa, a Motswana liberation activist and resident of Gaborone, described
how Batswana and the government facilitated the movement of what were considered
soft and easy “targets.” It was necessary to get them out of the country as quickly
as possible, usually to the north. Among these targets were prominent personalities
of the liberation armies or of the liberation movements. They tended to be on the
top hit list of South Africa or Rhodesia. Kowa noted, “They had to move on as
soon as possible; [otherwise] they would either be killed [or]... endanger the lives
and security of ordinary citizens. Botswana did not possess enough resources to
protect them.”138 Those who waged war against the settler regimes and used
guerrilla tactics carried out these activities through the neighbouring countries,
whereas military training took place far to the rear in such places as Zambia,
Tanzania, Algeria, and, later, as far away as China and the Soviet Union. As part of
their training, cadres were taught to evade detection by blending in, and interacting
well, with the communities in which
they lived.
Botswana supported both freedom fighters and refugees, though it was not always
easy to distinguish between the two. Sasara George, former First Secretary of
Botswana to the High Commission in Zambia, Lusaka, and later Botswana
Ambassador to Brussels observed that“most of the leadership of the liberation
movements understood and appreciated Botswana’s position. Without Botswana,
they had nowhere to go. In fact, major battles were fought from Botswana against
South Africa and Namibia.”139 Furthermore, the leaders of freedom fighters
worked closely with Botswana’s police intelligence, and the government entered
into many alliances and understandings with the top leadership of ZANLA, ZIPRA,
and MK. The normal procedure was for them to inform the Botswana government
of their intentions and movements, and sometimes they would be escorted to their
destinations. The Botswana intelligence
also warned the freedom fighters’ leadership of looming dangers emanating from the
enemy. In short, a modus operandi of sorts existed between Botswana’s intelligence
and the freedom fighters.140
Former Botswana President Festus Mogae echoed the sentiments of other Batswana
regarding freedom fighters. He recalled that South Africa made all kinds of accusations
against Botswana regarding the presence of freedom fighters in Gaborone and in
Botswana in general. “They claimed that ten percent of those who came were, in
fact, ‘terrorists.’We denied knowledge of that... South Africans charged that we sent
people to train in countries to the north (e.g. USSR etc.) as guerrillas. We denied
that. All we did was to facilitate their passage northwards and did not know what
they did once they arrived at their destinations.”141 The former President also noted
that the South Africans later carried on dastardly acts by blowing up Batswana
homes, claiming
(138) Interview with Victor Kowa, (Gaborone) February 2007.

(139) Interview with Sasara George, (Gaborone) February 2007.
(140) Ibid.
(141) Interview with His Excellency Former President Festus Mogae, (Gaborone) November 2008.
that they were hideouts for freedom fighters. The Rhodesians, too, attacked the BDF
inside Botswana and attacked Francistown in the belief that Botswana was hiding
freedom fighters.“They painted their trucks the same colour as BDF trucks and made
uniforms similar to that of the BDF so that they would not be easily detected. At
times they kidnapped our people.”142 (His Excellency’s observations regarding
Botswana and the freedom fighters are fully articulated later in this chapter.)
Botswana had little choice, no matter how sympathetic to the struggle, of
disengaging itself from arresting freedom fighters involved in subversive activities
for release and immediate transport to other countries.143 Such moves were meant
to demonstrate to the South Africans that Botswana was serious in not allowing its
territory to be used for launching attacks on its neighbours.And to reinforce this claim,
sometimes the Botswana government displayed arms caches wrested from freedom
fighters. Though it may have appeased the South African government, Botswana’s
public display of its policy rarely gained the support of the freedom fighters and their
liberation activists.144
The Role of the Army and the Police

At independence, Botswana lacked a military force and had a minuscule police
force at best, and that was unarmed.An extremely poor country for more than a decade
after independence, it faced an immense task of nation-building. In addition,
Botswana was faced with the immediate task of defending itself from incursions
from white- racist regimes on its borders, and dealing with spies and other ne’er-do-
wells coming into the country, while at the same time supporting as best it could the
liberation struggle. The closest the country had to a military force was the police’s
quasi-military Paramilitary Mobile Unit (PMU), but it was incapable of dealing with
the threats and efforts of the minority regimes (particularly the Rhodesians) to
destabilise Botswana. Thus in 1977, the BDF was formed, drawing most of its
soldiers and officers from the PMU. Ex-PMU commander (and founding BDF
commander) Lt. General Merafhe narrated some of the early challenges.
The Police Mobile Unit (PMU) was set up way back in 1967... but by 1968 it was
becoming clearly obvious that we needed a Force – a paramilitary force that could
deal with matters of internal disturbances and also provide minimum military
resistance to people who were obviously posing a threat. We could read what was
coming our way in terms of hostilities that were beginning to heighten within our
region. It was becoming obvious because the spirit of liberation was certainly
gaining momentum and there were more and more people from neighbouring
countries who were under these oppressive regimes who were coming into
Botswana. There was temptation of the white regime to follow freedom fighters into
Botswana and it became obvious that we really had to do something to ensure that
there was a paramilitary force that
(142) Ibid.
(143) Interview with Simon Hirschfield, (Gaborone) April 2008.
(144) Interview with Rampholo Molefe, (Gaborone) June 2008.
1994
could deal with this problem. It became clearly obvious that we needed a fully
fledged Defence Force to be able to handle these problems that were emerging as a
result of the increase in the activities of the liberation struggle within the region.145
The Botswana Defence Force
Unlike Zambia and Tanzania, whose armies participated in the training of the
freedom fighters, the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) did not provide such
training, in keeping with the national policy of not allowing guerrilla bases. The
BDF’s main responsibilities were defending the territorial integrity of the country,
protecting its people, and ensuring safety was provided to refugees and those in
transit to join the liberation forces based in Zambia and elsewhere. As the BDF’s
first commander, Lt. General Mompati Merafhe, put it:
The only thing we were a bit careful about was not to be seen to be supporting the
liberation fighters openly because if that had happened, we could have opened
ourselves to attacks by these regimes, a full scale war we wouldn’t have been able to
[with]stand. So we felt that we had to be careful in the manner in which we dealt with
these people who were in transit through Botswana back to South Africa and Rhodesia
to prosecute the armed liberation struggle. Fortunately, in Namibia they were coming
in from Angola through that route… So we had a policy of turning a blind eye, but we
had to be very careful.146
According to Lt. General Tebogo Masire, the BDF
...played a role in that it protected Botswana citizens from aggression by the
minority regimes. Both citizens and non citizens were protected by the BDF,
especially in the volatile areas like Francistown and the North East. The BDF was
also protecting refugees and guerrillas that were running away from Rhodesian
security forces. BDF would encounter freedom fighters, disarm them and send them
to refugee camps, and government would then arrange for their transit to Zambia, so
we were protecting them in that sense.147
Liberation movements were in contact with the BDF’s Military Intelligence unit,
which gathered information about the struggle and the state of security in the
country in order to protect Botswana’s territorial integrity, Botswana citizens, and
refugees. Before he became BDF commander, Lt. General Matshwenyego Louis
Fisher headed this unit.148 Army intelligence personnel kept in touch with
representatives of the liberation movements. And when the BDF found arms
caches, they asked these representatives to remove them.149
The BDF was soon drawn into conflicts with its troublesome neighbours. General
Merafhe related the following:
(145) Interview with Mompati Merafhe, (Gaborone) October 2006.

(146) Interview with Mompati Merafe, (Gaborone) October 2006.
(147) Interview with Tebogo Masire, (Gaborone) October 2008.
(148) Interview with Matshwenyego Louis Fisher, (Gaborone) November 2008.
(149) Interview with Tebogo Masire, (Gaborone) October 2008.
These are two main incidents because they are prominent by virtue of them having
received a lot of publicity, but there were a lot of skirmishes. Let me take for
instance our border with Rhodesia: there were skirmishes, almost regularly between
members of the BDF and the Rhodesians and we killed some of their people, but we
didn’t want to climb on our roof tops, boasting about the fact that we killed
Rhodesian soldiers. If we were to boast about it, we would have opened possibility
for attacks because they were a much stronger force than we were. But our chaps
were not intimidated in terms of confronting members of the Rhodesian armed
forces. Therefore, I think they played a very credible part because the Rhodesian
soldiers knew that they could not really come to Botswana without sacrificing their
own lives which is what is called deterrent in army language. So I think our force, as
young as it was, played a very important role in terms of providing protection to our
people along the border who were being harassed, ever so often, by the marauding
forces of Ian Smith. The Lesoma Incident was a terrible incident in the sense that the
Rhodesians were accusing us of harbouring terrorists and then mounted some attacks
against us. They decided that they were going to lay an ambush against our chaps in
order to punish us. In fact what happened that day was that a number of freedom
fighters had entered Botswana in the Kasane area, and the Rhodesian soldiers crossed
into Botswana following guerrillas. We got wind of the presence of Rhodesians in
our country and sent our small troop there to apprehend this group of Zimbabwean
fighters in order to interrogate and make them aware that their cross border activities
were not welcomed in the country. The Rhodesians decided to lay an ambush for our
people, and that’s when soldiers were shot and killed. I was actually one of the first
people to arrive at the scene of the ambush.150
The BDF lost fifteen soldiers at Lesoma near the Rhodesian border.
Another incident involving the BDF and Rhodesian forces arose from
Botswana’s protection of the border at Kazungula, which was the only link between
Botswana and Zambia, and indeed with the rest of independent Africa. The ferry at
Kazangula carried people, goods, and vehicles across the Zambezi. Most refugees
used it to enter Zambia though some were flown from Francistown. In other words,
Kazungula and its ferry were the “life line.” Not surprisingly, from time to time
Rhodesian soldiers sabotaged the ferry, and on one such occasion, BDF soldiers
went to investigate. A shootout ensued between them and the Rhodesians, who had
been hiding a few meters from the crossing point. One of our soldiers was killed in
that skirmish. So the Rhodesians were literally pointing guns at the crossing point
whenever they wished to do so. General Merafhe determined to remove this menace.
He instructed Lt. General Ian Khama to cross into Zimbabwe with some soldiers to
drive the Rhodesians away and destroy their hide out. After a shootout, during
which the BDF lost one of its soldiers, the Rhodesians withdrew.151
Botswana, as General Merafhe states, was under constant pressure from the white
minority regimes: “The idea was to intimidate us into complete submission so that
we should completely detach ourselves from any form of support to the liberation
(150) Ibid.
(151) Ibid.
1994
struggle.”152 To its credit, Botswana resisted such pressure and continued to support
the liberation struggle as best as it could. South Africa wanted Botswana to have
diplomatic relations with it and to sign a non-aggression treaty along the lines of the
Nkomati accord (with Mozambique). Botswana rejected both.153
Other examples can be provided to demonstrate how the BDF defended Botswana
and its people.
In May 1978, a Motswana in the north east was abducted by armed black
Rhodesian troops. After receiving this report, a BDF unit set out to apprehend them.
They soon caught up with them. Upon being challenged, the Rhodesians fled, and
the BDF opened fire. The BDF killed one Rhodesian soldier and wounded another.
The rest escaped to Rhodesia.154 On another occasion in the same year, in the Tuli
Block area on the Botswana/ Rhodesian border, three suspects wearing military
uniforms were apprehended by the BDF patrol under Sergeant Ompatile Tswaipe.
They suspected their prisoners of ferrying Rhodesian soldiers across the Shashe
River into Botswana. The three were a British tourist, a farm manager, and the
manager of a nearby game farm.155 A scuffle ensued as the three suspects
attempted to escape. They were shot dead. Tswaipe was arrested and tried in the
High Court with Chief Justice Robert Hayfron-Benjamin presiding. The students at
the University of Botswana demonstrated in support of Tswaipe. For lack of
sufficient evidence of any wrongdoing, Tswaipe was acquitted.156 In another
incident, in April 1979, the BDF foiled an attempt by Rhodesians in two troop
carriers to attack the Dukwi refugee settlement. After an exchange of fire, the
Rhodesians retreated. Some BDF soldiers sustained minor injuries.157 Another
incident occurred when the BDF foiled another Rhodesian attempt to set up an
ambush. When the BDF approached, the Rhodesians fled, leaving behind some of
their weapons, including a Russian anti-tank rocket, similar to the one used at
Lesoma.158
In order to deal with Rhodesian incursions and to reassure the people of Botswana,
especially in troubled border areas, the BDF set up army camps in strategic areas
along the border in the northern, north-eastern, and eastern parts of the country.
Small though it was, the BDF dispensed its mandate admirably. The Rhodesians
could not just “walk into Botswana” at will, without fearing a confrontation.
The Role of the Police
The Police assisted the liberation struggle in many ways, directly and indirectly.
They exposed undercover agents pretending to be refugees, arrested spies for the
(152) Ibid.
(153) Interviews with Mompathi Merafhe, (Gaborone) October 2006; Matshwenyego Louis Fisher, (Gaborone)
November 2008.
(154) Daily News. 10 May 1978.
(155) Daily News. 3 April 1978.
(156) Daily News. 14 November 1978.
(157) Daily News. 24 April 1979.
(158) Daily News. 27 August 1979.
white minority regimes, and vetted refugees. Botswana’s police shared with the
BDF the mission to safeguard the people, including those along the borders and at
other trouble spots. All the branches of the police force had the responsibility for
state security and the maintenance of law and order. The Special Branch (SB) had
special responsibility for state security. At the time, Botswana did not have a
National Security Intelligence Service. So the SB performed this service, namely to
monitor the safety of the nation.159
The police were in the forefront in dealing with refugees. In the early 1960s,
especially after the Sharpeville Massacre, many refugees from South Africa entered
Botswana. Many were young people desiring to go to Zambia to join the liberation
struggle. The police’s role was to register them for security reasons and arrange for
them to go to Zambia. Others in this refugee group were educated professionals such
as teachers, doctors, and others who found employment in Botswana and contributed
to the development of the country. Many of them took up Botswana citizenship. These
early refugees were not troublesome like the refugees who came in the 1970s, and
so no special camps were established for them. They either settled among the
Batswana, especially in urban areas, or continued on to Zambia.160
The police experienced many problems with the South Africans who came in later
years. “While refugees from Rhodesia were cooperative in many ways, we started
to see a different kind of behaviour exhibited by South African refugees. They
were generally looking down upon Batswana,” asserts former Police Commissioner
Simon Hirschfeld.161 The huge number of refugees, particularly those of school-
going age, led the government around 1978 to consider establishing a school for
them at Mosetsana Montle in Kweneng. However, the plan was abandoned and
Dukwi Refugee Settlement was established in the Central District (see Dukwi
above).
Vetting of Refugees
One of the most onerous tasks carried out by the police was determining who among
the constant stream of asylum seekers entering Botswana were legitimate refugees.
Former Special Branch Head Adolph Hirschfeld describes the vetting process the
police developed to meet this challenge:
Hundreds of applications for asylum were submitted. It was the duty of the SB to
determine, in accordance with UN conventions on refugees, who were genuine
refugees and who were not. It was a mammoth task requiring all sorts of information.
Occasionally we relied on other refugees and the leaders of the liberation movements.
Thisinformation,if available,wouldbeanalysedforauthenticityandusedtosupplement
our own information. Such information would be treated with great caution. At times
leaders or representatives of liberation movements would report that one or some of
(159) Interviews with Calvin Sekwababe, Head of Criminal Investigation Division, (Gaborone) January 2008;
Adolph Hirschfeld, former Head of Special Branch, (Gaborone) December 2008; Simon Hirschfeld, former
Commissioner of Police, (Gaborone) May 2008.
(160) Interview with Simon Hirschfeld, (Gaborone) May 2008.
(161) Interview with Adolph Hirschfeld, (Gaborone) December 2008.
1994
the would-be refugees were, in fact, undercover agents. If indeed we too determined
that such information was correct we sent such individuals north, to Zambia, so that
the liberation movements would deal with such persons. Indeed, an undercover agent
could be a hindrance to the liberation struggle. So in exposing such persons, the SB
was assisting the liberation struggle. We did our best to protect the refugees and the
representatives of the liberation movements in Botswana. We always warned them if
we had information about anything that could harm them. We had limited resources to
work with. So we advised the refugees and the representatives of liberation
movements to also rely on themselves for their own security.
In the vetting process, we found that only very few applicants were not genuine
refugees. In such cases we handed them over to the UNHCR to deal with them. Such
individuals usually joined genuine refugees to come here to search for opportunities
for work and establish some small businesses. Some of them eventually returned
to their countries. As for the genuine refugees, they were taken to Dukwi refugee
settlement for their own security and care. We ensured that Dukwi always had
adequate security. It was never attacked by the racist regimes.162
Hirschfeld referred to what he termed “hot potato” cases, that is, wanted persons
fleeing South Africa.
There were two of them, a white and a black person. The SB got to know at short
notice that they were being flown in a private plane which flew very low to avoid
being detected on the South African radar. They landed in the country and we fetched
them. The South Africans were desperately looking for them. We quickly processed
UN passports for them and arranged for them to be flown to Zambia. In fact all such
persons who the racist regimes wanted to capture were enabled to transit to the north
expeditiously for their own and our protection.163
Another case involved forty six ANC followers in Lesotho for whom the Nordic
countries chartered a plane to fly them over South Africa to Zambia. The South
Africans somehow managed to tamper with the plane so that it would have to land in
South Africa. However, when the experienced pilots encountered problems, they
flew into Botswana and landed without knowing where they were.
We had been alerted that there was such a plane. When we approached the plane, the
passengers wanted to dash to the bush as they thought they had landed in South
Africa. We had to shout to them not to worry as they were in Botswana. We hurriedly
took them to a secluded restaurant for dinner and then put them up at the nearby
Police College for the night. They left for Lusaka the following day.164
Hirschfeld related stories about the opposite challenge of dealing with persons
working for the South Africans.
(162) Ibid.
(163) Ibid.
(164) Ibid.
In those days, Botswana was infiltrated by undercover agents (spies). So, one of the
SB’s tasks was to also infiltrate the South African intelligence system. At one point, I
managed to befriend a South African agent pretending that I was a South African who
was in Botswana on business. I was able to get some information from him about what
he was doing in Botswana. He had come to gather information about the liberation
movements here. He then gave me some information to pass on to the South African
police in South Africa. I was able to use this information to warn the representatives
of the liberation movements to avoid capture or death by moving away from where
they lived.
In doing our work we had excellent relations with the intelligence persons of the
liberation movements. We often exchanged information on security matters. When
leaders of liberation movements such as Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki visited
Botswana to consult with the government, they usually came with their security
person. The SB had the opportunity to exchange views with them on matters
pertaining to security.165
Hirschfeld also stated that people along the borders, such as near Maitengwe, were
generally security conscious because they were raided often by the Rhodesian
agents. On one occasion, a certain villager (an old man) shot and killed a white
man. It is suspected that the man was a Selous Scout – an elite hit squad of the
Rhodesian army.166 In summary, Hirschfeld asserted that in protecting the refugees,
the representatives of the liberation movements and those in transit through
Botswana to the north to join liberation forces, the SB was contributing to the
struggle, especially in sharing information with the liberation movements and
warning them of impending dangers. On occasion the police arrested undercover
agents and other undesirable elements.
For example, B.R. Beyleveld, formerly of the South African Defence Force, was
arrested by Botswana police in the train, in Francistown, on his way to Rhodesia.
He was charged with preparing to give assistance to the Rhodesian army, thereby
posing a threat to the security and sovereignty of Botswana. He was wearing a
South African army uniform and had documents including an application to join
the notorious Selous Scouts. He was tried in the High Court and sentenced to
fifteen years imprisonment.167 Many other incidents can be cited to demonstrate
that the Botswana Police played a vital role in exposing undercover agents who were
a danger to both Botswana and the liberation movements.
The Role of Women

The liberation struggle, in general, and that of southern Africa in particular, were
hardly the prerogative of men. In fact, all liberation movements fighting against the
settler regimes— FRELIMO, PLAN, MK, ZANLA, ZIPRA, MPLA, UNITA—
had women in at least some of their combat units. While it must be admitted that
only
(165) Ibid.
(166) Ibid.
(167) Daily News. 30 November 1977; 31 January 1978, 2 February 1978; 15 February 1978; 20 February 1978.
1994
a few women were involved in physical combat, many played a critical role, in
other ways, in assuring the success of the struggle. In Botswana, women were
among the unsung heroes that played a supporting role for liberation. They
accommodated and fed refugees and freedom fighters, facilitated their education,
carried out their errands, and supported them economically, socially, morally, and
even emotionally. Such organizations as the Young Women’s Christian Association
(YWCA) and the Botswana Council of Women (BCW) played a significant role in
making education possible for refugees. They were headed largely by Batswana
women such as Mrs Phumela Vanqa, Mrs Molefe, with the assistance of Mrs
Brigalia Bam, a refugee herself, who coordinated the women’s division of the World
Council of Churches (WCC).168 Working with other Botswana citizens, they
helped young ladies find accommodation, food, clothing, and opportunities to
further their education. Mrs Vanqa and her colleagues also provided parental care to
young refugees. As Mrs Vanqa recollected,
In the 1970’s, the YWCA was requested to do something for young people who were
flooding in. The situation was worse in the case of girls due to issues of personal
hygiene, and we had to provide specific necessities in this regard. We soon had to open
a Day Care Centre as some of the girls started having babies. They needed
mothering which was provided by ladies such as Mrs Molefe and Mrs Esther
Mosinyi.169
The young women refugees were helped to enrol in such secretarial programs as
typing and book-keeping.170 Mrs Vanqa and her team were among those that also
helped young men further their education by getting them admitted into Botswana
secondary schools or helping them to secure scholarships overseas, and also helped
them reach other countries for military training.
Women helped the liberation struggle in other ways. Mrs Tsholofelo Morake, a
senior financial officer at Jubilee Hospital in Francistown, described how the
nurses at the hospital used to treat injured freedom fighters.
We were then living in Francistown. I was working at the hospital as a senior officer.
Occasionally, injured freedom fighters and others came for treatment at the hospital.
Some had lost limbs. We lived in constant fear of attacks by the Rhodesians. I recall
the occasion when our soldiers were ambushed by the Rhodesians at Lesoma resulting
in many people being killed. We were told at the hospital to be ready to attend to the
injured. There was total mobilization of staff doctors, nurses, and all other workers
in readiness for the injured. However, the hospital did not receive the injured, as
they were taken elsewhere. We were ready to assist. Although we were afraid that
Rhodesians might attack us, our patriotism and desire to help the injured made us
ignore the fact that we might be attacked. This was war and we rose to the
occasion.
(168) Thato Bereng to Lily Mafela, e-mail, 30 March 2007. Mrs Bam is currently chairperson of the South African
Independent Electoral Commission.
(169) Interview with Phumela Vanqa, (Gaborone) February 2007.
(170) Tshidi Moroka to Lily Mafela, e-mail, 18 June 2007.
We were sympathetic to the people of Zimbabwe who were fighting for freedom. So
we assisted the freedom fighters as best as we could, with the hope that they would
defeat their oppressors.171
Other women accommodated, fed, and did errands for the members of liberation
movements, and in some instances they assisted without knowing they were carrying
out special missions. A Motswana woman who agreed to be interviewed on condition
of anonymity (Anonymous Woman #1) was a member of a family with relatives in
South Africa, whom she visited during her school holidays. As a working person,
she accommodated and fed some refugees from South Africa, and, in some
instances, supported them financially.172 She became so close and helpful to them
that she, naturally, became emotionally attached to one and ended up with a child.
Because of this intimate association, she found herself accommodating other
refugees.
I know I played an important role in the struggle besides accommodating refugees.
As a Motswana who had a passport and who frequented South Africa to visit
relatives, I was sent to deliver letters in the process, which on hindsight, I think was
a very dangerous thing to do. It was only afterwards that I realised that what I was
doing could have landed me in big trouble. Of course I carried the letters in good
faith and did not have the slightest idea that what I was carrying had anything to do
with the liberation struggle. There were times also that I had to carry important
messages across the border. These messages were to be delivered to certain families
in Johannesburg
- Soweto. And so were the letters, which came from different refugees throughout
the country.173
Anonymous Woman #1 described the kind of messages she delivered as “...very
important ones because I remember that I was sent to deliver a message to someone
in Soweto and tell them that matsela a tsile (the cloths have come). I think whoever
received the message knew what the message meant even though I had no idea
what the message meant. I think, on hindsight that it meant that weapons of some
sort had arrived, weapons perhaps in the form of guns ammunition or grenades”174
Anonymous Woman #1 also described how she accommodated many refugees
including those who came to Botswana to visit their children or relatives. She came
to know many of them well. She still keeps in contact with some of these ex-
refugees, who visit her whenever they are in Botswana. Anonymous Woman #1 felt
that she had made a significant contribution to the liberation struggle.
Lentle More is another woman who played an important role in the liberation
struggle. Ms. More talked freely about her experiences in the 1980s. At the time she
worked as a receptionist at the President Hotel in Gaborone, and she lived with a
number of refugees.175 The President Hotel, which was frequented by people from
all walks of life, became an important social gathering spot for refugees, too. Ms.
More
(171) Interview with Tsholofelo Morake, (Gaborone) October 2008.

(172) Interview with Anonymous Woman #1, (Gaborone) October 2008.
(173) Ibid.
(174) Ibid.
(175) Interview with Lentle More, (Gaborone) October 2008.
1994
often helped refugees by using the telephone facilities at the hotel to make calls to
South Africa on their behalf, doing so without the permission of management. She
and her friends gave food and drink to some refugees and gave them money from
their own personal funds. “Whenever there were social gatherings we invited
them,” she said, “and sometimes we invited them to our homes. They were easy
going and found comfort in our homes, particularly my home.”176 The refugees Ms.
More helped included members of the South African Student Organisation (SASO),
the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the ANC, and the PAC. Others came
with families, some with young children. Ms. More struck a rapport with many and
became a confidante of the liberation movement to the extent that, as with
Anonymous Woman #1, she was sent on occasional errands. Her story is so
interesting that paraphrasing tends to dilute its significance. Here are her words:
At one point I and my sister called Mma Segola and my brother went to Johannesburg.
While there we decided to visit a friend in one of the local townships. This particular
friend asked us if we would give her cousin a ride to Botswana. We happily agreed.
When we asked specifically where in Botswana she will be going, we were told that
she was visiting a cousin of hers who was a refugee. This refugee man was a priest
by the name of Morris Ngakale. I also knew Morris as he frequented the President
Hotel. Our host did not elaborate beyond this. The following day we went to get her
and when she came out, she did so with a baggage of nice suit cases and was dressed
very nicely. We came with her all the way until we crossed the border. She was not
saying much during the journey. We crossed the border in the evening and unknown
to us she was using a passport that did not belong to her. She would have landed us
into trouble of unimagined proportions, but with the Grace of God, the police did not
recognise her. They did not realise that the passport she was using was not hers.
Meanwhile she came to be known as a “prominent official” who organised students
to cross the border for either educational or military purposes or both. We realized
later through other people that she was wanted by the South African Police. Her
photograph was said to have been circulating in several South African
newspapers.177
Ms.More went on to describe how the cousin,Morris,never showed up at the President
Hotel as was expected, and, after a week of waiting for the “cousin”, it became
obvious that the girl was stranded. “She didn’t know me, and I didn’t know her, the
only thing I knew was that her aunt had requested us to give her a ride to
Botswana.”
I then told her that it is now over five days and this cousin had not showed up at the
President Hotel. I could tell from her face that she was petrified of the news, and she
still had not divulged to me that she was a refugee. I asked her if I should ask my
husband to accommodate her for the time being while hoping that “cousin” would
show up. Suddenly she was bright in the face at this suggestion. This was the
beginning of my stay with her. I was buying her food, clothes, and shoes, and from
this a bond emerged and we became one. By this time she had told me that she was a
refugee, but had still not told me about herself and the story of the passport.
(176) Ibid.
(177) Ibid.
Despite food rations offered to refugees by the government, she refused to register.
She therefore shared the food bought at Lentle’s house.
We stayed together like that for two years and I was treating her like a member of my
family in every sense. She was waiting to go to school somewhere abroad. But many
people from South Africa used to come by the house to see her and I just took it that
they were her former school mates as the majority of them were of her age. Even her
parents from South Africa when they came to Botswana they came to visit my house.
She then told me of her two sisters that they were both in exile in Zambia. There were
many student organizations then, but she said she belonged to the ANC. We stayed
together while she was organizing her papers to go to school abroad. One day a cousin
of mine said this girl was wanted in the papers of South Africa. That is when she
told me that she crossed the border without using her own passport. I was not
worried by those reports because most refugees at the time were almost always on
the wanted list of the South African Police.
It now came to a point where her arrangements for further studies abroad were
finalized. She left to go to school in New York, USA. She went to school, finished,
and worked there. She began to send me money and other stuff every month from
there. She has been doing so ever since, she sends me stuff from America. As we
speak, this lady is now the South African Consular General in Los Angeles, USA.
Her younger sisters have now returned from exile and they are now in South Africa.
Both of them look after me because I used to look after their parents and sister.
Even her cousins and relatives who were refugees, whenever they came to
Botswana, they came to the house called “Lentle House.” My house was ever so full
of refugees, but as they came, I gave them food and generally provided them with
what they needed.178
Ms. More concluded by explaining how her house was used by both freedom
fighters and refugees, including some that were eventually killed in the 14 June
1985 raid. She continues:
A refugee called Thami [Mnyele], one of the officials of the ANC, once came into
my house during what was called“stay away.” That is when their intelligence had told
them that that particular night it was not safe to stay where they were. I found him in
my bedroom sleeping with a gun beside him. He was also friends with the most
wanted Kous Segola. That is when I feared for my children in the event of him being
traced. But he immediately left, explaining that it was stay away.179
Lentle knows she has helped the people of South Africa: “I feel proud that I have
played a part in their eventual emancipation, all because of Janet Ndlovu, the present
South African Consular General in Los Angeles, USA.”180 “Lentle’s House” was so
well known that even former president Thabo Mbeki used to visit there on his
missions to Gaborone.
(178) Ibid.
(179) Ibid.
(180) Ibid.
1994
Another anonymous woman (Anonymous Woman #2) recounted in her interview
her role in the liberation struggle. Her interest in politics was influenced largely by the
environment within which she grew up, which, along with simple humanity, sparked
her interest in the liberation struggle and led her to play a role.
I grew up under that political environment; I grew up in Francistown and it used
to be a politicized area with Pan Africanism, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. Our
homestead was neighbours with that of Phillip Matante, the Pan Africanist and leader
of the Botswana People’s Party. In our area in White City, Francistown there were
many refugees who lived there and belonged to the PAC and the ANC like bo Rre
Seperepere, Rre Ndlovu and many others that I can easily name. We lived not very
far from the famous “White House”, the house that has housed many refugees, some
of whom are now important personalities in their countries of origin. We grew up
playing with these people’s children and we came to know that their parents came
here because they were oppressed in their own countries. We therefore had to
accommodate some of these people.181
Anonymous Woman #2 became involved with the liberation struggle, in part,
because she was married to a South African refugee, but mainly because the idea
of liberation had always been part of her growing up and because it flowed from
her sense of botho (humanity) in wanting to help other people. Her contribution to
the liberation struggle began when she joined the media fraternity. Journalism
naturally inclined her to be a courier of information: “Whenever there was critical
information which might be helpful to the community in which I lived, including
the community of refugees, I transmitted it to the relevant direction.” Unsurprisingly,
therefore, she easily, almost naturally, associated with the refugees when she came
to pursue her career in Gaborone. The community of refugees she associated with
was called Isandhlwana Revolutionary Movement (IRM) under the auspices of the
Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), which prided itself on being neither ANC
nor PAC.182 The BCM was led by such personalities as Steve Biko, Onkgopotse
Tiro, Harry Nengwekhulu, and others.
It was in this community that Anonymous Woman #2 found a husband. She
described the IRM as a community of literate people, professionals, teachers, and
medical doctors. Some, such as her husband, though trained in the medical field,
taught in local secondary schools. As a media person, Anonymous Woman #2 was
instrumental in the founding of the Isandhlwana newspaper. Typed on stencils, the
newspaper was circulated among members. She still has the typewriter and the
stencils in her house.183 Anonymous Woman #2 gathered information on educational
opportunities and scholarships as well as news related to the liberation struggle, and
distributed it among refugees. As a journalist she often travelled overseas, and she
says,“I carried literature from overseas to share with comrades. They used to give
me
(181) Interview with Anonymous Woman #2, (Gaborone) November 2008.

(182) Ibid.
(183) Ibid.
a list of books to buy when I was overseas and I used to use my own money to buy
such books. We still have some of these books and we are keeping them for
posterity. This would be Isandhlwana history. We are looking at possibilities of
publishing a book with a colleague about our lives in this community of
refugees.”184
Her house, too, became an important destination.“My house was one of the transit
areas,” she recalled, “because I used to accommodate the little girls who came as
refugees. My husband and I had to run around and report them to the police for
protection before we facilitated their movement northward. During the raids by the
South African commandos, it was uncomfortable because one was not sure whether
one’s house would be bombed or not, since I was helping the refugees so much.” So
many young male refugees went in and out of it so frequently that it was beginning
to be thought of as a base for military training. To fend off South African agents,
“my house was patrolled and protected by the BDF, but I didn’t even know it until I
heard about it from other people. The government knew who was involved with the
liberation movements and gave them due protection.185
The fact was that the house of Anonymous Woman #2 was being used as a base.
She was aware that arms and ammunitions passed through Botswana and that some
weapons were even kept in her house. She knew this made matters dangerous, but,
as she explains, “I was saved by the fact that I worked for the government.” She
also recalls that her husband left teaching to dedicate his life to the liberation
struggle. He joined the taxi industry because this trade, though not paying much,
served a good purpose in the liberation struggle. “The arms that were in our house,”
she added,
we transported them easily as we were running public transport. We transported them
through a taxi. We used to go through roadblocks with them because the police hardly
ever searched taxis. The arms were transported to certain areas in the lands [masimo]
close to the borders in such areas as Tlhareseleele (Borolong) where there are
Basotho residents. Sometimes my husband undertook reconnaissance missions to
these areas before the transportation and deployment of arms could take place. Even
my brothers and sisters whom I lived with in the house never knew that there were
guns in the house because we were very discreet.186
The support given by women to the liberation struggle was not limited to black
women only. Even some white women, finding themselves in difficult situations
with the freedom fighters of the liberation struggle, had no choice but to lend
support to the struggle. One such case, involving a white woman farmer in Ghanzi
and PLAN freedom fighters, has been mentioned briefly above and deserves
elaboration here: Three well armed men in army gear walked into the farm house of
Mrs Keith Thomas and politely requested food.187 Alone, Mrs Thomas had little
choice but to show them to the pantry and told them to help themselves. She
recounted her experience:
(184) Ibid.
(185) Ibid.
(186) Ibid.
(187) Interview with Mrs Keith Thomas, (Tsabong) June 2008.
1994
Three guys walking into your house with rifles and you don’t know where they were
coming from except that they said they were coming from Namibia. They came with
a bakkie [pick-up truck]; I looked out through the window and saw that it was a
Botswana registered bakkie. But anyway, they came in. I sat there. There was enough
time when I had to go to the bedroom and get the rifle and unlock the thing, what was
I going to do with guys with AK 47, what is it going to help with a rifle, they will kill
me. I sat there with nothing to do. I told them, this is the key, you may take whatever
you want. They took everything, and came back and said “Do you have any meat?” I
told him “yes,” in the deep freezer. “Can we have some?” he asked. I said take
whatever you want and go! He went, I believe to Xanagas. They left the vehicle at a
hotel in Gobabis with a note saying “Thank you for lending us your vehicle, we
needed it for the cause, we appreciate it.188
Women in other districts of Botswana have also shared their experiences regarding
the liberation struggle. In the Chobe area, where in those years she was employed
in Pandamatenga by the Colonial Development Corporation, Fumbani Sefako
recalls seeing the freedom fighters coming in from Zimbabwe and the Rhodesian
soldiers who were tracing them.
Freedom fighters used to cross into our villages and attack white soldiers that side in
Rhodesia. And then cross over here in Pandamatenga. The white soldiers then followed
them up to the border near Pandamatenga. Normally the freedom fighters travelled at
night and the white soldiers followed them up to the border. They would follow them
up all the way from Matetsi to Pandamatenga.189
Freedom fighters attempted to weaken the commercial sector of the white farmers
by forcibly removing black workers from their farms. Black workers, having no
alternative sources of employment, often returned to the white farms.
Mrs Sefako knew about secret freedom fighter camps, such as Sebuyu. People
living in the area of these bases suffered at the hands of Rhodesian forces, which
harassed them while looking for freedom fighters. Nevertheless, villagers did not
assist the Rhodesians. They also did not report the presence of camps to the
Botswana police and the BDF.
We did not report the freedom fighters, because they had relatives here and we knew
some of their parents. Most of them had relatives, especially among the Ndebele and
they used to visit fellow Ndebele at that place called Botebele. Also, freedom
fighters were soldiers fighting for freedom and some of them had warned us about
sellouts. They also told us that in Rhodesia they tortured fellow blacks who betrayed
them. This is why we did not inform the police or BDF about their presence in the
village.190
Sefako recalled instances where a black man known only as“White”was tortured by
the freedom fighters for not disclosing the whereabouts of the Rhodesian security
forces.
(188) Ibid.
(190) Ibid.
It’s like he knew where the white soldiers were hiding. They wanted to find out
where the white soldiers were hiding and he was refusing to tell them. They lit a big
fire and roasted him. Initially, he was refusing to give them the information, but later
gave up and told them where they were, by the border.191
Women in the Chobe District, including the areas of Pandamatenga and Lesoma,
were very helpful to the freedom fighters. They cooked and fed guerrillas in their
homes and supplied them with fresh drinking water. Freedom fighters were allowed to
hide in their fields (masimo), confident that the women working there would not tell
anyone of their whereabouts. Esther Katukula, whose husband befriended guerrillas,
stated that she used to cook for them on their frequent visits to Katukula’s homestead
during which they had long cordial conversations with her husband. Mma Katukula’s
story runs thus:
My husband was amongst those who interacted well with the guerrillas. If he was
alive, he would give you good stories. He used to say these were good people and
people of God. He requested that whenever we see them in the compound, we
should give them food if we have some. Children in the village, including ours, got
used to seeing guerrillas at the pool where they used to fetch water; they would go
into the bush heading towards Pandamatenga. We learnt not to report their presence
to the BDF. Freedom fighters always told us whenever we see anyone dressed in
army uniform, whether it was a white or black soldier we should not tell him where
they were. They even requested that if anyone asked whose foot prints were at my
place I should not talk about guerrillas. They used to say that they did not know all
their enemies. They wanted to meet their enemies without being followed. They told
us that they did not trust some black people who were used by the white soldiers as
collaborators.192
Some women developed personal relationships with freedom fighters. Mrs Katukula
tells of a Pandamatenga woman named Monica, who fell in love with Mkhwananzi,
a ZIPRA intelligence agent working inside the Botswana border. After the war,
Monica went with him to Zimbabwe, where they live. Another woman known as
Dolly, who is a daughter of Katukula’s uncle, also had a relationship with one of the
freedom fighters. She too went with him to Zimbabwe where they were married
and lived happily together. Some former freedom fighters still cross the border to
come and visit the families that supported them during the liberation struggle.193
Mrs Katukula gave a vivid picture of the Lesoma incident (see above). Her story
is lengthy and has been somewhat abridged.
The day I came to know about the freedom fighters was the time when sixteen soldiers
of the BDF were killed.When this incident happened, I was not well. My husband
woke me up because he wanted us to go to the lands. We then heard gunshots from
inside Zimbabwe and I told my husband that those were the gunshots of the freedom
fighters. We retraced our steps back home and when we got there we found people
running in all directions in panic because they were afraid of gunshots. Some told us
that there
(191) Ibid.
(192) Interview with Esther Katukula, (Lesoma) July 2007.
(193) Ibid.
1994
was a group of freedom fighters who crossed the border and that they had passed
through the village carrying weapons. The headman of Lesoma, Jameson, sent his
sons to go and call the BDF for patrol. Since I was sick that day I went into the house
to rest. In a matter of minutes my husband entered the house and told me that we
should run away because there may be a fight between white Rhodesian soldiers and
the guerrillas. He took our child Siphiwe by hand and instructed me to run as fast as
possible ahead of them, but they had to leave me behind because I was sick.Villagers
ran into the bush. Some drove cattle from Lesoma into the bush heading towards
Kasane. I was left alone that day and when I woke up and walked into the kitchen to
drink water I saw this young man dressed in army uniform carrying a gun and a small
bag. He was speaking Ndebele and told me that my people had run away. He asked
me why I did not run away with them and I told him I was not feeling well. He gave
me two tablets to help ease my pains. This young man begged me not to tell anyone
where he was hiding. He was referring to anyone who would come to our place
wearing uniform which looked similar to his. He disappeared for a while, and came
back and asked how I was. I told him that I was now feeling better and he left. While
sitting alone in the compound, I suddenly saw a flying machine. It was flying below
tree level and I was able to see male white faces inside the helicopter… At around
five o’clock in the evening I heard loud gun gunshots and I saw smoke from the other
side of the village and we heard that they had bombed and killed Botswana
soldiers.194
Maria Mbakani gave a similar version. The BDF unit searched the area to disarm
freedom fighters, but some had managed to escape with their weapons.When the BDF
got into their trucks to return to base, they were suddenly attacked by the Rhodesian
soldiers. Gunshots were heard and there was smoke all over Lesoma village. Her
son Uwe Simon was caught in the cross fire while he and some soldiers were
attempting to run into the village.195
The rich accounts of these women reveal their direct involvement in the struggle
as providers of accommodation, food, clothing, education, protection, and courier
missions to freedom fighters. Their recollections of events they witnessed also
testify that women were active in and deeply committed to the liberation struggle.
Though they did not wield guns, these and many other women in Botswana
supported the liberation struggle in many important ways.
Selected Experiences of Liberation Struggle

Activists
As the extended reminiscences of women demonstrate, any overview of Botswana’s
role in the liberation struggle can be enhanced considerably by quoting the words
of those who were present at the time and played their own, individually important,
roles. This section is dedicated to bringing into view more of these recollections,
not only for the information they provide, but for the appreciation the reader can
(194) Ibid.
(195) Interview with Maria Mbakani, (Lesoma) July 2007.
gain of the selfless acts of many heretofore unnoticed participants. The individuals
below have not attempted to trumpet their place in history, rather they were found
by our research team. They were fully cooperative, generous with their time, and
open about their past. What follows, is a small but sincere means of recognising
these contributors to freedom in southern Africa. Some of it is in summary form,
some in their own words.
Okgetheng Mogorosi
In Gobojango, eastern Botswana, a Motswana by the name of Okgetheng Mogorosi
participated in the liberation struggle as a ZIPRA cadre in the 1970s. He had left
school after completing his junior certificate. This qualification enabled him to
manage the general dealer shops of his uncle, Motsumi Mogorosi. He also learnt how
to drive, and during the influx of refugees into Gobojango, he transported many to
Bobonong using his uncle’s trucks. He was interested in helping refugees because
he was quite aware that they were fleeing from the oppressive regime of Ian Smith.
In addition, many of them were his Zimbabwean relatives.
ZAPU officials in Francistown often visited Gobojango. One of them, Joel Sejie,
lived in Gobojango with his relatives. It is through these men that Mogorosi learnt
more about the struggle for freedom in Zimbabwe. These men also told the
villagers to watch out for spies from Rhodesia who, more often than not, tried to
abduct them with a view to soliciting information about freedom fighters and
refugees. He was taught how to detect harmful objects like small bombs which could
be placed in their houses and how to detonate them.
Mogorosi decided to leave Gobogango after discovering a bomb under his bed (it
was defused). When Mogorosi discovered that his life was in danger, he put aside the
advice of his family to stay with his uncle in Gaborone, and followed his real
passion, going to Zambia and joining the liberation forces. He went to Francistown,
where ZAPU officials, who already knew him, made the necessary arrangements,
and soon he was on his way to Lusaka with a group of new recruits.
He did his initial training at a ZIPRA camp in rural Zambia. His instructors were
ZAPU senior officers that had trained in Cuba, Algeria, the Soviet Union, and other
places. Rigorous training followed at Morogoro, Tanzania, where he met other cadres
from the liberation movements—ZANU, SWAPO, ANC, PAC. After he and others
returned to Zambia, their mission became to infiltrate Rhodesia by crossing the
Zambezi in rubber boats. The main objective initially was to teach the peasantry
about the struggle and to identify targets for subsequent sabotage and attacks
against the enemy.
On one occasion, while returning from one of their missions, they were
ambushed by Rhodesian forces. Mogorosi was terribly injured, and two of his
colleagues were killed. To this day he bears the scars of his injuries on his wrists
and eyebrow. After recuperating, he entered an officer cadet course at a military
training college in Zambia, where he met twelve other cadets from the Botswana
1994
Police Mobile Unit (later Botswana Defence Force). He was then sent to the Soviet
Union to be trained in communications. Zimbabwe became independent soon after
his return, whereupon he returned to his home in Gobojango. He knew only a few
other Batswana who fought for the liberation of Zimbabwe. All were motivated by
the desire to see black people liberated.196
Klaas Motshidisi
A retired civil servant and politician, now resident at Palapye, Klaas Motshidisi
recounted how, as one of the anchor people, he played his part in coordinating the
liberation struggle from the south of the country to the north.
It was more individuals than the state that helped freedom fighters. We made personal
sacrifices by accommodating them in our homes. As individuals we suffered; I was
declared a prohibited immigrant by the South African State in 1966. When Samora
Machel arrived in Lobatse, the Kgaboesele people accommodated him. They literally
moved out of their house to accommodate them. When Nelson Mandela returned
from military training he landed in Francistown and Fish Keitseng stayed with him.
Our people provided the rungs of a ladder for these people to rise to prominence in
their own countries. Joe Modise, as one of the commanders of Umkhonto we Sizwe,
would tell us when their people would be passing through Botswana. Fish Keitseng
coordinated the southern part of Botswana and I handled the central part of the
country, which included the Tuli block area. From the south the freedom fighters and
refugees were transferred to Palapye where I and others, including Mpho and Matante
would assist their passage to the north.197
Simon Tladi
Simon Tladi was a resident of Morwa village in Kgatleng District. In 1951 he
migrated to Cape Town for work and stayed in Nyanga East. A Motswana who
stayed with him was Kenneth Nkhwa, now a former Member of Parliament for the
North East constituency. In 1957, after years of dealing with racism at work and in
the streets, Tladi became politically active and joined the ANC. After the 1959
split, Tladi joined the PAC.
In March 1960, Tladi joined the nation-wide passbook strike. It became violent,
and many people were killed, while others were detained. Tladi was among the
strike leaders and became a wanted man. In June he escaped by returning to his
home country, still the Bechuanaland Protectorate. After settling in, he joined ANC
activists Fish Keitseng and Motsamai Mpho, among others, in forming the
Bechuanaland People’s Party. Though a PAC member, Tladi shared with the
others the desire to promote political independence and freedom from colonial and
white minority rule. Alongside Tladi’s involvement in local politics, came his
participation in the liberation struggle. Tladi worked closely with Keitseng in
helping other ANC members fleeing to Botswana from South Africa, including
Nelson Mandela and
(196) Interview with Okgetheng Mogorosi, (Gobojango) May 2007.

Thabo Mbeki.198 Tladi met Mandela in Lobatse at Keitseng’s. Freedom fighters

recruited by Mandela went for training abroad by passing through Botswana. When
the ANC bought a Land Rover for Keitseng to transport recruits from the Pitsane,
Lobatse, and Ramotswa borders, Keitseng could not drive, but Tladi had a driver’s
license and became Kietseng’s driver. He transported recruits from South Africa
for further training in the northern countries. He drove from the border, always at
night, all the way to Francistown, on to Kazungula, took the ferry, then on to Lusaka
to deliver his charges. Tladi worked closely with a man called Rantao, an uncle to
the late Botswana National Front (BNF) leader Paul Rantao. Rantao was the ANC’s
main recruiting agent in South Africa. One daring mission he recalls was when he
transported Harold Wolfe and Arthur Goldreich, two ardent apartheid critics who
had escaped from a South African jail. Tladi and Keitseng collected them from the
Lobatse border and drove them the entire night all the way to Francistown.Arriving at
sunrise, the two refugees were put in prison for their protection and later released for
onward transportation. Tladi also recalls helping refugees from Namibia, including a
Dr Abrahams.199
Gladstone Phatudi
Born of Botswana parents in Mafikeng, Mr Phatudi played an important role in the
liberation struggle in the Southern District. He was educated in Mafikeng, trained as
a teacher and later took up employment as a court interpreter. He used to interpret
cases involving the ANC members. Subsequently, he became an ANC informer.
The Boers quickly discovered his secret and decided to eliminate him. He got wind
of the plan and avoided the South African police by crossing the border into
Botswana, where he settled among the Barolong of Good Hope and became
headmaster of a local primary school. It is here that he became active in dealing with
freedom fighters and refugees from South Africa.
I was one of the people who were in the forefront in helping escapees and freedom
fighters to cross into or from Botswana into South Africa. At night I used to go to
the border fence to meet the refugees, and at other times I used to go there to show
the freedom fighters where to cross safely into South Africa without being detected
by the Boers. I also kept them for a couple of days in my house, and I helped
identify places where they could bury their weapons while they were still on
surveillance missions. My code name was “Ntloko” and when that name was
mentioned I knew it was a freedom fighter because nobody else knew that name, but
the freedom fighters. On their way back from South Africa, I also accommodated
these freedom fighters for a couple of days before I facilitated their move back to
Zambia. They used to tell me their successes and failures and how ordinary people
hid them from being seen by the Boers.200
(198) Interview with Simon Tladi, (Morwa) June 2007.

(199) Ibid.
(200) Interview with Gladstone Phatudi, (Hebron Good Hope) June 2007.
1994
Kgosi-kgolo ya Bangwaketse, Kgosi Seepapitso IV
The Paramount Chief of the Bangwaketse in the Southern District also played a role.
Being related to ANC legend Dr James S. Moroka through his maternal grandmother,
Kgosi Seepapitso frequented Thaba Nchu in the Orange Free State where Dr Moroka
lived. Moroka was the treasurer of the ANC and for a time its President General.
Seepapitso recalls,
I used to be sent on errands by my uncle, errands of the ANC. I was once sent secretly
to give Nelson Mandela some letters. Mandela was then hiding in the Orange Free
State as he was wanted by the Boers, but that particular errand saved Mandela from
arrest as the letter was warning him to move to another hiding place. Mandela has still
not forgotten Seepapitso and every time he sees me, he thanks me for delivering the
letter that saved his life. I also helped Thabo Mbeki locate his brother, Jama, who was
a lawyer in Selibe-Phikwe.201
The chief described other times when he helped liberation comrades cross the border
into South Africa to undertake their missions. He was supposed to deliver one group
of freedom fighters at the border with South Africa by driving them in his truck
to a village called Rakhuna near the Ramatlabama border post. They got out and
Seepapitso continued to Ramatlabama and entered South Africa. Meanwhile his ex-
passengers sneaked across the border to a place where the chief collected them and
drove on. “I left them at an undisclosed place to do what they had come to do.” The
truck he used to pass through the immigration point was carrying hidden weapons
and grenades, along with letters for delivery in South Africa.202
Kgosi Tlhophane Botshake

Karakubis kgosi Tlhopane Botshake accommodated and transported Namibian
freedom fighters to safe places such as Tsootsha and Ghanzi. Karakubis was a
receiving point, but only 70 km from the Namibian border. All strangers in the village
were expected to report to him. He questioned them to determine whether they were
refugees or freedom fighters, before sending them to the police station at Tsootsha.
Transport was scarce then, and the chief often used his own vehicle to transport them
inland. In doing so, he endured immense personal sacrifices including endangering
his own life. South West African authorities knew him to be a freedom fighter conduit
and made him a prime target, particularly when he considered crossing the border
to visit his Namibian relatives. But black Namibian security officers alerted him to
his imminent arrest should he cross the border.203 Subsequently, some of his people
turned their backs on him and accused him of being a Namibian, but investigations
proved otherwise, and he continued assisting refugees and freedom fighters. Along
with other Batswana, he dedicated his life to assisting those who were oppressed by
the neighbouring settler regimes.
(201) Interview with Seepapitso IV, (Gaborone) February 2008.

(202) Ibid.
(203) Interview with Tlhopane Botshake, (Karakubis) October 2008.
Gaditshwane Mmutla
A former policeman, resident of Ngamiland, and member of the Botswana
Independence Party (BIP), Mmutla assisted SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma when he
entered the North West District. But the story Mmutla remembers most vividly is that
of a young man from Mozambique destined for training in the north, who sought
his assistance. The young man was in poor health and fatigued from extensive
travel when he reached Maun. He had been advised that the easiest way to the north
was through Botswana. He had come via Swaziland and South Africa, though how
he reached Maun was something of a mystery.
Mmutla helped the young man by transporting him from Maun to Francistown, a
journey that in those days took five or six days by lorry on a gravel road. A driver
was identified to drive the young man at night. Mmutla used the good offices of
his party to transport him, process his transit papers, and gain accommodation in
Francistown.204
Lopang Kadimo
Lopang Kadimo of the Chobe area witnessed freedom fighters from Rhodesia
coming over to the Botswana side with frequent regularity. They visited such
villages as Pandamatenga and Lesoma, pretending they were visiting Amandebele
and Vhananzwa relatives. He recalled the skirmishes that often took place between
freedom fighters and the Rhodesian security forces. At one time guerrillas at a
camp near the Kazungula ferry exchanged fierce fire with the white Rhodesians,
who completely routed the camp.205 The exchange spread panic among the
peasants as bullets flew over their homesteads and explosives went off close by.
Lopang recalled an incident when the Rhodesian security forces crossed through
Kazungula at night and threatened villagers with torture or death unless they revealed
the freedom fighters’ whereabouts. The villagers, who the Rhodesian security
forces thought were assisting freedom fighters, were killed. In the small village of
Sebuyo, Smith’s soldiers shot several of the inhabitants to death; most notable among
the dead was Chibariso. The latter was an innocent person carrying an ordinary
hunting gun and mistaken for a freedom fighter.206
Kesegofetse Morake
Mr Morake, a farmer and a resident of Palapye (Topisi), is a retired livestock inspector
who used to work in the Kasane-Nata areas during the liberation struggle days. In the
course of his duties he met freedom fighters who often looked hungry and somewhat
desperate. He shared with them whatever he had. He also helped them with transport
and carried their equipment. In the course of time, they shared their experiences with
him. Mr Morake had this to say about the freedom fighters he encountered:

(205) Interview with Lobang Kadimo, (Kasane) July 2007.
(206) Ibid.
1994
I gave them transport free of charge from Nata to Maitengwe, from where they made
incursions into Rhodesia. I really felt pity for them and sympathized with their
cause. At times I would spend the night with them at the residence of my cousin
called Mangazha Moremi. He worked at the quarantine in Maitengwe as a fence
foreman. Moremi gave them shelter and food. I met different groups of guerrillas.
They warned me not to tell whoever I met about them. Never tell them you saw
freedom fighters. On several occasions, I met Rhodesian soldiers who asked if I saw
a group of people moving together. I denied ever seeing them. The guerrillas came to
know me and my car. Those I had never met before would tell me they had known
about me from those I had met before. They came to like and trust me. I too liked
them for I knew about their cause.207
By and large, Morake found freedom fighters a likeable lot. All they wanted was
occasional help to carry heavy weapons. He became so close to some freedom
fighters that they revealed to him some details about their incursions inside
Rhodesia.
They used to tell me what they did after reaching Rhodesia. They used to lay land
mines in areas frequented by Rhodesians. They would then return to Botswana
leaving one of them who would later report whether the land mines had worked. On
one occasion, I met some guerrillas who hurriedly departed, warning me about the
possibility of meeting Rhodesians. Indeed, soon I met the Rhodesians who enquired
about the guerrillas. I denied seeing them. Later when I went to Maitengwe from
Kasane I was told there was fighting between Rhodesians and guerrillas, and many
Rhodesian soldiers died. I actually saw the damaged Rhodesian car where the
fighting had taken place.208
The relationship between Morake, his cousin Moremi, and the freedom fighters
became cordial. At Moremi’s place, they were always guaranteed shelter and food.
They regarded Moremi’s place as their place, and planned missions from his house.
Moremi, in turn, provided them with surveillance information.
Victor Kowa
Victor“Two Minutes”Kowa, a Motswana who was educated in South Africa, where
he played soccer in their top clubs, returned to Gaborone in the late 1970s, and
worked for the Eagles Insurance Company, while playing for Centre Chiefs, a
Mochudi soccer club. He became a liberation struggle activist by virtue of the fact
that he had gone to school with some ANC freedom fighters-to-be. He housed
some of the top MK commanders and assisted them on their way to and from South
Africa.
In 1985, during the raid of Gaborone by the South African Defence Force, I was
accommodating a very senior commander of the MK, in fact the highest commander
in the country. He was in charge of a caravan in Mogoditshane, which had all the
weaponry belonging to the MK. When the Boers were planning to attack Gaborone,
this MK commander knew that they were coming as they had spies within the South
African Defence Force. There was also another South African who claimed to be a
(207) Interview with Kesegofetse Morake, (Topisi) November 2008.

(208) Ibid.
refugee and was friends with the commander who was staying with me. He played
golf and apparently was an informer on the South African pay roll. He also knew
about the caravan which had an arms cache belonging to the ANC. He tipped the
SADF which came to eliminate those that were guarding the caravan and took all the
arms away. Before they attacked, the South Africans rehearsed during the day by
driving around and identifying their targets.
The commander tipped all refugees not to be in their houses that night and those
that did not take heed of his advice were killed. The South African newspapers later
showed a picture of another MK commander who was staying with me and described
him as the most highly wanted man by the South African regime. The Botswana
government quickly whisked him away to Lusaka and warned me of the consequences
of harbouring such people. However, I continued to house freedom fighters both on
their way to or from South Africa. They used to tell me of their missions, including the
one of blowing up the oil refinery in South Africa.209
His Excellency Festus Mogae, Former President of Botswana
Former President Festus Mogae (1998-2008) was serving in the Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning in the early years of the struggle, rising to
Permanent Secretary in 1975. Thereafter he served as president of the Bank of
Botswana (1980- 1982) and Permanent Secretary to President Quett Masire (1982-
1989). Here are the views of this top government insider concerning the liberation
struggle:
In the earlier days, the liberation movements such as the ANC wanted us to allow their
freedom fighters to transit through Botswana to attack South Africa. We constantly
reminded them of our policy of not allowing attacks to be launched from our country,
pointing out that if that were to be allowed, then both we and the ANC cadres would
be wiped out. After the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique,
the ANC renewed the request to open up Botswana for guerrillas to transit to South
Africa. We refused, explaining our policy as we had done before. We then quietly
told the ANC that Botswana was a huge country and that we would not be looking
for them. They had the responsibility to avoid being seen by us. In other words they
could pass through Botswana, but avoid being seen and arrested.
Despite our vulnerable position, we supported the struggle. We tried not to give
South Africa a pretext to attack us. We explained to our African colleagues why we
could not open up the country for freedom fighters. Eventually they understood our
position. The relations with the liberation movements were good.Whenever there were
differences, we discussed them amicably. Our security people worked closely with
the ANC security, exchanging information on matters of mutual interest. Oliver
Tambo and Thabo Mbeki visited us periodically to exchange views on matters of
mutual interest. We told them what we were able to do and what we were unable to
do in the liberation struggle. On the whole, they appreciated our position. There were
those who argued we should establish bases for liberation movements. We said to do
so would be to open both the freedom fighters and Botswana to attacks. We would be
sitting ducks.
(209) Interview with Victor Kowa, (Gaborone) February 2007.

1994
If freedom fighters were caught in Botswana, they would be arrested, put on trial,
sentenced, and then sent back to Zambia and Tanzania. They did not serve their
sentences because we supported the struggle. The arrests and trials were meant to
demonstrate to South Africa that we did not allow attacks on our neighbours from our
country.210
The foregoing testimonies demonstrate how some Botswana citizens took close
interest in the liberation struggle, some risking their lives by working closely with
and aiding freedom fighters. Their punishment by the settler regimes could be brutal,
their residences and cars bombed, while some risked abduction if found to have
collaborated with the freedom fighters or refugees. The citizens of Botswana took
these risks because they supported the cause pursued by their kith and kin, as well
as by complete strangers, bringing about an end to oppression in the countries that
surrounded them. They were acutely aware of the fact that, although they lived in
an independent country that respected its laws, they could not be entirely free for as
long as their brothers and sisters continued to live under oppression. Moreover, their
efforts were complimented by the actions of their government, which, although it
forbade military operations within its borders, tacitly supported the struggle.
Up to this point, the focus of Botswana’s role in the liberation struggle has
emphasized the relationship between the government and its citizens on the one
hand, and freedom fighters and refugees on the other. Yet, freedom fighters
operating clandestinely in the different parts of Botswana did not act in isolation.
Their organisations, with headquarters operating in exile in Zambia and other
countries, depended on Botswana’s cooperation to carry out their objectives, and so
it is appropriate to turn to the relationship between liberation movements and the
Government of Botswana, to appreciate this additional level of support that
Botswana provided.
The Role of the Botswana Government

Government Relations with Liberation Movements
Members of literally all the liberation movements of southern Africa came to
or passed through Botswana. Apart from Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana
was the only independent country in the tip of southern Africa. Whether these
organisations originated in South Africa (ANC, PAC, BCM, SASO, AZAPO, UM,
SAYRCO), Zimbabwe (ZANU, ZAPU, UANC), Namibia (SWAPO, SWANU,
CANU),
Mozambique (FRELIMO), or Angola (MPLA, UNITA, FNLA), at least some of
their members found their way to Botswana. In response, the Botswana
government welcomed all and gave them sanctuary.
The presence of so many liberation movements in Botswana created its own
challenges.Liberation organisations competed with one other,and vied for recognition
(210) Interview with His Excellency Festus Mogae, former President of the Republic of Botswana, (Phakalane,
Gaborone) 5 November, 2008.
from the Botswana government and international organizations such as the OAU and
the United Nations. Each claimed to be the sole and authentic representative of their
country’s people. These movements often differed in their ideologies and strategies,
each arguing that theirs was the sounder, and their representatives inside Botswana
vied for preferential attention.
In 1977, for example, the PAC solicited funds from the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), proposing to build what it termed the “Azania Institute,” to be
located in Gaborone. The PAC claimed they had the backing of Nigeria in this
undertaking. The institution would accept students of all persuasions, Batswana
included. A representative of the PAC, Elias L. Ntloedibe, officially approached the
government on the issue.211 The government declined, arguing that the Institute
would endanger the security and safety of the Batswana, as it would be located on
South Africa’s doorstep and provide an easy target for attack. Further, Botswana
had already taken steps to accommodate South Africans of school-going age in its
own schools.212 Had it materialized, the “Azania Institute” would have given the
PAC a major victory over the ANC.
Sometimes representatives of the liberation movements discredited each other
before the government in a bid to win recognition over the other. Instead Botswana
made every effort to treat them on an equal footing, while urging each movement to
bury its differences with the others and fight for a common goal.213 For instance,
some liberation movements complained that the government favoured the ANC by
forcing refugees to go for military training at ANC camps at the expense of the other
liberation movements. The government response was that, if such were the case,
Botswana would have very few refugees. As Secretary for External Affairs, Charles
Tibone put it in his stinging rebuttal: “The bickering that goes on between the ANC
and other South African movements is an internal South African matter. There is no
reason why Botswana should be dragged into it.”214 Tibone stated that Botswana
was more interested in unity among liberation movements than in divisive
utterances, which were designed to score points. These sentiments were echoed
years later by former civil servant Nathaniel Mmono:
The Botswana government urged the movements to unite regardless of ideology
and fight a common enemy. The differences among liberation movements put the
government of Botswana in a difficult position. Some liberation movements tended to
think of themselves rather than the cause. Other movements even had the temerity to
accuse Botswana of not being supportive enough.215
The Botswana government often found itself in the role of an arbiter. In March 1976,
a serious conflict arose in Francistown between two factions of the United African
(211) BNARS, OP 27 47: L.M. Mpotokwane to the President, 16 February 1977.

(212) Ibid.
(213) Interviews with Seepapitso IV, (Gaborone) February 2008; Pule Motang, (Good Hope) June 2007.
(214) BNARS, OP 27/47: CM Tibone to District Commission, Lobatse, 13 December 1976.
(215) Interviews with Nathaniel Mmono, (Hebron) June 2007; Kenneth Nkhwa, (Gulubane) May 2007;
Lotlamoreng II, (Good Hope) June 2007; and Motlatsi Molapisi, (Francistown) May 2007.
1994
National Council (UANC): Oliver Sawunyama led the Muzorewa faction against
Joshua Nkomo’s faction. On the surface the disagreement appeared to centre on the
payment of utility bills,but underneath it reflected differences in the parties’beliefs
and strategies. Both representatives condemned each other and wrote to the
government for arbitration. Sawunyama accused Nkomo’s faction of failing to pay
telephone and water bills after the latter had moved their office to another building
in town that it had secured through the help of the government. In a strongly
worded letter to Sawunyama’s faction, Mr Lebang Mpotokwane wrote: “I am afraid
your attitude may lead to friction [between your organisations]. But as I once
informed both of you the government will not tolerate any incident involving your
two organizations.”216 Clearly the government was not prepared to support one
faction over the other and thereby undermine the struggle.
In the case of Zimbabwe, the liberation movements were routinely invited to
attend summit meetings of the heads of the Frontline States, which urged that they
cooperate and unite, resulting in the ZANU-ZAPU pact, later to be known as the
Patriotic Front.217 The Muzorewa faction was left out when its proposal for conducting
elections prior to a transitional government met opposition from the Botswana
government. The Botswana government made it clear, however, that its support for
the Patriotic Front did not exclude support of other liberation movements.218
Namibian liberation movements in Botswana also had their share of differences
and competed for recognition from the Botswana government. The situation was
compounded by the fact that the OAU recognized SWAPO, rather than SWANU,
as the authentic movement for representing the Namibian people. Here, Botswana
was obliged as an OAU member to prefer one movement over the other. SWAPO
also campaigned for a unitary state, rather than a fragmented constellation of
states favoured by SWANU, which resembled the Bantustan system installed under
apartheid South Africa.219 Botswana’s position regarding Namibian independence
and its liberation movements was articulated in 1978 by Botswana’s Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, Dr Thomas Tlou, before the UN General
Assembly. Tlou proclaimed “Botswana’s unswerving support for the struggle of the
Namibian people led by SWAPO, their authentic vanguard movement.”220
SWAPO itself did not regard SWANU as a serious liberation movement and
ruled out any possibility of cooperation, much less union. Such was reflected when
SWAPO’s Administrative Secretary Moses Garoeb met Botswana’s representative
Cecil Manyeula in Lusaka. Garoeb made it absolutely clear that the question of
unity
(216) BNARS, OP 26/46: L.M. Mpotokwane to J.D. Richardson, 29 January 1976.

(217) Daily News. “Frontline Heads Boost Nkomo/ Mugabe Pact,” 11 January 1977.
(218) Ibid. “No support for Bishop’s Plans.”
(219) Daily News. “We want a Unitary State of Namibia.” (Botswana Foreign Minister Archibald Mogwe), 3
December 1975.
(220)Daily News. “Our Unswerving Support for the Namibian Struggle.” 14 June 1978.
between SWAPO and SWANU was out.221 SWAPO also ruled out any negotiations
with the South African regime, when SWANU appeared susceptible. SWANU
activists were allegedly more interested in obtaining university education, than in
soiling their hands or risking their lives through guerrilla warfare.222 The Botswana
government tried its best to unite these two, and SWANU denied that it lacked
commitment to the armed struggle. Members of SWAPO and SWANU, after all,
were the same kith and kin fighting for a common cause; unity should far outweigh
the differences between them. In summary, though Botswana supported SWAPO, it
urged it to unite with its counterpart for the sake of the Namibian people and for
the cause of the struggle.
Botswana’s reconciliatory approach was supported by its own citizens. As kgosi
Lotlamoreng II describes it, “The government treated them [liberation movements]
equally and encouraged unity. The goal was liberation and not support for one
movement over the other.” Gladstone Phatudi noted that in spite of conflicts within
and among the liberation movements, the Botswana government acted as an arbiter
and counselled the liberation movements to unite and fight for a common goal.223
Botswana’s support for these movements was costly, in human and monetary
terms, but steadfast and broadly based. Thousands of refugees connected with these
liberation movements poured into Botswana, leaving the Botswana government
with the responsibility of, among others, finding them housing, placing them in
government schools, setting up shelters and camps for their provision and safety,
and finding planes and other means of forwarding freedom fighters to Lusaka and
beyond.224 The government made every effort to involve the liberation movements
locally and to involve other independent African states, in these and other matters.
An open door policy throughout these years gave all members of these organisations
the opportunity to present their views to the government and seek their support.
Perhaps Botswana government’s relationship with the liberation movements is
best reflected in its support for the OAU’s Liberation Committee based in Dar es
Salaam. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Botswana’s former Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, had this to say:
We attended meetings of the Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam. We supported
it not only by attending meetings; we also supported it financially, secretly and
people don’t even realize that not only did we contribute, although we did so after
some time because we were afraid that our contributions would be so public that
South Africa would be annoyed, and we would be harmed, but eventually we paid our
dues.225
To escape the scrutiny of its nemesis, South Africa, the Botswana government
opened a secret account in Addis Ababa. “Something people don’t know,” Legwaila
related,
(221) BNARS, OP 27/46: Cecil I. Manyeula to Secretary of External Affairs (Office of the President), 9 October
1975.
(222) Ibid.
(223) Interviews with Lotlamoreng II, (Good Hope) June 2007; Gladstone Phatudi, (Hebron) June 2007; Legwaila
Joseph Legwaila, (Gaborone) August, 2006.
(224) Interview with Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, (Gaborone) August 2006.
(225) Ibid.
1994
is that we had decided earlier that in lieu of contributing this money directly to the
Liberation Committee, which would leave our contribution public because it was
going to appear in the records of the Liberation Committee, we decided to open an
account in Addis Ababa so that we could use the money in that account to support the
liberation movements.226
By and large the relationship between the liberation movements and the Botswana
government was cordial. After all, some of the leadership of the liberation movements
were former school mates of President Seretse Khama and of some of his cabinet
ministers, while others such as Joshua Nkomo were in school in South Africa at
almost the same time. Oliver Tambo of the ANC and Robert Mugabe ZANU attended
Fort Hare at the same time as President Khama. The leaders of these movements
clearly understood the position of Botswana, and they needed Botswana for their
movements to survive. The relations between the two, therefore, were not as tense
as some might wish to believe, although there were occasions when the government
was called upon to quell tensions among the liberation movements. In spite of
factionalism within the liberation movements, the Botswana government
maintained its position as arbiter and involved all its representatives in southern
African summits as a means of uniting them.227 The Frontline States, whose role is
discussed elsewhere in this chapter, were tireless in making attempts to unify the
movements. It was obvious that the defeat of colonialism needed unity and not
division. The united liberation movements, particularly of Zimbabwe were a result
of the efforts made by Botswana and the Frontline States. Besides dealing with the
liberation movements, the Botswana government also had to deal with acts of
destabilization by the settler regimes.
Botswana and Acts of Destabilization by the Settler Regimes
The liberation struggle in southern Africa was beleaguered by deliberate acts of
destabilization meted out by the oppressive regimes. The settler regimes were bent
on intimidating neighbouring states and frightening them away from harbouring
“terrorists” and refugees. In all sorts of ways—economic, diplomatic, military—
settler regimes perpetrated crimes and assaults on their neighbours without
compunction, and often on the slightest pretext. Among others, Botswana bore the
brunt of these acts of destabilization, often barbaric. Destabilisation was meant to
discourage, if not end, guerrilla activity and make the local populace and their
governments pay a steep price for lending any kind of support to the liberation
struggle. In Botswana, acts of destabilization took the form of cross-border attacks,
bombings, abductions, and assassinations.228
(226) Ibid.
(227) Interview with Samuel Mpuchane, (Gaborone) March 2008. Mr Mpuchane, former Permanent Secretary to
the President, is now a businessman.
(228) Dale, R. “Not Always So Placid a Place: Botswana Under Attack.” African Affairs 86 (1987): pp.73-91; idem.
“The Politics of National Security in Botswana: 1900-1990.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 12.1 (1993):
pp.40-56; Interview with Mr Cedric Bapela, (Gaborone) March 2008. Bapela is a former refugee, liberation
Rhodesian and South African armies took out their wrath regarding Botswana’s
assistance to liberation movements by terrorising peasants in border areas.229 The UN
and other international organisations condemned these acts of aggression, though
Britain and the United States abstained from doing so because of their economic
and other ties to the Rhodesian and South African regimes. In 1977, Vice President
Masire noted that since independence, Rhodesian forces had violated the country’s
sovereignty thirty one times.230 In response, the Botswana government was forced to
divert its somewhat limited resources to invest in the security of its country. In 1977,
the small Police Mobile Unit was supplanted by the small but new Botswana
Defence Force for deployment along the Rhodesia-Botswana border.
Rhodesian refugees in and around villages on the Botswana-Zimbabwean border
wereunderconstantharassmentbythe Rhodesiansecurityforces.Theinfamous Selous
Scouts also kidnapped refugees.231 The Botswana government strongly condemned
the abductions, but they continued.232 Such acts of terror affected innocent citizens
who were often shot and / or abducted by Rhodesian soldiers. Two North East District
residents (Abel Maphane and Jota Bango), for example, were abducted by
Rhodesian intelligence officers.233 Villagers faced difficulties in carrying out their
daily routine along the border. Fields were abandoned for long periods; children and
teachers, alike, feared going to school. Due to the Rhodesian crisis, tourist numbers
in Chobe and Kasane declined drastically and led to retrenchments.234
On numerous occasions, the Rhodesian army crossed into Botswana and staged
attacks on BDF camps and carried out ambushes against the soldiers; the Lesoma
incident being the worst.235 Rhodesians also attacked public places. In
Francistown they bombed the Mophane Night Club, seriously injuring eighteen
women and twenty-four men, two of whom later died. The Rhodesians claimed that
refugees and freedom fighters frequented the place. The Botswana government
condemned it as an act of cowardice and barbarism, while messages of solidarity
and condolences came from all corners of the world.236 Despite widespread
condemnation,Rhodesian attacks increased. Shortly after bombing the Mophane
Night Club, they attacked the BDF
activist, and SASO Chairperson. For South Africa’s regional destabilisation campaign, see J. Hanlon, Beggar Your
Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.
(229) In addition to the many such incidents already cited in this chapter, see in the Daily News: “Gun Fire at
Kazungula,” 25 November 1974; “PMU Returns fire in Kazungula incident,” 16 October 1975; “Rebel Forces
Murder Motswana near Matseloje,” 23 November 1976; “Rhodesian Troops Shoot Woman, “21 January 1977;
“Rhodesian shoot at Batswana,” 21 February 1977.
(230) Daily News. “Mogwe to attend UN debate or Rhodesian Aggression.” 5 January 1977; “UN Resolution
Condemn Smith over Botswana.” 19 January 1977.
(231) Daily News. “Four Rhodesians are Snatched.” 25 March 1974; “Rhodesian Refugee Abducted.” 16 October
1974; “Dube was taken to Rhodesia.” 17 October 1974; “Smith’s Men Abduct Ten Men from Here.” 8 October 1976.
(232) Daily News. “Government Demands Return of Dube from Rhodesia.” 18 October 1974.
(233) Daily News. “Rhodesia Admits Abducting Batswana.” 1 March 1977.
(234) Daily News. “Rhodesian War Evokes Kasane Employment Cut.” 28 March 1977.
(235) See above.
(236) Daily News. “Grenade Blast Toll Now Two.” 10 May 1977; Interview with Motlatsi Molapisi, (Francistown)
May 2007; “Messages of Sorrow Pour into Botswana.” May 1977.
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camp at Kazungula. Some of the Rhodesians turned to banditry, robbing motorists
and shops at gun point.237 The Rhodesians also used letter and parcel bombs to
eliminate refugees and freedom fighters. One of their victims was Botswana’s
ZANU representative, Dick Moyo (Joseph Chikara was his real name). Moyo was
among the few ZANLA members of the ZANU high command who had escaped
detention in Zambia after the death of Herbert Chitepo.238 Another leader
assassinated in this way was ZAPU Vice President J.Z. Moyo, soon after arriving at
his Lusaka office from Geneva in January 1977. The parcel was addressed to him
in handwriting he recognized and sent from someone he knew in Botswana.
Rhodesian Special Branch members celebrated the success of the attack and
boasted that they had listened in on a phone call mentioning the parcel, intercepted
it in the post, and inserted their explosive device.239
Rhodesian forces used all types of intimidation against the villagers near the
Rhodesian border. The villagers of Jackalas No. 2 complained that the Rhodesian
security forces frequently entered the area and audaciously patrolled the border on the
Botswana side.240 Near Matsiloje, in the North East District, they found amusement
in firing over the heads of children fetching water from the river. In August 1975,
the Rhodesian soldiers entered near Bosoli and threatened local Batswana over the
alleged presence of freedom fighters.241 Numerous such acts of intimidation and
threats along the lengthy border were carried out without cessation, because the
border area lacked sufficient soldiers and policemen to superintend it.
South Africa also carried out attacks on Botswana. It did so through the support
of Rhodesian security forces and by launching its own attacks on the southern
part and from South West Africa on Botswana’s northwest. South Africa justified
itself by accusing Botswana of harbouring guerrillas. South African Minister of
Justice, Police, and Prisons James T. Kruger believed that guerrillas trained in
Botswana crossed over into South Africa for subversive activities. The Botswana
government denied these claims, even inviting Kruger to identify the military camps
purported to exist in the country.242 Botswana’s assertions did little to discourage
South Africa. In 1976, reports from Kasane in the Chobe District indicated that six
South African soldiers from Caprivi drove their speedboat in the Chobe River in
violation of Botswana’s territorial waters. Kasane villagers washing laundry at the
river were terrified, and the local District Commissioner described the river violation
as provocative.243 South Africans soon drove their boat again into Botswana
waters,
(237) Daily News. “Armed Rebels Rob US Motorist.” 17 June 1977.

(238) Celliers, J.K. Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia. London: Croom Helm, 1985: See p.203.
(239) Ibid.
(240) BNARS, OP 19/19: M.S. Merafe to Permanent Secretary to the President, 20 August 1975.
(241) BNARS, OP 19/19: S. Hirschfeld to Permanent Secretary to the President, 12 November 1975.
(242) Daily News. “Kruger also Welcome to Investigate Such Bases in Botswana.” 4 October, 1977; Daily News.
“Kruger Asked to Identify Bases in Botswana.” 6 October 1977.
(243) BNARS, OP 21/11/1: A.B. Masalila to Permanent Secretary to the President, 9 July 1976: Interview with
Sasara George, (Gaborone) February 2007. George is the former First Secretary, Botswana High Commission,
Lusaka.
reaching the southern bank of the Chobe River. They disembarked, walked to the
Chobe Safari Lodge, sat at the cocktail bar, and started taking photographs of the
customers. Some Botswana citizen customers shouted and threw empty beer cans at
them and told them to go away.244
People living in Botswana and travelling in South Africa faced all sorts of insults
and harassment. University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (UBLS) student
Lithebe Maine and three of his friends (also UBLS students) were stopped by South
African police near Zeerust.When searching their luggage, the police found a book
by Kwame Nkrumah. It belonged to Victor Mtetwa, a Swati, who was a political
science major.245 Maine and his friends were taken to an isolated police station,
interrogated, and told that Nkrumah’s book was banned in South Africa. They were
assaulted, asked for information about refugees, and threatened to be shot if they did
not give information about Joe Matthews in Gaborone, Jama Mbeki, a private
attorney in Selebi-Phikwe, and the “terrorist” activities of the South African Student
Organization (SASO). The police threatened to shoot them if they did not
cooperate. They pressured Maine to agree to work for the South Africans by
providing information about refugees. When he refused, he was beaten.246
South African soldiers routinely engaged in acts of intimidation that bordered
on barbarism. In 1977, six South African soldiers crossed the Limpopo River and
entered the Tuli Block. At the farm of a Mr Koetzee, who was absent, they came
upon an old man, his wife, and their pregnant daughter. The man and his wife were
Koetzee’s Batswana farm workers. Three of the soldiers assaulted the old man, then
dragged his wife to the river, and took turns raping her.247 They then left and crossed
the river back to South Africa. Following Botswana’s appeal, the culprits were later
court-marshalled, but given a very light sentence.
South Africa was also involved in abductions and assassinations. On 13 June
1979, South African soldiers kidnapped two Batswana at Ramotlabaki in the
Kgatleng District at gunpoint and forced them back into South Africa. The two,
Molokonye Rapelana and Mokoke Motlhaje, had been herding cattle near the
border inside Botswana.248 The Botswana government intervened in order to get
them released. Another kidnap victim was Joseph Sephoka. In April 1982, this
Botswana citizen was fishing in the Limpopo River at Pontdrif with his wife,
Margaret Tlou Kelapile, and daughter, Alita Sephoka. Ms. Sephoka and her father
were employees at the Tuli Lodge. Three white South Africans approached
Sephoka, grabbed him, and dragged him across the river into South Africa. The
incident was reported to the police, who approached their South African
counterparts at Pontdrif, but the South Africans denied knowledge of Joseph
Sephoka’s whereabouts. Five days later, Joseph
(244) Ibid.
(245) BNARS, OP 19/19: Simon Hirschfeld to Permanent Secretary to the President, Easter 1976.
(246) Ibid.
(247) BNARS, OP 28/13: Statement by Sergeant Ramodiwa, October 1977.
(248) BNARS, OP 28/13: I.I. Zebe to Permanent Secretary to the President, 19 June 1979.
1994
was found at the Limpopo camp. He confirmed that he had been forcibly abducted
from Botswana to South Africa where he had been tortured, assaulted, shocked with
electric gadgets, and pressured to join the South African army as an informer.249
Politically active South African refugees faced even greater dangers. The South
Africans plotted to silence the most outspoken by dealing them gruesome fates.
Abram Onkgopotse Tiro, former student of Turfloop University (University of
the North) and president of its Student Representative Council (SRC), escaped to
Gaborone after he learned that the South African police wanted to arrest him. Tiro
had given a stinging speech at a Turfloop graduation, lambasting apartheid and its
policies, and calling on the graduating students to become the vanguards of the
liberation. In Botswana, Tiro taught at St. Josephs, a Catholic secondary school at
Kgale Siding, five miles south of Gaborone. Here Tiro received a parcel purporting
to have been mailed from Geneva, Switzerland. The parcel contained a bomb, which
killed Tiro instantly when he opened it. Many bombings, in letters, cars, and houses,
claimed the lives of Botswana and South African citizens alike.
Alongside Rhodesia’s Lesoma massacre stands South Africa’s most outrageous
attack on Botswana; its 1985 raid on Gaborone targeting South African refugees.
On the night of June 14 1985, a well coordinated South African commando unit
crossed the border, entered Gaborone, and bombed houses that were at the time or
had previously been occupied by South African refugees. A total of twelve South
African refugees and two Batswana were killed.250 Botswana’s reaction to the
attack was to appeal to the international community to condemn South Africa,
reminding the world that it had no capability to retaliate. The Minister of External
Affairs, Dr Gaositwe Chiepe, accused South Africa of violating Botswana territory
and killing Batswana civilians. In turn, South African Foreign Minister Roelof
Frederik “Pik” Botha accused Botswana of harbouring ANC guerrillas and
condemned it for doing nothing to stop these activities. Both the local and
international public reactions were anti-South African.
At the memorial service for those who died in the raid, Botswana’s voice was
principled and not submissive, contrary to South Africa’s expectations. Botswana
made it clear that no amount of violence meted out to the oppressed people in South
Africa or to its neighbours for that matter, would extinguish the quest for freedom.
South Africa had declared war on its own people and was fighting a losing battle. It
would crumble, as had Rhodesia, and other oppressive regimes in the region and in
the continent. In the words of former President Quett Masire,“We tried to make sure
(249) BNARS, OP 28/13: Commissioner of Police to Permanent Secretary to the President, 30 April 1985.
(250) Those killed included Mr Cecil George Pahle, Mrs Lindie Pahle, Mr Thamsanqa (Thami) Harry Mnyele, Mr
Ahmed Mohammed Geer, Mrs Eunice Patricia Kobole, Mr Michael Frank Hamlyn, Mr Bassic Amos Zondi, Mr
Themba Machobane, and Mr Dick Mitsweni. The twelve included eight South Africans, two Batswana, one Dutch
national, and a six-year-old Mosotho boy. The details of the raid and the names of all those killed can be found in
the Daily News, 21 June 1985.
there was an international uproar so that South Africa would know that if they did
worse to us the uproar would be much greater.”251
South Africa continued with its attacks on Botswana, nevertheless. In the early
morningof 19 May 1986,SouthAfricalaunchedanotherattackonthe Gaboronesuburb
of Mogoditshane, where the BDF headquarters is located. Using helicopter gunships
and fighter jets, they shot at private houses, which they claimed accommodated ANC
refugees and freedom fighters. They also fired at the BDF barracks, scattered anti-
ANC leaflets, and then flew back to South Africa. One civilian died and several
others were injured.252
Another attack came on 11 December 1987. In this night raid, several houses in
Gaborone and its precincts were bombed, and four innocent people were killed in
the process. South Africa’s acts were meant to thwart what it perceived as
communist operations on its door step, and were also an attempt to get Botswana to
cower. Yet this raid, as with all the others, elicited the opposite reaction and made
South Africa increasingly unpopular in the world. And, just as important, South
Africa’s policy of intimidation and bullying failed to diminish the determination of
the liberation movements and its supporters all over Botswana and elsewhere, or
even to end protests in South Africa itself.
Botswana and the Frontline States (FLS)
In the mid 1960s, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and Tanzanian President
Julius Nyerere met regularly to exchange views and devise strategies for addressing
issues affecting the region. Both of their countries were feeling the effects of
increasing numbers of refugees from South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola,
Mozambique, and South West Africa. They wanted to harmonise their approach to
the refugee question and come up with measures for dealing with southern Africa’s
oppressive minority regimes. Through Kaunda’s efforts, President Seretse Khama
participated in these discussions and soon became an indispensable partner. After
joining the FLS in 1974, Khama became a moderating voice when differences of
opinion threatened to frustrate discussions or cause a stalemate.253
Soon after Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in 1974, they
too joined the FLS, and, following de-colonisation and the end of apartheid, so
did Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990), and South Africa (1994). Lesotho, Malawi,
and Swaziland did not become members of the FLS. Malawi was excluded because
of its close and cordial relations with apartheid South Africa, with whom Malawi
maintained full diplomatic relations. Lesotho and Swaziland were excluded for two
reasons. First, Kaunda and Nyerere did not trust their prime ministers. Second, their
(251) Masire. Very Brave or Very Foolish?: See pp.270-271.

(252) Dale, R. Botswana’s Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa: See pp.56-59.
1994
geographical position would make them vulnerable to South African searches for
vital documents after FLS meetings.254
Initially some misgivings arose as to Khama’s FLS participation. Some regarded
him as a conservative with little or nothing in common ideologically with the more
radical and revolutionary Kaunda and Nyerere. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, former
Botswana Ambassador to the United Nations and one time Senior Private Secretary
and Political Assistant to Sir Seretse Khama, put it succinctly:
Well, you know, a lot of people have asked how Botswana became a member of the
Frontline States.I think the reason why they are asking is because,if you look at
President Kaunda and President Nyerere – the two who started the Frontline States
fraternity – I think you realise that there was nothing in common ideologically,
between them, and Seretse Khama. Therefore, no one expected Seretse Khama to be
welcomed to that fraternity. Additionally, Seretse Khama was geographically too close
to South Africa. In other words, what we mean by the Frontline States is their
proximity to South Africa, and therefore I am sure a person like President Nyerere
would have thought that if Seretse Khama joined the Frontline States, that was
tantamount to saying to South Africa, “You can go to hell. I am going to join the
very same people who have been agitating against apartheid.255
But Kaunda and Nyerere fully welcomed Seretse into their group. As Legwaila
explained, “It turned out that, according to Nyerere, that was indeed a Godsend
because you had somebody [Seretse] who became a moderating influence in the
Frontline States fraternity.”256
Despite different ideological orientations, the FLS presidents remained united
throughout the turbulent period of the armed struggle. They managed to do this
because the“ideology” they did share, their guiding principle as it were, was
“freedom” for southern Africa. Moreover, their meetings were characterised by a
great sense of humour, which drew them much closer together. Khama’s “personal
qualities of patience and good humour,” as Legwaila listed them, “discretion when
required, and honest talking when needed, were to be put to the test in keeping the
frontline brotherhood together.” Of course, the brilliance and sharp wit of FLS
chairman
Mwalimu Nyerere brought exceptional guidance to these deliberations as well.
For example, Khama played up the humour of his being a “wicked capitalist”
and a soft-hearted liberal amongst avowed socialists of a different ilk. Khama
arrived in a small plane to attend one of their meetings, and, after the pilot parked it
alongside the hulking presidential aircraft, Khama quipped:“I do enjoy meeting all
you socialists. By the way, I notice that I am the only one to come in a hired plane.”
He then distributed oranges from his Seleka farm among them, saying “Look what
this capitalist has brought you all, this time.” When Seretse was addressed in jest as
“chief,” as he often
(254) Ibid.
(256) Ibid.
was because of his royal birth, Khama was apt to counter by drawing attention to
Nyerere’s lesser known aristocratic origins by addressing him as “headman.”257
Similarly, Kaunda teased Khama over his fondness for phane (a type of silk-
worm harvested from Mophane trees in northern Botswana; when dried, regarded
as a local delicacy). Khama often stuffed his pockets with phane, occasionally
picking one at a time to chew as a snack. On occasion when Khama dug into his
pockets,
Kaunda was apt to shout “Seretse, have you dropped your worms?” or “Seretse,
pick up your worms!” Such teasing in a good humoured manner helped to keep
these presidential meetings on an even keel, important at times when considerable
stress and fatigue might otherwise have prompted bickering.258 Kaunda and
Khama had been friends for over a decade, and once they came to know Khama,
Nyerere and Machel became his close friends, too, in spite of their initial wariness
of him because of their ideological orientation.259
Of course, differences among the FLS presidents were bound to arise over
certain issues, but they agreed to differ or reconcile their differences. For example,
on the question of Angola, Kaunda and Khama did not see eye to eye with Machel
and Nyerere. When the MPLA declared itself the government of an independent
People’s Republic of Angola on 11 November 1975, the other liberation
movements, FNLA and UNITA, did not accept it. Kaunda, who had just developed
fairly good relations with UNITA, insisted that there should be a government of
national unity until elections could be held. Seretse supported Kaunda at an OAU
special meeting in Addis Ababa in January 1976. Machel and Nyerere supported
immediate recognition of the MPLA. Khama held little truck with the essentially
undemocratic notion that any party could be declared the“sole and
authentic”representative of an entire people without elections. However, South
Africa’s invasion of Angola in support of UNITA complicated matters. On the
university campuses in Botswana and Zambia, students demonstrated in support of
the MPLA and against the South African invasion. Khama and Kaunda eventually
recognised the MPLA government.260
The main tasks before the Frontline States were to devise strategies for dealing
with white racist regimes and to assist those movements struggling to liberate their
countries. Movement leaders were invited to FLS meetings so that all could review
progress of the struggle or otherwise and tender advice as necessary. The Frontline
States worked assiduously to unite liberation movements so that they could mount
effective struggles against their oppressors. They also provided them with
diplomatic and material support.
On the diplomatic front, FLS governments worked in concert to persuade Great
Britain, the United States of America, and European countries to support the
(257) Parsons, N. et al. Seretse Khama 1921-1980. Gaborone: The Botswana Society/Macmillan BOLESWA, 1995:
See p.319; Interview with Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, (Gaborone) August 2006.
(258) Ibid.
(259) Parsons. Seretse Khama. See pp.319-320; Interview with Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, (Gaborone) August 2006.
(260) Parsons. Seretse Khama: See p.325.
1994
oppressed people of southern Africa. They kept up their diplomatic campaign through
representations in such fora as the UN, the Commonwealth, and many others. One-
time Permanent Secretary for External Affairs Lebang Mpotokwane captures in his
testimony the role played by the FLS:
The Frontline States attended to the struggle in southern Africa. The Frontline States
were facing the problems of white minority racist regimes more than other countries.
There was a need for these countries to work together in order to find a solution.
The countries exchanged views about what needed to be done. They discussed ways
of influencing policy by other countries and international organizations against the
minority ruled white racist states. The Frontline States worked in concert to influence
major powers such as Britain, the United States, and other European countries. They
also tried to unify liberation movements so that they would be stronger. Botswana’s
role in the FLS was that she agreed with other countries, but she always made it very
clear what she could afford. There were certain things that other Frontline States could
afford in dealing with Rhodesia and South Africa that Botswana could not.
Botswana was very realistic in her policy towards the powerful settler states and the
other Frontline States understood our position. In principle, Botswana agreed with the
other member states.261
At the first FLS meeting Khama attended in 1974 in Lusaka, the three presidents
(Khama, Kaunda, and Nyerere) persuaded the Zimbabwean parties to unite as the
United African National Council (UANC), headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa.
Joseph Legwaila describes what took place:
It was a dramatic meeting, in the sense that Mwalimu [Nyerere] had to send his Private
Secretary, accompanied by Mark Chona, the Special Assistant to President Kaunda,
to go to Salisbury to liberate, for a very short period of time, the leaders of
ZANU
– to make sure that they could attend the meeting in Lusaka, and [Joshua] Nkomo
had to be brought from the detention camp, to attend that meeting. Then, of course,
Mwalimu discovered that what was brought from Salisbury was [Robert] Mugabe,
instead of [Ndabaningi] Sithole. President Nyerere believed that the leader of ZANU
was Ndabaningi Sithole, not Robert Mugabe. The two – that is, the Private Secretary
to President Nyerere and the Special Assistant to President Kaunda, Mark Chona – had
to go back to bring Sithole, and Sithole was brought during the night. Finally, the
parties agreed to unite under Bishop [Abel] Muzorewa.
The idea was that they would unite and go back to Salisbury to organise a Congress
to elect a leader to replace Muzorewa. Of course, if they elected Muzorewa, that
would have been their prerogative. And, unfortunately, that Congress never took
place, because some of the people who had gone to Lusaka, instead of staying in
Salisbury, some like Robert Mugabe, for instance, took off for the border with
Mozambique and went into Mozambique, to prosecute the liberation struggle from
Mozambique.262
The Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, tried to buy off Nkomo by holding
separate talks with him in 1975, while Muzorewa’s UANC began splitting into
(261) Interviews with Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, (Gaborone) August 2006; Lebang Mpotokwane, (Gaborone)
August 2006; Gaositwe K.T. Chiepe, (Gaborone) August 2006; Archibald Mogwe, (Gaborone) September 2006.
factions. When Nkomo came to brief Seretse about the talks with Smith, Seretse
disapproved of this approach as it would weaken the struggle. In March 1976,
Nkomo abandoned the talks when Smith asserted that white power would have to be
guaranteed in any settlement.
Attempts to solve the Rhodesian problem through negotiations collapsed when
the liberation movements failed to unite, and Ian Smith remained recalcitrant,
declaring that there would be no majority rule in Rhodesia during his life time. This
caused Khama to state, when asked if it was worthwhile continuing the dialogue with
Smith, that:
The British tried a long time ago – “Tiger” and “Fearless”, “the Pearce
Commission” and what have you. Nkomo tried – I do not think Smith has ever
budged from his position. He has said “No” to majority rule in his life time, in a
thousand years. So it doesn’t matter how patient you are, how much goodwill you
have, nor how much you shun bloodshed, you must at some stage get fed up.263
In April 1976, American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger came to the region
to consult with the FLS and the white minority governments about a negotiated
settlement. Kissinger’s reason for sudden concern in southern Africa was his fear for
Western interests following the arrival of Cuban troops in Angola and the inflow of
Soviet arms there that began in March 1976. Archie Mogwe, Khama’s indefatigable
Minister for External Affairs, dismissed Kissinger’s mission as “Much Ado About
Nothing.” Kissinger’s failure to consult with the liberation movements ensured the
demise of his mission.264
The failure of the liberation movements to implement what was agreed to in
Lusaka, namely to form a united front, did not discourage the FLS from pressing
the Zimbabwean parties to unite. Legwaila described how they were preoccupied
for days with this issue. In the end, FLS efforts paid off when Nkomo’s ZAPU and
Mugabe’s ZANU formed what became the Patriotic Front and prosecuted the struggle
more effectively (The parties retained their original names and became ZANU-PF
and ZAPU-PF.). In February 1976, the FLS met at Quelimane in Mozambique and
threw unqualified support behind the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front in resuming the
armed struggle against the Smith regime. The presidents were pleased about the
PF’s formation, hoping it might avoid the fractiousness that afflicted relations
among the Angolan liberation movements.265
The FLSpersuaded Britaintoholdtalkswiththe Zimbabweanliberationmovements
to reach agreement on the independence of Zimbabwe. Smith and PF leaders
attended the talks at Lancaster House in London, where Botswana was represented by
Archibald Mogwe and Joseph Legwaila. The Lancaster House Agreement, which
was
(263) Parsons et al. Seretse Khama. See p.327.

(264) Ibid, See pp.327-28; Masire, Very Brave or Very Foolish?: See p.283; Interview with Legwaila Joseph
Legwaila, (Gaborone) August 2006.
(265) Masire. Very Brave or Very Foolish?: See p. 283; Interview with Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, (Gaborone)
August 2006.
1994
concluded on 21 December 1979, led to a constitution, elections, and independence
in 1980.266 Commenting on this development, Seretse Khama said that peace in
Rhodesia also meant peace for Botswana. “It will also contribute to the momentum
towards peace in the rest of Southern Africa.”267 On 28 December 1979, the Office
of the President announced that with immediate effect the country would lift
sanctions against Rhodesia in the spirit of the Agreement.268 In January 1980, the
first batch of Zimbabwean refugees were repatriated to return home and register for
the country’s first ever truly democratic elections in which all racial groups
participated. The government made available twenty-three of its five-ton and
twelve-ton trucks to transport refugees to Zimbabwe.269 At Plumtree in Rhodesia,
thirty-four Batswana truck drivers were arrested by the local authorities, but
released after a few days following a demand from the Botswana government.270
This was seen as an attempt by the Rhodesian government to deprive the refugees of
the opportunity to register for the election, and thereby deny victory to the Patriotic
Front. The elections were held and won by ZANU-PF of Robert Mugabe who
assumed power in an independent Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980. Three months later,
Seretse Khama died of cancer, his passing away representing a great loss to
Botswana, while seeming to provide finality to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.
Apartfrom Zimbabwe,the FLSweredeeplyinvolvedinbringingabouttheliberation
of Namibia and ending apartheid in South Africa. At their meetings, they invited Sam
Nujoma, Oliver Tambo, and others to discuss the situation in their countries. They
worked assiduously in the United Nations and elsewhere to drum up support for the
SWAPO and the ANC. In Namibia’s case, competing liberation movements was
much less of a problem than it had been for Zimbabwe. SWAPO was the dominant
liberation movement. The FLS did not think much of the Democratic Turnhalle
Alliance (DTA) backed by the South African government, and SWANU which,
though it had a few backers in Botswana, was not an effective liberation movement.
Botswana released its Ambassador to the United Nations, Joseph Legwaila, to be
the Deputy to the Special Representative of the UN in Namibia, Marti Atisaari of
Finland (the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize winner). Legwaila was also dispatched to South
Africa to observe the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and
Multi Party Negotiation Process talks at Kempton Park, which resulted in the
emergence of a democratic South Africa in 1994.
Botswana and the Formation of SADC
The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), formed in
1980, and renamed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992,
(266) Ibid.
(267) Daily News. 28 December 1979.
(268) Daily News. 28 December 1979.
(269) Daily News. 18 January 1980; 23 January 1980.
(270) Daily News. 28 January 1980.
was a creation of the Frontline States. The Commonwealth Secretariat approached

the FLS through Seretse Khama with this idea of forming an economic grouping as
a wing of the FLS. Khama’s envoy Joseph Legwaila later recalled SADCC’s
genesis:
I was sent to Dar es Salaam to broach this idea to President Mwalimu [Julius] Nyerere,
and I went there with the Minister of External Affairs, Mr [Archibald] Mogwe; and
President Nyerere said well, since he was the Chairman of the Frontline States, and
in any case, Tanzania was not a contiguous country to South Africa; and then, of
course, the other reason he gave was that Seretse Khama, so far as the Western world
is concerned, was more popular than he was. Thus when Seretse Khama goes out to
ask for assistance on behalf of an economic wing of the Frontline States, the
international community would be more forthcoming than if he – Mwalimu– were to
go there and ask for assistance. And, therefore, we came back and informed our
President, who agreed to initiate what today we call SADC, and again it was I, and
Minister Mogwe, who went around selling the idea to all the Presidents of the
Frontline States. And, therefore, SADC is a child of the Frontline States.
This is because of the solidarity that the Frontline States felt, and that is why it
was easy for them to agree to an economic wing of the Frontline States. Because
even that economic wing of the Frontline States could have been problematic
because there are those who felt that we should also invite the Soviet Union, for
instance; the GDR, and knowing Botswana, we thought that those would be invited
simply to occupy space, because they were not known to give aid, I mean financial
aid. All they used to give were weapons for the liberation struggle.
And then, of course, eventually we said, “Well, let’s invite whoever needs to be
invited,” and we agreed that we invite the East and the West to participate in the first
meeting of SADC. But I think the long and short of the story is that SADC is a child
of the solidarity that we, in the Frontline States, felt towards each other.271
In his memoirs, Sir Ketumile Masire states that SADCC was almost high-jacked
by Professor Adebayo Adedeji of Nigeria, who was working at the Economic
Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa. At that time he was advising Zambia on
some economic matters. Adedeji came up with the idea of a Preferential Trade Area
(PTA) for Eastern and Southern Africa. Professor Adedeji drafted a PTA constitution,
which he intended to table at SADCC’s first meeting in Arusha, Tanzania. At the
same time, a SADCC draft constitution was also drawn up with the assistance of
the Commonwealth Secretariat.272
Before the Arusha meeting, when SADCC was formally launched in Lusaka in
April 1980, members faced the question of what to do with the PTA draft
constitution. In other words, which document would be presented to the heads of
state at the Arusha summit? Masire, who chaired the preparatory meeting of
ministers, handled the two documents diplomatically. “I began the meeting,” he
recounts, “by saying that we had two drafts, and since this was a SADCC meeting
we would start with the SADCC draft and add whatever was appropriate from
Professor Adedeji’s draft. That was

1994
how we proceeded.”273 The draft SADCC constitution was adopted, and President
Seretse Khama was elected SADCC founding Chairman, a position that Botswana
held for many years. The SADCC headquarters were established in Gaborone,
where Botswana officials (principally Lebang Mpotokwane and Kenneth Matambo)
did the preparatory work until an Executive Secretary was appointed.
While Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland were excluded from the Frontline States
group, at Botswana’s insistence, they were invited into SADCC. As Masire put it,
“we felt that if we were to have regional cooperation for economic development, it
was logical to include all the countries in the region.”274 Khama sent Masire to invite
these countries to join SADCC, and they agreed. Other states—the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Seychelles, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa—
were admitted later. In his memoir, Masire noted Botswana’s expectations for
SADCC:
Some thought SADCC was a way of opposing South Africa, but it was more a case
of protecting ourselves from South Africa. We could see a role of SADCC even
beyond a new political dispensation in South Africa… It was not just a question of
dealing with South Africa as a pariah. We also needed to coordinate development in
the region even after apartheid. It was a matter often discussed by Seretse and
Nyerere.275
In summary, the main aims of SADCC were:
• to reduce economic dependence on South Africa in particular, but also on other
countries outside the SADCC area;
• to promote trade between SADCC countries, and thus foster regional integration;
• to unite SADCC countries in getting foreign aid for development projects, and
• to develop joint projects that would benefit SADCC countries.276
On 17 August 1992 at their meeting in Windhoek, SADCC heads of state signed
the treaty that created the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to
replace the SADCC. This move reflected the maturity of the organisation and its
strengthened commitment to regional cooperation. Some of the objectives of
SADC are:
• achieve development and economic growth, reduce poverty and improve the
quality of life of the people of Southern Africa;
• develop common political values, systems and institutions;
• promote and defend peace and security;
• promote development, through collective self-reliance and interdependence of
member states;
• promote productive employment and use of the resources of the region;
• protect the environment; and
• promote links among the people of the region.277
(273) Masire. Very Brave or Very Foolish?: See p.277.

(274) Ibid.
(275) Ibid.
(276) Tlou, T. and A. Campbell. History of Botswana: See p.386.
(277) Ibid. See p.388.
Perhaps SADC’s greatest achievement has been to bring together the states in the
region to discuss matters of mutual interest. By jointly planning their development,
SADC has created a sense of togetherness. Gradually the people of the region
are realising that they share a common history, destiny, and goals, while they face
similar problems. Their future binds them together as does their joint advantage in
solving problems through cooperation and self-reliance. In that spirit, Botswana has
participated, together with other SADC countries in finding solutions to crises in
Lesotho, Mozambique, Somalia, and now more recently in Darfur and Zimbabwe.
Other activities aimed at enhancing regional integration include promoting trade
among the SADC countries and creating cultural and academic exchanges. Clearly
Botswana benefits from such activities. Achieving full regional integration is
necessarily a slow process that depends on, among other factors, the political will
of SADC member states and the political and economic stability of the region.
Nevertheless, a commendable beginning has been made towards viable regional
integration. It is worth noting that there is overwhelming support for regional
integration on the part of those interviewed who are knowledgeable about SADC
affairs.
Conclusion
Contrary to views held by some, the information provided by oral testimonies, the
main source for this study, supplemented by documentary evidence, conclusively
demonstrates that Botswana played a significant role in the liberation struggles in
southern Africa. Despite its precarious geopolitical situation arising from its being
almost entirely surrounded by racist white minority regimes, it rendered assistance,
to the best of its ability, to those fleeing oppression, by offering them a safe haven
as refugees, and to those who wished to join liberation movements, by facilitating
their passage to the north to such countries as Zambia and Tanzania.
Assistance, both covert and overt, that enabled the struggle to be executed
purposefully, was tendered to the liberation movements. Despite its limited resources
and heavy economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, Botswana maintained a
principled stance against racial discrimination and exploitation of the black majority
in white-minority-ruled countries.
Botswana paid a heavy price in the process as the racist white minority regimes
launched attacks against it and actively sought its destabilisation. However, the
country continued its support for the liberation cause to the end.
Together with other Frontline States, Botswana played a major role in assisting the
liberation movements to prosecute the struggle to its logical conclusion. The Frontline
States tendered advice to the liberation movements, and mobilised material, political,
diplomatic, and other forms of support to the liberation movements.
1994
Abbreviations
ANC: African National Congress (South Africa)
AZAPO: Azanian People’s Organisation
BCR: Botswana Council for Refugees
BCM: Black Consciousness Movement (South
Africa) BCW: Botswana Council of Women
BDF: Botswana Defence Force
BDP: Bechuanaland (later Botswana) Democratic Party
BIP: Botswana Independence Party
BNARS: Botswana National Archives and Records
Services BNF: Botswana National Front
BPFP: Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party
BPP: Bechuanaland (later Botswana) People’s
Party CANU: Caprivi African National Union (Namibia)
CODESA: Convention for a Democratic South Africa
DTA: Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (Namibia)
FLS: Frontline States
FNLA: National Liberation Front of Angola
FRELIMO: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
IRM: Isandhlwana Revolutionary Movement
JAC: Joint Advisory Council
LEGCO: Legislative Council
LWF: Lutheran World Federation
MK: Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we Sizwe, military wing of the
ANC) MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
OAU: Organisation of African Unity
OP: Office of the President Series (BNARS)
PAC: Pan African Congress (South Africa)
PF: Patriotic Front, the alliance of ZANU and ZAPU (Zimbabwe)
PLAN: People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (military wing of
SWAPO) PMU: Botswana Police Mobile Unit, formerly Paramilitary Mobile
Unit PTA: Preferential Trade Area
SADC: Southern African Development Community, formerly the Southern
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)
SADF: South African Defence Force
SASO: South African Student Organisation
SAYRCO: South African Youth Revolutionary Council (South
Africa) SB: Special Branch (for the BDF)
SIDA: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SRC: Student Representative Council
SWANU: South African Youth Revolutionary Council (Namibia)
SWAPO: South West Africa People’s Organisation (Namibia)
UANC: United African National Council (Zimbabwe)

UBLS: University of Botswana, Lesotho, and
Swaziland UDF: United Democratic Front
UDI: Unilateral Declaration of Independence (1965 Rhodesia)
UM: Unity Movement (South Africa)
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WCC: World Council of Churches
YWCA: Young Women’s Christian Association
ZANLA: Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (military wing of
ZANU)
ZANU: Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU: Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZIPRA: Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZAPU)
5.4
Botswana
Personal Stories
Badirwang, Mogomotsi —361 Merafhe, Mompati—454

Bapela, Cedric—363 Mfanamajaha, Friday Mufisa (The Late)—462
Bapela, Ledric —365 Mgadla, Nono —464
Bathami, Kangangwani —367 Minyoi, Lloyd Mutakela—466
Bereng, Thato—369 Mmantsho, Mme—469
Chilume, Obed Itani —374 Mmutla, Gaditshwane —471
Chiziyo, Kaki —376 Moahi, Billy—477
Diane, Munyani Kgosana—381 Mogae, Festus G.—479
Dintwe, Moatshe Gobby—384 Mogorosi, Benjamin —483
Gaborone, Monare—388 Gaborone, Mogorosi, Okgetheng Legong —485
Elijah —392 Molapisi, Motlatsi —489
George, Sasara —394 Molefhe, Patlako—491
Habano, Taolo Goyamang —397 Morake, Kesegofetse—492
Kadimo, Lopang N.—399 More, Mme Lentle—494
Katukula, Esther —402 Moroka, Tshidi —498
Kgokong, Mpotseng—405 Mosetlhe, John —501
Kgosientsho, Lerayang —406 Mosogwane, Makgabane —503
Kowa, Victor—410 Motang, Pule —505
Kwerepe, Gaerobwe Mesho —412 Motswai, Sekgwa—507
Legwaila, Joseph —419 Mpho Motsamai —509
Liti, Ester—425 Munisola, Joseph M. —514
Lotlamoreng, Kgosi of the Barolong—427 Muyoba, Akanyang —516
Malema, Kgosi Mmirwa —429 Muyonda, Gaufiwe—518
Manamela, John —431 Ngonga, Edward —521
Maplanka, Edward Barakanye —433 Ngala, Join —523
Masire, Tebogo—438
Ngonga, Lucas —527
Mathora, William Maziba —442
Nkhwa, Kenneth Moesi —529
Mathumo, Meshack —444
Phatudi, Gladstone —531
Maruatona, James —447 Pinto, Alvaru —533
Mbakani, Maria —450 Ramsden Ronald—535
Mbayi, (Mr) —452 Sankwasa, Luckson—539
1994
Sarah, Mma—542 Sisingi, Adriano—567
Seepapitso, Kgosi —543 Slash, Siana Mothusi —569
Sefako, Fumbani —545 Thupane, Shirley —574
Tlou, Stephen —576
Sekgororoane —549
Tsholofelo Morake, Mrs —578
Sekhambo, Mma —551
Vanqa, Mrs—580
Sekwababe, Calvin Thunamo —555
Sekwababe, Kepaletswe —556 Vanqa, Themba —582
White, Songai —583
Serote, Thibedi —557
Willet, Sheila—585
Sethoko, Lethogile Modumo —561
Setshwaelo, Ntombi —565 Woman (2) - Anonymous —588
5.4 botswana personal 361
stories
Badirwang, Mogomotsi
[Gobojango Village]
Mogomotsi Badirwang, was born in and also resides in Gobojango village as a pastoral
and agricultural farmer. He tells about his experiences during the liberation struggle,
mainly with Rhodesian refugees.
I Mogomotsi Badirwang, was born in Gobojango and also resides in this village as a
pastoral and agricultural farmer.
The following is what I can recall from the history of the liberation war in
Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. The war in Rhodesia, waged by Ian Smith, started during
the 1970s. It was an internal conflict in Zimbabwe. The ruling strong party, “Smith
Regime was struggling to control the power to rule. I remember the time when the
Rhodesian blacks crossed into Botswana in large numbers. Some of these
people were injured or sick when they arrived at our village, fleeing the
atrocities of this cruel regime. They arrived at our cattle post in Moshalalwe, along
the Shashe River, which is also on the border with Zimbabwe. We quickly made
transport available, like donkey cart or bicycle, and sometimes we actually
escorted them to the main village, Gobojango, where the police or government
officials were located. This was an underground activity with the blessing of the late
President Seretse Khama, who gave us permission to do so, as the community of
the surrounding villages. The golden rule was to assist all these people fleeing
and to make them surrender them to the Government Authorities so that they can
be transported in vehicles to Zambia and other destinations. As time went by, we
also encountered some frightening incidents. In 1975 or 1976, Mr Join Ngala, a
prominent farmer, who helped a lot of refugees by giving them food and shelter was
attacked during the night. This came about because some of the spies who had
infiltrated the refugees and returned to Rhodesia during the night, went to call
Smith’s soldiers directed them to Mr Ngala’s home. On arrival they set some huts on
fire, fired at random, destroying his house, tractors and other
property with arms of war and grenades.
In spite of these attacks, Batswana continued to give more support to their
neighbours, who were fleeing through their country, in large numbers, to their
destinations. As the war escalated, these freedom fighters sought refuge from the
front line as casualties. We took them to our cattle posts along the border and had
them treated. They had their own medical men and we transported those who were
badly wounded to bigger hospitals in Bobonong or Selibe Phikwe.
During the mid 1970s, Mr Join Ngala’s house that was attacked during the night,
was an arrival point for most of the refugees. Some spies who returned to Rhodesia,
informed the Smith regime of this activity so that the regime soldiers attacked Mr
Ngala’s house using machine guns, destroying property and burning his houses
although no one was killed.
1994
In spite of all these threats, we continued to help our neighbours with our motto of
“Boipelego”, meaning self-reliance; and we were advised to be secretive or to
perform what we were doing as an underground activity, when helping the freedom
fighters with the support of the government.
I recall one day, a certain white man accompanied by two white women landed at
the Gobojango Airstrip. He then moved around the village at random and the people
got suspicious. This case was reported to the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), and
when they arrived, this white man refused to stop when he was ordered to do so.
Warning shots were fired and this spy was finally captured without any resistance.
What I can remember is that since our cattle post is within the border we interacted
a lot with the freedom fighters, who actually had their daily meals from us, and
proceeded with their work inside Zimbabwe.
Our participation in the Liberation of Zimbabwe was done for a genuine cause,
but even after independence we encounter some problems with our neighbours. The
Zimbabweans are still scrambling, not all is well in their country. What is annoying
is that, when they cross over to Botswana they steal our domestic animals, donkeys,
goats, sheep, cattle; they also do housebreaking and robberies. This is a reflection
of an unstable country, hunger, poverty resulting in lawlessness.
This is totally undesirable because we are not happy to lose our belongings in
this manner. Before we used to trade with our neighbours, go to the hospital in
Mpilo, Bulawayo, Manama and so on, but because of this friction, things are not
smooth any more. Zimbabwe is our neighbour; we are one tribe with the Babirwa
on the other side; we have all these villages of Mabolwe, Semolale, Gobojango and
Bobonong, but this inter-border crime disturbs our relations.
stories
Bapela, Cedric
[Bontleng]
Cedric Bapela came to Botswana as a refugee from South Africa in 1981. He was a
freedom fighter and was involved in the liberation struggle, to escape the Boers. He is
now staying in Bontleng as a former refugee.
I was one of the refugees, and my name is Cedric Bapela. I came to Botswana in
1981, because of the political set up, I don’t know what to say but the political
turmoil, Boers arresting and killing people, and then we flee, while fighting for
freedom. I was involved directly in the struggle. We were fighting for freedom of
the black man; exploitation from the Boers and freedom.
Coming to Botswana was a better choice because of the tribal setup and
relations, as I am a Mopedi. I was to associate with either Botswana or Lesotho but
I chose Botswana because I couldn’t be in two places at the same time. Again
Lesotho is a landlocked country, so when trapped up in Lesotho it was not easy to
flee; you were likely to be killed as it later happened to some of our members who
went there. The language in Botswana was also similar to ours.
the reception you got from Batswana was mixed; some were ready to
accommodate us while others were not, and those who sympathised with us were
always supporting us with a variety of things when ever in need.
We just told ourselves that we were in a foreign country so things will not always
be simple and we had to be strong acting as a unity. When I came here I had just
finished my matrix and was ready for tertiary education but things were not that easy.
After sometime I did accounting at the University of Botswana, and later acquired
other qualifications.
When I came here I was 20 years old and I came alone without my parents to take
care of me; we were just a group of students. When we arrived here some students
from the June 16 uprising were already here. We were still students and this house
used to accommodate refugee students like Kgotso Seatlholo, who was our
president during the Soweto uprising. We had powerful ladies too, those who held
high positions in our organisation, some of us stayed in Tlokweng. Like I was
saying they held powerful positions which meant they had responsibility to carry.
But since we were in a foreign country it was difficult to notice any significant role
and say this is what they were doing but they were important to the struggle.
There were many challenges did they face in Botswana, like having to stay away
from parents and family in a foreign country or not knowing what was going to
happen the following day, at such a young age. The women survived the challenges
as they were our sisters and partners in the struggle, so we had to be there offering
protection for each other always.
We came to Botswana as political advocates belonging to the Soweto Student’s
Representative Council and the South African Revolutionary Council.
1994
Botswana government’s policy on refugees then was that of non-interferance
with other states; they encouraged refugees to stay in Botswana at Dukwi where
they were kept safely and provided with basic needs. As refugees we were not
happy with the government policy; we expected the government to do more, like
coming up with other policies to ensure our safely in Botswana.
I stayed in Dukwi for some time until I came to Gaborone to study. I stayed in
Dukwi in 1981. I came to Gaborone to study with the help of the African American
Institute. I don’t know the Government policy on refugees at the moment because my
status as a refugee ceased when we attained independence in South Africa, that was
14 years ago.
When I first came here my behaviour was bad; at the age of 20 in a foreign country
alone, we had to get used to the political climate of a foreign country. We were thrown
in the deeper end, with the sharks waiting to eat you. Having left our political enemies
at home, we held the responsibilities of adults, at very young age. The behaviour of
Batswana towards refugees never changed at all. I don’t know why it never
changed, but in life people are always like that, there are those who love you and
those who hate you. There were sexual relationships between Batswana and the
refugees; some of them are still married couples as we speak, it was natural love with
no discrimination. Sometimes we had to protect refugee women from Batswana
men because we were coming from the same pot and we could not bring them that
far just to let them be played around by Batswana men. It was just protection; it
was not like we were against their relationships though.
The general challenges that we faced in Botswana as refugees were like growing
up without parents; there was shortage of food and clothing was sub-standard as
they were donations from the Botswana Council of Refugees which was second
hand.
Those who had come without having graduated from secondary schools were able
to go to schools like St. Joseph College and other schools, which were available.
The students were able to adjust well to the new school environment because ther e
was less hostility in Botswana schools. As refugees we were not happy at all about
the role played by the Botswana Government to help us, because of the way we
were handled and reprimanded; coming from Soweto our culture was different.
We did not have a political office in Botswana. This house was our office, and it
was not a secret, the Boers just came and took pictures of it and when some of us
went to South Africa we were confronted but no action was taken against us.
The liberation struggle sharpened my mind; I grew strong politically and was
able to face challenges at an early age. I always go back home; our political asylum
ended in 1994. I have my passport and I am a South African staying in Botswana. I
am married; I met my wife five years ago and we have a kid. I am still staying in this
house because I bought it from the owner of this house.
stories
Bapela, Ledric
Mr Ledric Bapela arrived in Botswana in 1981 as a refugee from South Africa, because of
the politics of that time. He joined the University of Botswana and had to concentrate in
school at the same time he was working for the liberation struggle. He got married to a
Batswana and is now working in Botswana as a South African. He tells of his
experiences in Botswana during the liberation struggle.
We had another house in Lobatse which was bought directly by Obasanjo in 1976. Our
boys were staying there and happened to be arrested in South Africa with some guns. I
was summoned to Muyaluka’s office from the University where I was a student. I
used to get permits for our boys to stay in Lobatse; the permits came from
Modimakwane in the office of the President. The case had a potential of exposing
Botswana as a potential base for terrorists and terrorist training. The guy was
sentenced to 6 years in Robben Island.
We had people who backed us and our students’ organization; people like
Kwelagobe, Magang, former minister, Rre Setlhoboko, who were sympathetic to
our cause. They used to call us and tell us through their intelligence, the movements
and intentions of the Boers and we used to survive that way. Now I am no more a
refugee, but a South African working in Botswana and married in Botswana.
Botswana is now my home.
We are part of the people and community and the community is part of us. This
house is a symbol of the struggle, because most of the refugees stayed there. We were
friends with the people. Since 1976 we had been coming here, so for some twenty
odd years, we were part and parcel of the people of Botswana. We respect Batswana
for that. My life was an experience in Botswana. I arrived in Botswana in 1981
that was 27 years ago. Last year I was invited to address a gathering of the 60th
anniversary of Steve Biko at the South African High Commission as a special
guest. The High Commissioner asked me to help because I was there during the
liberation struggle.
We were part of the grassroots. We had the issue of Tiro; a tombstone was put on his
grave. Tiro was later exhumed and buried in his home country.
I came to Botswana as I said in August, 1981 because of the politics of the time. I
was supposed to have initially gone to India for a scholarship, organized by Fatima
Meiah, a sociology lecturer at the University of Natal. But I left for Botswana by
train and got off at Mafeking railway station. In the evening I took a bus, got off in
the middle of nowhere and walked through the bush. I knew that I was near the
Botswana border. I rested during the day and walked at night. I crossed into
Botswana at Pitsane next to Rakhuna and I was alone. Then I started marching
towards Lobatse and arrived around three on the same day. I was walking parallel to
the road so that I could get my bearings. Then all of a sudden someone emerged in
front of me and he was very dirty with torn clothes. I greeted him and he said you
know what, the Boers are patrolling here. He told me that he wanted to cross to
Botswana but couldn’t and he wanted to go back because of the Boers. The guy
was right because the Boers missed us by
1994
a whisker. I had to retreat back into South Africa before I could press on with my
journey. I re-crossed into Botswana at 12 midnight. I slept for 3 nights in the bush. I
had bought two loaves of brown bread and raw eggs. My suitcase with clothes and
a blanket was a pain, yet necessary. I got a lift at Rakhuna.
I had crossed at the “famous” steps at Rakhuna where so many had crossed. The
lift of a truck dropped me in Lobatse. I immediately asked for a police station where
I told them that I wanted to be arrested because I had entered the country illegally.
They did not arrest me but I was taken to the Special Branch. I was in Lobatse for
5 days while the Special Branch were still verifying where I was a genuine
refugee or not. They took my finger prints. I was then brought to Gaborone. The
Special Branch told me that the Boers were looking for me because of politics.
They told Special Branch to hold me until they came to get me. In the evening I
was told to get into the train to Francistown and then Dukwi. I later came here to
stay in this refugee house because I wanted to go to the University of Botswana.
Six months later I was in Lobatse carrying some papers about the guy who was
arrested in South Africa. Then I was admitted at the University of Botswana. I had
to concentrate in school at the same time that I was working for the liberation
struggle. It was a hectic time. I had already passed my matric and had been
admitted at the University of the North. There were informers in our organization
and once they were detected we brought them here and tortured them. We had so
many within us and outside. We were harsh. In 1982 one of our guys was
kidnapped, Peter Lengene. He was a member of Central Logistics Unit. Barney
Mokgatlhe, got a car from Avis. Guys used to come and delivered hand grenades.
Peter left with the others including George Khoza and Kazibu. Peter was given the
car to go and collect the grenades only to learn that there was nothing inside the
grenades. Peter was kidnapped. We now wanted to kidnap the kidnappers because
we knew them, the three guys who went with Peter Lengene. We kidnapped Kazibu
and he admitted that he was part of the kidnappers. Kgotso who was arrested from
here was refusing to come with information for the Boers and eventually was
sentenced in Robbin Island.
The Boers decided to kidnap at random here, hoping that somebody would talk.
That is why Peter Lengene was kidnapped. Kazibu was working with the Boers. We
tortured him the whole night until he started to sing.We had kidnapped the kidnapper.
Later there was a court case, and other people were given 6 years imprisonment, we
were given six to eighteen months in prison for torturing Kazibu in 1982. They
took Peter from here to Gaborone Sun and bought him beer and made him drunk,
before going to“collect” the grenades at Kazibu’s house, where there was a white guy
waiting. They beat Peter Lengene and bundled him in the Avis car and crossed the
border illegally. Peter Lengene is now dead, killed by the ‘guys’ five years ago. But
he had sold some of my guys who were later released and given scholarship to study
abroad such as in Cyprus, then Germany. Kazibu is still in Germany, Khoza and
Litswalo were taken to South Africa. Lengene later worked for the Boers as a spy at
the Rustenburg spy centre.
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Bathami, Kangangwani
[Dukwi; July 2008]
Kangangwani Bathami was born in 1947 and is a former Station Commander at the
Dukwi Police Station, where he interacted with refugees for a period of time.
I was transferred to Dukwi refugee camp in 1990; that is when I came into contact with
the refugees. The station commander’s house was divided from the refugees’
houses by a road: we were neighbours with the refugees. There was no distance
between us.
The refugees were just fine like the people I once interacted with (Batswana). I
saw them attending church with Batswana. Our Police football team (Stone
Breakers) was made up refugees and police officers; and these are examples of how
closely knit we were with refugees. There was no xenophobia because some
refugees were even married to Batswana.
The refugees were socially up-right people, they very much respected authority.
A leader in the camp meant more to them. I remember one of my junior officers
impregnated a refugee’s daughter. The father of the girl brought the pregnant girl to
my house and left her there. I tried to tell him the police officers were not my children
but he could not take it; to him being a Station Commander was synonymous to
being a father of all officers. Hence he left his daughter with me simply because
a police officer had impregnated her. I stayed with the girl for some days until all
arrangements were made for the officer’s parents to come and address the issue of
pregnancy with the girl’s parents.
Regarding authority in the camp, I would say the Settlement Commandant was
held with high regard in the camp. He was an overseer in the camp or a government
representative. The will of the government was executed through the Settlement
Commandant.We also had the UN office and Office of the President operating directly
under the UN. The Police, District Commissioner, Prisons, Health and Botswana
Defence Force (BDF), were all operating under the Office of the President in the
camp. There was the Botswana Council for Refugees under which the Coordinator
operated. The Coordinator was the personnel responsible for the general welfare of
the refugees such as food, clothes and their grievances. We also had Zone leaders
within refugee areas of residence. The Zone leader was responsible for monitoring
and reporting presence of refugees in his zone. Sometimes grievances were
channelled through the zone leader.
The Botswana Christian Council and the Red Cross Society were some of the
organizations within the camp. They were largely responsible for offering
supplementary aid and counselling to help refugees cope with their lives.
Culture within the camp was a fusion. The refugees were allowed to practice
their culture but it was evident they had assimilated some of the things Batswana
did. That is why they could easily identify with Batswana. For example during
funerals, some refugees conducted their burials like Batswana did.
1994
I would not say crime was high in the camp. There were cases of assault, theft
and others, but these cases were not alarming. Zimbabweans were leading in
crimes reported, followed by South African refugees and then Angolans.
South African refugees were evidently not happy to live in the camp. Other
refugees had settled in, but South African grievances were endless. The refugees’
complaints in general however were directed at the quality of food and their
restricted freedom of movement. I cannot rule out the possibility of some refugees
escaping from the camp. They could have done that at night but I don’t recall any
case presented before the police of escaping. But I do not rule out the possibility. I
came in 1990 and maybe before that there were cases of trying to escape. In such
extreme cases that is when the BDF could be called in to intervene.
The refugees lived on handouts of the UNICEF and agricultural products. They
were allocated land for gardening and some were involved in poultry and other
animal production. Their products were sold in and out of the camp, even as far
as Gweta. UNICEF arranged free transport for refugees to carry their produce to
the market.
Challenges that the refugees faced were mostly poor quality of food, learning
Setswana in school, restricted movement, and lack of jobs and shortage of farming
equipment.
The Botswana government policy on refugees was that since refugees had been
given asylum in Botswana, they should not participate in Botswana politics. They
were also not allowed to re-start their countries’ politics here in Botswana. The
refugees adhered to these policies without any problem.
In 1994 most South African refugees could not go back home. Some were
possibly criminals of war and feared going back home,some even married Batswana
and stayed. Refugees taught us to be self-reliant and make use of extra space in
our yards.
Having a garden at the back yard had become a norm to Batswana who came into
contact with the refugees. Batswana were motivated by the refugees to do small
scale business.
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Bereng, Thato
Thato Bereng is an ex-refugee from South Africa who was in Botswana but has now gone
back to South Africa. In this text she explains of her life as a refugee and some of the
relationships she observed between the refugee and host communities.
I’d say the first jolt for us as South Africans was encountering the distinctions
within the larger Africanness that we had politically envisioned our struggle within.
Basically there were distinctions socially and culturally that we had not
encountered nor imagined. Those differences were on both sides, that is on the side
of how we perceived and experienced the host populations as well as how we
ourselves were, as South Africans. This ‘cultural shock’ applied across gender lines.
Adjustments to me seemed equally difficult for both genders. Socio-
economically the women of Women of Azania (WAZA) were at an advantage
compared to the male youths given the monthly house allowance allocated to their
house or home by the World Council of Churches(WCC) -Brigalia arrangement. At
a more personal and intimate level I am not certain whether this is an indicator or
sufficiently notable disaggregant that where female refugees had male-female
relationships invariably if not all the time, these were with South African fellow
exiles or South Africans. With males, there were a number of Batswana homes
whereas ‘the adults of the refugee community’ we went to ‘bega molato’ or
responsibility for pregnancy on behalf of the boys’ parents, who were in South
African. In some cases they would follow up, in others they did not. I cannot
conclusively say that the Botswana Act, passed regarding the non-citizenship of the
offspring of a non-Motswana with a Motswana did not automatically become
citizens even though born in Botswana, was because of this latter situation.
Basically I am saying, the different cultural or political outlook was to me
manifested by these relationships whilst cemented by the government policies as in
the above Act.
On the accommodation aspect, the struggle to house the male refugees was more
pronounced. Members of the Relief Committee graciously availed their ‘servant’s
quarters’ to both genders. Most of the male refugees lived in an old farm-house
in Broadhurst, where there were several houses with Zimbabweans and I think,
Namibians. Male refugees also got themselves other houses in the townships, as
well as in Tlokweng and Mogoditshane. Others lived with three of the 1974/1975
adults in Mochudi, where they taught at the local school. According to the refugees,
the reception they received from Chief Lenchwe’s was quite sympathetic.
To me at first there was a stand-apart curiosity from the population. The almost
daily government pronouncements injected other perceptional attitudes. There is no
attempt here to deny the cultural, political, or dispositional differences between South
African refugees and their host community; it is rather how the differences were
handled that largely made refugees feel rejected. It is one thing to be different, it is
another matter for the difference to be seen as negative, less-than-human, intruders,
or interlopers.
1994
In interacting even with the YWCA committee members, sometimes there were
emotional debates on their expectations of refugee WAZA girls; their adolescence
seemed to be eclipsed by the fact that ‘they were adult enough to tackle a whole
government’(meaning their political uprisings) and should thus behave like adults.
Interestingly these utterances were made by YWCA committee members, expatriate
South Africans married to Batswana.
What was peculiar was that the South Africa expatriate members married to
Batswana, who were with us in the Soweto Students Relief Committee, had a
different attitude; they recognized the youthfulness involved, like any mother
would, without rationalizing social blunders.
There was such interaction and networking to varying degrees between different
refugee houses or homes with some of the ‘older’ refugees like in Gaborone,
Lobatse, Mahalapye and Francistown. Without going deep into such interaction,
there was largely a generational chasm between the pre-1976/1974 refugees and
ourselves, which would be greater, less pronounced or absent depending on the
personal or political attitudes of the ‘older’ refugees involved.
Seemingly from official and other reports the Botswana government had never
had refugees of our age-group who thus needed to be integrated into the school and
other systems. This seemed to define and operationalize the interaction referred to
below. For those of us who were at university level there were interventions by
some high profile Botswana citizens with support from the UNDP for scholarships.
The Botswana citizens’ intervention was what worked the most. On their advice
we formed and registered the Soweto Students’ Relief Committee as an advocacy
group made up of ‘expatriate/refugee’ South African professionals (lecturers),
African lecturers from Ghana, Uganda, Zimbabwe and ourselves. It was through this
committee that advocacy was done on immigration or deportation matters, health or
illness matters, arrests for ‘petty’ transgressions, representation to the UNHCR for
resources like blankets, mediation in major conflicts, agreements with scholarship
agencies, and so on. It was through this same committee that the World Council
of Churches’ Women’s Division coordinator Ms Brigalia Bam, afforded the refugee
girls a house or home through the NGO ya bo Mrs Oliphant, the YWCA. The home
was subsequently named Women of Azania or WAZA. I am reliably told after our
hasty departure from Botswana, at different times, the house was opened to other
countries’ refugee women.
On the education front, after the first group, ya rona, other refugee university ‘drop-
outs’ subsequently benefited from political relations image struck with the UNDP,
IUEF and similar agencies by the Botswana government. For high school level
‘drop- outs’, integration into the education system, was quite tricky and difficult. At
first we were informed that Botswana could only afford to take two students per
‘rural’ school to avoid undesirable effects of a South Africa refugee sub-culture from
affecting host schools. The people who were at this level can best comment on how
it was for them. I do not know whether the two-to-a-school practice continued or
changed.
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The one major difference between South African refugees and those from other
countries was their age. The avalanche came after the 1976 uprisings and these
were children of high school level, and those who had been outside the school
system but were of around the same age, basically. Programmes were along gender
lines, even though agents met with all refugees’representatives when introducing
programs. Here I am specifically thinking of a programme by an African American
Social Worker, called Ruth, who ran a programme for refugee girls. As time passed
and the‘liberation’ programme seemed like a mirage, the education option was now
conceded to, hence their attendance at local and subsequently other institutions.
Another angle was that the Botswana government was under pressure from the
South African government and from South African’s exiled liberation movements
to ‘do something’ about the rising numbers of refugees in Botswana.
For some like us, it was university level, for the rest who left at high school level,
it was that same level. There were very few refugees, male and female, whose first
goal was furthering education. I repeat they were there, but they were very few. The
anger, the pain and furthering the political goal of bringing down the apartheid
government and dispossession was the burning goal, both with males and females.
The younger refugees who stayed long after we had left Botswana said
interpersonal relations with the hosts were congenial, with some developing into
long lasting friendships till the present time. Those that made us feel like people
were from the small group of members of the Soweto Students Relief Committee.
Discussion groups which encompassed the political and the social helped us cope,
as did the important and vital role of the Batswana members of the Soweto
Students Relief Committee. Their houses were our outlets for real homes, their
families were our ‘visits’ to family life and their acceptance helped close out some
of the hostility. Mostly, social networks were with South African expatriates, local
or those abroad. The 1976 group over time, had more of these locally, I understand.
During my stay, 1974 till 1978, it was more of ‘urban-peri-urban-semirural’
grouping than ethnic. There were more urban-originating refugees than those from
peri or semirural areas. It was quite a revelation of how big South Africa is, for us to
find some refugees who could only speak their own language, as different from
those who were urban and thus multilingual.
Difficulty of settlement was deducible from all that which has been said above.
Settlement was always precarious as indicated by the ‘one-way-passage’ granted to
refugees who would leave for Nigeria or the States and be refused re-entry. Some
were put back on the planes they alighted from, wherever that plane was going.
After the 1974 group, much later some of the 1976 group apparently came back to
Botswana, they were accepted back and they lived there.
The 1974 and 1976 groups were largely BCM and SSRC, the loosely named
Tsietsi Mashinini-Khotso Seatlholo group. The authorities interacted with these
groups with what I now see as ‘bewilderment’ because they did not have any
‘official’ agreements with us the older ones, or with the younger group. With ANC
and PAC groups there
1994
were obviously some agreements with their leaders, and thus control over followers
or members of both. There are South African refugees who stayed on after 1994
but we’ve since lost contact in the last few years.
Smith’s soldiers were aware of this relationship we had with Zimbabwean
freedom fighters; the white soldiers followed freedom fighters in villages like
Senyawe, Tsesebe, Mapoka and other villages close to the border in the North East
District. That happened a lot, and that area was called “hot pursuit”. They followed
freedom fighters there. They would even ask for those who helped freedom fighters
and started shooting everywhere and scaring people. They kidnapped some people
and I even know of some people whom they ended up killing. They killed one
gentleman who used to grow vegetables around the Ramokgwebana River (North
East). Some small boys and other herd boys were also kidnapped.
Of course, a lot of people died in some of these villages along the border It is
only that newspapers were not in circulation at that time and the few we had were
not giving wide coverage on such events. There were only a few of them in
circulation; therefore, a lot of people in the country were not aware that many
people died in Bokalaka area during the liberation war.
The government then started border patrol. There was the BDF but before its
establishment there was what we called Police Mobile Unit (PMU). PMU was there
before the establishment of the BDF in 1977 to patrol the border. In the Bokalaka
region (North east) the Veterinary kraals were closer to the border because they were
located at an area that had good grazing land. Right next to Ramokgwebana River, at
the border was the Veterinary kraal. So the BDF would notify or inform the Veterinary
employees about the presence of Smith’s soldiers along the border. Whenever we
received such information from our soldiers we had to run away far from the border
for safety. There were incidents where the BDF clashed with Smith’s soldiers; they
met at Pobe-pobe and in Masunga. Pobe-pobe is an area between Matsiloje and
Senyawe. One day on our arrival at Pobe-pobe we were told about the incident
where there were five exchanges between our soldiers and the Rhodesian soldiers.
We also heard that the Ian Smith soldiers were seen by our soldiers in Masunga but
we did not meet them.
I am not sure how Botswana as a country helped, but I think the local people are
the ones who played a major role in helping freedom fighters. The local people are the
ones who helped freedom fighters. For example in the Bokalaka region, in the North
East, those people who were affected by cross border incidents were those who
helped freedom fighters. Once a freedom fighter was injured they used their own cars
to take them to the hospital. They played a part in the transporting of freedom
fighters from Francistown to Kasane. They crossed the border with them using
“mokoro” or canoe, leading them to Livingstone because at that time the army patrol
was not as effective as it is nowadays
Most freedom fighters from Ngamiland were SWAPO activists from Namibia and
some from Angola. We did not know their entry points into Botswana but we only
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heard that freedom fighters had passed there. I remember one time when we were
at the veterinary camp, and we heard that they had passed along Seronga, and other
villages. We were camping close to the border, and at some instances we only found
their treks but we never knew when they passed through Ngamiland. Some of them
passed to Zambia through Shakawe and other villages along the border; that was
their route, even for those who were returning back home to Namibia or Angola,
used that same route.
Villages along the Botswana-Namibia border are Nxaunxau, Kaudwane, Dobe and
Mohembo. Freedom fighters passed through these villages going back to Namibia to
join SWAPO, which then sent them out for military training in other countries. Sam
Nujoma of course stayed in Maun. But I didn’t see him in person.
I seem to know a lot of incidents which happened in the North-east as compared to
Ngamiland because I was posted for work in North-east immediately after completing
my studies. Those who trained in Swaziland were sent out to the border area to report
on livestock cross-border incidents. We met a lot of Zimbabweans, South Africans
and people from other countries. When I was in Lesotho and Swaziland I met
refugees who were transported by planes directly to Dar-es-Salaam. They were
from refugee camps. It was when I was in Swaziland that I became revolutionized; I
became exposed to the liberation struggle politics while still training in that
country. We schooled with a lot of those involved in the liberation struggle. I even
schooled with some of the current Ministers in South Africa. On Fridays after class
some of them went to Johannesburg and bombed some locations; and on Mondays
we attended classes with them. Some of them became our friends and they often told
us what they were going through because of the apartheid regime in South Africa.
Thanks a lot mma.
1994
Chilume, Obed Itani

[Tutume; May 2007]
Obed Itani Chilume, is 75 years, he is a businessman and farmer, as well as a former MP
for nkange. He hails from marapong ward in tutume village. He recalls what happened
during the Liberation Struggle, and says that there were some batswana who wanted to
fight in the liberation war, and did so; after independence they became members of the
Zimbabwe Army.
When refugees arrived in Botswana they were given good reception. Even school
kids escaped from Zimbabwe to Botswana, running away from the Smith regime.
There were those who arrived with injuries such as broken legs and they were taken
to hospital and given medical treatment here. People in this area were close to the
border and they understood what was happening. The fighting between the freedom
fighters and Rhodesian forces was close to them; and people here had relatives in
Zimbabwe. Batswana took the refugees to the police who transported them to refugee
camps; Batswana also provided fleeing refugees with food. Some Batswana wanted
to fight in the war of liberation and they joined the liberation forces and died there.
A son of Mrs Khupe joined the liberation forces and later became a member of the
Zimbabwean army after independence.
Batswana helped in the liberation struggle because some people in Zimbabwe
were Bakalanga with relatives here. We sympathized with those who had injuries
and were in pain. Smith’s forces followed people into Botswana and some
Batswana at Maintengwe had to flee and relocate to Tutume. Some were accused of
harbouring freedom fighters and placed were in the wanted list by Smith’s forces.
They were forced to abandon their shops and homes because of these threats, this
happened to Mr Mojanaga.
Some Batswana along the border who were accused of feeding Magandanga
(freedom fighters) were forced to flee deeper into the country. The Botswana
government took care of refugees and protected them at centres, such as the Dukwi
Refugee Camp. Some Batswana were killed in their homes for allegedly feeding
Magandanga.
Freedom fighters hid their guns whenever they crossed into Botswana. They wanted
to hide and fight from here. The senior and proper leaders of the liberation movement
understood Botswana’s position of not allowing the country to be used as a stepping
stone to attack her neighbours, but ordinary people and fighters did not understand
this position. They wanted to be allowed to stage the liberation war from here, and
they accused Botswana of being in collusion with Smith’s forces. The liberation
struggle affected Batswana because they were never free; people lived under threats
and fear. Grazing close to the border was disrupted and the fields were abandoned.
There was also the loss of lives, as ordinary people were killed by Rhodesian
forces. Some cattle and other livestock strayed into Zimbabwe and were lost
because people were afraid of crossing over to search for them.
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Botswana’s foreign policy was not to allow herself to be used to attack her
neighbours because that would have given those neighbours the excuse to attack
her. This was to avoid reprisal. The Frontline States (FLS) understood the Botswana
position. The North East borders Matabeland and that is why the Batswana in this area
supported Nkomo’s forces. There are Bakalanga and also the Ndebeles in
Zimbabwe. The Botswana government did not tolerate misunderstandings and
conflicts between different liberation movements because it believed they were
fighting for a common cause, which was to defeat the Smith regime. The
government mediated in such conflicts because it wanted Zimbabweans to
concentrate on the struggle for freedom. The economy of Botswana was dependent
on Rhodesia and South Africa, where the country obtained many goods, including
cheap foodstuffs. Botswana continued to trade with the two countries because
she was a small country. She would have suffered more than Zimbabwe and South
Africa, in the event the economic links were severed. Other countries, even those in
the OAU and FLS understood Botswana’s position. She had to trade with those
countries whilst still opposing their oppressive policies and denying freedom to the
majority. After their independence, these countries realized Botswana sacrificed
for their struggle for independence and they expressed their appreciation in
conferences and other fora. Batswana knew that their brothers also deserved to be
free just like themselves, hence they made the sacrifices they did.
1994
Chiziyo, Kaki
[Pandamatenga; December 2007]
Kaki Chiziyo was born in 1956 in Pandamatenga. He attended Kasane primary school
from 1965 to 1972 and joined the Botswana Defence Force in 1976. He did his training in
Gaborone and was posted to Francistown.
My name is Kaki Chiziyo. I was born here in Pandamatenga, ko matlotleng kwa,

at the old village site. I was born in 1956. My father was working in Kasane at the
lodges, and so I attended Kasane primary school from 1965 to 1972 and this was
the last time I went to school. I did not do well at school and when I realized life
was becoming difficult I joined the Botswana Defence Force in 1976. I did my
training in Gaborone and was posted to Francistown. I joined the army when it was
formed and had spent 30 years in service. I retired from the BDF at the end of 2006
and I had to retire because I had reached the maximum years that one must work in
the army. I was ready to retire and the package is good for someone who started
right at the beginning with BDF.
When I joined the army things were bad in Zimbabwe and Namibia, but I had
to join the BDF. I was in love with the army. I liked the jungle and using the gun.
Honestly I liked the army. Many guys refused to join the army because of the death
of the 16 soldiers at Lesoma. Currently I am doing something different. You know I
have just built a bar and I hope it will generate more money.
I do understand the topic for this interview is about the role that Botswana played
during the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa., but I think I
should first let you know how things were in Pandamatenga before I joined the
BDF. There were people called freedom fighters who used to move around
Pandamatenga.
The first people who used to come to Pandamatenga were not in uniform, but they
had guns. These people were called “Magandanga”. They came at around 1967.
People used to give them food and they were mostly seen at the lands (masimo).
They did not force people to give them food.
These were soldiers from Zimbabwe. They were difficult to understand. We
never knew whether they were fighting for the liberation of Zimbabwe or they were
another group of Zimbabweans who were fighting each other. Then in 1970 there
was a group of other soldiers who used to come to Pandamatenga from Zimbabwe.
These ones were now in uniform and they were friendly people. These are the ones
who were called “guerrillas”. I really don’t know what differentiated “Magandanga”
from the guerrillas because I have never had a chance to talk to “Magandanga”. I
was young by then.
I talked to the guerrillas when I was in the BDF. I met them several times in the
bush. These were the freedom fighters who were fighting the regime forces of
Smith. They were called guerrillas because of the tactics they used when fighting.
Their tactic was ‘hit and run’ or ‘hide’, just like the real guerrillas.
stories
Botswana did support the struggle. Botswana was used as a transit route for
refugees from Namibia and South Africa going to Tanzania. This was the route for
young men who were going to train as soldiers in Tanzania. Most of the people who
went to Tanzania used Botswana, and Kazungula was their exit and entry point into
Botswana. The refugees were also coming here and we the soldiers escorted them
to Dukwi and Francistown. We protected these refugees.
When I joined the army, these people used to cross into Botswana and that was
in 1977. These guys used the Chobe route because it was much safer. There were
guys from Namibia and these ones came in large numbers. There were also a few
from Zimbabwe. At one time some of these people from Namibia came to Kazungula
claiming to be a football team going to play in Zambia and they never came back.
We as soldiers knew the strategies they were using to avoid being noticed by
impipis (spies) of the white regime forces. They knew that if they told anyone where
they were going they could be caught easily. Kazungula was infested with impipis
of the white soldiers and some of them were blacks whom we didn’t know. This is
why the white Rhodesian soldiers blew the pontoon in 1978.
Kazungula was the entry point for guerrillas that were going to fight in
Zimbabwe. They crossed the Zambezi and entered Botswana. I really don’t know
how they crossed but we are told they used traditional canoes (mekoro). They could
not use the pontoon because they carried weapons when coming from Tanzania.
Some of them hid the weapons in the big trucks from Zambia and they got into the
pontoon wearing plain clothes. These guys were clever and they were well trained.
Those who crossed the Zambezi River into Botswana were mostly guys from
Zimbabwe. They used a certain area at Kazungula which was bushy and crossed
into Botswana. Then they entered Zimbabwe coming from Botswana. We could see
them but we did not trouble them. I don’t know how the Namibian guerrillas got into
Namibia but I think they used other routes not Kazungula.
I was a junior soldier by then. I don’t know what sort of agreement existed between
governments of Zambia and Botswana. But I suspect that this was something they
agreed on because even we soldiers at the forefront were instructed not to trouble
them. We relied on orders from the foreman. In most cases we were told to let them
cross into Botswana. It was a secret and we pretended not to see them when they
were crossing the border into Botswana. We were told about crossing of the border by
freedom fighters who were coming from Zambia, so that they could enter
Rhodesia; and we allowed them to do so because they were not dangerous to us.
What we knew was that they were going to fight the regime forces in Rhodesia.
There was the issue of disarming guerrillas who were seen with weapons of war
in this country. The BDF policy was there but it was difficult practically because
these were soldiers crossing into Rhodesia for a struggle. At times BDF needed to
act humanly towards these guys. They were going to fight and how would one
expect them to fight this war if they did not have weapons when crossing into
Rhodesia? After all they were not staying long in Botswana. There were cases where
we disarmed
1994
guerrillas especially when we found them in small numbers. They were not allowed
to come into the country with weapons. They sometimes refused to hand over their
weapons; and we left them when they refused to listen to us. We were flexible; we
could left them because this policy was difficult to implement. They sometimes ran
away with their weapons.
It was difficult to handle them because the guerrillas were in large numbers and
we were only a small army. These guys never troubled us and they used to help us a
lot whenever we had problems with the white soldiers. They would warn us not to
take certain directions or routes to avoid an ambush by white soldiers. They were very
useful. We would be betraying them if we had to constantly disarm them, while
they were ready to assist us when it was tough.
I remember, it was in the year 1978. We were patrolling from Kazungula to
Pandamatenga, using a land rover and all of a sudden we met white soldiers and
they started to harass us. They were along the Botswana border. They crossed into
Rhodesia and started shooting at us and we also shot at them. After some few minutes
of cross fire they ran further into the bush in Rhodesia.We heard some gun shots from
some direction and guerrillas came running towards us. They told us that they were
monitoring the movements of those white soldiers and laid an ambush in Rhodesia.
They told us that they had killed them. They were very important to us even though
we sometimes disarmed some of them. We met some of them in the bush after the
Lesoma incident and they told us that they had killed the white soldiers who killed
the Botswana soldiers, and we were very happy.
They policy of not allowing freedom fighters to use Botswana as a base for
attacking Smith forces was okay for the protection of our people and their property.
Had the regime forces known that Botswana was hiding refugees and guerrillas, we
would have been in trouble. They would have come in full force and attacked us.
You also know how sophisticated the Smith ‘boys’ were. Maybe could have tried
them on the ground but not in the air because they had fighter jets and helicopters.
Now with the guerrillas I personally think the best thing the government should
have done was to let them come with their weapons here because without the guns
they could not manage in their war against the white soldiers. Mind you the white
soldiers were just along the border. It was really difficult for them to leave their
weapons at the border and enter Botswana.
I met the guerrillas several times. One day when while on leave I met some of
them in the bush. I was looking after cattle. They told me they really did not like
the idea of handing over their weapons to the BDF and they seemed to like the
secret that Botswana government had, regarding the stay of guerrillas here and the
harbouring of refugees and not revealing that freedom fighters were in Botswana.
They used to say it was good practice because when it was‘hot’in their country they
knew they had a place to run to and avoid being caught by the white soldiers. But
they did not like the idea of leaving their weapons behind and that is why they
insisted on entering Botswana with weapons.
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The white soldiers realized that Botswana was supporting the struggle but not
showing it. Things changed in 1976 and 1977. There were several cases of
shootings from the side of the white soldiers in Rhodesia. They used to fire at our
camps and we sometimes shot back. I also heard that there was an instance where
BDF soldiers fought white soldiers at Kazungula but I was not around at the time.
One day the white soldiers shot at customs offices, but no people were injured.
They also laid a bomb and blasted the pontoon and this time some people were
injured. I am not sure if there were people who died because it happened in 1978
and I was not around at the time.
The worst problem which we faced was the day when 16 soldiers were
massacred in Lesoma. The BDF were informed about white soldiers and guerrillas
in Lesoma and they went there. According to what I heard the soldiers were attacked
before they got off their vehicles to search for the guerrillas who were in the nearby
bush. These guerrillas were seen by the villagers and they reported them to the
BDF.What we heard was that the BDF were in their three land rovers and on their
arrival at the ‘highland’ they were attacked and one of the freedom fighters was
transported to Francistown and died there. The white soldiers used bayonets to kill
the BDF soldiers who were still alive. During the day of the massacre my crew was
in Francistown. The ambush happened in the afternoon. When this incident
happened we were immediately ordered by Rre Malesu to leave Francistown for
Kasane. We left Francistown in the evening and were in Kasane in the morning at
around four. It was one of the days that Botswana lost many soldiers. The road was
not tarred and this was why we took so long to reach Kasane. The old man Malesu,
who was in charge of the northern part of Botswana, including areas from Chobe,
Maun, Shakawe, and Gantsi, was angry and he wanted us to take the white soldiers
head on.
We went straight to Kazungula border and found some of our guys there. They
were ready for anything. It was painful to lose some guys that we knew very well.
We met with the commander there, and early, around six in the morning we started
to plant big guns from Kazungula border offices to Lesoma. Some of our guys went
straight to where the ambush was done and they found some guys dead there. One
guy I knew very well who died there was Mathe, and he was a junior soldier. We
could see the Rhodesian white along the border in Zimbabwe. Malesu wanted us to
go for a fight with the white soldiers but we were stopped by the Authority in
Gaborone.
We were ready to fight, and you should know that they were now having two
enemies. It was us and the freedom fighters. Maybe in the air they were going to
destroy us but on the ground we were ready to take them on.
It was obvious the freedom fighters were going to help us because they were the
guys who used to warn us about the white soldier ambushes. They were going to
assist us because they were being helped by our government using Botswana land
to cross over to Rhodesia. Kazungula was where they used to run to after they had
attacked white soldiers in Rhodesia and this is where they could rest without fear
that they could be attacked while sleeping, but not in their own country.
1994
The white soldiers at the border were rude and liked firing at our camp. They even
blasted the pontoon. When they shot at us we also shot back. We dug trenches just by
the border and fired from there. It was difficult during those days because you could
die at any time.
Namibian side was not that active and we used to patrol there. Those ones in
Namibia liked using helicopters, aero planes and fighter jets when they were
patrolling their borders. They had a tendency of crossing into Botswana and
crossing back into Namibia. There was only one incident when they shot at the BDF
camp which was at Ngoma, and the BDF soldiers shot back and destroyed one
building which was used by the white soldiers. This time I was not around but I
heard what happened there.
There were no freedom fighters crossing the Namibian side of the border. Those
who used to be seen by villagers here were the refugees. I think the type of
vegetation inside Namibia made it difficult for guerrillas to fight well from that
side. The area from Kasane to Parakarungu is open and there are swamps along
Caprivi Strip. The white soldiers had strong bases along the border. They had a
camp at Mpalila and Ngoma and had boats which they used to patrol in the river.
They really controlled the Caprivi Strip and guerrillas had no chance of crossing
over.
It was difficult to control the guerrillas because they liked traveling at night and
we did not have enough equipment to operate at night. Sometimes we used to let
them enter the country with weapons because these guys helped us a lot when we
were on patrols. We were not making it look obvious that BDF was allowing them
to cross over with weapons. It was a secret, because if they were seen by white
soldiers they were going to follow them and we were going to be in trouble, because
they were going to attack us.
When we found refugees from Namibia, we first informed them that we were
Botswana Defence soldiers and were not harmful. We then transported them to
Kasane and then handed them to the police. If there were political refugees among
them, they were immediately taken to Francistown. We, being soldiers, escorted
them all the way to Francistown protecting them. The others, who were not political
refugees, were later taken to Francistown as well because that was the safest place
and there was a refugee camp there. There was no refugee camp in Kasane. There
were only tents to accommodate refugees and it was not safe to keep refugees in
Kasane because Kasane is on the border, and the white soldiers were also near and
could follow these refugees and kill them. The political refugees had to be
transported immediately because they were wanted dead or alive by the white
soldiers.
I can’t remember the names of the political refugees that were escorted from
Kasane, but I remember escorting one guy from Namibia who was a politician. What
he said was that the white soldiers caught them in Caprivi at Linyanti and he managed
to escape at night and ended up in Kasane.
Thank you mma.
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Diane, Munyani Kgosana

[Kazungula]
Munyani Diane was born in June 22, 1935 and went to school in Kazungula. As a young
man he worked in hunting Safaris. In his entire life he has been a hunter. He is also a
pastor in the Apostolic Church in Kazungula; and in 2004, he became Assistant
Headman.
My name is Munyani Diane. I was born in June 22, 1935. I went to school here in
Kazungula but I can’t remember when that was because I never completed school.
I think I went up to grade three. I did not complete school because those days we
paid for education and my parents were not able to pay for me. Also during those
days our parents never saw the importance of education. Things were not expensive
and we had cattle and goats. Life was not that expensive like nowadays I have
never had a permanent job. I worked in hunting Safaris, but these were just contract
jobs, and I was a young man by then. In my entire life I was a hunter, and we used
to hunt wildlife for people who raffled for game animals. Those were the days when
the government could give us such animals. They were raffled for, and lucky people
were given permission to hunt. I was one of the people who hunted animals for
people and they gave me meat or money. I am also a pastor in the Apostolic Church in
Kazungula. In 2004 I was elected to be the Assistant to the Headman here in
Kazungula. I am kgosana in Kazungula.
I was in Kazungula when the whites “baga Smith” [Smith’s soldiers] were
troubling people in Zimbabwe. We used to run from here and go to Kasane.
Freedom fighters used to come to Kazungula. They came to us when they were
in need of food. They did not come to ask for food regularly and they came in
small numbers. They could come in groups of two or three and go to different
places or yards to ask for food. You could hear people around the village saying
“kana” the freedom fighters were here asking for food. They could ask for maize
meal or ask people to cook for them. They never troubled people; their main job was
fighting the White soldiers in Zimbabwe.
Starting from here in Kazungula up to cattle post 256, these freedom fighters had
camps. Those were the days when I was a hunter. Those were the days when we
could raffle for animals. We used to meet them in the bush. Sometimes we gave
them game meat after we have killed game and they were happy. They used to say
“people from Botswana are good people”. I met freedom fighters several times.
They never stayed in the village but in the bush. This was very important because
they could sometimes meet with our soldiers and find themselves ambushed. Those
freedom fighters used to inform our soldiers regarding what the White Rhodesian
soldiers were planning. They came into the village at night, and they only came to
the village when they were hungry. They could eat saza/ papa (maize meal
porridge) without relish (meat or vegetables). They would just eat it like that and go
away.
1994
They did not leave us with much information really, because they knew they
were safe in our homes. In the evening or at night they crossed over to Zimbabwe
that is where they fought the regime forces till they forced them to move from the
border area. The white soldiers moved to Victoria Falls. Whenever the white regime
soldiers were walking along the border, freedom fighters tried hard to move them
away from the border.
What troubled people in Kazungula was fear of guns, especially when the
guerrillas started fighting the whites. They could fight from six in the evening till
morning. You could hear sounds of bombs and big guns. During such instances we
could not sleep and I remember one day people took blankets and headed towards
Kasane, only to return in the company of BDF. They were warned by BDF that it
was not safe to travel at night because if the white soldiers found them along the
road they could kill them. Sometimes our BDF soldiers were involved in this
fighting at the border. They used to tell us not leave our houses because they had
spotted white regime forces. We lived in fear along the border. The White
Rhodesian soldiers used to come to the border, and we could see them walking,
running or even shooting. They could shoot in the village but luckily nobody was
injured. I can’t remember very well when this happened because it has been a long
time, but It was in the 1970’s, during the days when Zimbabweans were in trouble,
and we used to pray a lot here.
When the freedom fighters saw us carrying guns they did not shoot at us because
we were black like them and just ordinary hunters not wearing any form of uniform.
I once found a freedom fighter hiding in the bush. According to his story, they had
crossed the Zambezi at Katongola in Zambia; this is where freedom fighters used to
cross into Botswana. According to this guy, they washed their clothes in the river, and
while still drying them, the White regime soldiers patrolling along the river found
them and they attacked them. The five freedom fighters had to run away. The one
that we spoke to, had to run into Botswana, but somehow he thought he was still in
Rhodesia, because and he and the others had not worked out where the border was.
We were shooting guinea fowls in the evening, and we found this particular
freedom fighter in the bush, about 50 kms from Kazungula. He heard the gun shot
and followed us where we were. He was walking barefooted and slept in the bush.
He saw our tracks along the migration routes that were used by elephants. At first
when he saw us he thought that he was still in Zimbabwe. What helped us was the
dog. If we were not accompanied by a dog he could have could have probably
killed us. He said he spent two days in the bush and luckily it was raining and he
could drink water in the bush. He followed our tracks and found our vehicle where
we were hunting and he hid under a bushy tree. The dog we had was barking and
initially we did not see what it was barking at. I think the training they went
through was strict that if you hear a dog barking then you should know there may
be some ordinary people around. He just came to the car and hid by a tree. When
we were done with hunting I took my three boys and headed to a pond to get water
and in a short while we came back to our hunting spot. When I was about to get into
the vehicle, I heard somebody
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say “Salibonani” (hello in Ndebele) and I immediately realized that he must have
been one of the Nkomo (ZAPU leader) boys. I went closer to him and asked him if
he is a son of Nkomo [freedom fighter] and he said “yes”. I told him that he was in
Botswana. He jumped up three times happy and said this is the country he wanted
to be in. We spent the whole week with him in the bush. Those days guerrillas had
their foreman called Mkhwanazi who stayed in Kazungula at one of the freedom
fighters camps. Mkhwanazi was the boss of the freedom fighters, and he stayed in
Kazungula just by the river side. The freedom fighters had a camp near the river.
All those freedom fighters who had problems reported to him at that camp. They
used to visit my place regularly.
We spent a week with him and we gave him some of our clothes. We then took him
away to a certain man called Lameck to take him to Kazungula. Lameck took this
man to Mkhwanazi the boss of the freedom fighters, and told him what happened.
There is this another day when freedom fighters found me at Pandamatenga, just
near the camps. I had killed a Zebra. There were four of them and were hungry. I
gave them cooked meat and they ate. When they finished eating I cut a big piece of
meat and gave them to take to their secret camp. They were even talking about killing
a baboon to eat it but we told them that baboons were not eaten in Botswana. They
spent most of their time in the bush. One day when we were with their foreman
Mkhwanazi, we found some freedom fighters at 14 (cattle post) just near that tall
tower on your way to Pandamatenga. They were carrying blankets full of bullets
and were heavy. We loaded these blankets into a vehicle. They were relocating to
256 (another cattle post). This was a government vehicle, but we had to use it to
help. We dropped them at 256 and we drove off to Pandamatenga.
It was proper for Botswana to support the struggle because our relationship with
people from these countries was ok. All our food came from Zimbabwe and Zambia.
Even now we are relying on these countries for food and other things. The problem
we are now facing is that people from Zambia and Zimbabwe are now coming here
to steal.
Ke lebogile monkane. Thanks mate.
1994
Dintwe, Moatshe Gobby

[Gaborone; June 2008]
Mr Moatshe Gobby Dintwe, was born in Mochudi in 1941; he started being involved in
the struggle, through his uncle, when he was 8 years old. In 1965 he became a teacher
and later he was more involved with transporting and assisting freedom fighters, mainly
from Mozambique. He and his uncle became friends with Samora Machel, whom they
knew as Moses.
I was born in 1941 in Mochudi, and I came to know about the liberation struggle
when I was 8 yrs. That was during the days of colonial rule when they ruled through
churches; its rulers were district commissioners who were assisted by pastors. When
there was a church involved, maybe London, one was assisted more as compared to
when one came from a different church. In 1948 African Advisory Council took a
decision with the European Advisory Council to work together to help governments.
They looked at people who were seen as nuisance to the government. It was found
that Roman Catholic was a big church, which grew fast, but with many blacks.
Whites were not interested in it, so there was suspicion that it was a political
organization.
In 1948 they started punishing people. I had an uncle who was a teacher; he
was a chief ’s son. His name was John Dintwa and he taught Mma Chiepe Koma,
but he was a drunkard; so when he was drunk he became brave. Later he taught at
Serowe, and that gave him a chance to further his studies at Fort Hare, where he
found other southern Africans finishing their studies, including Seretse, Mandela,
Ezekiel Mphahlele, Mugabe and Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Those were the people
who wanted to know what the future held for Africa. They came up with ways they
were going to change Africa, because they had read, they had left the masses at
home. John was later called to Mafikeng because he was seen as rebellious; he met
with the High Commissioner and was warned and withdrawn from school.
He was seen as a ring leader and he was taken to Rhodesia to be a teacher,
teaching English. There he was monitored, because he could only speak English,
the masses spoke mostly Shona and Ndebele. When Seretse and Mandela graduated
in 1947, Kgosi Tshekedi called John to attend Seretse’s graduation in South Africa
and translate for the people. One was chosen to give a poem, the other the main
speech. Seretse gave the main speech. Mandela knew that if he was to give a speech
he would be chased out of the country. Seretse told the people that they were
looking forward to developing Africa as a whole, and this angered Tshekedi who
told him that he wanted him to talk about his people back home not Africa, Seretse
told him that Africa was changing and they had to change too.
When Seretse got to where he was teaching-he went to Uganda where he attended
Makerere University. He was given a chance to finish his BA and he taught at
Makerere University. He did a degree in Education so that he could teach. His job
was to link
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his boys with people from other countries, like Nyerere, Kenyatta, Banda, and
chiefs’ sons. Chiefs’ sons later denounced bogosi and pursued educational careers.
When Seretse arrived from England he had problems because he was married to
a white lady, people were saying that why didn’t he marry ladies at home others
were jealous of him, others said he was going to sell their land as the whites did,
and their old friendship came to an end. Seretse now started with new classmates
many of whom were English like Dr Herman Goldbom.
Seretse could only go to Zambia with ease, and Botswana later bought its own
plane for transport. He used it to attend meetings, it was called Chobe. Seretse then
reunited with old friends to link with Nyerere and Banda. He asked them what they
thought about Africa, they later agreed to unite. In the meantime, Members of
Parliament in Botswana consulted with their people to avoid going where the
President could be killed on his trips without people’s knowledge. In 1958 people
questioned as to why Seretse always went out but the other people never came to
Botswana. Later Kaunda promised to come, and on 18 June 1968, he made his first
visit to Botswana. With Seretse and the others, they formed the Frontlines States,
which grew to include Lesotho and Swaziland. These latter two had a contact with
Botswana through the common university. Whenever they applied for permits in
South Africa, they said they were attending university issues, not politics. In
Botswana they used the Chobe plane with Khama, and later left it in Zambia to get
an international airline to Tanzania, where meetings were being held. That is why
most coordinators had to be in Tanzania, as that is where most things started,
including the Frontline States.
Leaders of the liberation struggle came to Botswana in 1960, but some refugees
were already in the country. I became aware of refugees who were my age mates,
coming from Mozambique, passing through our area, like Moses Machel, he changed
names to Samora Machel. We became aware of this when he told Seretse on his
first visit to Botswana that people were given money to look for freedom fighters or
refugees. There were different groups, so those who had struggled against white
rule were on the refugees’ side, but those who did not were against refugees. We
accepted refugees, our government was slow to give us information, but we used to
hide them, most of them were harmless.
When Samora Machel and his group arrived in Lentswe-le- Moriti in their cars,
there were already road blocks at about 50km; when they were about 10km away,
they left their cars and went thru the bush for about 60km. They had to travel fast
so that people could not see them. Boers saw their footsteps and later trekked them
with dogs and donkeys. They stopped at Ratho and were given food. Ratho people
came and told us, and we told them to hide them. They were seven including one
who seemed to be the leader, and they were tired with blisters. We took them away at
sunset, but the Boers were already near and they later tortured the people who had
hid them until they told them the truth. We had to go through caves, where it was
dangerous. We saw a big snake, we knew that because it produced sparks at its tail;
but
1994
we were able to go through the cave safely. However, the Boers were not so lucky, as
it attacked them and their dogs, until now we have not heard about them.
We later arranged for Moses, the name we knew him by, and the others to get a
ride on a truck that was transporting cattle to Palapye. We hid them under sacks and
blankets in the truck, on the journey to Palapye. From there the cattle were transferred
onto the train to the Lobatse BMC. There, I was able to put them on the train. It was
easy for me to do this because it was my job to arrange for the transportation of the
cattle, and I was also able to give them a little bit of money when I parted with
them at Palapye.
We didn’t know him as Samora we knew him as Moses so when I heard that
Samora was coming to Botswana. I was not interested. Apparently, Samora told
Seretse that he knew two people, Gobi Dintwe of Lentswelemoriti and Kgaboesele
of Lobatse who he wished to be reunited with. Police were sent to me and told me
about Samora Machel; I went with them, when I arrived I saw people coming
towards us and I noticed Moses as he noticed me too; we ran towards each other
until police stopped us because of protocol. He asked me about Kgaboesele, who
happened to be my uncle to whom I had sent Machel and his people by lorry from
Lentswe-le-Moriti, and it was arranged to tell him to come to the BMC the
following day. He too was surprised at seeing Samora Machel.
I came to Gaborone in 1965, when I became a teacher because there was a
shortage of teachers. Most of the refugees came from Soweto, so most Batswana
who were here were from schools in GSS; they were in groups like tshabantsa,
middle class, and us labourers, I was hired by a Boer to look after his Zebras
Investments, which housed 3 companies. I was paid more than MPs around 1965.
Batswana didn’t treat refugees’ well because they were educated, loved by girls
though some were bad like Sten Khubeka, some pretended to be refugees whilst they
were not they were spies for the Boers; they were informants who just disappeared
later. Some schooled at UBLS; when Khubeka graduated he started politics and was
arrested and taken to jail where he joined other politicians.
Many of the refugees who came later were just kids; they did not care and they
easily got used to any environment. But people were ill-treating them, those who
came first were able to accommodate them in large numbers. Using Radio Bantu,
Botswana used to talk about them so people were able to know about them and even
give them food. Organizations such as the Botswana Council for Refugees came
later because others used to stay with local people, some stayed at Moruti
Motswasele’s place. I even had to make way for some. Spiritual churches also helped
with food, but they could not stay long; they could stay for only a week. Most of the
refugees had children; the girls from South Africa ended up getting married to
fellow refugees. To us Seretse told us that a person was important; he wanted
Rhodesia, Namibia and Angola to get independence, and we could sanction South
Africa. We didn’t know if that was a formal refugee policy.
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Leaders’ view on refugees did not change overtime because Seretse became
angry towards people who called themselves refugees, only to burn Mr Nzaligwa’s
house. That incident was an eye opener to us; it took five years to state where
refugees stayed, attackers like Dekorkor who came to attack had maps, which was a
surprise because maps could not be made in a day. We had to be careful with
strangers.
The raids in 1985 changed people’s attitudes, because they started living in fear.
The refugees I knew already had their residences; girl friends were friends with
others. Then there were people like George Phahle and his wife, who were later
killed at Tsholofelo, our government was able to cater for them. I didn’t hear of
ordinary people chasing away refugees.
In my knowledge, Khuna Mmusi, our land did not have many educated people,
especially police. We had many Basotho, Rhodesia, Marotsi; most teachers came
from Lesotho. The African Advisory Council took up the task of attracting people
who were educated, and most people were recruited. Makeba who was a singer,
Abel Mmusi was a teacher at Lentswele Moriti with a Master’s Degree, and was
one of the people who convinced me to go back to school.
1994
Gaborone, Monare
[Tlokweng]
Chief Monare Gaborone is a Batlokwa Chief and during the struggle he worked as a
veterinary officer at Manumo, and later as an immigration officer in Air Botswana.
I become a chief during the 1970’s after serving in the national service for a long
time. Seretse Khama then told me that it was time for me to come and serve my
people. That was when I retired from the government. I worked as a veterinary
officer at Mamuno border near Namibia.
One day when I was still in the national service, in the veterinary department at
Mamuno, a place near Namibia, I was patrolling the Botswana Namibia Border and I
saw many people who were running towards Botswana; some of them were hungry.
I took them to our base at Mamuno, where they were taken to Gantsi, on their way
to Gaborone. I asked them questions as to why they were fleeing from their
country, and they told me that they were fighting for freedom. They said they
wanted their land back from the Boers, who had taken it by force. They came
through the desert with no transportation.
They were both males and females, but not all of them were carrying children.
Just imagine having to flee with ten children! Most of them were left behind with
their grandparents who also could not travel. At some point I came across Sam
Nujoma’s deputy president who was also among the people who came to Botswana
as refugees. On that day we were patrolling the border using a South African van
because vehicle could not traverse the terrain, and fortunately we took them all to
Mamuno. Sometimes we travelled with the South Africans so that they could help us
when we had break downs along their side of the Border. In Gaborone they were kept
in police stations and at times at the prison, but not as prisoners. It was just to keep
them safe to give them accommodation and to feed them.
There was a man who operated a transport van between Gobabese and Ncojane.
That man was such a snake! He was once paid to transport refugees from Gantsi
to Gaborone but he decided to inform the North West Police about the planned
transportation. He decided to schedule the journey a couple of days ahead so that the
Boer police could meet him on his way to Gaborone, where they took the refugees
and went with them to Namibia; he later went to Gantsi and pretended they were
taken from him by force. Apparently, the Boers had a break down on their way to
meet him, so he pretended to have a break down as a way of buying time to allow
the Boers from South Africa to reach him. Fortunately the UN instructed them to
bring the refugees back unharmed, and luckily they were returned safely. The
transporter was a white man who was just doing business between Gantsi and
Gaborone.
One of the captured people happened to be a great friend of our former president
Sir Seretse Khama; they went to school together abroad and he later became a
medical officer in Botswana. That was almost the end of my stay on that side, as I
was
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transferred to Francistown where I was dealing with international transportation of
cattle to Rhodesia, that’s when I later knew about Dukwi Camp passing through it
going north. I was transferred to the north and later had to come back home. I also
had a brief stay in the department of local government here in Tlokweng.
The refugees were accepted by Batswana; even some used to stay in my house.
The whole village was willing to accommodate them and stay with them. I gave
some of them this house of mine to stay in. I still keep in touch with some of them;
we invite each other for functions. I even owe them a return journey.
Staying with a stranger in my house was dangerous to my life and that of family
members, but what could we do? Those people came here looking for help and we
had to accommodate them; where could they go if we rejected them? I gave them
my bedroom to sleep in. Even on bedroom was used as an armoury for keeping
their guns. People loved them they used to sing their traditional songs and people
would come here to cheer them; everyone was enjoying themselves.
Personally as a chief I encouraged inter marriages to take place; why not? They
were in love and I could not prevent that from happening. Those who were able to
bear children did just that and we were happy for them.
You are right about the dangers of leaving behind fatherless children or even
diseases, but I was not much into that. In fact there were children here in Tlokweng
who were born from such parents, and luckily some of them still keep in touch. There
is one boy here who was born that way, and can always visit his family members
back home in South Africa. The father of one boy went to America, but also comes
back to check on his relatives. To earn a living they used to work for us, doing
every job available for them; even this house was built by them. There was one
man who was very good in building houses and we paid him to earn a living. Some
who were teachers were able to take up part time jobs in evening schools. Others
used to go with us to the lands or do any job that they found us doing in the village
and they were always given something in reward.
Those who were in Tlokweng were coming mostly from Lesotho, Namibia and
South Africa, and I lived with all of them here in my house. Those who were
coming from South Africa were mostly from the Riff, not in Tswana villages but
some of those in my house who later became my relatives were coming from
Tswana villages. They were mostly from the ANC. Some went for further studies
and later came back. Even the Brother to President Thabo Mbeki was here, he
became a teacher and later joined Ian Kirby’s Law Firm. One day at night I received
a call from them asking if I could offer him protection, I told them to meet me
under the Tlokweng Bridge near village. I brought him here and later a plane was
arranged for him to go overseas. Some stayed in Botswana for a long time, but
others stayed for only a short time because arrangements had already been made for
them up north in Zambia. Zambia was used as a transit route. I also came into
contact with them when I was working as an immigration officer for Air Botswana.
1994
There were lessons learnt from the liberation struggle; I learnt about friendship. It
taught me friendship, working together with different people. Dishonesty also, some
of them were very dishonest. If you go to the kgotla you will find a house which
used to accommodate some young boys from south Africa, among them there was
a very dishonest boy who used to disappear for a very long time, just to reappear
weeks later; he even had a baby with one of the village girls. His name was Buti.
That boy was a sell-out, he told South African Police about his friends who were
staying in Botswana. He lied to me, saying he went to visit his uncle in Serowe, but
when I enquired about it I found out that he was lying. I told him to stop doing that,
and I even told the ANC to remove him because the police were going kill him and
even his friends. It was also not difficult to rule my people with them. Some of
them even decided to stay behind and we did not have any problem with it.
It was not our duty to meet as the Dikgosi to discuss refugees in Botswana, but I
used to meet one arch bishop of the Anglican Church who used to work with refugees.
Botswana government helped a lot. If it was not for us, they could have lost their
lives; we gave them protection, food and clothing.
The UN agencies also worked with the Botswana government to help them with
whatever they needed, like medication, clothing, and scholarships, as it happened to
Mbeki’s brother.
Some of the refugees acknowledge what the Botswana government was doing to
help them, but others were ungrateful, since they felt that the Botswana Government
could have retaliated to the Boers; but we did not have the resources to do that and
again we are a peaceful country.
The coming of the refugees did not affect Botswana’s development policies that
much, but some countries were reluctant to help Botswana because they felt they
were helping criminals.
Regarding the South African Police bombings, I told you that there were some
among them, even some local people who leaked information to the South African
Police. One lady who was married to a white guy was also responsible for that.
They were paid to leak Information; even before they asked for it, they were
given money so that they disclosed crucial information. On the day of the bombings,
police went straight to the places where refugees were staying and that means they
had information. At some hide out places refugees were lucky to survive because
they were not sleeping in their houses that night.
There was no reaction from the Botswana government to the Bombings, but I hear
there was a meeting at the border to discuss among other issues that bombings.
I don’t really know much about the ANC and the offices of the other parties here
in Botswana, but you must know that they were operating in secret so that people did
not get to know about them.
Some people in the village accuse Esaack Solly of having worked with South
African Police to give crucial information and blame him for the Bombings. I agree
with them because that evening there was a white man at Solly’s Oasis Motel, who
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was happy and talking good about the bombings, yet the owner did not report him.
But that man was later killed in South Africa since he was only in Botswana using
a permit.
You see that certificate? It comes from South Africa, and this boy used to play
with refugees. He said this, pointing to his son who is in his early 30s.
1994
Gaborone, Elijah
[Tlokweng]
Elijah Gaborone was an ordinary man in the society, who was in Tlokweng during the
liberation struggle. He explains his experiences as a young man during the liberation
struggle.
When refugees were staying in our village, we were still young and did not
understand much what was going on, but we know that there were once people who
were staying here as refugees.
They came from South Africa from Vokazenzele and Orlando; they came running
away from the Boers who were killing them in large numbers so they decided to
come to Botswana to become refugees. Some of them were school children who
were challenging the white man’s rule, by going on strike. They were they both
male and female and some of them were coming with children. When they first
arrived here we just accepted them with both hands, since they told us that they
were fleeing away from the white men who wanted to end their lives and they had
to cross the border into Botswana.
They came to Botswana instead of other neighbouring countries because of the
peace and tranquillity that prevails in our country; ever since we gained independence
they had never heard of any troubles, so they hoped to find good life in Botswana.
Their stay here depended on a number of factors. Those who were just here stayed for
a long time but the others who were on their way to the north stayed until it was safe
for them to travel. Others stayed for two to three years, and when they had to go back
home they told us. Those who went back to South Africa, do come back to see us;
it is only that most of those who come here come as visitors, to visit those who
stayed behind when the others went back.
They were the opposition; some were school children like those who were
coming from Orlando who were always on strike. They were just school children
speaking with one voice. These people were not guilty they were just fighting for
freedom; they were just rejecting the white minority rule in South Africa. The way
we lived here in Botswana we were just a peaceful nation and we expected them to
be the same when they arrived here. I don’t remember anything which was meant to
target the refugees. Of course they had to behave since they were not in their
country, when you enter other people’s country you have to be careful of what you
do.
When they first arrive in Botswana they were supposed to report to the chief who
took them to the government officials. Some were allowed to stay with people, but
with the knowledge of the chief. The chief had to tell the government officials that
there were some people who needed protection. The first group of people came
from the Transvaal, at Meloreng. Boers were killing them and they decided to seek
protection in Botswana. There were others who were spreading all over; you know
when you flee you don’t really choose where to go but those who knew about
Botswana decided to come here, as I said earlier.
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Bahurutshi were among the first people to come here and unlike others they
wanted citizenship in Botswana so that they could stay here for good. They did not
get what they wanted because of lack of land in our area. Our Chief told them that
it was not like he was rejecting them, but rather it was because there was nowhere
to allocate them. They were too many; some are still staying in Kweneng, where
they went looking for land. They ended up in Molepolole, where they got
citizenship and even now they are still there as part of Batswana.
There was no discrimination of any form shown towards the Bahurutshi; they
stayed here peacefully with us. Even where they stayed is still visible. Yes there was
no problem with intermarriages between the refugees and Batswana. The only
problem was with those from the Transvaal because the Boers used to come here
looking for them and that was a danger to people married to them. That was the
only problem because even when we went to work in the mines we did not encounter
any problems. I don’t know much about the form of help the refugees got from
the Botswana government, because the chiefs were the ones who were dealing with
it. They were nice people, not like these Matebele (current Zimbabweans staying In
Botswana), we see in our country nowadays who pretend to be refugees but later kill
you. When they arrived we used to take them to the chief who decided whether to
take them and stay with them before handing them to the government. That was
meant to see if really they were refugees, as some could just come pretending to be
refugees whereas they were crooks. But some of them were later killed by the
Boers. I don’t know exactly when that happened, but it was some time back, they
came to kill school children who were from South Africa and were rebelling
against the Boers. They just came looking for them. Who knows? Maybe someone
told them.
When the refugees were killed, our government just instructed its people not to
fight, because the Boers were not fighting our people. There was a lot of cruelty.
They did not try to take them back; they just came and killed them in Botswana and
left them to die. One was staying by the kgotla and he was killed there. When he
heard
them coming, he tried to run away but before he could jump the fence they killed him.
I lived with them, and they attacked the refugees anytime at night; one of them
was killed at the town, but we don’t know how they got to know about him or where
he was staying.
The refugees did not try to fight back. How could they when they knew that the
Boers were using big fighting guns? Again they were not staying in one area where
they could be able to fight back as a group.
Their coming helped us as Batswana a lot, I remember one guy who was a
traditional doctor called Sello, he was practicing in Botswana and people were
visiting him for consultation. Another one of them is a mechanic, and he still stays
somewhere at Masetlheng.
1994
George, Sasara
[Phakalane]
Mr Sasara George is the Deputy Permanent Secretary and former 1st Secretary of
Botswana Embassy in Lusaka; and later Botswana Ambassador in Brussels.
Botswana supported the liberation struggle because it was part and parcel of the
Southern African region. The struggle of the people of Namibia, South Africa and
Zimbabwe was the struggle of Botswana as a country. Botswana was not truly
independent as long as some of its neighbours were still under oppression.
When Botswana was invited to be one of the Frontline States it agreed. That was
a critical moment for Botswana and its subsequent role in the liberation struggle.
For international politics you need your neighbours in order to survive. Botswana
joined these states, what the settler regimes perceived as joining the enemies of the
status quo. Botswana made lots of sacrifices especially human sacrifice. Batswana
hosted the refugees in their own homes as there were no refugee camps initially.
They could not just be left in the open, as they would be sitting targets for the
enemy. They were hiding among the Batswana, and they sacrificed their lives by
taking that risk.
The Botswana government sacrificed a lot by taking “a-not-see attitude” regarding
the droves of people that came into the country. Some of these people were sent
to school, others served in our schools, and others were given employment by the
Botswana government. In terms of resources, the upkeep for some of these people
was coming from the Botswana government, employment in the civil service,
employment in schools and other non-governmental organizations.
The attitude of the Batswana towards the liberation movement was positive.
Batswana were willing to go an extra mile to help their brothers. People sacrificed,
some died trying to help the liberation struggle because in a liberation struggle death
is inevitable. Batswana used their own means to support them; even up to today the
friendship and personal relationship is still there.
It was difficult for Botswana to distinguish between a real refugee and a spy.
Many refugees lost their lives, as they were killed by South Africans. Botswana had a
limited capacity in as far as intelligence was concerned, and could not effectively
distinguish genuine refugees from spies. The refugees were Namibians, South
Africans and Zimbabweans who were more relatives than alien people. Refugee
camps in Zambia were bombed by settler regimes. My neighbour in Lusaka,
Dumiso Dahengwa, was nearly kidnapped as the Rhodesians came to raid his house
but he had been tipped and was not in the house.
Most of the leadership of the liberation movements understood Botswana’s
position.Without Botswana they had no way to go. In fact, major battles against South
Africa and Namibia were fought from Botswana. When their top leadership escaped
they came through Botswana. The government recognized both PAC and ANC; in
fact we recognized all of them. We encouraged all of them to unite because we
knew
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the dangers of supporting one liberation movement over the other. Botswana played
its role.
We never recognized SWANU though. SWANU posed a problem because the
person who joined it was the Vice President of SWAPO, Muyongo. When he left
them he passed through here; in fact he is a Motswana from Caprivi. We recognized
both ZAPU and ZANU. Botswana helped sponsor their people for scholarships.
Sometimes the liberation movements tried to be difficult, as they did in Dukwi in
1976, almost wanting to control the government of Botswana. Some movements were
stronger than our government at the time because of the armaments they had. The
government admonished them and told them to behave or face the consequences.
Nkomo, Mugabe, Nujoma and Oliver Thambo were leaders that were very good
people. They met with Presidents and joked about the past.
In order to monitor and control guerrilla freedom fighters, Botswana made
alliances with the top leadership of ZANLA, ZIPRA, and MK. They told the
Botswana government their intentions and movements, and the government
actually escorted them. They worked closely with our intelligence.
Botswana tried to resolve conflicts and factionalism in the liberation movements but
it was difficult. Botswana brought Chissano and Dlakama together here in
Botswana. Botswana was instrumental in the signing of the agreement between
FRELIMO and RENAMO; ZAPU and ZANU agreements, Botswana was there
negotiating in long meetings, in Lusaka, Tanzania and here. After the liberation,
people knew the role Botswana has played. Others were disappointed because they
wanted Botswana to commit political suicide. The majority however were aware of
the sacrifices Botswana made to their liberations. Relations with other SADC
countries are quite cordial.
We did not have the capacity to confront the wars of destabilization, but we
made lots of noises in the international arena. We reused the profile of the negative
attitude of the oppressive regimes. South Africa used to fly over Botswana in acts
of intimidation and over Zambia as well. They told the Zambian soldiers to stay
put, because they were looking for their own enemies. They went drove to the State
House and demolished Nkomo’s house near the state house. We were promoting
peace, but not war as the settler regimes were doing.
In 1977, Freedom fighters shot down a plane over the Zambezi because it was
suspected that it was loaded with weapons that would be used to destroy guerrilla
bases in Zambia. The Rhodesians retaliated by shooting down a big truck from
Zambia in a ferry and it sunk together with the ferry. The Rhodesians suspected that
it was carrying weapons to be used by freedom fighters.
Botswana is a small country that is land-locked. Botswana made sure that it
was in its interest to make sure that the region was integrated. Economically
Botswana would benefit from the integration, as it would access the markets of the
region easily. What we have learnt from the liberation struggle to do what we can to
the current situation, is working together as leadership of the region. Southern
Africa was
1994
liberated because the leadership of these countries worked together, and the region
should strive to work together for development.
Frontline States contributed to the liberation struggle. Nyerere admired Seretse
pragmatic position and how he managed to be in Frontline States in spite of the
precarious position of Botswana in the region. Seretse was vocal about apartheid
and that it should be contained. Initially Frontline States was composed of countries,
Botswana,Zambia and Tanzania.Frontline States understood the position of Botswana
in respect of the liberation. Mugabe came through Botswana, stayed in Tlokweng at
Kgosi Monare’s house, Nujoma, Tambo, Machel, Mandela, all passed through this
country – so Botswana contributed to the liberation struggle in many respects.
Botswana used to have a lot of refugees. We eventually built Dukwi refugee
camp. We used to have South Africans, Zimbabweans, Namibians and others from
other countries, like Angola. If somebody came with arms, they were arrested and
put in protective custody. If they were going to proceed, they were released silently.
Steve Tshwete, former Minister of Sports in South Africa was once arrested here and
put in protective custody, but he was later released quietly.
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Habano, Taolo Goyamang

[Kgosing Ward]
Taolo Goyamang Habano was born on the 2 March 1949 and schooled in his village up to
class six. He completed his junior certificate and went to complete his education in
Lesotho and came back to train in agriculture, in Botswana. He got a diploma in
Agriculture, in Swaziland and started working in Francistown, where he started meeting
with freedom fighters and people talking about Smith’s soldiers crossing into Botswana.
Bluetown, the place where he was staying, was also where freedom fighters were staying
on their arrival, on transit to Zambia. So he was in the position to interact with the
freedom fighters who came to Botswana during the liberation struggle.
My name is Taolo Goyamang Habano. I was born on 2 March 1949. I started school
here in Gumare but then it was only Standard Four. I then went to Shakawe to complete
my schooling up to Standard Six. Then of course we were nearing independence and
after independence the education system changed, that was around 1967. I then went
to Swaneng Hill in Serowe to complete my Junior Certificate up to Form 2, and mind
you, we were paying school fees. The school was then run by Missionaries. After
completing Form 2, I came back to Gumare where I spent a couple of years before
I was sent to school in Lesotho. But before that I was taken to Cape Town, under
the department which was responsible for BOLESWA citizens. I did not spend a
long time in Cape Town, but I then heard that the capital was now being moved
from Mafikeng to Botswana, and I came back to Gumare. There was an Agriculture
school based in Mahalapye and I applied; I was admitted and started training there. I
finished the training in 1972.
I started working at Chobe; at that time there was an outbreak of Foot and Mouth
Disease in the Western Province of Zambia. I worked there for about 8 months. At
the time, as you may know, Chobe was under Ngamiland district administration;
even though I worked there, my base was still Ngamiland. That was around 1973
and 1974. Around 1975 I was sent out for training in an Agricultural College for
a Diploma course, in Swaziland. When I finished my course I was posted to
Francistown for work. This is where I met people talking about Smith’s soldiers
crossing into Botswana. I was staying in the area called Bluetown, in Francistown,
and close to where I was staying was a place where freedom fighters were staying
upon their arrival, on transit to Zambia. While I was staying at Bluetown, the place
was bombed twice. The freedom fighters who stayed there on transit to Zambia were
very intelligent people, in the manner they were carrying out their activities. When
Francistown was bombed, no one was hurt because when the ‘Boers’ were
bombing, none of the freedom fighters was at their Bluetown home; and I don’t
know who might have warned them to escape early. The Mophane Camp in
Francistown was also bombed, but I‘m not sure of the exact time. I think it was in
the mid 1970s, and they normally did the bombing during weekends.
1994
The bombs were set by an Ian Smith agency. There were whites in Francistown;
some of those who owned Tati ranches were Smith’s agents, who were sometimes
using Batswana agents. The Batswana agents were sent out into the country to set those
bombs. This was because as Batswana, they knew a lot about their local
environment, Bluetown, and it was easy for them to set those bombs targeting
houses where freedom fighters were accommodated. The United Nations Refugee
Committee was renting the accommodation. They did that in many locations not
only in Botswana.
I also worked in the North East and part of the Central district. I was covering
Bobirwa, Tuli Block, Ramokgwebana, Maitengwe, Nshakashogwe, Sebina, and
Mathangwane, some of Tonota North and up to Kasane in the Chobe.
We often met freedom fighters in the villages closer to the border. In most cases
we met them in Maitengwe and Matsiloje near the border with Rhodesia. You know
what? They were operating in shifts, some coming into Botswana, while others
going back secretly into Rhodesia. Once we met them they were willing to discuss
some issues about their activities. They often told us that they were taking food
supply, water and other things to the guerrillas. They travelled and passed through
Nata to Kazungula and Kasane on their way to Zambia. After about two months we
would see them coming back from Zambia into Botswana with new weapons. Since
they knew us, and were used to meeting us, they would tell us when they were
going to attack their enemies in Rhodesia. Sometimes when we were on duty close to
the border they warned us about the time so that we should move away from the
border to avoid to be affected by the exchange of fire. That, mind you, was done
secretly so that Smith’s soldiers should not know that we worked with freedom
fighters, because if they knew that, it would have been dangerous to our country. We
would have been their targets.
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Kadimo, Lopang N.
[Kasane; June 2007]
Lopang Kadimo was born at Kachikau in 1922. He went to school at Kachikau primary
school and only went up to grade four. He worked in the Department of Wildlife and
National Parks right here in Kasane, as a builder. From 1973- 1988 he became the court
president.
My name is Lopang Kadimo. I was born at Kachikau in 1922. I started my school at

Kachikau primary school and only went up to grade four. I worked in the Department
of Wildlife and National Parks right here in Kasane. I was in the building team
which repaired Wild life officers’ houses. I am not sure when I started working in
this department but I retired from this department in 1973 and became the Court
President in Kasane from 1973 – 1998. I decided to become a court president because
it was paying better wages than being in the building work, where I spent most of my
time in the bush. I preferred staying in the village where I could to be with my
family. I was a married man and I needed to be with my children. I had to retire
from court presidency because I was old. I am now taking care of my cattle at 256.
Oh you mean during the war between SWAPO and the Boers.Yes, refugees
crossed into Botswana and were treated well. Sometimes they crossed into our area
using traditional canoes. There were teachers, school children and older people
from the Caprivi. They would cross the river at night and we found them in the
morning at the old kgotla. They were welcomed here at our kgotla. The District
Commissioner who was around at the time arranged tents and he communicated with
others in Gaborone as to where these people should be taken to. Some were taken to
Francistown. Just on that one, some of the people from Caprivi Strip had relatives
here. As you may know this land here in Kasane is occupied by Basubiya and on
the other side in Caprivi are Basubiya. We are relatives with people in the Caprivi.
Those who crossed the border during the war found their relatives here. Villagers
here used to take them to their houses. When refugees were to be sent out to
Francistown, relatives would first identify those to whom they were related. They
stayed with them right here in Kasane. I know many refugees who did not return to
Namibia after problems were resolved.
These refugees came in at the time when I was the Court President but I can’t
remember the exact year; you can check the date in the government records because
there are people who were taken by the government to Francistown. Many refugees
crossed from Namibia several times and were taken to Francistown.
It was not easy to detect who the freedom fighters were. Those who knew these
people were the police and other government top officers. As for us we never knew
who was indeed a freedom fighter. Some of them were just ordinary people and
others even asked for employment from white people around here, working in Safaris,
building houses. There is this other one who was shot along Pandamatenga Lesoma
road, at a place called Nineteen (19). He was shot by the white soldiers. We stayed
with him and he was a builder. He is the one who used to buy food from Kasane
1994
for the freedom fighters. He used to leave us in the evening and went to the camps
where the freedom fighters were staying. The freedom fighters had camps just
along the main road and he delivered food to them. In the morning and afternoon
he was a builder and at night he delivered food to freedom fighters. Freedom
fighters used to come but they never troubled people. They never spent long hours
with ordinary people. They just came like visitors who were troubled in Zimbabwe.
Those who knew them are the police, because that was where they used to go and
report about their presence to officials. it was during this time that we came to realize
that the man known as a builder around Kasane was an intelligence of freedom
fighters when the Boers bombed the vehicle he was driving at 256. He was called
Mkhwanazi, I don’t know if this was his real name but this is the name which was
common amongst us here. They shot him but they were not able to kill him. He used
to leave in the evening to inform his “boys” (freedom fighters) about what was
going on to assist them to plan ahead.
Those were the days when the road was not tarred between Kasane and Francistown.
When the freedom fighters entered this country, government officials and BDF took
them to the police station, and they easily identified them. Sometimes government
officials would meet freedom fighters when traveling along the Kasane-
Francistown road and give them food. Refugees were taken to Francistown but the
freedom fighters were returned to their camps inside Botswana and although
secretly located, people knew where these camps were. That was also the
government officials’ secret. We at the customary court were aware that the police
knew what was happening within the liberation struggle activities. That was a
government secret. They were aware that freedom fighters used to come to villages
such as Pandamatenga and Lesoma. As you know people in Pandamatenga and
Lesoma are Ndebeles and Nanzwas. The freedom fighters were coming to their
tribes’ men and this is where they got food supplies. Some relationships even
started among freedom fighters and women in Lesoma and Pandamatenga.
The regime forces knew very well that freedom fighters were hiding here. They
were aware of the activities of the freedom fighters. Politicians such as Luckson
Sankwasa never entered Zimbabwe. They could be killed. The problem we faced is
that they started to fight. Do you see that Camp by the Ferry? They demolished it.
Those were the bullets from the white soldiers. We used to hear bullets flying over
our huts. They were searching for freedom fighters. They even used to trouble people
at the Kazungula border. People never wanted to come and work here because it
was tough. The white soldiers were fighting and our BDF soldiers fought them at
Kazungula border.
Honestly, I think it was good to support the struggle because we were helping
our relatives and fellow black people so that they could get independence. That is
why the government took care of the refugees and let the freedom fighters stay
here. Some people died because of the war of Liberation. When you get into a war
you know you can die. If the white soldiers did not know that freedom fighters
were staying here
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they would not have crossed into Botswana. If our soldiers did not want them, they
should have prevented them from staying here; allowing them to stay means there
was an agreement with the liberation movement. I don’t think it was wrong to give
them support. They were soldiers.
When the refugees were still in Kasane by the old kgotla, there were people who
were impimpis. They once came and killed a person who was a refugee somewhere
here. It was still bushy. These were ethnically Basubiya. They used to come here,
crossing at Mpalila. They came here pretending to be visitors who were coming to
check their relatives, and yet they were coming to see where refugees and freedom
fighters were hiding. Then they went back to Namibia and informed the white soldiers
about how the situation was.
Ee kana Masubiya a ga lona. [Yes, these were your Subiya people, they were
divided
into two]. Some were on the SWAPO side; others were supporting the white
regime forces and were the spies. Whites were sending them here to come and
search for freedom fighters and refugees. The spies were coming here for those
who ran away from Namibia. Even the one they killed was from Namibia. He was
killed by other Namibians just by the river on the side of Botswana.
We were very much affected by the struggles, life was not good here. People
knew that freedom fighters came in and some with their weapons because many
freedom fighters were caught in the National Park having killed wild animals. They
used to kill animals but no action was taken. They were just left to go. That was a
government secret.
Thank you son.
1994
Katukula, Esther
[Lesoma Village; July 2007]
Esther Katukula was born in 1940 in Lesoma. She never went to school and has never
worked anywhere. She got married to Mr Jameson Katukula in 1960 and have been
doing subsistence farming. She tells of her experiences at Lesoma, which is on the border,
during the liberation struggle
My name is Esther Katukula. I was born in 1940 right here in Lesoma. I have never
gone to school and have never worked anywhere. I got married to Mr Jameson
Katukula in 1960 and we have doing subsistence farming since I got married to this
man. I stayed with him from 1960 and he passed away in 1989.
Those things like guerrilla wars were only known by men. Women were always
home and afraid of the bullets shot across the border from Zimbabwe. Our men are
the ones who used to meet these guerrillas when they were looking after cattle or
when fetching firewood.
What I remember is that freedom fighters used to come here at my place asking for
water or they would come when they were hungry to ask for food. I was married and
my husband is the one who interacted with those guys.
My husband is the one who used to talk to the guerrillas and I did not talk to them.
They only greeted and would ask where my husband was. I never knew what they
were talking about. Men in the past never wanted to share what they were
discussing with women. There was a man who used to visit my husband he was
called Mkhwanazi. This is the man who used to buy food for the guerrillas.
The day I came to know about freedom fighters was the time when sixteen
Botswana Defence Force soldiers were killed. When this incident happened I was
not well. But my husband woke me up in the morning and said we should go to the
field [tshimo]. We heard gun shots inside Zimbabwe and I told my husband those gun
shots must be
coming from the guerrillas. I feared they might be fighting and my husband agreed
that we immediately return back to our home. When we arrived home we saw people
running to different directions in panic and they told us they were afraid of the gun
shots. Some told my husband that there was a group of freedom fighters who crossed
the border and have passed through the village carrying weapons. The Headman of
Lesoma Jameson sent his sons to go and call the BDF for patrol. Since I was not
feeling well that day I went into my house to rest. In a matter of minutes my husband
entered the house and told me that we should run away because there might be a
fight between white Rhodesian soldiers and guerrillas. He took our child Sephiwe
by hand and instructed me to run fast ahead of them, but they had to leave me behind
as I was sick. Villagers ran into the bush. Some drove cattle from Lesoma into the
bush heading towards Kasane. I was left alone that day and when I woke up and
walked into the kitchen to drink water I saw this young man dressed in army
uniform carrying
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a gun and a small bag.1 He was speaking Ndebele and told me that my people have
run away. He asked me why I did not follow others and run away too and I told him
I was not feeling well. He gave me two tablets to help ease my pains. This young
man begged me not to tell anyone (especially those in uniforms) where he was
hiding. He was referring to anyone who would come to our place wearing uniform
which looked similar to his. He disappeared for a while and came back and asked
how I was feeling. I told him I was now feeling better and he left. While sitting in
my compound alone, suddenly I saw a flying machine (helicopter). Since the
helicopter was just below the tree level, I saw some white male faces inside the
helicopter. People ran away from the village when this helicopter came. At around
five o’clock in the evening I heard loud gun shots and I saw smoke from the other
side of the village and we heard that they (whites) had bombed and killed Botswana
soldiers.
The following day, and I think that was two days after the death of the BDF
soldiers, my cousin Chekecheke came with his children to our home to check on my
condition. Since I was not feeling well and was a bit affected by the smoke from the
cars that were bombed, Chekecheke suggested we sleep outside the house in the
compound. The whole village smelled of smoke that day. In the middle of the night
I heard footsteps and woke up. When I looked at the road leading to the water stream,
I saw five people carrying guns. Then I woke up my husband who also saw them and
said they were not guerrillas, but Smith’s soldiers. In the morning the Botswana
police came to Lesoma. But I’m not sure whether they were able to track them
down in the village.
The police came to Lesoma to find out why the Headman (Jameson) reported the
presence of freedom fighters. They were saying that if the freedom fighters were
not reported then the BDF soldiers would not have been killed. There was no
punishment against the headman.
Some of the freedom fighters spoke Ndebele and were our tribesmen. They came to
the village to ask for food and water, but they never spent many days here; sometimes
they were here just for a few minutes, and then went to their hiding camp in the bush.
Towards the end of the war of liberation in Zimbabwe, one of my uncle’s daughters in
Zimbabwe called Dolly got married to a freedom fighter.
The other day I visited some of my relatives in Bulawayo. I had a problem with
transport money and my relatives organized a fund raising function in which they
collected enough money to put me on the train. Some of the former freedom fighters
do visit the village even today. A certain James Mathe once came here and asked me
if Jameson and Mkheswa (my husband) were still alive. When I asked him who he
was he told me that he was a former freedom fighter. He told me that they used to
move
around Lesoma village, and were even invited at our ‘masimo’ where we gave them
freshly produced corn from the field. He talked about how I used to be afraid of guns,
whenever they were around our house visiting my husband.
(1) Traditional a home is a set of houses within a compound, some serving as bedrooms and a one serving as a
kitchen where cooking is done and it is at this place that water, utensils are kept.
1994
Sometimes they used to fetch water at a certain pool but they never troubled people.
My husband was amongst those that interacted well with these guerrillas. If he was
alive, he would give you good stories. He used to say “These are very good people,
they are people of God”. He requested that whenever we see them in the compound
we must give them food, if we have some. Children in the village, including ours,
got used to seeing guerrillas at the pool where they used to fetch water and after
collecting water, they would go into the bush heading towards Pandamatenga. We
learnt not to report their presence to BDF. The freedom fighters always told us that
whenever we see anyone dressed in an army uniform, whether it was a white or black
soldier, we should not tell him where they were. They even requested that if anyone
asked whose foot prints were at my place I should not talk about guerrillas. They used
to say that they did not know all their enemies. They wanted to meet their enemies
without being followed. They told us they did not trust some black people who were
used by the white soldiers as collaborators, who were paid to give information to the
white soldiers about the whereabouts of the guerrillas.
The worst problem faced by this village was the death of the sixteen (16)
soldiers, because among these soldiers there was one young man from Lesoma who
was sent out by the headman to call the soldiers. He also died there.
Thank you and have a safe journey to Kasane.
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Kgokong, Mpotseng
Mpotseng Kgokong is a South African ex-refugee, who had to go to Botswana during the
liberation struggle.
After 1976 in particular, there was a readiness to assist South Africans and this
made it quite easy to access schooling, particularly in Europe, North America, East
and West Africa. But South Africans had always been lucky because of the good
disposition of the community of nations towards us as an oppressed lot. As far as I
know, refugees were treated as such without regard to gender. There was nothing that
we did not expect.
The average Motswana was receptive and civil. In Dukwe for instance, those on
the lower rung of society interacted with us freely and saw us as fellow human
beings; whereas the technocrats saw us as something indescribable. The ordinary
urban folk were most hospitable and accepted us as their kith and kin. The political
heavy weights, particularly after the passing of the founding President, were
vitriolic.
There was interaction with earlier (pre-1976) migrants and South African refugees
and interpersonal relationships with the hosts were good. We related well with other
groups like the Angolans, Namibians and Zimbabweans, in the circumstances. As
political beings, we realized that here and there we would have problems, at times
emanating from our disparate cultural or political backgrounds or perceptions. The
human body is an amazing thing. We adapted to the circumstances because we were
on a journey that we had undertaken consciously. The social networks were also
good, although the numbers from the various groupings vacillated.
There were no differences in acceptance by Batswana of Botswana of Batswana
refugees from South Africa, and those of other ethnic groups, and I speak as a
Motswana. We had access to education; although this was mostly in foreign countries,
i.e. outside our country of first asylum. Botswana did place some of us in some of
the local schools, including tertiary institutions. As you may well know, the Dukwe
Refugee camp had a facility and refugees were encouraged to register locally.
Political Education lessons were a life saver in our case. In terms of other means of
survival, self-reliance was the thing.
There was nothing we did not expect in the settlement or passage. We took some of
the hardships in our stride as we were expected to. Botswana was always willing
and ready to get people to resettle in other countries.
A lot of the UNHCR people were not inclined to treat refugees along political
affiliation. This can’t be said about the middle layer Special Branch officers who
did not hide who their preferred refugees were. There were South African refugees
who stayed on in Botswana after 1994, and the attitudes are so different now.
1994
Kgosientsho, Lerayang
[Kazungula]
Lerayang Kgosientsho, grew up in Kazungula and worked for a Company which was
transporting cattle from Botswana to Zambia.
My name is Lerayang Kgosientsho. I was born a long time ago at a place I don’t
know. I grew up here in Kazungula but I am told my parents and others came from
that side of Ngamiland. We stayed in Kachikau when I was a boy. I have never
attended school and have never worked a permanent job. The only company I
worked for was that Company which was transporting cattle from Botswana to
Zambia. I was born in 1918 and about a place I don’t want to lie because my parents
never told me. We came to Kazungula from Kachikau. My parents were following
some of their relatives who were here in Kazungula.
I am too old to remember when I worked for the cattle company, my child. I
will try to remember but it is a long time. It was during the time when there was
copper mining in Zambia. These cattle were bought from people around Botswana
particularly in Ngamiland. I and some other guys received the cattle at Nata and
we drove them to Kazungula. We sometimes used to receive these cattle at a place
called 256. This is where these cattle rested and grazed for some days before being
driven to Kazungula border. The cattle were being bought by the mining company to
feed miners. The cattle crossed the Zambezi River on the pontoon. The pontoon has
been here for a long time. They keep on bringing new models. We drove the cattle to
the border and then they were driven into the pontoon. The Zambian government
controls the pontoons. The other one was blasted by the Boers during the guerrillas
wars. This was not a long time ago. It was in the 1970’s. About whether people died
I don’t know. The only thing I heard was that people were injured.
I was employed to look after their cattle and driving them to the pontoon. I did not
retire from that job. I stopped working because the company stopped buying cattle
from Botswana. I don’t know whether the mines were not doing well or not. I worked
in timber industry around Kasane in 1984, but it was after a long time from the time
I stopped working in the cattle company. This is where I worked for 3 years but I
was getting old. I decided to retire and looked after my cattle. I am now a pensioner.
Those refugees or freedom fighters were coming to Kazungula. Those who came
here were freedom fighters from Zimbabwe. They liked coming to Kazungula to
ask for water and food and we supplied them with some. They used to ask for food
and then went back to where they used to hide in the bush. They came to my place
several times to ask for food and water. The freedom fighters never selected yards
from which to ask for food and water. They asked from every yard they entered.
They hid in the bush inside Botswana, and in the evening they crossed to
Zimbabwe to fight the white regime soldiers.
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The river is used as the border here in Chobe. You know that. The white regime
soldiers were checking movement along the river and the freedom fighters were afraid
that they could be seen and be shot by the Boers. They preferred here because it
was a bit bushy. The freedom fighters stayed in Botswana and crossed to Zimbabwe
in the evening. They moved around Lesoma and Kazungula. They were many and
in most cases they never wanted to be seen by people while carrying guns. When
they saw people like us who headed cattle they hid their guns. The other time they
found me at 256. When I was still working for the cattle company; this was a
stopover where we used to spend two or three days so that cattle could drink water,
graze and relax. We slept with them there and I was with this other guy from
Parakarungu. Early in the morning they woke up and cooked food. In the evening
they crossed into Zimbabwe and came back in the morning. There were many
freedom fighters in Botswana along the Kasane–Francistown Road. We stayed with
them at 256, and they liked following the white soldiers in the evening and early in
the morning they crossed back into Botswana. When the white soldiers came
following them, they would find that they had already crossed back into Botswana.
The place 256 is not far from the border. It is close when the white soldiers came
to the border and found that Freedom Fighters had crossed into Botswana they
would shoot haphazardly in case they hit them in the bush. They never crossed in
Botswana walking. They used to come with helicopters but they never saw the
freedom fighters. The freedom fighters hid themselves in the bush and they never
moved in large numbers during the day. The only people they saw during the day
were us, herd boys and the cattle and they never troubled us. When ever freedom
fighters discovered that white soldiers were following them they dispersed and
moved into Botswana crossing the road which goes to Francistown only to meet later
as a group. They knew the white soldiers would not follow them into Botswana
because white soldiers knew it was illegal to cross into another country
unauthorized. The white soldiers were also afraid of our soldiers.
What the freedom fighters at 256 were saying was that Boers wanted to be the
only ones in power. Blacks also wanted to have a share in the government of
Zimbabwe.
256 is in the bush but along the Francistown–Kasane Road. What was happening
was that when freedom fighters saw vehicles coming they stopped them and asked
for food. They once stopped us in the middle of that open area at 256 when we
were driving from Kasane going to Francistown. One freedom fighter came from
the bush. He stopped the vehicle and asked for water, and then another one came
also, and we poured water into their water bottles. They drank first and then we
poured more water into the water bottles. They then proceeded into the bush and we
went to Francistown. Sometimes they got water from water ponds because it used to
rain well during the rainy season. As you are aware 256 has several water points and
they were lucky to arrive and find water there.
It was a good thing that the Botswana government was secretly supporting the
liberation struggle because those freedom fighters were black people. If they came
1994
here running there was no way we could tell them to return back to their enemies;
we had to protect them. Even though they were not allowed to come and fight from
here I found it was necessary for Batswana to help them. However we did not allow
white soldiers to enter Botswana. Freedom fighters helped us in stopping them
from attacking us. They knew they were not fighting us but their enemies, the white
soldiers. The freedom fighters used to attack the white soldiers at night and we could
hear sounds of guns and bombs from a distance. Early in the morning, around four,
they crossed into Botswana after launching an attack. There was a camp in Rhodesia
which belonged to white soldiers. Freedom fighters were strategic. They used to
come to Kazungula in ordinary clothes and without guns. In the evening they
followed the white soldiers at that Camp. They fought them at night, killed them and
crossed back into Botswana. As you know when someone attacks you at night you
can’t see; and when you try to run they shoot you.
There was a lot of fighting at the place where there is a Botswana Defence Force
(BDF) camp now. The Botswana Defence Force used to fight white soldiers at the
border. The regime forces were the ones who used to shoot. They blasted the pontoon
and people died there, the one which is being used for transport. The white soldiers
attacked, fighting BDF, and our soldiers had to protect themselves by shooting
back. Zambian forces were also on the other side fighting the white soldiers when
attacked. The freedom fighters, BDF and Zambian forces were one common force
fighting the white soldiers. The freedom fighters never went to the battle field during
the day; they always fought their battle at night. The fighting really happened at
Kazungula border. I am not sure whether some soldiers died there but there are
rumours that some white soldiers died. Maybe they were killed by our soldiers.
I believe our soldiers at some point fought with the white soldiers because we heard
gun shots at the border. BDF used to come to the village and told us not to get out of
the huts if fighting was on at night. They were saying they might mistake us to be
the white soldiers and shoot at us. They were also saying if we were to run away the
white soldiers might think we were refugees or freedom fighters from Zimbabwe and
shoot at us. Our soldiers knew what was happening at the border well. During the
day they allowed us to carry on with our daily activities but at night there was no
movement at all; they stopped us from moving around. In most cases they started
fighting with the enemy around five in the evening, and machine guns would be
heard until morning. When the fighting was going on, some of the BDF soldiers
came to the village and announced that we should not move out of our houses
because they might shoot at us, thinking we were white soldiers. They told us not to
move anywhere even if the gun sounds were heard close to our houses.
No one got injured in Kazungula; and no one got injured during the fighting at
the border. The only area where bullets reached was at that old immigration office
which is now used by the BDF as a camp. That camp was shot several times. The
only place where people died in large numbers was at Lesoma when the fifteen
(15) soldiers were killed. One boy from Lesoma was also killed there. He was one
of the
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boys who were sent by the Headman to go and call the Botswana soldiers from their
Kazungula base.
The policy of Botswana not allowing freedom fighters to use Botswana as a base
for attacking the regime forces was not that effective. Freedom fighters entered the
country with guns, especially at night. They knew the BDF were not supposed to
see these guns and so when they came here they hid them in the bush. When they
were in the bush, they carried them openly. But they never entered the village
carrying guns. The ones I often met at 256 used to carry guns because they were in
the bush. Here in Kazungula they never came with weapons.After fighting they hid
their weapons in the bush and came to meet villagers looking innocent. At night they
went back to prepare to launch attacks. Towards the end of the war they left some
guns in the bush. One day, some guys who were fetching firewood found a gun in
the bush with 11 bullets. They came to tell me and we informed the police. We
went there in the company of the police to collect the gun. This shows that when
these freedom fighters went back to Zimbabwe, many guns were left in the bush and
maybe burnt by veld fires.
In some cases we heard that freedom fighters were caught by police and sent
to Francistown. I don’t know what these freedom fighters would have done. I am
saying this because freedom fighters had their representatives in the Chobe District
especially here in Kasane and Kazungula. There was the leader of the freedom
fighters called Mkhwanazi. He was a Ndebele and the police knew him. They never
took him to Francistown. The freedom fighters had a camp by the river side here in
Kazungula just on your way to the Brigade. I think the police knew this camp but
pretended they didn’t know about its existence. There was no way that we would
have gone to report freedom fighters who did not give us problems. They were
fighting for their land and we had to support them. They were black like us. Some of
these freedom fighters had relatives in Botswana, why report them?
Mkhwanazi was the one who bought food for freedom fighters and distributed to
them at their different stations. The police knew him because when ever there was
a freedom fighter found lost in the bush, he was the one who was called to identify
or prove whether the soldier was Zimbabwean or not. These representatives had
vehicles and drove from Kasane to Pandamatenga giving the freedom fighters the
things they needed. More information about how Mkhwanazi operated can be
obtained from one of the police officers who once worked in Kasane.
Kazungula was an area of freedom fighters only. The borders here were busy, and
there was a lot of fighting so the refugees could not enter Botswana from
Zimbabwe, because the white soldiers were patrolling the borders day and night. If
there were refugees who came here then I never knew them. The only refugees who
entered Botswana were from Namibia but we never helped any here in Kazungula.
They were helped in Kasane.
Thank you Rra.
1994
Kowa, Victor
[Phakalane; February 2007]
Victor Kowa is a Botswana citizen but he was formerly an activist in the liberation struggle.
Botswana had to practice what they were preaching, their democracy, they had to
try to sow it to the rest of the world and the neighbouring countries that they were
truly independent. We were aware that Botswana’s position militarily could not stand
against South Africa or Rhodesia and therefore they had to try to be as smart as
possible. Botswana did not want to damage its name; it had to continue to cooperate
with South Africa. South Africa liked this position because it demonstrated for them
that although they were always condemned, they nonetheless were dealing with
black independent countries in Africa.
From what I know Botswana was supporting the liberation struggle because
they were supporting the liberation here. Those that they felt were easy target for
South Africa they had to ask them to move further on to at least Zambia because
Botswana did not have resources to protect those people. There were people in the
Special Branch who were on the pay roll of the South African regime. I know
because I accommodated these freedom fighters. When they caught these freedom
fighters they gave them about two months to leave for Zambia; meanwhile they
took their diaries and contacted the South African regime to inform them about their
intentions and information. When the MKs arrived in Gaborone and were caught by
the Special Branch, they were reported to their seniors in the government, and then
the MKs would be given a chance to do what they wanted to do within a month.
Then they arrested them, took their diaries and informed the South African
intelligence, but after they had sent them back to Zambia. This was to save
Botswana in the face of the international world, that Botswana was supporting the
liberation and was against the apartheid regime. However, some members of the
Special Branch were double agents; providing South African Intelligence with
information and at the same time appearing to aid and support the liberation
struggle.
Financially Botswana had to keep on transporting these refugees and freedom
fighters. Botswana had to use their financial resources to fly them out of Botswana.
If they were refugees, they were accommodated at Dukwi and that had financial
implications. In 1985 during the raid, I was accommodating a very senior guy of
the MK, the highest commander. He was the guy in charge of the Caravan in
Mogoditshane which had all the weaponry. When the Boers were preparing to come
and attack Gaborone, this MK guy knew that they were coming. MK had moles
within the South African Defence Force, so they were communicated in their lingo,
and he knew that they were coming. There was also another guy who claimed to
be a refugee and was playing golf. He was close to the guy that was staying at my
place. He also knew me but did not know where I was staying. He also knew about
the caravan in Mogoditshane. Before the raid, the South Africans came before hand
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and disarmed the MK guys at the caravan in Mogoditshane, and it was made public
to the Batswana; it was well described in local newspapers. Before they attacked at
night they rehearsed what they were going to do during the day; they drove around.
This guy was now with a schoolmate of mine who is now Deputy Commissioner of
the police in the South African Police. He warned other refugees not to be in their
houses that night, but when some did not listen like George Phahle, they were killed.
The South African newspapers later showed the picture of the MK guy, who it said
was highly wanted by the South African regime. Botswana government
immediately whisked the MK guy to Lusaka. When they raided, most of the MK
guys were not killed. The golf guy is the one who made sure that the weapons in
Mogoditshane were discovered and confiscated by the Botswana Police, and then
the South African raid began. The Botswana government advised him to leave and
he went to Holland, flew back to South Africa and was a South African operative
around the Carlton Centre in Johannesburg. The aim was to blow the Carlton Centre
by the MK.
Batswana supported the liberation struggle. They liked these South African
refugees but later when their houses were being blown out, cars bombed, they
kicked these refugees out of their houses for their safety but I did continue until the
bitter end.
Rhodesia was aware of that was happening in Botswana and so was South
Africa. South Africa however did not have any good evidence to attack Botswana.
In fact Botswana used to invite the South Africans to come and identify the terrorist
bases. Even the African National Congress guys had to look at the positive and
negative side of Botswana. When Botswana Defence Force met these MK guys
they were scared because of the type of weapons they were carrying. Botswana did
not have a preference over liberation movements, it accepted them equally.
Botswana monitored and controlled guerrilla activity by making a close follow
up; if they saw a new face they allowed him to stay for a month or so.
In dealing with wars of destabilization, Botswana appealed to the United Nations
and the international community, which condemned the two giants.
The refugees were taken to Dukwi after realizing that there was no accommodation,
and staying in houses was risky as they could be bombed.
1994
Kwerepe, Gaerobwe Mesho

[Maun; September 2008]
Gaerolwe Mesho Kwerepe was born in Maun on the 25th April 1929. He looked after cattle
and goats before going to school, and went to school full time in 1942. He left school in
1950, after having done standard six Batawana National School. In 1951 he joined the
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) and worked as a messenger until
he was promoted to be a translator after having leant “fanakaloo”, a vernacular used at
the South African mines. I mastered it and served well as a translator for WENELA. He
also worked at several other posts before getting involved in active politics.
My name is Gaerolwe Mesho Kwerepe. I was born in Maun on the 25th of April
1929.I looked after cattle and goats before going to school. When I started going to
school, it didn’t last long because we were told to go and look after livestock. I then
went back to school in 1942 and completed standard six in 1950, at our school
Batawana National School. In 1951 I joined the Witwatersrand Native Labour
Association (WENELA) as a messenger. I worked as a messenger until I was
promoted to be a translator after having leant “fanakaloo”, a vernacular used at the
South African mines. I mastered it and served well as a translator for WENELA,
and worked as a translator for the WENELA representatives especially the whites.
They were responsible for mine labour recruits, and had a problem of
communication with these people. WENELA recruited labour for the mines; mine
workers were sold to the South African mines by WENELA and when they got there
they stayed for 9 months. WENELA didn’t have a mine; it was only selling
labourers to the mines. I worked there for a long time and they were happy with my
services. I was paid about 3.10 pounds per month, which is equivalent to P7.20 now,
but I was doing a responsible job. I was also responsible for the papers of the
‘repatriates’ and I was responsible for making sure these people got their salaries,
which was called ‘back pays’.
My employers were very impressed by the service I provided to their company.
They wanted me to go and work in South Africa, but I couldn’t go there because I
was the bread winner in the family; I was staying with my mother, grandmother and
my aunt and that was why I could not go to another country. They therefore to paid
me for three months and then I had to quit WENELA and started work at the
Batawana Tribal Office. I was employed there because I had experience in typing,
office work and filling. I also worked as an Assistant Treasurer.
I thought of going to school, but there was no good secondary education in our
country. Botswana by then was poor and I was also having financial problems. I then
tried my best to go to America and ended up in Cape Town because I was caught by
the authorities there. People there saw that I was a stranger and brought me back to
Botswana. They left me at Mafikeng, which was the Imperial Reserve and Offices
of the then Bechuanaland Protectorate headquarters.
stories
I then came back home in 1954 and the veterinary office employed me. I became
the so called “Learner Cattle Guard” and I didn’t know what I was supposed to be
learning about livestock diseases. I worked there because I understood diagnosing
cattle diseases and their western medicines. Then there came a white man who didn’t
know how to write and he was given the post of Stock Inspector. He didn’t like me,
he was jealous of me because the District Commissioner (DC) knew me well. The
DC knew me from the time I was still a student, because he was the Chairman of the
school committee of Batawana National School. I also knew one pastor, Reverend
Neil, from England, who always told this white man about my abilities. I was
working with him in the same office. Whenever people needed help while we were
together he referred them to me. This increased the hatred that the other white man
had for me. He was a racist, so one day he told me that I thought I was a white
person, because I was working in an office, but I was just a “learner cattle guard”.
From there I worked at the Botswana Trading Association (BTA), which was
owned by the Greeks of Deacons. I worked there for a few months, before I was
promoted to be a manager, and then transferred to Tsau to manage the business.
These Greeks were from Cyprus and they didn’t know English. My responsibility
was to buy cattle from villagers. The predominately cattle owners, Herero speaking
people, mostly dominated Tsau at the time. I had to learn the Herero language, and I
mastered it; up till now I speak it very fluently. Initially local people were reluctant
to sell their cattle to me but since I had worked at WENELA before, where I was
recruiting people for mines, I knew how to make them take interest in what I was
doing. Gradually I became friends with many potential sellers, and I bought many
cattle for the company. I worked with the Greeks for some time, and I had to do my
own business on the side. My own business was located about 16km south of Tsau.
These Greeks heard that I was running my own business of buying leather and selling
it to Francistown at a profit, and they chased me away from their company. People
who were jealous of seeing me doing well had told the Greeks about my business,
so one morning they sent someone to assess everything in the shop and that very
person ended up taking over my position; so I left that job to run my own business.
I operated butchery in Shakawe, but I didn’t like Shakawe, because I was interested
in cattle rearing. I came back and concentrated in Makakume, which is 16km south
of Tsau.
While I was there active politics started, although I wasn’t interested in joining
them, I believed in Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP). In 1961-2, Philip
Matante, Motsamai Mpho and Kgalemeng Motsete came to see me and talked about
politics. We were not educated into politics at the time. In 1957, we heard that some
Namibian refugees had just arrived in Ngamiland. By then Namibia was under South
Africa white rule and was called South West Africa. So I developed interest in
those people who were seeking independence. When the Bechuanaland Peoples
Party (BPP) representatives Matante, Motsete and Mpho, the Secretary General of
their party, discussed some of these issues, I developed some interest in politics.
These
1994
guys wanted to take us by storm, telling people in Ngamiland that they were going
to bring independence to our country and that they were going to chase the white
man away because they were eating a meal 6 times a day, while cheating Batswana.
The message from these politicians was that they didn’t want white people in our
country. I felt their politics was not right for me. It’ sounded like they didn’t like
white people. Of course I listened to what they were saying but I never took them
seriously. Then after the BPP representatives politicking then came Mr Tsheko and
Mr Xhebere from BDP. Both are late. I told them I was joining BDP because I
developed interest in that line of politics. By then I was talkative and I started
moving up and down, informing people that we should be independent. Though I
had some little doubt as to whether we were going to make it, but then I thought we
should be independent. In 1964 I went to Xaxa, which is 9 km from Namibia, and
most of the inhabitants there are Bushmen (Basarwa). When I was there I addressed
meetings and they were interested in what I had to say, because they liked smoking
tobacco which I brought for them; they also knew me since we were trading
together when I was still working for the Greeks. I told them that we were
establishing a party and they listened. Then one of them who had been working at
the mines at Bayford said he knew what I was talking about. I went there to the
Basarwa settlement wooing them into BDP politics
using a donkey for transport and I took with me a water bag, dikgobe tsa kabu, milk,
and I had a gun. It is 164 km from Tsau, with no village in between at all. I went
there to sell the message of my political party.
After some time, it was clear that some people in the region wanted me to be a
Member of Parliament but I refused and Mr Morris Mohapa was elected to be a
Member of the Parliament and he died shortly. Since I was not interested to be a
Member of Parliament, I assisted and organized everything in order for Mohapa to
be a Member of the Parliament. But after his death, the President of Botswana sent
some people to me asking me to take over the position. He convinced me to be a
Member of Parliament, but I told him I could not manage because I was running
my own business and I had livestock to look after. I told him was not interested in
joining politics. I also told him that I was not good in English since I only did primary
education and learnt it through a few paid jobs.
When we joined the parliament, everyone was tested whether they were fluent in
English or not. We were sent to the District Commissioner, Grand. He took me and
tested me as to whether I can write or speak English. He dictated and I was writing,
then we started conversing, a dialogue. He then wrote me a certificate and told them
that I was fluent in English. They then appointed me to be a member of parliament
in 1965. On the 1st of March on Saturday we voted and on the 28th of March on
Monday the parliament, the Botswana National Assembly at Lobatse was officially
opened. All the Members of Parliament were 35; 31 elected and 4 specially elected.
I was a member of parliament since then, till 1994, and Jacob Nkate the Minister of
Education took control of North-West district.
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Most of the people who came to Maun were from Namibia which was known as
South West Africa under South Africa and the policies of apartheid prevailed. We
supported these people carefully not to be caught unaware. We decided to support
them but other people said we have manoeuvered our independence. It is wrong to
say that, it was just handing over to Botswana. Britain protected us because we
were in a danger and our forefathers had a vision. The chiefs went to England to
seek for protection; they were afraid because the Germans defeated Baherero and
after the defeat they fled to Bechuanaland which was under the British and they
came as refugees in 1904. We were receiving refugees and we were already
expecting them. There was Mzilikazi from the south, he passed through Botswana
and killed a lot of people you know history tells us that. Paul Kruger’s Boers were
already in the Transvaal and they fought with Mzilikazi and I think you know that
these Boers were also eager to take our country. That’s when we went to seek
protection from England and the protection came with Sir Charles Warren in May
1885.
We then experienced few injustices such as education, our education was limited,
it was segregated, it was inferior education. So we didn’t like these inequalities.
When we got our independence since in Botswana there was no education by then,
we tried to avoid all these. We tried to uplift our education that is when we
collaborated with Lesotho and Swaziland and came up with one university. When
Lesotho chased us away, we made sure that we built our own university and the
President came up with the principle “motho le motho kgomo” and we managed. I
personally, in the North- West, donated 8 bulls, but others donated 2 bulls. Former
councillor Mr Morapedi also donated 8 bulls. That was when diamond and copper
were also discovered, which improved our economy. We sold our cattle to white
farmers but they gave us the price for each bull, that was unjust and we knew that
there was nowhere to sell them except to the white farmers. We also practiced
battering at times; we exchanged a cattle for clothes. We did that because we were
suffering, as our cattle could not be sold to the market; only white farmers were
allowed. We then had a committee to help us to sell our cattle in Kazungula which
sold them to the Zambian Coal Storage in 1964.
When helping freedom fighters, we encountered a lot of problems.What we wanted
to do was to keep these people safe while in Botswana. Even the local people
donated food and at times we gave them money. For example, from my home
village there are Baherero, of which their grandchildren are the ones who fled the
1904 wars. That is why we accepted them and gave them food and money. We made
sure that they stayed safely in Botswana before they transited to their destinations.
Some stayed in Maun for some days before heading to Zambia, and some even
stayed for some months. I don’t have a proper figure of how many freedom fighters
passed through Maun. I remember that the largest group comprised of 57 people and
others came in groups of 4, 5, 10 and so on, but 57 is the only figure I remember of
freedom fighters, that passed through Maun. Most of them went to Zambia and
Tanzania. Those ones they didn’t stay in Botswana.
1994
By then the Boers were under Malan and we knew they could attack us, but they
were also afraid to attack us because we were under the protection of Britain; it should
be clear that they were afraid of the British not us. The British did not refuse us to help
freedom fighters. What we did was that we did not allow them to launch their attacks
from Botswana. We only gave them food and we did not give them military
weapons. We only gave them food. That is why I am saying those who really
helped them are the Zambians. What we did here was to give them protection and
food so that they live and transit or proceed to their destinations. Those who stayed
here stayed with their relatives. That’s why the Dukwi Refugee Camp was built.
Most of the refugees were from Namibia and they had relatives here. We have a
lot of refugees from Namibia in this region. Those that you know, the Angolans,
came recently and they didn’t stay here.
The local people were told that the freedom fighters should be helped. There was
no one who was against them being helped. I did not hear anyone complaining as
to why we were helping them. Everyone accepted that these people came from
their country to seek political refugee and they should be helped.
Political refugees did not threaten anyone; they stayed with their relatives and they
did not destroy anything. The police were protecting the local people and the refugees
as well. When they saw any refugees they caught them and kept them in camps,
they treated them with care until they proceeded to their destinations. They asked
them where they were coming from and where they were going. Our law allowed
these people to be helped because we were also involved in the struggle.
The government did not donate money in order for these people to be helped, but
they were helped by the community and the government only gave them food. But
at the end we really helped. In this region the Boers did not trek freedom fighters
to Botswana. That only happened along the Rhodesian border. In this region they
only guarded the border. There were no cases of fire exchange. They nearly shot
me, especially those who were patrolling along the border. I was using a party car
which was having a sticker written Botswana Democratic Party. I realized they
wanted to shoot me and I stopped the car and went out of the car without fear and
they had their guns pointed at me. I told them that I am using a party car I am just in
my country; you can come and see it. The one who was supposed to order them to
shoot was a bit far and when I talked to them they seemed not to understand English
but at last they dropped their guns. We were on our side and they were patrolling on
their side, but they wanted to shoot because they thought we were freedom fighters
hence helping to transport others. We were only three. They once shot Mr Henry’s
car a former member of parliament of Gantsi because they thought he was helping
to transport freedom fighters. Of course he was helping them. They crossed the
border because they knew he was helping freedom fighters. The government of
Botswana did not take any action after that because the Boers shot the car and ran
away. I did not raise the issue at the parliament concerning these people because
they didn’t do anything. They wanted me to go and stay with them so that I can give
them information. I told
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them that it is a crime to do that because I didn’t have the right to stay or cross the
border. I just said that and they replied in Afrikaans and I didn’t understand what
they were saying.
Here we didn’t have people spying among the refugees like in Gaborone. They
did not take a long time here except those who were staying with their parents.
Because most people who ran away from Namibia were Mbandero and they had
relatives who stayed in Botswana and when they arrived they stayed with them.
Most of those who did not go back acquired the citizenship of Botswana; they
did come back and stayed for a long time. We can also say Botswana helped
freedom fighters by giving them protection and food.
We had cooperated with them but we were only advising them. We advised
SWAPO and SWANO. That is why their first President thanked Botswana for its
help during their struggle. We never gave them guns; we only advised them on how
they can handle the struggle. Freedom fighters only passed through Botswana they
did not stay long. They didn’t have any activities here; they used Botswana as a
transit route to Zambia. We helped them to cross the border with their cars at times.
Freedom fighters are refugees, and there was no committee comprised of members
of political parties to deal with them. When freedom fighters arrived, it was
announced that freedom fighters have arrived and people went to help them. The
government built a refugee camp and when they returned from Tanzania and
Zambia they stayed at Dukwi Refugee Camp.
The Rhodesians are the ones who were fighting or attacking villages along the
border because their people ran into Botswana. You know they killed our soldiers
at Kazungula. Botswana had to seek for protection and Britain was tired of helping
Botswana, then Britain, asked Botswana to join South Africa and Rhodesia.
Organizations like OAU and UN donated funds for these freedom fighters to be
helped after our independence because our independence was smooth and there was
not any struggle; we cooperated well with Britain and the right word is “neelano”.
Then Princess Marina came and took their flag and left ours; that is when we took our
independence. heads of departments for different department were left behind for
examplepeopleheadingagriculture,educationandhealth.Theseheadsof departments
were responsible for teaching Batswana how to operate those departments. Since they
assigned us we never quarrelled with them.
The chiefs helped by going to Britain and asking for protection. They knew
where they were going and what they were going to do. They did not know English
but they had pastors to help them in translation. They were fore-seers. Then Britain
protected us by giving or sending governors and soldiers to help us. The principle
was that refugees should be helped, they shouldn’t be threatened and we should
help them at all costs. Especially the Baherero, they came to their relatives. I don’t
have any idea about churches which helped refugees
Sam Nujoma stayed here for some days before he went to Tanzania. He did not stay
long here and he was caught at Gantsi, and his wife was even seen in that gang,
and
1994
they were helped by Lesedi Mothibamele who was then a member of the Police
Force but later became a member of parliament. He was the Officer Commander at
Gantsi. He kept them safely and gave them food and even accommodated them at
his place. They passed through Maun. They came here before they went to
Kazungula and they went through Livingstone. Coming here they used their
leaders’ cars and others had their own cars those from SWAPO and SWANO. In
fact Sam Nujoma was not the leader then, he was the leader of the party after they
met and discussed few things and they saw that he should lead the country. It is just
like that.
The government wanted these people to be helped. The government wanted them
to be given accommodation. But it should be clear that the government didn’t
publicly announce that they are helping freedom fighters. The community was told to
help them with anything at their disposal but should not give them military weapons.
The government helped them by allowing them to cross or pass through Botswana to
other countries or to their destinations without having to suffer first. They were only
asked questions about their whereabouts and also to investigate whether they had
committed crime or not.
It was interesting to meet freedom fighters. They told us their feelings about the
struggle. Therefore, we were able to give them anything they wanted especially
food and money. We liked what they were doing. We were competing; when you
found them you gave them P50 or P100 or even popping out a bull for relish.
The government has built the Dukwi refugee camp to cater for both refugees and
those who run away from their governments. But nowadays there are no freedom
fighters. They are all free except those who are caught committing crime or who
are threatened by their countrymen like Mugabe. If they are caught in Botswana they
are only sent back to Zimbabwe because they are dangerous, they are thieves and
they are starving. They come here without anything and when they starve they are
forced to steal.
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Legwaila, Joseph
[Gaborone; August 2006]
Mr Legwaila served as Senior Private Secretary, and Political Assistant to the President
of the Republic of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama from 1974 to 1980. He became the
Permanent Representative of Botswana to the United Nations from1980 to 2002; Then,
while he was still the Ambassador, he was appointed Deputy Special Representative of the
UN Secretary General in Namibia from 1989 to 1990. Later from 1992 to 1994 he was
appointed the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the OAU in South
Africa.
Well, you know, a lot of people have asked how Botswana became a member of the
Frontline States. I think the reason why they are asking is because, if you look at
President Kaunda and President Nyerere, the two who started the Frontline States
fraternity, I think you realise there was nothing in common ideologically, between
them, and Seretse Khama. Therefore no one expected Seretse Khama to be
welcomed to that fraternity. Additionally, Seretse Khama was geographically too
close to South Africa. In other words, what we meant by the Frontline States was
its proximity to South Africa; and therefore I am sure a person like President
Nyerere would have thought that if Seretse Khama joined the frontline states, that
was tantamount to saying to South Africa, “You can go to hell. I am going to join
the very same people who have been agitating against apartheid.” So Nyerere and
Kaunda welcomed Seretse to their group.
In fact, I am told that there were some of their officials, who thought that it was not
good or wise to have Seretse become a member of the Frontline fraternity, because
of his ideological orientation. I think the view was that Seretse Khama was
conservative, as compared to Nyerere and Kaunda, who were considered radical and
revolutionary. Therefore, they thought Seretse Khama was going to dilute their
revolutionary credentials. Nevertheless, Seretse Khama became a member, and
according to Mwalimu, as it turned out, that was indeed a God-send he became a
moderating influence in the Frontline States fraternity.
There is no doubt that Botswana contributed a great deal to the liberation of
Southern Africa. First, I talk about the cost, in terms of time, energy and money,
because we had to hire planes to fly to the capitals of Tanzania and Zambia, and later
on, to the capitals of an enlarged Frontline States group, which included Mozambique
and Angola.
Of course, the meetings never took place in Gaborone because some of the
members did not want to risk coming so close to the border with South Africa. The
first meeting attended by Seretse was in December 1974, in Lusaka; that was the
meeting where the three Presidents, President Seretse Khama, President Kaunda and
President Nyerere, united the Zimbabwean parties, under Bishop Abel Muzorewa,
to form what was called the United African National Congress (UANC), headed by
Bishop Muzorewa.
1994
It was a dramatic meeting, in the sense that Mwalimu had to send his Private
Secretary, accompanied by Mark Chona, the Special Assistant to President Kaunda,
to go to Salisbury to liberate, for a very short period of time, the leaders of ZANU,
to make sure that they could attend the meeting in Lusaka; Nkomo had to be
brought from a detention camp, to attend that meeting.
Then of course, Mwalimu discovered that who was brought from Salisbury was
Mugabe, instead of Sithole. President Nyerere believed that the leader of ZANU
was Ndabaningi Sithole and not Robert Mugabe, and so the Private Secretary to
President Nyerere and the Special Assistant to President Kaunda, Mark Chona, had
to go back, to bring Sithole. Sithole was brought to Lusaka during the night and
finally, the parties agreed to unite under Bishop Muzorewa.
The idea was that they would unite, and go back to Salisbury to organise a
Congress to elect a leader to replace Muzorewa, but if they elected Muzorewa, that
would have been their prerogative. Unfortunately, that Congress never took place,
because some of the people who had gone to Lusaka, instead of staying in Salisbury,
went elsewhere; some like President Mugabe, for instance, took off for the border
with Mozambique and went into Mozambique, to prosecute the liberation struggle
from Mozambique.
Now, the other thing, which we must not lose sight of, was the fact that the
liberation struggle was a liberation struggle for freedom in the totality of Southern
Africa. So, it wasn’t a liberation struggle in Rhodesia alone. So, the other question
which the Frontline States Presidents had to deal with was the question of apartheid,
in South Africa. In other words, they supported the liberation struggle waged by the
ANC and the PAC, in South Africa, so that every meeting of the Frontline states
took place in the presence of the leaders of all the liberation movements, and that
included SWAPO.
All the countries that were still under colonial rule shared something in common,
as they were all oppressed by foreign powers, and all of them wanted to be free.
The Frontline States was a focal point for them. These leaders were a conduit for
them to communicate their message to the rest of the world; that was to persuade the
colonial powers to give up, because freedom fighters were not going to lay down their
weapons in the struggle against apartheid and colonialism.
Botswana suffered a great deal and that suffering was a great contribution to the
liberation struggle because not only were we the ‘home away from home’ for the
refugees, but even for those people who left their countries to join the armies of the
liberation movement, we welcomed them, which was a very dangerous thing for us.
We welcomed them, not to wage war from our country; although they sometimes
did, against our wishes. We allowed them to pass through here and went for training,
or went to join their armies wherever they were encamped. That was the reason
why, eventually, we were treated as if we were actually, physically, participating in
the war against South Africa, and Rhodesia, and we were bombed. Francistown
was attacked by the Rhodesians; our soldiers were killed, as you know, in 1977 at
Lesoma. We were also attacked more than twice, here in Gaborone. This is a
contribution
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which the leaders of South Africa, and of Zimbabwe, have recognised; just this
week, on Monday 28 August 2006, President Mugabe praised Botswana, for what
we did during the liberation struggle.
When I was in New York, I was once asked, to nominate people for a Nobel
Prize, and I nominated the Presidents of the Frontline States. Of course, they did not
get the Nobel Prize, but I did so, because I bear witness to what they did, for Southern
Africa, and for the suffering their countries went through. If you consider what
Zambia went through! Zambia was almost brought to its knees; not only because of
the bombing by Smith, but also because of the presence of the freedom fighters on
the soil of Zambia. It was the same with Angola, and as I have already mentioned
my own country, and Mozambique. All these countries suffered a lot, for the
liberation of their neighbours. It is right to wonder why Botswana, a country that is
so exposed geographically, so close to and so dependent on South Africa for access
to the sea, for the exportation of goods and services, supported the liberation
struggle. We were, and still are, a member of the Customs Union. There was so
much that we shared with South Africa, which meant, that we had to walk a tight
rope in our foreign policy, to make sure that we were not destroyed by South Africa.
Botswana did walk a tight rope, but Seretse Khama was a man of principles; a
man who realised that his country would never enjoy peace, so long as South
Africa was not free; so long as Southern Rhodesia was not free; so long as
Namibia was not free; so long as any country that had not been decolonised,
around Botswana, was not free, because we were surrounded by white
minority regimes who did not like what was going on in Botswana.
What was going on in Botswana was democracy and non-racialism; a black person
could marry a white person and a white person could marry a black person; this
was not a good example to the white minority regimes, because not only were they
minority regimes, they were also racist regimes. I am reading a book on Seretse by
Ruth, and that says exactly what type of problems we faced, as a newly
independent country, where non–racialism was practiced. I think that is all I can say,
in explaining why by joining the frontline states, we endangered ourselves. We
joined the Frontline States simply because we wanted to associate ourselves with
those who were seeking the liberation of our continent; and we were also being
mindful of the fact that as long as there was no freedom in our neighbouring
countries, we were not going to be free ourselves.
Kwame Nkrumah once said, that the freedom of Ghana, alone, was not enough
freedom as long as the rest of Africa remained in chains. That was also our stance
in Botswana. Seretse Khama’s belief was that everybody around us must be free, in
order for us to enjoy our freedom.
Botswana supported the Liberation Committee in its prosecution of the struggle.
We attended all the meetings of the Liberation Committee, in Dar es Salaam. We
supported it, not only by attending the meetings; but we also supported it financially.
That was done secretly and people did not even realise that we were making our
financial contributions, because we were afraid that our contributions would be made
1994
public, and South Africa would be annoyed, and harm us; but eventually we paid
our dues and our arrears to the Liberation Committee. Another thing that people
don’t know is that we had decided earlier on, that in lieu of contributing this money
directly to the Liberation Committee, which would have made our contribution
public, because it was going to appear in the records of the liberation Committee,
to open an account in Addis Ababa, so that we could use the money in that account
to support the liberation movements.
Those are things we could not have publicised because of the danger that we
would have faced if we did that. So I think it is important for people to know that
our contribution was not only in terms of hiring aeroplanes, going to meetings of the
Frontline States; I, and others, being sent by our President to Geneva, to London; and
all over, to attend the meetings of the Frontline States. We did far more than that, and
I think it is important for people to know.
What I can say is that I am not aware of how the BDF treated freedom fighters, if
they encountered them in the bush. All I know is that there was a law in my country
that we were not going to allow the freedom fighters to operate from Botswana. There
were many cases where we arrested freedom fighters and tried them publicly, in a
Court of Law. Some of us thought that they should be tried secretly. They were
tried, but that didn’t mean that we had stopped being sympathetic to their cause. We
were still sympathetic to their cause. Botswana is a very big country and I would
not be surprised if the freedom fighters used our country to cross into South Africa.
How else could they get to South Africa, from Zambia, from Zimbabwe; and from
many other countries? The problem arose when the freedom fighters showed their
presence, with their arms, in Botswana., because that amounted to really saying to
the Government of Botswana,“To hell with your law forbidding us to operate from
here.” I don’t think if you heard that some freedom fighters had crossed from
Mathathane, into South Africa, you would call Tambo and accuse him of violating
our laws. As long as they were not seen, Botswana would not bother. I think that
was the understanding.
I am sure some people will think that I am treating our history carelessly, but I
am of the opinion that the freedom fighters secretly used our country. As I say, it is
empty, most of it, and therefore what we didn’t see, we didn’t worry about.
You know, a lot of individuals in Botswana contributed immensely to the liberation
of South Africa; liberation of Southern Rhodesia and the liberation of Namibia. They
didthatbyaccommodatingtherefugeeswhentheycrossedtheborderintoourcountry
or by hiding the freedom fighters, to make sure that they were not captured by the
Boers. I will not be surprised if there were some of my countrymen, and women, who
even crossed the border to go and fight for freedom, with our neighbours. One of our
countrymen, Michael Dingake, had to spend 15years in Robben Island, although he
did not go inside South Africa to fight, but he was fighting for the liberation of South
Africa, from Botswana; from wherever he was. So, there are so many unsung
heroes, and heroines, in the country, if only we knew who they were, who did far
much more than the ‘Call of Duty’; and that is the reason why they suffered so
much. A lot of
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people were killed, whose crime was simply to associate themselves with the
freedom fighters; in terms of giving them food, and in terms of giving them
accommodation. Therefore, we must always remember that it was not simply the
Government which assisted the liberation movement. Maybe the ordinary
Botswana people assisted the liberation movement even more than the Government,
because their people were not protected, and were not accommodated by the
Government. They did not come here to live in Government houses. They came here
to live in the houses of ordinary people, and when the Boers came here to bomb, they
did not bomb Government houses. They bombed a house belonging to your
grandmother, for example, who was housing an ANC person; therefore, that is what
must be recognised by our neighbours.
Another thing is that, people must remember that many of our people went to
school in South Africa; and while they were in South Africa, they came into
contact with the ANC, and they went to school with ANC people. Some of them
went to school with PAC people, and when they came back, they continued to be
members of those movements. Just like Sobhuza, King of Swaziland; he died an
ANC member and I am sure Seretse Khama, until he became the President of the
Republic of Botswana, he was still in the ANC; as well as many others like
Motsamai Mpho and the rest. There were people who were sympathetic to the ANC,
the ANC having been their party; some were sympathetic to the PAC, the PAC
having been their party; and therefore, even they have contributed immensely, to the
liberation of South Africa.
I think the greatest lesson we learnt, is the lesson of solidarity with our neighbours.
This was actually translated in the actions of the Frontline States; not only here, but
in New York, and the OAU, because we were considered a very good group to be
associated with, because we were in the forefront of the liberation of Southern
Africa, and therefore, we were so attractive...And, because we were attractive, we
ourselves discovered that our solidarity was very important, for ourselves.
As I said earlier, Botswana had nothing in common ideologically with other
Frontline States. We were on the conservative side, but people forgot that we were
conservative when we were a member of the Frontline States. They thought we
were as radical as the rest. And then, of course, one good thing is that we were
doing this for our own neighbourhood. One of the greatest lessons was that, when
your neighbour’s house catches fire, remember that if you do not help your
neighbour extinguish a fire, that fire will leap and consume your own house. We are
now reaping the benefits of regional cooperation, as a result of our contribution to
the liberation struggle. Mandela visited us because he knows the sacrifice that we
made for the freedom of his country.
Another lesson, which I think most people have forgotten, is that, SADC was
born out of the Frontline States; it was a creation of the Frontline States because it
is the Frontline States who were approached by the Commonwealth with the idea of
forming an economic grouping, as a wing of the Frontline States.
I remember I was sent to Dar es Salaam with the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Rre Mogwe, to broach this idea to President Mwalimu Nyerere. President Nyerere
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agreed to the idea, since he was the Chairman of the Frontline States, and in any
case, Tanzania was not a contiguous country to South Africa. The other reason he
gave was that far as the Western world was concerned, Seretse Khama was more
popular than he was. Thus when Seretse Khama went out to ask for assistance on
behalf of an economic wing if the Frontline States, the international community
would be more forthcoming than if, he, Mwalimu, were to go there and ask for
assistance. We came back and informed our President, who agreed to initiate what
today we call SADC. Again it was I, and Minister Mogwe, who went around
selling the idea to all the Presidents of the Frontline States. Therefore, SADC is a
child of the Frontline States. This was brought about by the solidarity that the
Frontline States felt. This was also the reason why it was easy for them to agree to
an economic wing of the Frontline States. That economic wing of the Frontline
States could have been problematic because there were those who felt that we
should also invite the Soviet Union and GDR to the first meeting. Botswana
thought that those, if invited would simply be occupying space, because they were
not known for giving financial aid; all that they used to give was weapons, for the
liberation movements. Eventually we agreed to invite whoever that needed to be
invited, and we invited the East and the West to participate in the first meeting of
SADC. But I think the long and short of the story is that SADC is a child of the
solidarity that we, in the Frontline States, felt towards
each other.
Thank You.
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Liti, Ester
[Dukwi; June 2008]
Ester Liti was born in 1978 and ran away from Angola in 1978 with her husband. She
settled in Botswana in 1981 as a refugee. Now she has acquired Botswana citizenship and
continues to live in the country without the refugee status.
I ran from war in Angola in 1978 with my husband and settled in Namibia. We had
one child in Namibia, but we could not stay in Namibia because there was a war
against the Boers. So we proceeded into Botswana and settled in the camp in 1981.
All other children of mine were born in Botswana. On arrival we were
accommodated in tents, but at roughly the same time, some Zimbabwean refugees
were repatriated and we occupied the houses that they had been using.
There were various organizations which made life easier for us in the camp. The
LWF is such an example. I do not know what LWF stood for, everyone just called it
LWF. Through such organizations my child managed to go to crèche and later started
schooling at Dukwi primary school. All my children attended school. I did not deny
them that right; they also participated in school activities and we allowed them to go
on school trips such as tours and music competitions.
The family lived on farming. We were given land and seeds to plough and other
tools to use in our gardens. Women worked equally as men on these gardens. There
was nothing men could do alone because all the life was centred around these
gardens. Apart from these gardens we lived on monthly rations that were supplied to
us.
Life in the camp was good except that there was too much dependence on
government and other organizations within the camp such as UNICEF and BCR.
However relations with Batswana were very good;, they were very tolerant and
understanding. I attended the Old Apostolic Church with Batswana; they treated me
and my family well. My children also played with Batswana children. We were just
like a family with Batswana. They were also willing to understand our situation, we
narrated stories of how we ran from war and they sympathized with us.
Of course I used the church as a coping mechanism. I could everything as normal
and that is why I took Angola and its troubles out of my mind. There was no better
solace than God.
The only conflict that I can remember was between Angolans and Zimbabweans,
but it ended. It did not persist for long. It only lasted for that one day. I cannot
certainly say what year it was. It was not significant. Generally relations among
refugees were good.
We learnt Setswana from interacting with Batswana, but largely we got it from
our children who were schooling. Since they were young they grasped the language
better than we did.
Life in the camp was very much better than It is now. We were supplied with
everything and now we are poor because we are expected to fend for ourselves. We
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have no jobs and life is hard. The government built us two roomed houses and left
us because we are now Batswana and not refugees. I don’t feel discriminated here
in Newstands. The only problem is that we are struggling to make ends meet as a
family. We did not go back to Angola because it could have made no difference. I
also believe that Botswana is more stable. Going back home would have meant
starting life afresh but here in Dukwi it is continuing with life, although I must
admit, it is a challenge to survive.
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Lotlamoreng, Kgosi of the Barolong

[Good Hope; June 2007]
Kgosi Lotlamoreng is relating his experiences of how Botswana as a country and her
people helped the refugees and freedom fighters, mainly from South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia, by giving them shelter, food and other needs, and by accommodating them in
their homes as well as building them camps,
Botswana supported the liberation struggle because they were supporting their
African brothers because as Africans we are one people. The liberation that was
wanted in South Africa was not for South Africa alone, it was for us as well as the
entire region of Southern Africa. It was important therefore that Batswana support
other Africans that wanted liberation by then. We helped them in different ways. We
gave them accommodation, shelter. Many South Africans that ran away from that
country were actually hiding here. Even those that passed to go to other countries,
they passed through this country and we protected them. We gave them that help.
We did not help the liberation struggle with money. We gave them protection. We
sacrificed our lives, as we were being bombed constantly by the South African
regime in places like Gaborone, Tlokweng and even Francistown. We gave them
protection and showed them the way to Zambia and other countries beyond.
I have said Batswana and South Africans are one people; oppression that was in
South Africa also affected us, as well as the people in other countries in the region.
Botswana was independent and its internal policies did not change save for
developments which could have been undertaken but funds diverted to cater for the
army, the food and accommodation for the refugees. Relations with South Africa
affected Botswanabecauseoureconomywasdependentontheirsandduringsanctions
on South Africa we could not export some of our products through that country.
The government treated the various liberation movements equally and encouraged
unity. The goal was liberation not support of one movement over the other. Botswana
did not want to make the presence of freedom fighters public nor did it want to talk
about their presence in the country. The presence of liberation struggle figures such
as Mandela, Oliver Thambo, Thabo Mbeki, and Samora Machel were kept secret,
and only released long after they had passed through the country.“I have heard that
some weapons used in the liberation struggle were recently unearthed in our
district, I am yet to verify the validity of that rumour.
Botswana resolved conflicts and factionalism in the liberation movement
because the Government was interested in unity and nothing more. The other
countries came to respect us for the role we played in the liberation struggle.
Botswana was known for its peace, stability, and democracy; besides, we relate well
with the SADC countries. Botswana was not interested in war but peace. Despite
acts of destabilization we maintained our peace and democracy, and we continued
to help the refugees.
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We have started to realize that we are all Africans and we are one people. We are
proud to be in the SADC region. We are benefitting from trading freely with each
other in the region.
Lessons learn by Botswana from the phase of political struggle that can be
applied to the current phase of economic transformation is that we have to respect
human rights. We are all equal and we should not despise other people. Our leaders
should listen to the people.
All international organizations supported Botswana and the Frontline States.
Other independent countries also supported the Frontline States.
We gave the refugees accommodation, shelter and food. We helped the refugees
by building them refugee camps in Selibe Phikwe, Francistown and Dukwi. We
even accommodated them in our private homes.
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Malema, Kgosi Mmirwa

[Bobonong; January 2008]
Kgosi Mmirwa Malema, 70, lived on the border with Rhodesia during the influx of
refugees into Botswana. He explains his experiences and what he witnessed during that
time.
I can recall the period of the liberation war in the 1970s, although I may not recall
everything. We received many refugees from Rhodesia such as teachers, nurses,
school children, and others; it was a whole mixture of people. Some had swollen
legs, and were hardly able to walk. One incident I can recall was that of an aeroplane
which had come into Botswana territory in search of Manama Mission school
children at Semolale/Gobajango. The villagers had scattered into the bush. There
were freedom fighters in the area ready to shoot it down, but the plane flew away.
Another incident I can recall was that, the Land Board members, including myself,
had put up for the night at Semolale. That night a Rhodesian plane flew over the
village and lit up the village with flashlights. I fled to Bobonong in my car. This is
how dangerous the situation was. The refugees who had fled to Botswana told us of
the cruelty inflicted upon the people by the Rhodesian soldiers, such as killings and
amputation of limbs; villages were left in ruins.When the refugees came to
Bobonong, they came to the kgotla and from there they were taken to Selebi-Phikwe
and onward to Dukwi Refugee camp by the police.
Our people were receptive and empathised with these people. They gave them food
and shelter. Many of them were related to us. They were Babirwa like us. However,
we did not discriminate against the non- Babirwa. We assisted all the refugees
equally.
In those days there was no police camp at Semolale and the army base had not yet
been established, so we sent transport from Bobonong to fetch the refugees. People
in the border villages who had cars transported them free of charge to Bobonong.
Some actually walked to Bobonong amidst great difficulties. Examples of those
who helped are Motsumi Mogorosi and Join Ngala. One of those who helped most
by giving shelter, food and protection to them was Join Ngala. Many knew him as he
had once schooled in Zimbabwe and lived there for sometime. This is why the
Rhodesian soldiers sought to capture or kill him. In fact at one point they nearly
killed him and he had to flee from his home in Mabolwe to Semolale.
There were also me who spied for the Rhodesians, and hence they knew about
Ngala. I do not have much information about the spies, but I am suspicious they
were there.
Another aspect of the struggle was that when freedom fighters were injured in the
war with Rhodesian soldiers, they were taken to Selebi- Phikwe hospital for
treatment and thereafter they went wherever they wished to go.
Concerning refugees, some of those with relatives in Bobirwa were allowed to
settle in the villages with relatives.At the end of the war, some returned to Zimbabwe,
others
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became citizens of Botswana. So, ethnicity helped to get some refugees assimilated
into Bobirwa.
One of the benefits for supporting the struggle is that Botswana became well-
known internationally, as a peace loving country. This raised our stature.
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Manamela, John
[Dukwi; June 2008]
John Manamela is 52 years old and a former refugee who arrived from South Africa in
the 1970. He lived in other parts of Botswana before he finally settled in the Dukwi Refugee
Camp.
I arrived in Dukwi refugee camp in 1980. However I left South Africa during the
1970s and settled in some parts of Botswana like Gaborone and Francistown,
before coming to the camp.
On arrival I was given a plot where I started operating an orchard. I never had any
prior knowledge to this agricultural feat; I did it out of interest because I used to see
fruit trees in South Africa, and I was interested in plants. In the camp we had a man
we called Mr Mmusi, he was then an Agricultural Demonstrator. He saw to it that we
had land and distributed seeds to refugees. However, I got seedlings from a store or
governmental nursery called Impala in Francistown for my fruit trees. The refugees
were mostly supplied with vegetable seeds. I had a range of fruits in my orchard,
like paw-paws, oranges and guavas, for example; I also had a range of flowers that
I was selling.
Everyone was familiar with my orchard and I had customers in and around the
camp. I could even sell as far as Francistown and Gweta. Of course transport was
always arranged by Botswana Council for Refugees (BCR). Batswana who worked
in the camp had my flowers in their compounds.
I also lived on my skills; I’m a builder. I built the restaurant that was run by
refugees, as well as the poultry houses for refugee chicken projects and the
community hall at the camp. The projects I have just mentioned were sponsored by
what we called LWF. I cannot remember well what it stands for but it was a
Lutheran organ.
Some of the South Africans were well learned men; the ones who were teachers
offered their service by teaching refugee students. The BCR was also another organ
that came to our aid in the camp; it helped refugees cope with their situation by
counselling them where necessary. It also addressed all refugee queries and needs,
such as scholarships. Those who wanted to further their education did so through the
guidance and organization by the BCR.
When the other refugees went back to South Africa I did not go back because I had
found happiness in Botswana. I married here and all my children are here so I did not
want to go back where I would start life anew. Batswana accepted us and I have
never had any problem because they were so good to us. Some did not go home for
fear of being killed; these were mostly the criminals who were wanted for gross
violation of human rights, and so they could not go back.
I had to vacate my orchard for new refugees, but I’ve now started a new one
in Newstands where we have relocated. I cannot say that I had lost much by not
returning to South Africa, because by then I did not have anything much. I am happy
in Botswana. The only difference is that I am no longer considered a refugee, and
I
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have to fend for myself and my family. In the camp we used to get food supplies
and clothes sometimes, but at present I am doing everything for myself; and I think
we are managing.
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Maplanka, Edward Barakanye

Barakanye Edward Maplanka was born in Maun 1953. He went to school in Ngamiland
in Moremi Primary School as well as Thamalakane, obtained first class, and then went to
Gaborone. In 1975 he joined the Police at Police College where he trained as a Para-
military at the Police Mobile Unit (PMU.) In 1977 when the Botswana Defence Force
(BDF) was formed he was one of those who managed to move from the Police to the BDF,
where he worked for 31 years, until his retirement in August 2005.
My name is Barakanye Edward Maplanka. I was born in Maun in 1953. So to start
with I started schooling in Ngamiland in Moremi Primary School as well as
Thamalakane; as you can see those schools are close to one another, so I finished my
standard seven in 1973 and obtained first class. I then went to Gaborone when I
was about 21-22 years. In 1975 I joined the Police at Police College where I trained
as a Para-military at the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), because you understand that at
Police College you are taught law and at PMU we were taught how to handle guns.
In 1977 when the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) was formed I was one of those
who managed to move from the Police to the BDF. I have worked with the BDF for
31 years until when I retired at my own will, on the 31st of August, 2005; that is
when I left the force. After retiring I have stayed in Maun for 3 years now.
Botswana played a role because the struggle was for Africans that was a struggle
for Africans; when we say Africans we are referring to Botswana, Namibia,
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique. I can also list
Malawi and those countries that today form the Southern African Development
Committee (SADC). There was that feeling that the struggle must be supported by
these countries, because they would cooperate as African states to liberate their
brothers and sisters. I can refer you to such organizations like Organization of
African Unity (OAU) which brought together African states, and which also assisted
in the liberation struggle of Southern Africa. I can say they are one family.
Botswana was threatened in many ways because the African people who were
fighting for their own survival were sometimes forced to run from their own countries
into Botswana, which meant their enemies had to follow them into Botswana.
Following them into Botswana posed a threat, sometimes there were attacks on
Botswana by the white regimes; the Lesoma incident was an example.
As we are talking about Ngamiland, most of the freedom fighters were from
Namibia; thousands of Namibians are still here even now, and this started during the
liberation period.
Batswana, including the BDF supported these people because they ran to us.
Therefore, if your relative is afraid of some sort of crisis from their own country you
help him; you give him water to drink, but also if you accept him, you must know
how you can help him overcome. This was what happened to freedom fighters and
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refugees. We accepted them, knowing that some had lost their families, others had
lost their friends and left school.You know that during wartime people were scattered
all over and others ran for good and never returned. It was very difficult during the
liberation war. When they came here we realized that they had to be helped. There
were United Nations (UN) Offices here for refugees; whenever they came they
were interviewed to see if they were those who ran away while at school, so that
they could be taken to schools here.
We caught some refugees and freedom fighters for having crossed the border
into Botswana. Of course, if we met people who were from war, crossing the border
illegally, we caught them and asked them some questions, because some of them
might have been soldiers working for the white regimes. We had to ask all of them
questions to establish how they came about to cross into our country at ungazzetted
areas. We also established why they crossed the border into Botswana and what
motivated the move.
The people of Botswana were very cooperative. Like for instance, although we
are talking about Ngamiland, if you take the case of Bokalaka where I worked for
14 years, based in Francistown; that is where many freedom fighters were crossing
the border into Botswana. We even met them in villages along the border. It was
dangerous because they were armed when crossing into Botswana, and people in the
villages near the border had to be worried. They wanted guarantee of their security;
they wanted to see the BDF in patrol so that they could get help when they needed
it. We used to ask them to tell us if they saw some people they suspected to be
freedom fighters in the village, and then we had to go there to see those freedom
fighters. This is the cooperation I am referring to. The people reported to us had to
confirm to us (BDF) if indeed they were freedom fighters. We knew they were
dangerous because they carried dangerous weapons and they did not hide that their
aim was to fight the government of Ian Smith.
We took their guns and kept them at the BDF camp. If people had been allowed
to cross into Botswana with guns, even though we were not fighting the regime
governments running the countries they were coming from, those white regimes
would still put the blame on the government of Botswana. They would still come
up with an excuse to attack us, claiming we were helping freedom fighters. We knew
that it was illegal to cross into another country with military weapons; therefore
these guns were taken by the BDF. We travelled with freedom fighters towards the
border to assess their problem because they were Africans like us and we understood
what they were fighting for and that they were ill-treated by the system where they
were coming from. Arrangements were made to take them to other countries where
they were supposed to go for training, but we did not want them to fight their
governments from our country. That is how we helped.
This is the danger about these people that I am talking of; I can’t deny that we
met Smith’s soldiers. But you should know that when soldiers meet in the bush or
along the border they shoot each other, like you may know that it was always
announced
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on the radio, especially by the late radio Botswana Rebaone Mookodi who knew
how dramatize, calculating our [BDF] shootings with Smiths soldiers. He used to
report about the attack and that Smith soldiers have exchanged fire with our
soldiers at the border.
There were many incidents where we exchanged fire with Smith’s soldiers. I can’t
go through all of them as to where we met and what happened but the history is there.
The only incident I can refer you to is that of Lesoma in 1978 because it was a
large scale event. There were so many small incidents which happened.
When we are talking about the Boers, we are talking about Boers of Smith,
South Africa, and those from Namibia; they were all the same and they did what
the Boers did, they cooperated. So we patrolled our side of the border up to Shakawe
and when we met we exchanged fire. It was in December 1981, and nobody died. I
am the one who was there at the time and I was the leader of the troop. It was
around 10 o’clock during the night when we started exchanging fire. I can’t tell you
a lot of things as to what happened but no one got injured. Not meaning that I was
alone but the tip was mine I was the one in charge.
There were no cases of misunderstandings with the local community. As you know,
if you are running away into another country asking for drinking water, kana mokopi
o tshwaanetse a ikise ko tlase. Not meaning that there were no cases of people who
were not well behaved; it could happen as human beings, a human being is always
a human being.
Incidents where white soldiers came and threatened villagers, while looking for
freedom fighters happened a lot in Bokalaka area. That is why we had to run there
whenever we were told Boers from Rhodesia got into Botswana, in villages like
Jackalas1 or 2. We rushed there only to be told that they were there and had already
gone. But since it was war time, white regime soldiers trekked the freedom
fighters; they trekked them until they found where they ended, like having crossed
the border into Botswana. Then the Smith soldiers threatened our people, abused
and accused them of harbouring guerrillas. Therefore the villagers reported them to
us and we went the border area to see what was happening; but by the time we
arrived they had disappeared from the village and had quickly ran back to
Rhodesia. You can see that there was tension because we were forced to patrol our
border to stop them from crossing into Botswana.
We were able to patrol the border because when our army was first established,
we were few in numbers, but during that time we were tough and strong. Everyone
was interested in joining the army; more so because it was formed when there was
tension between the Boers and the Blacks. So, if you join under such circumstances
it is not like joining the army during peace time, when you are not likely to gain
war experience know how it is to be at war. Therefore, we managed to divide
ourselves and patrolled the borders. We used everything we had at our disposal in
order to protect our people this on side. Now you can see how tough it was; that is
why I am saying
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soldiers during that time were very strong. We don’t want to mention their names
because some of them are highly respected people.
We never looked down upon ourselves; whenever we heard that there were some
attacks while we were in Gaborone, we were always eager to be taken where it was
happening as soon as possible. We were deeply in love with the army. Being a
soldier was in our minds all the time, to the extent that if you were at the border
and had come back to base without having met with the Smith soldiers, you felt like
you were not being a real soldier. It felt like you didn’t go to work.
When freedom fighters crossed the border into Botswana they had relatives in
Botswana, all borders. . Just like you in the Balalaika, people there have relatives in
Zimbabwe. Therefore, everywhere even around Shakawe they had relatives; those
from Namibia had relatives in Botswana and some of them are Bahererro and
Bambukushu who are citizens of this country. When people are relatives they are
relatives; but please note that even before the wars, they visited each other.
Therefore, during war times if a relative is coming to your place, you help him as
much as you can. First, you will give him first aid if he is found with dangerous
wounds. These are things that you might have to do if you find that someone has
been injured.
First aid in the army is the first priority because you are taught that being in the
army is a risk; during wars you fight and you can get wounded or something worse
can happen to you. Therefore, each and every soldier must know how to apply first
aid. You know that the Red Cross Organization deals with first aid. You know that
if you arrive somewhere and you find someone injured in an accident, having been
taught first aid you have to apply what is called first aid help. As an army, we did
assist a lot.
We examined how the freedom fighters were injured and applied first aid because
we had to save their lives, whether they were illegal immigrants or not. We had to
help them, but we could not ask them many questions while they were injured or
seriously wounded.
The relationship between Botswana and those white ruled regimes was very sour.
Our first President, Sir Seretse Khama was someone who time and again wanted
dialogue with these countries. But these countries were challenging us, like you
saw them following their people here and bombing our country. However, we had to
stick to the dialogue until, like in Zimbabwe where there was the Lancaster House,
if I remember well, these Lancaster House talks finally brought peace to Zimbabwe.
Some freedom fighters destroyed or stole property. They were a dangerous lot;
especially if we are talking about guerrillas, we are talking about someone who was
fighting for the freedom of his country without staying there but operating from
another country across the border; fighting from the bush not even staying in a
village, so where can food come from? This is why some stole from villagers. They
were hungry, and at the same time staying in the bush made some of them to be wild
and being military men, fighting all the time, obviously if they arrived at a village
unexpected, villagers had to run away. Sometimes those who were hungry arrived
at
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a local café and took food for themselves without asking or paying for it. Like in
the case of Bokalaka we found them having harassed the whole village and took
away food for feeding themselves in the bush. Some villagers got tired of helping
freedom fighters, and this is why villagers started reporting their presence to us.
There was fear in villages along the border. But initially they used to accommodate
freedom fighters without reporting them to authorities. They realized that some of
them attacked a nearby town in Rhodesia stealing items such as jewellery and
watches from shops and when they crossed back to Botswana they wanted to give
Batswana some of the valuable items for safe keeping; so some people were not
comfortable to assist in that manner. The local people also reported that when they
gave freedom fighters accommodation, some of them launched their attacks from
Botswana. After launching attacks against the Smith regime, they ran and came
back to Botswana. Therefore, Batswana households became the hiding place for
such characters. We caught some of them; we even exchanged fire with them some
time. Some of the freedom fighters were crooks at the same time. Sometimes we
expected them to fight us when we met them. Our main aim was to catch them
because they came into the country as dangerous people; they were armed and
they were also abusing our people because we had such information about them. So
such people could fight you whenever you met them.
Organizations such as OAU and UN were helping refugees, by taking them
to schools in Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana. Those on transit from Ngamiland
stayed in Maun for some days before they were taken to Francistown or where they
were heading to up north. In 1978-1982 some were taken to Dukwi. Some of them
decided to remain behind and ended up taking Botswana citizenship. Some Angolans
married Batswana here. Their children cannot speak any language except Setswana.
They are Batswana.
Chiefs were helping freedom fighters because they are the owners of the villages
and when people arrive, they were reported to them. The chief were supposed to
know about the arrival of these people and their presence in the village. He
assigned people to pitch tents for them for accommodation. The chief represented
the local government. In Ngamiland, when refugees arrived, they were taken to the
kgotla. Nobody took them to his house or let them settle before reporting their
presence to the chief.
The liberation struggle was for African countries: Southern African people who
were fighting for freedom. Given my own personal experience I consider the liberation
struggle educational. I am also proud to have witnessed that period in history. Since
we were ruled by a democratically elected government, we had directions as to
where we were going and what we were doing, but not our neighbours in South
Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Given our role in the struggle, at the end we saw
Namibia, Zimbabwe and finally South Africa being liberated. At the end of the day
we were proud of our role in their freedom.
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Masire, Tebogo
[Gaborone; October 2008]
Lt. General Tebogo Masire is the Commander of The Botswana Defence Force, Sir Seretse
Khama Barracks, Mogoditshwane.
Botswana was a member of many international bodies such as the Organization

of African Unity, the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. All these
organizations were in support of the liberation of all the countries in Southern Africa.
So Botswana, just like these organizations also supported the liberation struggle.
Botswana was in a precarious position geographically because she was in the
middle of it, that is, unlike other countries that were far from the struggle,
geographically. The moral attitude of our leaders then prompted Botswana to
support the struggle despite its geo-political position.
Support for the struggle was mainly in providing assistance to refugees and in
assisting the liberation struggle leadership to make contact with their people
in their own countries. The constraints we faced as a country were of course the
threats that we received from the minority regimes, and the occasional attacks that
we did suffer. I must also highlight here that our government was very strategic; it
did not condemn especially South Africa, that was the power house, out right. It
manoeuvered its strategy in such a way that it would not be openly seen as supporting
the liberation struggle. Botswana could give assistance, but it made it clear to the
liberation movement leaders that Botswana could not be used as a springboard or
launching pad for attacks on settler regime countries. Botswana’s argument to South
Africa was that Botswana could not sit idly and look at people suffer when they are
in the country. But at the same time, Botswana made it quite clear to South Africa
that it will not be used for attacking other countries. Botswana was saying to South
Africa that these issues could be resolved without violence. Botswana was not
condoning violence. At the same we were saying to the liberation movements, they
could stay in our country provided they did not use our hospitality for violent
purposes.
The financial sacrifice made by Botswana was in the aspect of supporting
refugees, and also in the later stages, in starting a defence force; as you know, we did
not have an army at independence because of expenses as our country was still
poor. Ultimately however, we were forced to go to such expenses because of
security reasons. Initially the finance was for supporting refugees, but eventually a
lot of money was needed to support the Defence Force. Material wise, we were also
setting up refugee camps, which we had to maintain and the ultimate price was the
human lives that were lost because of attacks from both South Africa and Rhodesia.
Batswana were very supportive. As you are aware, many refugees from South
Africa and Southern Rhodesia came here and were accommodated in people’s
homes, Batswana homes. People went out of their way to accommodate them and
help them where they could, and some even contributed money, and in that sense
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Batswana were very supportive. The refugees were allowed to pursue their studies
in our schools and those that were skilled were given employment by the Batswana.
But overall Batswana were very supportive.
I don’t know whether the internal policies were affected as much. We did not have
to craft any new laws or set up any new structures and so as far as internal policies
were concerned, I don’t think much happened, except that there was a development
in the creation of a department which was in contact with the United Nations.
As far as Botswana’s international relations were concerned, Botswana was put
on a high pedestal because everybody appreciated the gusto- that how can such a
small country, weak and with limited resources stand up so strongly and so loudly
and not fear anything against such powerful regimes. I think that put Botswana on
the world map. All the international organizations, OAU, Commonwealth, UN, and
the Frontline States supported Botswana.
Each liberation movement had its own representative here; almost all of them
would have wanted us to be more involved, but the leadership of the liberation
struggle appreciated Botswana’s position. Some may have had different views, but
by and large the leadership, very much understood Botswana’s position. Of course,
within the liberation movement itself there were differences. There were those that
held the view that Botswana was a sell-out, and that Botswana was favouring one
movement over the other. For example ZANU thought that we favoured Nkomo’s
ZAPU over ZANU. Also with the South African liberation movements, the ANC
thought we were pro PAC. Even today our relations with Zimbabwe are cordial, but
there are those who still believe that Botswana was anti the present ruling party,
during the days of the liberation struggle. Others thought that Botswana should not,
even after independence of the former settler colonies be given the prominence that
is equivalent to Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia.
Monitoring guerrillas and freedom fighter activities was basically the
responsibility of the Special Branch. They were tracking who was coming into the
country and who was not. The liberation movements had representatives here and
they normally reported the presence of their members, whether they were coming in
to stay or they were operatives in transit. The government was very clear to the
liberation movements’ representatives, mainly that their operatives were not going
to stay, but they should always be on transit. Other people who were not operatives,
like business people and common people, could stay. If the operatives did not comply
they were arrested. There were many instances where some were arrested. They
were later released and sent to other countries, mainly Zambia. In fact the liberation
movements were given the latitude to decide or determine where the arrested
cadres could be sent to; normally they were sent to Tanzania or Zambia, and
sometimes to Russia.
Botswana tried very hard to resolve factionalism and conflict within the liberation
movements themselves, and to remain neutral and maintain a non-partisan position.
We tried to mitigate, arbitrate and urged them to unite and bury their differences. In
Botswana there was never any flat out war because of differences, but in Zambia
and
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Tanzania some of these wars culminated in fierce fighting. But here, we were clear
that we were not going to support one liberation movement over the other.
Like I said, our relations with Zimbabwe have never been smooth because of the
earlier background. Our relations with South Africa have been very cordial. One
thing that can be said is that the liberation governments or liberated governments
have always clubbed together. In conferences and meetings, they will always club
together up to this day.
The Rhodesians were more arrogant and more careless than South Africa, in
the wars of destabilization. The Rhodesians behaved as if they had nothing to lose
whereas the South Africans were restrictive and cautious about their actions. The
Rhodesians were very arrogant, uttering statements that were very provocative – they
would march in and take Francistown, for example.
I cannot say much about the lessons learnt by Botswana from the phases of political
struggle, except that the liberated governments have a fixated way of looking at
things. The Zimbabwean situation is a typical example. The government there has
failed to liberate itself from the liberation mentality, to the extent that it would
compromise fate of its people to safeguard its ideological stance. The lesson we can
learn is that we need to appreciate that our way of doing business has stood the test
of time. We must realize that we cannot depend on our neighbours because of this
liberation mentality, Zimbabwe used to feed northern Botswana, and if we do not
stand and do something, we may find ourselves in the doldrums. What is happening
in South Africa should be ringing bells in our minds.
The Frontline States were the liberators. They ensured that escalation of violence
and bloodshed was stopped. It is because of their efforts that South Africa,
Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are now liberated. Our non-combative
approach also helped because we were the mediators, ensuring that there was unity.
The Frontline States preached unity, negotiation and peace. Their role in the
liberation struggle cannot and should not be underestimated.
The question of refugees was dealt with under the United Nations guidelines.
The Representative for United Nations High Commission for Refugees was highly
involved, making sure that they were catered for as far as food, accommodation
and education was concerned. There was a joint committee of UNHCR and the
government of Botswana. The Intelligence (National) would segment these people
and determine who were refugees and who were not; that is, political refugees,
economic refugees, or agents. They would be put before a panel which interviewed
them and this committee would determine whether someone was a refugee or a spy.
Botswana was very clear on the question of genuine refugees, it would never return
refugees to their places of origin. If a person was undesirable to us we would ask
him where he desired to be sent to and pass him or her to another country.
Our intelligence was in touch with the representatives of the liberation movements,
but the overriding fact was the emphasis that Botswana was not to be used as a
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springboard. Even when we found arms caches we would ask the representatives to
remove them.
The Botswana Defence Force played a role in the struggle, in that it protected its
citizens from aggression by the minority regimes. Both citizens and non citizens
were protected by the BDF especially in the volatile areas like Francistown and the
North East. The BDF was also protecting refugees and guerrillas that were running
away from Rhodesian Security forces. Whenever BDF encountered freedom
fighters, they disarmed them and sent them to refugee camps; the government then
arranged for their transit to Zambia. So we were protecting them in that sense.
1994
Mathora, William Maziba

[Mabole; May 2007]
William Maziba Mathora is 71 years old and a former businessman and farmer from
Mabole explains his experiences with freedom fighters and how he got into problems
with the South African authorities when it was alleged that he was assisting freedom
fighters from that country.
We were in big trouble because of the liberation war. I often had difficulties with
the South African authorities who alleged that I assisted freedom fighters with
transport to enter South Africa and kill the whites. They locked me up at the border
for about three hours completely naked on one occasion. They informed me that if I
did not tell them the truth they would execute me. I denied any knowledge of
transporting freedom fighters, but stated that I went to South Africa from time to
time to order goods for my shop; and on my way to South Africa or back to Botswana
I occasionally gave a ride to people who needed transport, but for a small fee. They
then let me go and ordered me to return in three days time for further questioning,
and if I did not return as agreed they were going to follow me in Botswana and
shoot me.
Indeed, on a Wednesday the following week, I went to the border post to meet
a Mr Johnson who questioned me. On arrival I was informed that he had gone to
Pietersburg. On being contacted, Johnson said he did not know anything about me, so
they let me go. All that was harassment, believing that I was going to give them
some information about freedom fighters. Thereafter, I continued to enter South
Africa to order goods without further trouble.
Refugees from Rhodesia used to come in large members. We fed them and I
transported them in my truck to Gobojango from where they would be transported
further. One day a group of six freedom fighters asked me to help them carry their
weapons from near our village, where they had been hidden, to Shashe River, on
the border with Rhodesia. On reaching the river their commander surveyed the
river to ensure all was safe, and then he walked across the river and returned; the
others walked across in his footsteps to appear as if only one person had crossed.
after bidding me farewell and thanking me they entered Zimbabwe. Some days
later they returned to our village with some cadres they had recruited. That was a
recurring activity, that is, recruitment of cadres. We fed them with food supplies
brought to Join Ngala’s home by the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). Sometimes I
fed them with food from my shop if Join’s supplies were finished.
One day at around midnight we heard gun fire. People fled everywhere.
Someone came to tell us that the Rhodesians had killed Join Ngala. In that
confusion, I realized that my aged mother who could hardly walk had been left
behind. She was a big woman. She refused to flee with the others though I offered
to carry her on my back. On crossing the stream we fell and rolled. She then hid in
a bush in the river and I went on to join my wife and others.
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At day break we returned to my home and I made fire to warm my mother who
complained that she was feeling cold. Then suddenly a group of refugees appeared
including Mareko Magisi, the father of Mdubane, one of the leading freedom fighters.
They told us that Join’s home was deserted. We removed thorns from their feet as they
had walked at night through thorny bushes. Then I went to Join’s home and was told
that he was alive and he had fled to Semolale.
One night a number of freedom fighters came to ask me to go to carry some of
their colleagues who had been wounded. They had been injured in a clash with
the Rhodesian forces. I brought the three injured ones to Mabolwe and the BDF
transported them to Bobonong and Selebi-Phikwe for treatment. I later saw one of
those who had been wounded, and he had recovered well.
An incident which led to the execution of one freedom fighter once occurred.
This freedom fighter was in love with a woman in Gobojango and generally
harassed people. His colleagues to took him and went with him towards Shashe
River. On reaching my cattle post they shot and killed him. My herdsmen came to
report the incident to me and I informed our soldiers; they went to collect the body.
Another incident involving freedom fighters was of the one who fled from
Selebi- Phikwe, to return to Rhodesia. The other freedom fighters followed him and
found him at my cattle post where he had put up. One of the two freedom fighters
shot him and broke his leg. This was reported to me and I reported to the BDF. One
of the guerrillas had moved on into Zimbabwe and the other stayed behind to
explain to the BDF what had happened. Indeed the injured man admitted to the
BDF soldiers that he was Smith’s soldier. They took him away, disarmed the other
freedom fighter, who then went his way.
One day chief Sehato asked me to ask the freedom fighters to help him because
some white persons had killed his herdsman who was looking after his cattle near the
Zimbabwe border. I reported this to Join who was in contact with freedom fighters.
Four of them agreed to go. They arrived and found lots of people and no one dared
to collect the body. Even the police were afraid to collect the body but the freedom
fighters did. Having so assisted they left, and the chief was grateful for their
assistance. Indeed the freedom fighters were very helpful to the people of our area.
1994
Mathumo, Meshack
[Francistown; June 2007]
Mr Meshack Mathumo, 72 years old went to school in Southern Rhodesia, but lived in
Francistown. While working in Northern Rhodesia he became involved with Nkomo’s
ZAPU, he was trained in different aspects of military in Tanzania; he also trained in
counter- intelligence, and became a ZAPU spy. He tells of his experience in the field as
an activist in the liberation struggle.
My name is Meshack Mathumo; I went to primary school in the then Southern
Rhodesia, lived in Francistown and went to work in the then Northern Rhodesia.
There, I found the politics of nationalism heated up led by Kenneth Kaunda and
Harry Nkumbula. Kaunda’s UNIP was aligned to ZAPU of Joshua Nkomo. I
became interested in Southern Rhodesian politics and became involved with ZAPU.
Nkomo declared a government in exile and the OAU decided that those Africans
outside Southern Rhodesia should go for military training in Tanzania.
I went to Tanzania and trained in different aspects of war including commando. I
trained in Tanzania for counter intelligence and became a ZAPU spy. In Tanzania,
there were a few ZAPU camps, with cadres from other countries, there was
FRELIMO from Mozambique, SWAPO from Namibia, the ANC from South Africa,
and UNITA from Angola; and the overall command was handled by a Tanzanian
national. I was later taken to Livingstone, Zambia to head the security sub-
headquarters. I was given an air ticket by Dumiso Dabengwa and flew to Maun,
Botswana, where I was immediately arrested and thrown into prison.
During this period, many refugees from different countries were flocking into
Botswana and the freedom fighters did not know that they were being infiltrated.
There were sell-outs within the cadres and I was suspicious that one of my comrades
in Livingstone betrayed me. I was taken to Francistown where I was handcuffed.
This was in 1967. Three men came to me and introduced themselves and PG,
Nkhwa, and the other one was Ndolo. Norman Mangoye who was a police radio
operator was there and he was my friend; he asked me what had happened. I asked
Mangoye if he knew of any good lawyer in Botswana, and Mangoye mentioned
Madikizela who was an ANC man based at Lobatse.
The police drove me 35 kilometres outside Francistown where they interrogated
and tortured me. The police knew me very well and they kept asking me why that
was happening. One policeman by the name of Harrison told me that I had been
arrested because I was a communist who wanted to destroy Botswana. For seven
days I was subjected to hardships. Steenkamp was the District Commissioner of the
area and he came over to say that I was a Motswana. I was tortured with a heater,
but I used my commando skills to overturn the table and escaping. The District
Commissioner’s office asked for my release after they saw me bleeding; but other
officers wanted me charged for assaulting police officers.
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I was released, but my mother’s place was monitored for 24 hours. This was not
easy for the police because I had received training on how to evade such monitoring.
I used to sneak to Siviya and Nata, making ‘connections’ while they were
monitoring. I and my colleagues had good training, but their operations were
difficult because the Rhodesian security agents had infiltrated ZAPU. Some
Babirwa in Gwanda spoke Setswana and they made ZAPU operations difficult
because they were in the movement. These were the people who used to kidnap
Zimbabweans in Botswana. Some 13 Zimbabweans were kidnapped close to a
house where I now live.
Botswana contributed immensely to the liberation struggle in the SADC area.
My mother operated a restaurant and provided fat cakes to people fleeing from
Zimbabwe. A neighbour by the name of Margaret Mukuru also provided help; a man
called Choba Maposa provided a lot of help too. Freedom fighters used to run from
Hwange and Victoria Falls, crossed into Botswana and reached villages such as
Nata and Manxotae, where they explained the situation to Maposa. He hid them in
his cattle kraal and killed goats and sheep to feed them. When Rhodesian forces
pursued them early in the morning, Choba sat facing the border fence. If Rhodesian
forces on horseback asked Choba what he had seen and he replied that he saw the
fighters running in the opposite direction. In the meantime Choba opened his kraal
in the morning to destroy footprints, when freedom fighters were hiding in the
kraal.
There was also a man called Store who was a backyard mechanic. He was also
called Mbokodo. When cadres communicated secretly, they said, ‘Go and see
Mbokodo.’ If communication was tapped, the enemy would not know who
Mbokodo was. Mbokodo would tell Maposa the number of cadres in Nata who
wanted to be taken to Francistown and that they needed arms and ammunition and
food. After crossing Dukwi, I sent messages that cadres should walk in a single file
and he counted them. He returned with them to Francistown at night and provided
them with arms and ammunition and then drove them to Siviya and Jackalas from
where they proceeded to Zimbabwe.
Weapons were kept in the yards of cadres and those who helped. A one foot trench
was dug and weapons covered in plastic because they were oiled. They were
covered with tarpaulin and covered with soil and vegetables were planted and
watered. Weapons crossed the Zambezi into Botswana because people were so
helpful. They were submerged in water and crossed the river. Truckers in Lusaka
worked with welders to open drums, pack in arms and ammunition and re-seal the
drums, then put oil and water on the top compartment. The Criminal Investigation
Department officers and police opened the drums only to find oil or water. Those
drums were only half full of water. Other vehicles were designed such that the
bottom part of the car was welded with metal sheets, then it would be re-welded and
weapons fitted in.
When freedom fighters were stranded along border villages such as Siviya,
people helped because they provided food and shelter. It was difficult for freedom
fighters to cook for themselves because the fire and smoke could be seen by the
enemy. In Francistown, Bapostori who wore white dresses were very helpful
because they were
1994
not suspected of any wrongdoing since they were Christians. When freedom fighters
were pursued, Bazezuru pretended to be in church, whereas they were hiding those
fleeing. When Ethan Dube was kidnapped, he had been pretending to be involved in
social activities.
ZAPU provided money for the freedom fighters. Freedom fighters were effective
because they got to places like Siviya and pretended to be herd boys looking for
employment. At sunset they disappeared to carry out missions and came back at
dawn. ZAPU operatives also ran a taxi operation, and the driver was a certain Moyo.
This taxi raised funds for refugees. Other tactics used by cadres were like, after
they got information here in Botswana, they cut hole in a shoe at the base, place a
letter inside, between the sole and base of the shoe, sew it and then the traveling
cadre put on the shoe and went to Lusaka. At Lusaka he opened the shoe and
handed over the information. From Lusaka, they did the same.
Some police officers were sympathetic to the freedom fighters, but the problem
was that the force was headed by white officers. Other officers were bootlickers.
The sympathetic police officers gave directions to cadres in order to avoid arrest.
Botswana government used to confiscate weapons from freedom fighters, but
stopped when they realized that the weapons were for a good cause.
Most refugees were found in townships such as Kgaphamadi and Bluetown.
Botswana did not favour any particular group of refugees, but treated them equally.
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Maruatona, James
James Maruatona, 70 and he is a politician, farmer, businessman, and educationist. He
went to school in South Africa and worked in South Africa where he learn about
liberation politics from his boss, who often got together with nationalists like Nelson
Mandela, Slovo and Ruth First.
I will tell you what I know about the liberation struggle. Before doing so let me tell
you about my early political experiences. I went to school in South Africa. I found
young South African students aware politically because of the oppression by the
apartheid regime. We learned about nationalist movements like the ANC and often
attended their meetings. I knew of the ANC during the Presidency of Dr Moroka.
Later I worked in South Africa and learned even more about politics. I used to
work for an Indian bioscope owner. He was a member of the Indian Congress and
often got together with nationalists like Mr Nelson Mandela, Slovo, Ruth First. I
learned about liberation politics then.
During the defiance campaign against pass laws,Mandela got involved in organising
the campaign. I met many of the nationalists there as a young boy, but did not join
the movement, as I feared arrest. Michael Dingake, a friend from Bobonong like
me, was very much involved, but did not press me to join the nationalist
movement. He was deeply involved in the ANC. I later went to train in Lesotho as a
teacher and then returned home to teach in Francistown.
While in Francistown, South Africans began to flee to Botswana due to oppression
in South Africa, some of them who knew me while I was in South Africa came to
me for assistance. One of them was Joe Modise of Umkhonto we Sizwe, who later
became Defence Minister of the new South Africa. We became close friends and I
assisted him as best as I could. At one point Michael Dingake, requested me to take
some of his papers and possessions, such as a Bank Book, to Bobonong for safe
keeping in case he got arrested due to his involvement in ANC underground work. I
did so and kept his material which he later got from me on his return.
Let me continue to state how I assisted in the liberation efforts by helping some
South Africans. There was a man, called Isaac Gontse who worked at the District
Commissioner’s office in Francistown; he is deceased now. I requested him to assist
fellow Africans from South Africa by obtaining relevant documents to enable them to
travel to Rhodesia, and from there to wherever they wanted to go, such as to Zambia.
Many of them travelled in this way. Later Joe Modise arrived. His mission was to
examine where South African freedom fighters could penetrate their country from
Botswana. Joe Modise went to such places as Maun, Gantsi, and Matsiloje. He did
this for quite sometime. He then requested me to get him a travel document to enter
Rhodesia and Gontse obtained one for him. I later learned that he was in Zambia.
1994
Joe was replaced in Botswana by Tenyson Makiwane who continued Modise’s
work in Botswana. He had been referred to me by his superiors in South Africa
who knew me. I assisted him as I had done for Modise by securing travel documents
from Gontse. Makiwane used to travel to and from Zambia, and would enter South
Africa periodically. I later learned that he was killed by the Boers.
Later Michael Dingake returned to Botswana. He used to travel north via Rhodesia,
but there were some spies who were looking for him in both Rhodesia and South
Africa. I then realised that among the Batswana there were some spies. One of
these spies got to know where Dingake lived in Lobatse. At one point the
Motswana spy got information about Dingake’s movements to Rhodesia and alerted
the Rhodesian police who arrested Dingake; that is how he ended up in Robben
Island. This was in 1965, and I had gone for a course in the UK.
The Botswana government was sympathetic to those who fought for freedom, and
so they helped these people a great deal. Some top government officers were very
helpful in this regard. Here is an incident which illustrates how the government tried
to help freedom fighters. One of the senior Botswana police, who trained Botswana
CID, planted a bomb at a refugee camp at Satellite. The bomb, however did not
do damage. Motswana CID officer, Batshedi Kgathi, was instructed to spy on this
expatriate officer. As he was about to arrest him, the spy fled to South Africa where
he joined the police in Pretoria. This shows clearly that the white minority
governments spied on the activities of the freedom fighters in Botswana.
In 1986, while I was a councillor, I led a group from Botswana to Zambia for a
course. There we met people from the liberation movements and learned a lot about
the liberation struggle. I realised that the Zimbabwean and South Africa liberation
movements worked closely together. My political awakening grew as I was now in
politics and had a good friend called Dumiso Dabengwa, a Zimbabwean freedom
fighter, who travelled to and from Botswana freely. Dumiso’s mother and my mother
were great friends and had met when she visited Botswana. This is how my
friendship with Dumiso started – through the friendship of our mothers. His mother
was a school teacher who was later killed by the Rhodesian soldiers.
At one point Dabengwa sent one freedom fighter, Ethan Dube, to me so that I
may assist him. I used to assist Dube in dealing with liberation issues. He was later
kidnapped in Francistown by Rhodesian spies and disappeared for good, presumably
he was killed. Despite all this the Botswana government continued to assist the
Zimbabwean freedom fighters.
One of the ways I assisted was that I acceded to Dabengwa’s request to hide their
weapons at my farm for use by the freedom fighters. They hid them where I did not
know on the farm near Francistown. I was concerned that the Rhodesians might
know about this and I would be in trouble. But because I supported the liberation
struggle I agreed. Another way I assisted the liberation struggle was through a
small shop I opened on the border with Rhodesia, at the Shashe River. The shop was
opened to serve mainly government officers who guarded the border with
Rhodesia, and
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people at the cattle posts in the area. One day I was driving to the small shop carrying
some goods and we came across a group of freedom fighters with their weapons.
The young people I was travelling with were terribly scared. I assured them that
these were freedom fighters and would not bother Batswana. They were fighting to
liberate their country from white rule.
Dabengwa had assured me that they would not bother Batswana. At one point
fifteen freedom fighters came to my shop to ask for food. I gave them bread and
drinks. They asked for soap to wash and they then left the area on their mission.
Botswana assisted Namibians. I got to learn this from Dr Chitendero, speaker of
the Namibian Parliament, who became my friend. He used to tell me how Botswana
assisted Namibians. He came with a group of Namibians entered Botswana and
they were all protected and fed by Batswana until the government took over and
arranged for them to be transported to countries to the north. Many went on to get
education, such as Dr Chitendero who obtained a doctorate in USA, and even
married an American. I do not know much about assistance to Namibians.
Botswana developed close ties with her liberated neighbours. For example
relations with Namibia are very good. We consult regularly on matters of mutual
interest. Even the dispute over Sedudu Island was settled amicably and did not spoil
our friendship. As for Zimbabwe, many Batswana have relatives in Zimbabwe and
so relations were always good. However the current government of Zimbabwe does
not sufficiently promote that friendship. Such incidents as stopping Zimbabwe
trains from passing through Botswana do not promote good relations. As regards to
South Africa, the relations are excellent. We get a lot of help from South Africa in
University education and specialist medical attention; whereas during the apartheid
period, very few Batswana studied in South Africa.
1994
Mbakani, Maria
[Lesoma; July 2007]
Maria Mbakani comes from Pandamatenga but was married in Lesoma and lives with her
relatives there. Her son died in the Lesoma ambush and the BDF has been taking care of
her.
My name is Maria Mbakani. I have never worked anywhere except some piece jobs
in the drought department. I am not actually from Lesoma. I come from
Pandamatenga, where I was born in 1925. I was married here and some of my
relatives live here in Lesoma. I am doing nothing, except ploughing during rainy
seasons, but I am now too old to travel to the lands. I was being helped by my
cousin’s son Gure Kelesitswe who was employed by the Botswana Defence Force to
take care of the monument where the Botswana Defence Force soldiers died. He is
the one who used to buy food for me and my children. He passed away in May 2007
and now there is no one providing for us here.
Gure was sick for a long time and was sick when he was working at the
monument. He died from a disease that I don’t know. He is the one who took care of
me. The BDF sometimes came here to give me groceries. The commander of the
BDF, Major General Fisher, came here to say goodbye when he was leaving the
army. The BDF also built this two- roomed house for me and even put up the fence.
They have also promised to connect water to the house.
The BDF employed Gure to take care of the monument because he is one of the
people who survived the Lesoma ambush. My child Uwe died there and this is why
the BDF built a house for me. I don’t want to continue with this interview because I
don’t want to remember my child Uwe. He died when he was still young with some
15 other soldiers during the day of the ambush.
On that day the freedom fighters attacked the white soldiers inside Zimbabwe
and crossed into Botswana. We heard gunshots inside Zimbabwe in the morning at
around 9 o’clock. After a few minutes the guerrillas came running with their big guns.
I was sitting here with my children and they passed here running into the high land
bush up there. Those who were at the fields ran away when they saw the white
soldiers entering Botswana. There was chaos as people were running away from the
village. I did not run away. The white soldiers’helicopter kept hovering over our
village but they were not shooting at us. We knew they were looking for the
guerrillas. The headman then called my child Uwe and his son Gure and sent them
to go and call the BDF soldiers. They rode on bicycles and went to Kazungula.
Within a short period they arrived with the soldiers. Uwe and Gure were used as
guides for the BDF soldiers to show them where the guerrillas ran to. The BDF
soldiers went to the high land area to search for guerrillas. They searched for them for
an hour.What I heard from Gure was that they found armed freedom fighters hiding
in the bush. According to Gure there was an argument between them and the BDF
as to whether to arrest the guerrillas or not. The guerrillas begged the BDF troops
not to arrest them because they were
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fighting the white soldiers. The Commander present was insisting that they should
arrest the guerrillas. Some freedom fighters then ran away with their arms and only
two guerrillas were arrested by the BDF. They manhandled them and walked them to
the vehicles and when they got into the vehicles they were attacked. Gure came
here running and when we asked him where Uwe was, he said he did not know. The
attack happened in the afternoon. Some soldiers were badly injured and were
rushed to the Kasane hospital. Uwe never came back and when we heard that 15
soldiers were killed I knew he might have been killed. I cried the whole night. In the
morning some soldiers (BDF) arrived and searched for the missing soldiers. They
found all the dead bodies. Some were stabbed and some burnt. Uwe was also found
dead and the bullet had opened up his chest. Please, I don’t want to remember what
happened to my child because he was later found near the vehicles dead and his body
was already beginning to rot. We buried him in Kasane. The death of my child
affected me for a long time and we even suspected that they were attacked by the
guerrillas.
When the headman decided to send the two small boys to guide the BDF, we never
thought there was going to be such an attack. We knew that freedom fighters were
having a camp at that high land in Lesoma. We thought they were just going to show
the BDF where the guerrillas were hiding. They had a camp up there and they used to
come here to ask for tobacco from people. They even used to drink traditional beer.
People knew where the camp was but they never disclosed to outsiders where the
camp was. The freedom fighters used to beat up people who showed signs of
betrayal to their course. They were saying we should not tell anyone where they
were hiding.
There is nothing I remember my child, except that I lost a child that day. The BDF
still come here to help me with food and I have asked them to employ my other son
so that he can take care of me. The other thing is that there is uncertainty as to who
killed the 15 soldiers and my child. There was this version about guerrillas who had
escaped from the Botswana soldiers and then another regarding the white soldiers
who were seen in a helicopter that was hovering over our village. As to who carried
out the ambush, nobody knows because even Gure does not know who carried out
the ambush. There was confusion when they were attacked.
Thank you Sir.
1994
Mbayi, (Mr)
[S/Phikwe]
Mr Mbayi was an ordinary person who witnessed the liberation struggle and developed
interest as a student. he lived in Swaneng where there were many South African
refugees, some of them being his teachers
I was just an ordinary person, who saw other people struggling. This struggle started
when I was at school when I was doing my form 1 in 1969 at Swaneng. I had a
Biology teacher by the name Davidson Ngcweleni, he was South African and
another one called Lawrence Nota and others. While we were still in school Mr
Ngcweleni was deported to Zambia and we started wondering why this teacher was
deported and what he could have possibly done at Swaneng. Different teacher came
from different countries of the world others from Zimbabwe and so on and so forth.
Well life went on I went to stay in Gaborone and then Phikwe later on. We used to
read about what was happening in South Africa in newspapers like Sowetan. When
I was in Gaborone in 1974, there was a Drum magazine dated December 1973, this
magazine had a headline “The Most Wanted Men in South Africa” and it showed
pictures of the men and from the pictures I noticed a man who taught me, Mr
Ngcweleni. And then I came to Phikwe and in Phikwe there weren’t a lot of South
Africans. After June 1976, a lot of South Africans came to Phikwe; people like
Tsietsi Mashinini came to Phikwe. So during that time a man called Zama Mbeki,
whom I ended up getting used to, came. Zama Mbeki was a friend to my cousin
called Mr Phumaphi who is a Judge now. Later on I met a lot of South Africans at
Zama Mbeki’s place. Zama Mbeki was staying in Phikwe at Moshoeshoe Street, but
I don’t know whether he was a refugee or not. What I know is that he practiced
Law, he was a lawyer and he had an office at the Mall which he took over from O
Maraka; Mr Gaongalelwe later on joined Mbeki as a partner.
We are talking about 1976 or 1977, somewhere there. When he was with
Gaongalelwe there were other people who came to work in his office from South
Africa for instance the current Minister of Justice in South Africa, Richard Mabandla,
worked in Zama Mbeki’s office, I don’t know if he was practicing law or not. He
will not be able to remember me but I do. I take it he was a lawyer, maybe, that is why
he is the Minister of Justice. Zama Mbeki had these other boys who were staying
with him, he also stayed with his family, he was married with children, and his wife
was a nurse at the BCL mine; his house was small. I also had a house but I was
staying alone. When I started getting used to the people who were staying at Zama
Mbeki’s place, I started taking some to stay with me, but it was not permanent as
they sometimes went back to his house, even when I was not around I gave them
my key.
When I was staying with these people we never ever discussed politics; even
with Zama Mbeki we did not discuss any politics. I remember at one time years back,
I had read a book by Brian Fisher in South Africa, the book mentioned something
about
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his father in Robben Island and then I asked him how he was related to Govan Mbeki
and he mentioned that it was his father. And at times Zama’s wife went go to Robben
Island and check on the old man and sometimes he asked me to go, but I refused to
go because it was during the times of apartheid and I was afraid to go. I wish I
could have gone.
When I said I took people to my place I am not talking about a lot of people; just
a few that I got used to came as visitors, sometimes for food, and then went back
to Zama’s place. They didn’t mention anything about the parties they belonged to; I
just learnt about the freedom charter from them but, some things I read about from
newspapers.
1994
Merafhe, Mompati
[Gaborone; September and October 2006]
Minister Mompati Merafhe, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation. He started his career as a police officer and rose through the ranks until he
became the Deputy Commissioner of Police. When the government decided to set up
Botswana Defence Force (BDF), the late Seretse Khama then the President of Botswana
decided to give him the responsibility of putting the Defence Force together; and since
then he commanded BDF for 13 years. In 1989 he retired and joined politics and became
the Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration in 1994. He ran for
elections, won, and then became the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation.
My name is Mompati Merafhe. As you are aware I am currently the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. I have held a number of appointments
within this government. I started my career as a police officer and rose through the
ranks until I became the Deputy Commissioner of Police and then when government
decided to set up the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), the late Seretse Khama who
was the President of this Republic decided to give me the honourable responsibility
of putting this Defence Force together, and since then of course I commanded this
Defence Force for 13 years and in 1989 I retired and joined politics and became the
Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration in 1994. I ran for elections,
won and then became Minister of Foreign Affairs and I have been here in politics
and government since. So briefly that is where I come from in terms of my own
personal credentials.
I joined the Police 1960, a long time ago; I am embarrassed to say this, since
some people in this room were not born then. The PMU was set up way back in 1968;
because it was becoming clearly obvious that we needed a paramilitary force that
could deal with matters of internal disturbances and also provide minimum military
resistance to people who were obviously posing a threat. We could read what was
coming our way in terms of hostilities that were beginning to heighten within our
region. It was becoming obvious because the spirit of liberation was gaining
momentum and there were more and more people from neighbouring countries that
were under these oppressive regimes, who were coming into Botswana. There was
temptation of the white regimes following freedom fighters into Botswana, and it
became obvious that we really had to do something to ensure that there was
paramilitary force that could deal with this problem. It became clearly obvious that
we needed a full fledged Defence Force to be able to handle these problems that
were emerging as a result of the increase in the activities of the liberation struggle
within the region.
It was clearly obvious that there was more and more impatience on the part of the
minority regimes in Rhodesian and South Africa to destabilize the independence of
Botswana. We were viewed as a bad example for the white ruled regimes within
this region. So we were a bad example because we were challenging the South
African
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apartheid belief that an African country could not run itself in the manner we were
running this country. That was the problem, and they were doing everything they
could do to destabilize us in many ways. Sometimes through sending hit squads
just to create instability within the country.
If we can talk specifically about Namibia, I would say for us Namibia was a
source of many refugees. In fact most of the leadership of SWAPO, who are
currently running the country, went through Botswana for military training in
countries such as Tanzania. They all went through Botswana. The current president, I
mean President Pohamba, was a resident in Francistown for months.
A number of leadership of Namibia went through this country, on their way to
the north, where they were trained in the liberation struggle and eventually came
back and put up an armed struggle resistance against the Namibian regimes. But
there wasn’t much military activity as far as that front was concerned because I think
it was basically because of the nature of the border with Namibia. We got this vast
desert, shrub desert between us, and therefore, built up areas like Gaborone, Lobatse,
Francistown and other places were not easily accessible by the marauding forces of
the then South West African government, which of course was under the control of
the South Africans. So there were fewer activities as far as military operations were
concerned, because the centre of activity was concentrated along the border between
Angola and Namibia. That was the centre of activity.
Those who were coming in through Botswana were going back through Angola
where real military activity was taking place. But here in the south, along the
border with South Africa, of course there were many activities; I mean everybody,
Mandela went through here, Mbeki, you name it; everybody went through
Botswana. The problems started when these people started coming back in order to
find a way of launching attacks against the white regimes in their countries. The
same applies to Zimbabwe. We had a lots of Rhodesians, as they were called,
coming here. We had scores and scores of refugees who were based in
Francistown. Some of them were actually travelling to countries in the north to
receive military training. When they were returning they had to go through
Botswana to access their countries. So really without Botswana I don’t think we
would be where we are today. Quite frankly, we had to come up with or draft a
policy which ensured that our own independence was not in any way compromised.
If our independence had been compromised, the independence of South Africa,
Rhodesia, Zimbabwe and Namibia would have been delayed even more.
We were accommodative of everybody. The only thing we were a bit careful
about was not to be seen to be supporting the freedom fighters openly because if
that had happened, we could have opened ourselves to attacks by the white
regimes, or to a full scale war that we would not have been able to stand. So we felt
that we had to be careful in the way in which we dealt with the people who were on
transit through Botswana, back to South Africa and Rhodesia to persecute the
armed liberation
1994
struggle. Fortunately in Namibia they were coming in from Angola; So we had a
policy of turning a blind eye but we had to be very careful.
More often than not we were accused by the South Africans for collaborating
with the freedom fighters; and to some extent they were right, but we just had to
ensure of our own survival and the survival of our own independence. So we did
not want to make unnecessary sacrifices.
There were two serious problems that this country or this nation faced as the
result of our role in the liberation struggle. There were some elements within the
liberation movement: those who felt that Botswana should open its doors to the
liberation fighters, regardless of the consequences. That we should allow them to
use Botswana as a base or use Botswana as launching pad for attacks against our
neighbours. Those fighting for the liberation were complaining that we were not
doing enough to assist their struggle. On the other hand the South Africans and the
Rhodesians also accused for collaborating with the freedom fighters. So we were
this dichotomy where we were caught between two situations; two conflicting
situations. Of course, generally speaking I think most of the leadership of the
liberation struggle appreciated the predicament in which Botswana found itself. But
the ordinary rank and file fighters felt very strongly that Botswana should be
allowing the country to be used as a launching pad. In fact there was one leader who
will remain anonymous for the purpose of this interview who advocated for
Botswana being used as a military base. He used to say Botswana could afford to
sacrifice 5000/6000 people. I cannot mention his name
My comment is that those statements that Botswana did not do much in the
liberation of our neighbouring countries, are belittling, misplaced and completely
false. Some people do not seem to realize the difficulties which we faced, and the
policy options that we had to choose in order to ensure that we continued to be of use
to the struggling masses in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. If we had acted
foolishly Botswana would have been overrun in no time, and I can tell you the
independence of South Africa would have been further delayed. However we had
to make some political statements in some of the international fora, and we were
bold enough to describe the situations in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. We
were fearless in our condemnation of the apartheid regime using the Organisation
of African Unity, the Liberation Committee and the UN. We were bold in terms of
expressing our views regarding what was happening in South Africa. So, we
contributed a lot to the liberation struggle of southern Africa. I can tell you that
without Botswana, so many of those who went through our country for military
training abroad would not have been able to do so without Botswana’s assistance.
The challenge faced by this country was to try and come up with a policy that
would take into account our self-preservation. In other words we had to do business
with the white ruled South Africa. There was no way we could detach ourselves
from the economies of that country. We were economically, part of South Africa,
and so we had to be very careful as to how we handled the situation. All our fuel
and all
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the strategic commodities that we required here were coming through South Africa.
If one morning South Africans decided to close the border we would suffer the
consequences. We avoided what had become fashionable, like what other people who
were shouting from the comfort of distance, talking about imposing sanctions on
South Africa.We had to make sure that we maintained our principles and convictions.
That is as far as our commitment to the struggle was concerned; but always we
were mindful that we had to survive as a country
The 1980s raiding by South Africa and the Lesoma Incident, an attack by the
Rhodesians, are two main incidents and they were prominent by virtue of them
having received a lot of publicity, but there were a lot of skirmishes. Let me take
for instance our border with Rhodesia, there were skirmishes almost regularly
between members of the BDF and the Rhodesians; and we killed some of their
people but we didn’t want to climb on our roof tops, boasting about the fact that we
killed Rhodesian soldiers. If we had boasted about, it we would have invited the
possibility for attacks because they were a much stronger force than we were. But
our chaps were not intimidated in terms of confronting members of the Rhodesian
armed forces, and therefore they played a credible role, because the Rhodesian
soldiers knew that they could not come to Botswana without sacrificing their
own lives. That is
what is called deterrent, in the army language. So I think our force, young as it was,
played a very important role in terms of providing protection to our people along
the border, who were being harassed ever so often by the marauding forces of Ian
Smith. Of course the Lesoma Incident was a terrible incident in the sense that the
Rhodesians were accusing us for harbouring terrorists, and then mounted attacks
against us. They decided that they were going to lay an ambush against our chaps
in order to punish us. In fact, what happened that day was, a number of freedom
fighters had entered Botswana in the Kasane area, and the Rhodesian soldiers
crossed into Botswana following the guerrillas. We got wind of the presence of
Rhodesians in our country and sent our small troop there to apprehend this group of
Zimbabwean fighters in order to interrogate and make them aware that their cross
border activities were not welcomed in the country. The Rhodesians decided to lay
an ambush for our people, and that is when our soldiers were shot and killed. I was
actually one of the first people to arrive at the scene of the ambush.
Can you imagine the emotions and everything when you find the bodies of 15 of
your compatriots, your colleagues, comrades and subordinates, you know, scattered
all over the place? I only had about 12 men when I got there, I remember that
when I decided to go there General Khama was coming to Gaborone to fetch more
reinforcement and said to me rather jokingly, “Please commander, do not go there
because I am too young to take command of this BDF”. But despite this caution I
decided that we should get there. We went there, just to find dead bodies all over the
place. It was an experience that will forever haunt me for the rest of my life.
I think there was a lot of sympathy on the part of Botswana; and even more
importantly, the Batswana also appreciated that we were not a superior force that
1994
could really confront Rhodesians and South Africans confidently in the battlefield.
However, they did appreciate that we were offering minimum resistance to the forces
of Rhodesia and white South Africa. There was a general understanding that we
had to act with absolute caution, to avoid endangering the lives of Batswana, in our
attempt to counter the acts of provocation and aggression by the South Africans and
Rhodesians. I think there was a general appreciation of the predicament we found
ourselves in, as a country.
BDF was a small army. In a situation like that you identify areas where you think
there is a concentration of activities because you cannot seal a 640 kilometre
border; what you do is you try and identify areas where there is a concentration of
activity, and you give it attention because you are limited in terms of manpower, in
terms of resources, to be able to cover something like 45,000 troops. Can you
imagine 45,000 troops? We had very few soldiers. I suppose now I can give you
figures because time has gone; I think we had not more than 3 000 at the time. So
we were no match at the time to the Rhodesians soldiers in terms of capacity. We
had to do all the best we could. In some cases you felt it was like putting a small
bandage over a very large wound, but nevertheless, we did manage to cover areas
which we felt were somewhat troublesome.
Without the BDF securing the border and providing opportunities for the fighters
who were destined for South Africa and Rhodesia the liberation struggle could not
have yielded the sort of results that we are now talking about.
Oh! We had to share information with both the liberation movement and the white
regime. Yes, there were times when we had secret meetings with the white regimes
when they were accusing us of all sort of things. Remember, they put us under pressure,
wanting us to sign the Nkomati Accord. The government did not agree to sign that
Accord. The South African white regime signed it with one of our neighbours, but we
refused and occasionally we had to speak to them. Although they said “look, let’s
talk confidentially”, and then they would go around telling every other country that
we spoke to Botswana and when they met the Mozambique leadership, they will
come and tell us what they were discussing with Mozambique. So we knew that it
was never a secret whenever they met with to one of us in the region. But generally
speaking, we shared information with the members of the liberation movements.
We shared with them the activities of the Rhodesian Forces. We also shared
information about the activities of the South African Defence Force, so that in their
planning they could factor this in, as they tried to execute their struggle.
There were other incidents beside the raiding of Gaborone and the Lesoma
incident. You will remember those who were shot and killed and the Tswaipe Court
case and the rampage at the university by students protesting against the manner in
which this case was handled. We were constantly under pressure, politically,
diplomatically, militarily or otherwise. The idea was to intimidate us into complete
submission so that we should completely detach ourselves from any form of support
to the liberation struggle. But we had to find the right form of words to express our
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displeasure about what was going on within South Africa and our condemnation of
the system in the country
There was no country which was more frontline than Botswana. So we couldn’t
really have frontline states without Botswana. All these other countries were
remote from the situation so we found ourselves in a position where we could not
really not become part of the frontline states, when, in fact, we ourselves were
more front line than any other country. Frontline states meant a body that was going
to be used to mobilize public opinion against South African leadership and also had
a forum for consultation on issues pertaining to the liberation struggle.
By virtue of the locations of Angola and Mozambique, we really did not have
many Angolan refugees. The many Angolan refugees came during the civil war,
after the independence of that country; that is when many of them came, across
Botswana, running away from the civil war. This was particularly so, because
Southern Angola is very close to us and UNITA was very active in that part of the
country. But in terms of fighting the Portuguese, there was really no urge for them
to come here. The Mozambicans used this as a transit route; you know Samora
Machel was a resident of Lobatse, and a few other leaders went through Botswana,
It is important to appreciate that Botswana provided a transit facility to all the
political activists of the liberation struggle.
I have learnt a lot; I have always been a part of this government in my capacity
as Commissioner of Police, my capacity as Commander of the army and my
capacity as a Minister. So I have been at the centre of the policy formulation in this
government and I really appreciate the art of going through situations which are
extremely difficult. This is the kind of experience that I always find extremely
rewarding.
The truth of the matter is that leadership plays an extremely critical part in the
management of public affairs. We have been extremely lucky as a country to have
the kind of leadership that this country has had. Seretse Khama laid a strong
foundation at independence, the kind of formation which is going to be extremely
difficult to destroy. You need somebody who is really terribly malicious to be able
to destroy the foundation which has been laid down by Seretse.
When Masire took over, he confined his leadership along the same path earlier
created by Khama; and when Mogae took over he also continued along the same
path. I am sure the next president of this country will have no option but to follow the
foundation that has been established by the founders of the Botswana independence.
Batswana have always been people who are endowed with wisdom because they
choose the right kind of people to lead this country. Please, don’t ask me where they
get this wisdom something rare amongst other African nations. I used to sit with
the late Seretse Khama and discussed these issues that affected our country, and
you could admire the wisdom coming through him; just the way he was navigating his
way around in a conversation. Some of these extremely intricate questions that you
have been putting through to me have a direct bearing in the manner in which he
directed
1994
his cabinet and this nation; the manner in which he ensured that we continued to
develop even in the face of these problems that we are discussing in this interview.
Having lived and interacted with Seretse Khama for so long, I can say that the
man was such a liberal democrat, that it comes out of his character. The reasons
why African politics are in such chaos at the moment it is because there is lack of
the culture of tolerance. Seretse had some sense of tolerance. Although he was the
son of the chief, he tolerated opposition from different angles. He was prepared to
listen to all kinds of opinion, and that I think is what has built this nation to be what
it is today. That is why we don’t have a single refugee outside this country; it is
because Seretse tolerated all different views during his regime; so did Masire, and
so did Mogae. I think we had leaders who have really placed this country into
proper developmental process. I think we must thank ourselves for having chosen
them for leadership. Seretse was a man, when faced with an absolute crisis, would
behave as if there was no crisis. Let me tell you something, one day I instructed a
platoon of men under General Ian Khama to go and destroy some strong Rhodesian
military points. The Rhodesians had strong points. I instructed General Khama to
take a whole group of men to go and destroy a Rhodesian camp base a few metres
away from the border crossing at Kazungula. When I gave him that instruction, I
told him he was going to destroy those strong points, so as not to allow those guys to
be sitting there and pointing weapons at us at the crossing point, making it difficult
for people to cross the border. There had been an incident when the Ian Smith
regime soldiers crossed over into our country to blow up the ferry. When the ferry
was blown up our soldiers went there to assess the situation and apparently the
Rhodesians had observation points, and they saw our guys coming close to where
they were hiding. Then there was a complete shoot-out across the border and one of
my tribes’ men, actually a distant cousin of mine, who was a soldier at the time,
was shot and killed. Then somebody from Rhodesia contacted Phil Steekamp and
told him they had a body of a Botswana Defence Force soldier, who was killed
within the Rhodesia soil. The fact that our soldiers had crossed the border into
Rhodesia of course became a problem to Seretse. Since the Rhodesian soldiers
were creating problems for us, we had ,on some occasions, sent in a small squad of
90 to go and sort them out. I was then called at the State House, to go and explain
the nature of the problem leading to the death of a soldier in the Rhodesian soil. The
meeting was called by the President, and Phil Steekamp was present in that
meeting; I cannot remember the other two who were also in the meeting. I was
asked to account for sending troops. I told His Excellency that he was responsible
for the general supremacy of the Defence Force and I was responsible for its
operational responsibilities. I told the meeting that I probably erred by not telling
H.E about the operation. However I did not think the gentlemen around the table
who were all furious really wanted me dead.
That I should have told them before sending soldiers on operation into Rhodesia,
but you don’t go around telling everybody that you are moving into Rhodesia. So
Seretse sat back and evaluated the matter, and later called me to remind me that he
stories
was the Commander in Chief, and cautioned that at least I should have taken him
into confidence. I apologized and accepted all the responsibility, as Commander, on
behalf of the army, regarding what had happened. Seretse Khama was able to sort out
this problem nicely. He was really a Statesman in the true sense of the word.
You remember ko bo Butale kwa? The Rhodesians went in there; landed in
helicopters; they were all over the border you know harassing our people. If you
ask people from the Northern part of Botswana particularly in the North East, bo
Mapoka, they will relate one story after another of their experiences and their
encounters with the Rhodesian Security Forces. The South Africans initially were
not as aggressive as
the Rhodesians. The South Africans of course came in during the 1980s, when they
came in to attack people when they were asleep, in Gaborone. But generally
speaking this border was a little quieter than the Rhodesian border. Please
remember that in fact the struggle in South Africa was not as fierce as it was in
Rhodesia, although as you may know the South African army was very strong, and
ANC had a big problem in trying to assert their military operations within South
Africa. But the same cannot be said for the Rhodesians. The ZANU and ZAPU
forces were all over Rhodesia harassing the Smith regime. The Smith regime felt
this pressure and decided to go to Mozambique; whereas, in that part of the country
the pressure wasn’t as much on the South Africans, as it was on the Rhodesians.
1994
Mfanamajaha, Friday Mufisa (The Late)

My name is Friday Mufisa Mfanamajaha was born in Zimbabwe in 1924 and never went
to school. The only thing he learnt was driving. He worked in many companies in
Zimbabwe as a driver and as a tractor driver in one of the Safari Companies. This was in
the 1970s, at the time when people used to cross to Zimbabwe without any problems. He
also worked in many farms in Pandamatenga.
My name is Friday Mufisa Mfanamajaha. I was born in Zimbabwe in 1924 and I
have never gone to school. The only thing I learnt was driving. I worked in so many
companies in Zimbabwe working as a driver. I also worked as a tractor driver in
one of the Safari Companies. In Botswana I worked in many farms here in
Pandamatenga. I worked in Zimbabwe in the 1970’s and that was the time when we
used to cross to Zimbabwe without any problems.
In the 1970’s that was the time when blacks were trying to liberate themselves
from whites. The situation was not good in Zimbabwe because freedom fighters
had no mercy on blacks who betrayed them. They tortured and killed people who
informed the white soldiers about the whereabouts of guerrillas. Kana these
freedom fighters were stubborn because they had a tendency of getting into the
white man’s farms and
drove black farm labourers all the way to here in Pandamatenga. They did not want
white farms to have labourers.
I did not witness any fighting between guerrillas and white soldiers. I was
working for a Safari Company and it was owned by whites. They warned me early
that there were going to be problems in Zimbabwe. Before the problems started the
company gave me a Landover and I had to drive a distance of about one hundred
and twenty miles, from the camp in Zimbabwe to here. I left early in the morning
and by 9 pm I had crossed the border into Botswana. The whites who owned the
Safari company I worked for came another day and collected the car from
Botswana. They advised me that it was not safe for me to work in a country where
there was going to be problems. So I came back from Zimbabwe during the time of
the war and settled in my home village.
Many freedom fighters used to come to Pandamatenga to drink alcohol. They
also liked visiting their fellow Ndebeles at “Botebele”. They had camps in the bush
especially at Sebuyu cattle post area. That is where they had a camp. There was this
guy called Mkhwanazi (commander of freedom fighters) whom I knew. Initially I
was not aware that he was a freedom fighter. At first I thought he was just an ordinary
refugee. I became aware that he was a freedom fighter when I heard that the vehicle
he was driving was bombed at 256. He used to visit me during the day and would
disappear in the evening. I hear he used to meet other freedom fighters in the
evening and told them how things were in the village. He also used to buy food in
Kasane to supply the guerrillas at their different stations along the Pandamatenga –
Kasane road. One day I was traveling with him from Kasane. We fetched water at
Kazungula and on the way we were stopped by the guerrillas. They recognized the
vehicle he was driving
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and he (Mkhwanazi) gave them the water. They called him Commander. Mkhwanazi
was a freedom fighter, and I don’t know where he got the car from; the pieces of
that vehicle are still there in the bush at 256. That man was a trained a guerrilla. He
did not die there. I don’t know how he escaped the bombing, but he survived and
walked to Pandamatenga. It was the Smith white soldiers who did the bombing.
He never stayed at one place. He used to travel between Kasane, Lesoma and
Pandamatenga checking how his ‘boys’ were operating. Some of the freedom
fighters were not good because they used to fight for women here in Pandamatenga.
They had the power of the gun but there were no cases of shootings over
girlfriends.
I am not sure that some people especially Basarwa were troubled by the
guerrillas. The only thing I know was that Moruti went missing at Sebuyu. What I
still don’t understand is whether Moruti was killed by white soldiers by the
guerrillas. I suspect he was killed by white soldiers in the bush because he was their
spy and they used him for tracking. There is also one guy called Jack who also went
missing at Sebuyu. What we heard was that Jack’s girlfriend was cheating on him
with one freedom fighter and they came back to the village and took him away at
night. People believe the freedom fighters killed him. These guys were never found.
One of the people who were tortured was a certain Mosarwa man, I can’t remember
his name. The guerrillas tortured him because he mistakenly told black soldiers who
were working for whites where the guerrillas were hiding. The guerrillas used to
warn us that there were black men who were employed by whites as spies.
Thank you Rra.
1994
Mgadla, Nono
[Tati Siding Village]
Nono Mgadla, is 85 years old and he explains about his experiences of the Rhodesian
soldiers as he lived on the border. He had to move to another area, Mosetse, which was
less isolated to avoid frequent harassment from the Smith regime.
The liberation war affected us because it made us uncomfortable, uneasy and

frightened; the Rhodesians terrorized us. We did not know what to do but the
government of Botswana advised strongly that those who lived very close to the
border should move and live in larger settlements rather than in isolated homesteads.
That is why I moved from Jackalas no.1 to Mosetse.
The soldiers of Joshua Nkomo used to mix with the people and they would ask for
food, water, and sometimes shelter. The soldiers of Ian Smith would then follow them
and ask us by terrorizing and intimidating us about the whereabouts of Nkomo’s
soldiers. They would harass us and ask us why we gave Nkomo’s soldiers water and
food. We told them that we were scared that if we did not give them food and water
perhaps they would kill us. The Smith soldiers used to trace Nkomo’s freedom
fighters by following their foot prints or shoe prints.
There were times when we or some other people, being so close to the border,
crossed into Rhodesia either to cut and fetch thatch grass or, in the case of men, to
go and hunt. This is what once happened to me. I wanted to build a roundavel, and
I, and another woman called Mma Onius jumped the fence into Mthenjwa’s farm
which was in Rhodesia. The grass in that farm was tall and very good for thatching.
We crossed at Vakaranga which is the closest railway siding with Rhodesia. We met
a man called Magabile. He was a neighbour in the homesteads of Jackalas no.1. He
was carrying an axe, and he too was crossing into Mnthenjwa’s farm in Rhodesia to
cut rafters for his house. Being a farm it did not only have good grass for thatching, it
also had good trees that made good poles. Mr Magabile was moving behind us
carrying his axe.
Suddenly I saw something, some movement which resembled the movement of
people. I alerted my colleague, Mma Onius. Indeed there were people and they
were Smith’s soldiers. They let us proceed, but they confronted Magabile, arrested
him and took him to Plumtree for questioning. He was released and returned to
Botswana after three days or so. They had took away the axe though!
Sometimes the Smith soldiers opened fire and killed people. Two sons of the
Bavu family in Jackalas no.1 were killed in this manner. One day they crossed the
border and went to the ruins of Mnthenjwa. Their purpose was to go to this old
place and steal corrugated iron that was left in the old house. They wanted to roof
their own houses on the Botswana side of the border. The Smith’s soldiers saw them
and opened fire and both of them were killed instantly. They mistook them for
Nkomo’s soldiers. They were eventually brought to the Botswana side of the border
as corpses.
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Another man from Ntemane ward, in Moroka suffered the same fate. He was a
hunter and was in possession of a hunting rifle. One day he crossed into Rhodesia to
hunt kudus, duikers and springboks. While hunting he came across Smith’s soldiers.
Rather than be submissive and humble, he decided to intimidate them probably
because he was in possession of a rifle. He started shooting at them, and they returned
fire killing him instantly. Botswana authorities were alerted about this incident, and
he was eventually buried at Moroka. The owner of the farm and his workers also
witnessed the incident and confirmed it to Mafuta’s relatives.
One day again there was widespread panic in Jackalas no.1 village. I still
remember that; it was about 3 o’clock in the afternoon when there was
confrontation between Smiths soldiers and BDF at the border near the present
Ramokgwebana border. By 4pm gunfire had started; there was exchange of fire
from both sides. The Botswana side had an upper hand; they used bazookas and
mortars that literally burnt the other side of the border. We witnessed the other side
of the border burning. The Smith’s soldiers left their weapons and ran for their dear
lives. That day nobody slept in their houses. We just put our cattle in their kraals and
ran to further and bigger settlements as far as we could. One particular soldier on
the Botswana side was singled out as a hero by the villagers as he was known to
have been unleashing deadly weapons that made the Rhodesians to retreat.
On another day again we were in the compound and we saw a white soldier
carrying his army paraphernalia and I confronted him because he was walking across
my field. He was very polite and told me that where he was coming from “was very
tough”(kwa ka sima). He was later arrested at the immigration office and I don’t know
what happened to him thereafter.
We also knew that Nkomo’s soldiers were deadly and whenever they met with
the Rhodesian soldiers many white soldiers were killed. Sometimes when herd boys
were heading cattle they reported having seen a cache of weapons hidden in the
hills near Chikes homestead. The weapons were assumed to belong to Nkomo’s
soldiers.
1994
Minyoi, Lloyd Mutakela

[Kasane]
Lloyd Mutakela Minyoi was born in 1942. He was employed in the forestry department
in Kasane in 1960, as a young boy and was responsible for making roads which
separated forestry areas from the national park and the community area. He worked in the
government until 1989 when he retired and started to do some business.
My full names are Lloyd Mutakela Minyoi. I was born in 1942. I was employed in
the forestry department here in Kasane in 1960. I was a young boy and we were
responsible for making cut lines or roads which divide forestry areas from national
park and the community area. I worked in the government until 1989 when I retired.
I started to do some business, and now I am just home as you can see I am blind.
Point of correction Sir, those people were refugees but they were our relatives.
Some were our brothers. What we used to do was to visit them at the police station
when they arrived. We used to go there, offer them food and then they were
repatriated to Tanzania, through Kazungula border. During the liberation struggle
the refugees were not given permanent residence here. They spent a few days here
before being transported to Tanzania.
I stayed in Kavimba and Parakarungu for sometime but from my own knowledge
there wasn’t any freedom fighter from Namibia who came there. What I know is that
there were our relatives from Namibia who were coming from Caprivi. They were
handled by the police. In Kavimba and Parakarungu there were no refugees seen.
The area in Namibia or along the border was open and the white soldiers used to
patrol the area using helicopters. I understand there were some refugees who used
to cross the border and stayed with their family members. Freedom fighters were
not seen around there. Most refugees were coming from Katima Mulilo and the
neighbouring settlements. They liked crossing at Ngoma or just in the bush along the
Chobe National Park. Some of these people came to Kasane from Mpalila in
Caprivi, and they were normally seen by the wildlife department people who
informed the police about them. Others knew where the police station was so they
went there and reported themselves.
Obviously we were affected by the struggle during the time I was working in the
forestry department. It affected us a lot.You remember there were those white soldiers
who brought war here and killed our sons at Lesoma. Those were our sons. Fifteen
soldiers were too much for our small populated country. The Rhodesia Smith force
killed our sons and that affected us a lot here. I went to the hospital that day when the
bodies of the 15 soldiers were brought. That affected us a lot people were crying.
Men and women were crying. People cried a lot when the bodies were flown from
here to Gaborone. Some women even fainted. There were white soldiers in
Namibia and white soldiers in Zimbabwe. These soldiers did not like the Botswana
government because the Botswana government was transporting refugees to
Tanzania and hiding
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those who were wanted by the white soldiers. They were making follow ups to try
and find out where the refugees were. This is why they even killed our sons at
Lesoma. I still remember the other day when I was in the Forestry Department.
We found a road block made by the Smith regime forces. They stopped us. We
were using a government vehicle. The road block was right in the Botswana road
border. There were four of us, the driver and three labourers. They ordered us to
come out of the car, and we got out of the land rover. They told us to undress; we
could not refuse, and so we did as they told us. We stood there naked and they told
us to dress and go away; and we went away. They just wanted to find out whether the
underwear we were putting on were made in Zambia or South Africa. They did not
like Kenneth Kaunda’s idea of training freedom fighters.
They also had a tendency of cross checking people’s passports when they were
traveling to Zimbabwe. I used to travel to Zambia but preferred going through
Zimbabwe to get to Livingstone where my brother was working. They used to
search us and there were road blocks almost after every 30 km. They looked at me
to check if I was a freedom fighter.
To the best of my knowledge, there were these whites who had Safari Companies
in Kasane and were specializing in hunting. There was Chobe Safari Lodge and
Hunters Africa. The white man I knew who was here, was Mr Mamson. He was
working for WINELA. That is the man who was controversial because he was a
spy. He took information from Botswana to Namibia, informing the white soldiers
there about what was happening. He was transferred to Shakawe, as he was one of
those people who were against Kaunda’s attitude of supporting the liberation
struggle. When he saw people that he did not know he would tell the white soldiers
that he saw freedom fighters in Kasane. He said the freedom fighters were the
enemies of the Boers.
It was not common to have freedom fighters in Kasane; it was common in
Lesoma, Kazungula and Pandamatenga. The freedom fighters were tricky because
they never put on uniform when they came to the village. It was difficult to
recognize them because they did not carry their weapons when they came to the
village. Some people say they used to see some of their relatives who were freedom
fighters but I never saw anyone I knew.
It was good for the government to support the liberation struggle. The idea was
excellent because a black man cannot suffer when another black man has a shelter.
The black guerrillas and refugees were our relatives; the white soldiers were
troubling our relatives. During that time there was no peace in Namibia and
Zimbabwe. We could not leave your cousins in trouble without helping them. The
border divided us but we were still one thing. The border was just a road. Some of
our relatives are still in Namibia and Zimbabwe, even today. The government was
doing a good thing and that is why there is independence in Southern Africa. These
white soldiers used to put road blocks especially at Gwezumba. The road blocks
were meant for trapping the BDF or freedom fighters. They came from Zimbabwe
and immediately on seeing a car they moved into the road and asked what you
were doing in the bush; even if
1994
the vehicle belonged to the government, with all the markings, they wanted to know
what you were doing. Then they searched inside the vehicle to see if there were any
weapons. It was not safe to travel along the border carrying a gun, because white
soldiers from Zimbabwe would think you were a freedom fighter and shoot you.
The government of Botswana did not to allow freedom fighters to enter with
weapons for strategic reasons, and so as not to provoke the Smith government. It was
good that way because we were a small country with a small army. If it was known
that the freedom fighters were coming in with their weapons, the Namibian regime
forces and Smith regime forces were going to come and destroy us all. The white
forces were stronger than our BDF; they were more sophisticated and had more
weapons.
It was not common in Kasane to have trekkers and people who acted as guides for
freedom fighters. It was more common in Lesoma and Pandamatenga. The people
who liked to work with white soldiers and freedom fighters are the Basarwa.
Basarwa knew the bush very well and it was easy to use them and later given them
little gifts. Basarwa also knew where there was water in the bush; and they were
good trekkers because they were hunter gatherers.
I don’t know anyone but what I heard was that there were Basarwa who were
employed by white soldiers and others by the refugees. This is not something
which was made public this is why I don’t know anyone but I heard they were
there.
Thank you Rra.
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Mmantsho, Mme
[Bontleng]
Mme Mmantsho came to Bontleng in 1971 while looking for a job, and started working at
the city council as a cleaner. He was in contact with refugees and interacted with them.
I started staying in Bontleng in 1971, as I was coming from Olifant drift. I was
looking for a job so I had to come to town and stay where accommodation was a bit
cheap as compared to other places in Gaborone. I found a job at the city council as
a cleaner. When I arrived here the refugees were already staying here at
Mmakholong’s place, during thebombings I was already staying here.One of
myfriends was accommodating them, so when I visited her I got to interact with
them; she was running a shebeen here in Bontleng. They were renting a room with
many of them staying in one room. They were very nice people, some of them we
did not know that they were refugees, up until after the bombing, that was when we
heard that those people were not supposed to stay here because the Boers were
looking for them, and they were refugees.
I remember it was on 14th June when the Boers come to bomb Botswana, but
I don’t remember the year. We accepted them just like the local people, they were
polite people, they had their own bus which they were using to get food and clothing
somewhere, one of them was called Tshepo, he was a friend of mine.
Both males and females came and they had kids but their kids were still young to
attend to school at that time. I remember they were supposed to get proper papers to
show that they were registered to stay in Botswana, but those who were staying
here did not show us any papers. They were supposed to get papers from the
Botswana government, they had to go and report to the government officials about
their presence in Botswana. They were very polite people who were law abiding,
they feared people, staying in small groups without mingling with the local people
much. As they stayed here longer they started mixing with the local people drinking
alcohol, having sexual relationships with the local people and fighting in the streets.
They started causing trouble in the village; they were now calling themselves South
Africans freely.
There was a little bit of tension, some were taken to the kgotla for sentencing.
The kgosi by then was kgosi Pilane. Local groups formed groups fighting with
them at night.
Some of the women refugees were married and their Batswana husbands were
taking care of them, those who were not married used to ask for temporary jobs so
that they could earn a living. Some Batswana women started accusing refugee
women of breaking their marriages and fights also broke out. Some of them were
married to Batswana men while others were just having relationships with them; it
was a common thing here. The fights that broke among the locals and the refugees
were based on sexual relationships. The refugee men wanted to go out with local
women
1994
but they did not want local men to date refugee ladies. Police used to arrest them and
charge them but the fights continued even at drinking places.
The reaction of local men towards refugee men dating local people is what
caused the fights, but the refugee men were less hostile maybe because they were in
a foreign country; again some of the refugee women were just their sisters not
wives.
When it was time for the refugees to go back home, they left behind women and
children; some of those children are living with us in the village. I don’t know of
any one of them who came back or who went home with the local women.
There was no lobola paid; it was just cohabitation. People just moved in with
one another without any elders being told. The elderly people who were staying in
the village were just fine with it. One lady who was staying with us was staying
with a refugee but elders never said anything. At that time their children were still
young but those who were born during intermarriages are schooling here because
they are Batswana.
The refugees stayed in Botswana for a very long time, some were able to go back
home while others were still coming. The first refugees who came to Botswana
were very polite, they were showing that they were into unknown world, and had to
behave, but those who came later were not that polite; maybe it was because their
counterparts had told them that Batswana were good people. I don’t know the
political parties they belonged to, but mostly I think they were supported Mandela.
No one was killed here in the bombing here in Bontleng, only a dog was killed
and the house was destroyed. I only interacted with the refugees from South Africa.
The refugees were arrogant and disturbing the peace that we once had before their
arrival. The children were just playing together. When they got home they would
tell us that they were playing with refugee children.
I just heard them saying they got food from somewhere but I didn’t know where
exactly. They said they chose to come to Botswana because Botswana was near
South Africa.
The coming of refugees affected the government policies and development at that
time because development went down; I remember before they came the government
was in the process of building flushing toilets for us but after the refugees came
that did not happen only the deep holes were left.
I don’t know whether the local churches played any role in assisting the refugees
because I don’t go to church, I just saw them drinking alcohol around. They were not
involved in criminal activities; they were only fighting as I mentioned above.
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Mmutla, Gaditshwane
[Gumare/Maun; November 2007/June 2007]
Gaditshwane Mmutla, 70, went to Moremi Memorial School and Molefi Secondary
School in Mochudi. He came back I worked in Palapye at a company called RA Bailey
before joining politics, as a member of the Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP), in 1961,
and later followed Mr Motsamai Mpho and became the Regional Secretary in North-West
district (Ngamiland). That was the area he had experiences with refugees coming to
Botswana, from Namibia, mainly.
My name is Gaditshwane Mmutla; I was born in 1937, and right now I am 70 years
old. There was no education in our country because schools were still being built. I
started school and went to Moremi Memorial School, and from there I went to what is
now called Molefi Secondary School in Mochudi. I then came back since my
parents did not have enough money to pay for us at school. So when I came back I
worked in Palapye at a company called RA Bailey. I worked there before I joined
politics. When politics started in 1961, I joined Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP)
and it split into Bechuanaland Independent Party (BIP) and then I followed Mr
Motsamai Mpho. I started as a member and then became a Regional Secretary in
North-West district (Ngamiland). My assignment was to take care of refugees who
were mainly from Namibia. We helped them to pass through Botswana. I helped
refugees at my own expense. I remember the late Kgosi Letsholathebe calling us to
help refugees, but that was after independence.
After independence, some of us were called by Letsholathebe to help refugees.
We transported them as far as Kazungula and they moved on to their destination.
We even took them to Zambia, but at first we used to take them to Rhodesia and
they had to go through Francistown which was our party headquarters. I worked on
this assignment for a long time; I did that until we got independence; until
Botswana became what it is today. I once stood for elections when Bechuanaland
did not have the local government, when there was a Prime Minister not the
President. Then we saw that we could not attain independence without having a
local government. The process started before September, and in July that was when
the local government came into being. I stood for elections in 1966 and a fellow
BDP counterpart defeated me with 411 to 407 votes. From there I continued with
my job as an organizer for North-West.
When we say Ngamiland, we mean the whole district that is to say Ngamiland and
the Okavango. From 1974 we had an old man by the name Sauqho Goipatabotho as
a councillor for Shorobe; I am the one who campaigned for him, and he won in 1966.
He died in 1973 and by that time there were no by-elections like now; there was no
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) which was responsible for elections. I then
became a Councillor for Shorobe in 1974. I was defeated by a BDP candidate in
1979 and then bounced back in 1984 up till now.
1994
I was still doing my assignment, which was difficult. Refugees from Namibia
came in Ngamiland and I once saw one young man from Mozambique and helped
him to pass through Botswana to Zambia. Our leader, Mr Mpho Motsamai already
knew about the liberation struggle. He was taught and was also involved in the
South African liberation struggle. We were also taken by the African Nationalist
movements to Zambia and Tanzania to be taught about liberation. We were aware of
the risk, but we also understood that Botswana’s independence alone could not take
us anywhere therefore; we had to cooperate with our neighbours. You see the
problem? Mr Motsamai encouraged us a lot because he had the experience. We did
that as a political party. From the beginning the ruling party had fear of helping
freedom fighters because of the attitude of the neighbouring countries towards
Botswana, since they were ruled by the white people. The Police caught the
Freedom fighters. This was until Mr Mpho Motsamai asked them to take them to
South Africa, and also to take them to where they were heading to for military
training.
The Botswana government did not want to support the struggle from the beginning.
I don’t know, maybe they didn’t have an idea of what to do when face with a
situation where they were expected to assist people that the white regimes regarded
as enemies. After sometime, they saw the need to help these people …after being
involved in organizations such as the Organization of African Union (OAU) and the
Liberation Committee. OAU then formed a sub-organ called Liberation Committee
and it was responsible for its funding, and funding was done by member states.
While supporting freedom fighters we came across some problems. You should
be aware that by that time our policemen were under the British. They harassed and
became suspicious of us. We experienced such problems. Since these people had to
go to Tanzania we had to find ways of assisting them without the police knowing.
The Bechuanaland Protectorate police were suspicious; they guarded our houses time
and again thinking that they were going to find freedom fighters. I remember in 1967
when we were driving from Kazungula; after crossing the border a policeman
searched us even in our socks. During that time it was called Police Mobile Unit
(PMU). They used to hide and wait for us after Samxu in Xhusa, near Mababe. We
usually found them in that area; one of the officers is still alive and he lives in
Bokalaka. He was in the Special Branch. The last time I went there I met him and
he asked us whether we knew the terrible things he used to do.
The other problem was funding. The truth is that I am the one who was working
hard in this region. I was the only one who was funding this charity project, at
times helping with petrol. We had cars which we were given by the OAU Liberation
Committee. The truth is that they were from Nkrumah and Nyerere, but we needed
petrol to run around.
The cars were given to BIP; we used them for the party. Nkrumah didn’t know which
party in Botswana would attract Batswana popular vote, so he gave BIP, BDP, BNF
and BDP money. The sub-committee, Liberation Committee was meant to liberate
other countries and it was based in Tanzania. OAU’s headquarters were in Addis
Ababa,
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the first conference was in Addis Ababa in 1962. That was where the headquarters
are even today. Emperor Haile Selasie declared his country headquarters of
Africa’s independence; hence the OAU headquarters are in Ethiopia, you have read
about it and you should know what I am talking about.
Some Batswana realized what we were doing was for the good of our fellow
Africans, but others did not; some thought we were crooks or criminals. Some
Batswana believed that we were committing crime to assist freedom fighters. Some
thought that we were bringing Communism to Botswana. Some even accused us of
bringing criminals into the country. We were however able to explain to them what
our aim was. We had songs we sang to pass the message to the public. The song
goes like, “ae buye, South Africa, ae buye Zimbabwe, ae buye Namibia” and
mentioning other countries which were not liberated. It was a message we gave to
Batswana in freedom squares.
So people understood our message; we had refugees staying with their relatives
here and getting the message across to the rest of the community through relatives
who accommodated them. In villages along the border, they gave them
accommodation, clothes and food. For example, Baherero and Mbandero of
Namibia are related and it was easy for them to get help. In the southern part of
this country, in villages like Ramotswa and in the Borolong people there have
relatives across the border. In Bokalaka in villages such as Maitengwe or Jackalas
they have relatives in Zimbabwe.
We had good relationship with Zambia and Tanzania as we were serving one role
in the liberation struggle. The relationship was smooth. One should not forget that
the Zambian economy collapsed because it accommodated a lot of refugees from
the liberation struggle countries, you know. Refugees and freedom fighters passed
through Zambia up north.
We knew people from ANC and SWAPO. When helping them we didn’t care which
party they were from. We accepted them as fellow Africans. We had good
relationship with ANC, SWAPO and ZANU. The independent government of
Botswana allowed us to help freedom fighters. South Africa, Zimbabwe and
Namibia were still fighting for their independence, and by keeping freedom fighters
here we were aware of a possibility of an attack by the white regimes. Our
government found it important to accommodate refugees even though there was
that threat. We accommodated them. Our government really helped. This is why at
the end we set up the Dukwi Refugee Camp.
At first people were afraid, but freedom fighters were highly disciplined. They
came here with their mission. Don’t forget that Botswana was a member of OAU
right? They had discussions about these problems, right? Hence the UN had an organ
responsible for refugees. Therefore, all these made Botswana to realize that it is
part and parcel of that body, hence the need to help other countries.
Our President used to explain to the nation that we were helping the freedom
fighters and refugees; but we could not allow our country to be used as a
battlefield. That message I still remember, meaning that we could help refugees, but
they shouldn’t
1994
launch their attacks from our country. So this is how Botswana managed to control
and keep that cooperation with other countries.
There were shooting incidents along the border, like the Lesoma incident in
the Kasane/Kazungula area. We were threatened by regimes in our neighbouring
countries. They tried to threaten Botswana. They believed that we accommodated
freedom fighters. There were also some minor incidents near Shakawe, Seronga
and other nearby cattle posts along the border. In Shakawe they threatened people
with aero planes, flying over villages. They did not drop bombs, but they were
threatening people and the villagers were terrified. This happened in the 1970s before
the Namibian independence. The government of Botswana could only report such
incidents to the United Nations. We had a small army and we were a young country.
Botswana opted for tactical diplomacy.
Earlier when we were assigned to look after refugees, we used to be called to
villages near the border to meet political activists such as Sam Nujoma, having
crossed straight from Namibia. They used to wait for us at a village called
Makunda that is next to Charles Hill in Gantsi District, near the border. We looked
for petrol to fetch them and brought them to Maun. They travelled in groups of
four, five, or even ten. We kept them at Sehithwa and in Maun at my place. Some
of them came in groups as teenagers; those were kept at Maun prison. Their leaders
already knew about us prior to sending their people here and when they arrived in
Botswana they trusted us. Suspicion only came after the Rhodesian wars of
liberation intensified along the Botswana border. Therefore, we never knew who
the enemy was and who was not. Even for us activists, it was difficult at times to
differentiate whether they were genuine refugees or spies.
One young man from Mozambique first met Mr Barxten Mokwena at Sabbath
Church upon his arrival in Maun, and Mr Mokwena informed us about his presence
in the village; he was not in good health. He said someone told him that the easiest
way to proceed north was to pass through Botswana. He said he came through South
Africa before coming here, and he also stayed briefly in Swaziland but people there
did not want to cooperate with him. He stayed at Mokwena’s place and we later
arranged for him to travel to Francistown. During those days, in the 1960s, trucks
travelled for about 5-6 days from Maun to Francistown. There were trucks which
were going to Francistown and since we were worried that he might get arrested at
the airport, we decided he that he should travel in a truck. It was in 1969 when we met
this boy. When we saw him at the SDA Church, he seemed tired and he wasn’t
eating well and people were afraid of him since they were not used to seeing people
in such condition. He stayed in Maun for about a week. Since the driver was a
member of our political party we knew he would know how to take care of the
young man until they reached Francistown. We had instructed the driver to inform
our colleagues in Francistown to prepare papers for his transit.
Mr Sam Nujoma is a respected politician of the liberation movement. When Toivu
Ja Toivu was arrested around 1963/64 and was taken to Robben Island, that is when
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Mr Sam Nujoma took over the leadership of SWAPO, he ran away when they were
searching for him. He crossed into Botswana at Makunda. Daniel Munamava, and
myself travelled to Makunda to pick him up. Mr Munamava was the coordinator of
SWAPO activities here. He linked those in Botswana and those in South West
Africa, now Nambia. Munamava was a Motswana. You know that Baherero are
related or have relatives in Namibia, so are the Mbanderu. The other one who was
also active in SWAPO politics from here was Edwin Kwatheri, he was also a
Motswana. There were Batswana linking Namibians in Botswana and their relatives
back home. They were the ones who gave us information. Since I was the party
chairman of the region, I was informed of everything that happened here in to the
region. Therefore they came to me and told me everything.
We managed to arrange for Nujoma to pass through Botswana. Since he was the
leader, Special Branch police heard about his presence in the district and since he
was the leader of a liberation movement and they Police were still operating under
the British colonial rule, they searched for him all over Ghanzi. When they went to
look for him in Makunda, Munamava and Kwatheri came to us and told us that the
police were looking for Sam Nujoma. The Special Branch went to Makunda in
search for us and Sam Nujoma, but then we spent that day at one cattle post known
as Motwere and they were not able to locate where we were. From Makunda and
Makakung they went to the Kuke Gate. When they were at Kuke, we slept at Xhoga
at Mr Mokwena’s farm; it is just close to the Kuke Gate on the western side.
Munamava and Kwatheri used horses to keep us informed of the whereabouts of the
special branch and what directions we should take to avoid meeting them. We were
using cars, but Munamava and Kwatheri were riding on horses and they knew how
and where to find us. There were no cell phones at that time and in our region
communication was mainly through transport movement. We were able to arrive with
him safely in Maun and stayed with him at my place. He stayed for 2 weeks. We
enjoyed conversations with him because we were new in politics and we liked to
hear about the liberation struggle. We always talked about liberation when we were
with him. We talked about how we wanted African countries to be liberated. We
heard about Nelson Mandela and that Nujoma
saw him in prison. There were some newspapers like the Contact and New Age that
we liked reading with Nujoma. We read them just like today’s Mmegi and The
Guardian. We enjoyed reading a lot. Nowadays there is no politics in the papers;
they are after money. Ga go na polotiki. Nujoma told us about problems
experienced fellow blacks in his country and that such problems affected Africa as a
whole. He was determined to help the fellow Africans in his country. By then there
were Pan-Africanist legends like Nkrumah, Nyerere and Kaunda who were great
men, and we talked about them because they were very supportive to the struggle.
I think the lesson learnt by Botswana was to cooperate with other countries. This
made Botswana a member of the OAU and to support the liberation movements; she
also became a member of the Frontline States. When she matured in some of these
things, Botswana started to be fully involved in the struggle.
1994
My own personal experience about the struggle was bad at times, and it was at
times nice; this was because it involved risking one’s life. Like I told you, the
police were under the British rule and they sent spies or other people to come and
tell us rubbish while addressing meetings in the Freedom Square. At first people
did not understand, but at the end they understood the message of liberation.
I understand that we did a lot; and even though we did that as a political party,
we did it for Botswana. Our aim was that this is our country and we had to help our
fellow brothers and sisters in neighbouring countries. At the end what would benefit
Botswana would also benefit others. As you can see, we can now take our children
to schools in South Africa or Zambia; we couldn’t do that before independence.
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Moahi, Billy
Billy Moahi is aged 41 years, and he worked as a teacher in the Dukwi refugee camp,
teaching primary school level refugee children between the 1980s and 1990s.He also had
the privilege of interacting with the parents of those children.
I taught at Dukwi primary school in the mid 1980s until the early 1990s, so I had
the privilege of interacting with refugees and their children.
Educationally refugee children were high performers when I compare them
to other schools that surrounded us. They were fine; their refugee status was not
expressed in their gestures. They were just normal children with good behaviour.
Cases of indiscipline were not anything to worry about because it was only childhood
mischief which is normal to all children. They conformed to school policies and loved
school. We never had cases of running away from school.
Setswana was an option earlier; it was done by those who were interested in
taking it as a subject. So people with languages close to Setswana chose it as a
subject, for example the South African refugees who could speak Sesotho or
Sepedi. I went for national competitions with these children in music and sports.
They were also very energetic in extra curricula activities.
The refugees needed love; I realized that they only became difficult when they
were not given love. My wife worked at the office of the president in the camp and
sometimes they reported cases of displeasure about certain personnel who were
supposed to be taking care of refugees.
Parents’ participation in the education of their children was higher than that of
Batswana parents. Most refugee parents were educated. The Angolan parents were
the ones who were not as educated as Zimbabweans and South Africans. Their
relationship with teachers was just fine. Teachers were tolerant.
Access to school was not done looking at students’age. Some parents were
attending school with their children because the idea was to give all refugees basic
education and try to make them forget that they were away from their countries.
The South African refugees were not happy to be at the camp at all. The
difference between them and other refugees was that they were still too much
involved in the struggle; always singing and chanting. Most of the time they were
lamenting about the type of life they were having in the camp. They wanted
relocation to countries such as America and Australia in order to be exposed to
various opportunities such as good jobs and scholarships.
There was good cooperation between refugees and Batswana; I went to church
with many refugees. South African refugees taught music in our church (OAC). They
were our friends and they always narrated their rough history to us. Sometimes there
was dissatisfaction because the supplies that refugees got were not 100%
satisfactory. The quality of food and quality of clothes they were given were
sometimes not up to their standard.
1994
In 1994 some South African refugees did not go back home. Some had found better
lives in America; some felt it was unsafe to go back home and a few were people
who were ‘wanted’ for one reason or other and so they feared for their lives.
The Botswana Christian Council was one of the organizations that offered its
services to the refugees. The BCC sought different donations for refugees, and to
help refugees to cope, the BCC offered counselling sessions. The Botswana
Council for Refugees (BCR) on the other hand dealt with the general welfare of the
refugees. Refugee complaints or grievances were channelled through the BCR.
I felt pity for the refugees considering the type of life they lived. Displacement
is a painful experience. The refugees were always monitored; they had no freedom
of movement as much as they would have wished for. For them to leave the camp
they sought permission and without permission they could be imprisoned for leaving
camp without permission. That was one of the policies in the camp; refugees lived
a governed life.
I do not regret the gesture Botswana took to accommodate refugees. Refugees
are just human beings like anyone else. We must help others so that in future we may
also be helped when we are in the same situation
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Mogae, Festus G.
[Phakalane, Gaborone; 5 November 2008]
His Excellency Mr Festus G. Mogae was in the public service for many years and rose to
position of Vice President, and then President.
First and foremost, Botswana served as a conduit for refugees from South Africa,
Zimbabwe and Namibia to the outside world. People had to escape clandestinely
from oppression, and our role was to assist them to reach their destination. We did
this in a situation where we were surrounded by hostile regimes of apartheid South
Africa, racist Rhodesia, and Namibia which was ruled by South Africa. We had a
small population and we were weak militarily and economically. But we were
acutely aware that our independence was not secure as long as we were surrounded
by these hostile racist regimes. We regarded the liberation of the region as our own
liberation. Once these countries were free, we would enjoy genuine freedom. Our
independence would be secure as we would have neighbours who respected us.
Consequently, the first thing we did on gaining independence was to join the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was highly critical of the racist
regimes and which these regimes hated. This demonstrated where we belonged and
later we became a member of the Frontline States. In the late 1960s, we were
already facing attacks from South Africa. Whenever refugees from there fled to
Botswana they would punish us by withdrawing railway wagons to stop goods
from moving to and from Botswana; so we would not be able to export goods for
periods of up to three months. This hostility grew as evidenced by the blowing up of
a plane in Francistown, which was used to carry refugees from Francistown to
Zambia.
The role of Botswana being a conduit was vital to the struggle because many
refugees and leading nationalists passed through Botswana. I would say about 90%
went through this country. It was important that those waging the struggle from
outside be connected to those inside South Africa. Some of our people acted as
couriers for the liberation movements. Those arrested such as Michael Dingake,
served many years in jail, in South Africa. We were surprised about the severity of
these sentences. The liberation movements later explained to us that carrying
messages from leaders outside to leaders inside South Africa was a serious crime in
South Africa, hence the severe sentences. But we always realised that we were part
of the struggle. Some of our friends like Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia realised our
precarious situation.
Around 1971 when Britain joined the EEC, they issued an invitation to the
Anglophone African States to seek an association with the EEC like the
Francophone states had done with France’s assistance (the Yaunde Convention).
The Anglophone countries felt that the Yaunde Convention was a neo-colonial
arrangement. It fell on Botswana to convince the others that we should negotiate. We
explained our position that in our precarious geopolitical situation, even a neo
colonial arrangement would be better than being isolated from the rest of the
world, and being dominated by
1994
racist South Africa and Rhodesia. We further argued that if we small countries,
namely Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland negotiated without the support of the
larger African countries, then a neo-colonial arrangement would result, as we had no
bargaining power: But if we joined together, the weak ones and the strong ones like
Nigeria, which was already exporting oil and groundnuts, we would have leverage.
To get things moving Mogae and Bareki were sent to East Africa to learn how
the association with EEC operated. The East African States had associate status
with the EEC. Botswana’s objective then was to have access to the EEC market for
our beef. We spent 3 months in East Africa. A meeting of Anglophone officials was
convened where we presented papers. Essentially we explained the weakness and
vulnerability of the BLS countries. It was imperative that BLS be assisted by
stronger and larger African countries to negotiate with the EEC so as to loosen the
stranglehold of the racist regimes. We got the support of the officials. Our position
was then supported at the meeting of Ministers where our delegation was led by
Quett Masire, who was Vice President and Minister of Finance and Development
Planning.
It was agreed that we should avoid alienating Francophone Africa by regarding
them as neo-colonialists. We should win them over to the idea of negotiating with
Europe together. This position prevailed and a meeting was convened in Abidjan
where the idea of negotiating as a united group prevailed. When the negotiations
began, Nigeria chaired the African Group. Finally, a broader front emerged of African,
Pacific, and Caribbean States (APC). Botswana played a leading role in this
because we always felt that as a weak small country our survival would depend on
uniting with others. In this we had a strong backing from the East African
Community. Indeed Botswana played a leading role in the ACP. We did this in order
to protect our Independence. It was a struggle for survival.
Botswana was a conduit for liberation movements and refugees who wanted to
go north for training for the liberation war. We facilitated their passage. The South
Africans demanded their return to South Africa. We told them that they had to move
on, because they were never intended to stay in Botswana. In this way we contributed
to the struggle and we always regarded ourselves as part of the liberation struggle.
This role was not easy because of the hostility of the racist regimes. For example,
they demanded that we remove the offices of ANC and PAC from Botswana. We told
them we couldn’t do that because the offices assisted in handling the many South
Africans who fled to Botswana.
They claimed that many or 10% of those who came as refugees were, in fact,
“terrorists”. We denied any knowledge of that and wondered why they did not stop
them from leaving since their police were better placed to do so than ours. Our police
force was too small to cope with the situation they were concerned about. South
Africans charged that we sent people to train in countries to the north like in the USSR,
as guerrillas. We denied that. All we did was to facilitate their passage northwards
and did not know what they did once they arrived at their destinations. Then long
before the attacks of later years, the South Africans blew up Batswana homes
claiming they
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were hide outs for freedom fighters. There were many such incidents, but being a small
country these incidents were not reported in the international press. The Rhodesians
also attacked our army and invaded border areas and Francistown. They painted their
trucks the same colour as BDF trucks and made uniforms similar to that of the BDF,
so that they would not be easily detected. At times they kidnapped our people. So
we suffered a great deal from these attacks but we persisted in assisting in the
struggle. Many countries, except our neighbours such as Zambia and Tanzania, did
not know about how we were attacked and harassed by the racist regimes.
In the earlier days, the liberation movements such as the ANC wanted us to
allow their freedom fighters to transit through Botswana to attack South Africa. We
constantly reminded them of our policy of not allowing attacks to be launched from
our country, pointing out that if that were to be allowed then both we and the ANC
cadres would be wiped out. After the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and
Mozambique, ANC renewed the request to open up Botswana for guerrillas to transit
to South Africa. We refused explaining our policy as we had done before. We then
quietly told the ANC that Botswana was a huge country and that we would not be
looking for them. They had the responsibility to avoid being seen by us. In other
words they could pass through Botswana but avoid been seen and arrested.
Despite our vulnerable position, we supported the struggle. We tried not to give
South Africa a pretext to attack us. We explained to our African colleagues why we
could not open up the country for freedom fighters. Eventually they understood our
position. The relations with the liberation movements were good. Whenever there
were differences we discussed them amicably. Our security people worked closely
with the ANC security, exchanging information on matters of mutual interest. Oliver
Tambo and Thabo Mbeki visited us periodically to exchange views on matters of
mutual interest. We told them what we were able to do and what we were unable to
do, in the liberation struggle. On the whole, they appreciated our position. There are
those who urged that we should establish bases for the liberation movements. We
said to do so would be to open both the freedom fighters and Botswana to attacks; we
would be sitting ducks.
If freedom fighters were caught in Botswana, they would be arrested, put on
trial, sentenced, and then we sent them back to Zambia and Tanzania. They did not
serve their sentences because we supported the struggle. The arrests and trials were
meant to demonstrate to South Africa that we did not allow attacks on our
neighbours from our country.
We took risks all the time so as to liberate the region, and there were many dangers.
For example we had learned through our security that one white teacher was targeted
by the South Africans. He refused to move north for his own safely. We declared
him a prohibited immigrant so as to get him out, and he went to Angola. The South
Africans sent him a letter bomb which killed his wife and daughter. These letter
bombs were quite common. Other people such as Tiro were killed in this way. A priest
in Molepolole also lost has arm from a letter bomb. So Botswana was
destabilized
1994
throughout, not just in the 1980s, when more dramatic events occurred and were
reported in the international press.
Concerning application of UN sanctions against the racist regimes, we could not
do this as we had no capacity to do so. Moreover, applying sanctions would hurt us as
the regimes would retaliate.
There were incidents by both the nationalist movements and the South Africans
where they used some of our people as spies. For example, the ANC used a
certain woman in one of the villages as a courier. The South Africans also used her as
a spy and she was in love with one of their policemen who belonged to the same
ethnic group. The ANC later exposed her and reported her to us. We told them our
worry about using our people as spies as this endangered their lives and the lives of
their families. There were also rivalries among liberation movements. The PAC had
a perception that we tended to favour ANC. We explained that we dealt with ANC
more regularly because they had more people here. As for ZANU’s perception
that we tended to favour ZAPU, we explained that ZAPU, like ANC, had more
people here just as ZANU had more in Mozambique. This was a function of
geography. In reality we welcomed all who came this country, such as the man who
later became the founding Executive Secretary of SADC. He came through
Botswana.
Concerning Namibia, SWAPO was the dominant party here. They lived in a house
dubbed the “white house”. When elections approached, SWAPO wanted us to stop
the Herero from going to Namibia to vote. The Turnhalle Alliance supported the
Botswana Herero’s desire to emigrate to Namibia as they stood to gain votes. But
SWAPO and Botswana opposed the move. In the end they did not relocate. This was
to happen after independence when some Herero returned to Namibia.
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Mogorosi, Benjamin
[Gobojango; May 2007]
Mr Benjamin Mogorosi is a 51 years old teacher, but during the liberation struggle he
used to drive a truck to transport refugees to Bobonong police station. He narrates how the
Rhodesian soldiers were harassing villagers and even students. He says that the
Rhodesian government was aware of those people who assisted the freedom fighters. He
also explains why the borders with Rhodesian and South Africa were not secure, as the
white farmers were armed and were in support of the governments of those countries.
Things were tough during the war because there was neither a police station nor
army bases. The refugees relied on members of the community who were willing
and able to assist. For example I used to drive Rre Mogorosi’s truck to transport the
refugees to Bobonong police station. We suspected that there were some people in
the village who told the Rhodesians who were assisting the refugees. People like
Mogorosi, Phalandwa of Semolale, Ngala of Mabolwe were known to the
Rhodesian government. With time, the government provided trucks to transport the
refugees.
There was a lot of insecurity and people like Motsumi, Ngala and others often hid
at night to avoid being captured by Rhodesian soldiers. Even feeding the guerrillas
was hazardous because those who assisted could be attacked by the Rhodesians. At
one point they captured some teachers at night and freed them at the border. One
John Mokgoba was once captured but he bolted and escaped from them. They came
to capture people at the cattle posts. At some point they came to our cattle post, but
we escaped to report to the BDF who traced them, but they had fled across the border
back to Rhodesia. As for the refugees, the villagers really rallied to help them as
best as they could. The villagers also protected the refugees and freedom fighters
by not disclosing their whereabouts.
There is the incident of Manama students who were harassed by a plane. We had
to move the pupils from the kgotla to the school. So, transport was arranged for them
to go to Bobonong. One disconcerting thing was that the white farmers in Tuli Block
near Bobirwa border villages could not be trusted. They were well armed as if they
supported the Rhodesians and South Africans.
The economy of the country was affected adversely. Foot and mouth disease spread
from Zimbabwe,as the veterinary services had broken down.Livestock theft
increased, especially by some Batswana. Theft from Botswana was not that
widespread. Some Batswana were even arrested and tried for stealing Zimbabwe
cattle.
We were very suspicious of white farmers whom we thought collaborated with
the whites in Zimbabwe and South Africa. For example, I feared going to South
Africa because we were often questioned about the freedom fighters, and finally, I
stopped going to South Africa for fear that I would be arrested or harmed in some
way if I continued going there.
1994
I personally once helped two freedom fighters who were badly injured in
confrontation with the Rhodesians. I went to Shashe River to transport them
to Bobonong. On the Rhodesian side they had been transported by donkey to
Shashe River.
Concerning alerting freedom fighters about the movement of Rhodesian soldiers
and an incident at Dinde River near Gobojango, I reported this to the freedom
fighters we were sheltering. Fortunately, the BDF soon arrived and went to repulse
the Rhodesians. At our homestead there was a room where we often hid freedom
fighters. Children were not allowed to enter that room for fear they might divulge the
information.
Concerning the question as to whether Botswana gained anything from its support
for liberation struggle, I feel that, overall, Botswana had not gained much.
Rather, the country was adversely affected economically. Its support for refugees
drained the country’s meagre resources. There was a break down in veterinary
services in Zimbabwe, which led to the spread of the foot and mouth disease to
the Bobirwa area, and up to the present day the disease ravages the area from
time to time. So, from time to time Bobirwa is banned from selling its cattle to
the Botswana Meat Commission. Cattle theft increased during the liberation war.
Some Batswana stole cattle from Zimbabwe border areas, thus further spreading of
foot and mouth disease. As for relations between Botswana and the liberated
countries, the relations with South Africa are very good. Batswana who could not
go to South Africa during the apartheid era are now welcomed to South Africa.
However, relations with Zimbabwe are not that good. Sometimes one feels that
some Zimbabweans tend to harass Batswana.
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Mogorosi, Okgetheng Legong

[Gobojango]
Mr Okgetheng Legong Mogorosi, is 52 years old Motswana Babirwa, who fought in the
Liberation War on the side of Joshua Nkomo’s ZIPRA force.
We are Babirwa people who live on the eastern border between Botswana and
Zimbabwe. There are many things which we have always shared with our relatives
on the Zimbabwe side of the border. For example, in the past, many of our people in
Botswana went to Rhodesia for medical care and education, as these were not well
developed in our area of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.
During the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, many people fled to our area to escape
oppression in their country. We assisted them as best as we could, with such things
as food, in some cases clothing, and transport for those who wished to move on
to other destinations. The three villages of Gobojango, Semolale and Mabolwe
were very much affected because of the influx of these people.
We took these people to the chief who allowed us to transport them to the police
camp in Bobonong, from where they were transported to Selebi-Phikwe and from
there to Francistown where the liberation movements had their offices. This assistance
was given by those in these villages who wanted to help these people and had the
ability and means to do so.
I personally played a part in assisting the fleeing people as I was able to drive.
My uncle, Mr Motsumi Mogorosi, had a shop and some trucks. We used these
trucks to transport refugees to Bobonong or even further to Selebi-Phikwe. We
assisted the police in the task of transporting them. At that time the police in
Bobonong had rudimentary transport which could not cope with the large numbers
of refugees. So the few people in our area who had trucks assisted with the
transport. In addition to dealing with the refugees, we also had contact with some
members of the liberation movements, especially ZAPU. They periodically
travelled from Francistown to our villages to explain to us about the struggle, and
gave us advice on how to take care of ourselves as the oppressors in Rhodesia and
South Africa were going to try to harm us because of the assistance we were giving
to the refugees. The oppressors knew the names of such people as Motsumi
Mogorosi of Gobojango, Join Ngala and Maziba Mathora of Mabolwe who were
very active in assisting refugees from their informers. So their lives were in danger,
as spies sometimes came clandestinely to these villages to ask about the
whereabouts of these men. However, generally the villagers who supported what
these men did and sympathised with the refugees, refused to divulge any
information about these men, and instead alerted them about the spy activities in
the village.
But these agents of Rhodesia and South Africa persisted in their efforts to know
and, perhaps hurt or capture those who helped refugees and liberation movements.
1994
In the mid 1970s they sometimes placed bombs in the homes of those who supported
refugees and freedom fighters.
In fact some of the leading helpers of the liberation struggle in the villages had
to avoid living in their own homes most of the time. They had to hide in different
places to avoid being hurt by the agents of the oppressive regimes. There is an
incident that illustrates the danger these men faced. A Boer and a black man once
came to our shop and placed a bomb in a room where I slept, believing that freedom
fighters hid there; fortunately, the freedom fighters had taught us how to identify
bombs and other harmful objects. So I saw the bomb under my bed and diffused it.
The persons who taught us about bombs and other harmful objects were generally
known by their war names, but we knew some of them by their real names such as
Joel Sijie, Ethan Dube, Mohadi who is now (2007) a government minister in
Zimbabwe. They came at night and disappeared before day break. Their main task
was to meet the refugees and to make arrangements for them to move on to
Francistown and then to Zambia and other countries north of the Zambezi. They
also came to see what the situation was in our villages, so as to tender advice on how
to deal with the dangerous situation caused by the influx of refugees.
One of the ZAPU men, Joel Sijie, lived among us in Gobojango, which was the
base from which he recruited cadres for ZAPU from among the refugees.
Periodically he crossed into Zimbabwe to recruit cadres directly from there. We
assisted him in this recruitment drive. Sometimes we went with him at night to meet
the recruited cadres at the Shashe River. The River is not far from the border villages
of Bobirwa area. Joel functioned easily because he lived with his relatives in
Gobojango. He was an able and brave functionary of ZAPU.
I was about 20 or 21 years old when I got involved in these activities of assisting
freedom fighters and the refugees. I realised that my life was in danger, and fearing
that the agents of the oppressive regimes could eventually harm me, I decided to
leave Gobojango. I was the manager of Mr Motsumi Mogorosi’s business and
transport. Some of the prominent people who were involved were: Motsumi
Mogorosi, a business man (Gobojango), Chief Makwati (Gobojango), his successor,
Sehato Koma, Join Ngala who became chief of Mabolwe village in later years,
Maziba Mathora (Mabolwe), a business man, Phalandwa (Semolale), and others in
Bobonong such as B. Sekwababe. These men had trucks which they volunteered to
use to transport the refugees to Bobonong and Selebi-Phikwe. They transported,
housed and fed these people at no charge. They considered it a duty to do so in
order to assist the refugees. The villagers contributed food and helped to cook and
feed the refugees; many of them being their relatives from Zimbabwe and to some
extent from South Africa (The South African element was to a smaller extent in the
Bobirwa area). In Bobonong some of the people who assisted with food and
transport were Mr James Maruatona, Mr Selelo Phofuitsile. Both these men were
businessmen in Bobonong.
In all this we worked closely with the Botswana Police. I recall the good
cooperation we had from officer Macha who ran the small police station in
Bobonong. We took
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the refugees to the police and they liaised with government agencies to take these
people to their destinations.
The line of communication was (1) village chief(s), (2) Bobonong police, (3)
Selebi-Phikwe, (4) Francistown and onwards to refugee camps or to countries north
of the Zambezi via Zambia.
Concerning my own situation, it became untenable. Mr Motsumi Mogorosi was
now no longer able to live in his home due to fear of being harmed by the agents
of Rhodesia. So I was now responsible for all his business affairs and receiving
and transporting refugees. My life was in danger. So Mrs Mogorosi advised me to
leave Gobojango for Gaborone to seek advice from Dr Phineas Makhurane,
Motsumi Mogorosi’s brother, who taught at the University of Botswana. He and
others advised that if I so wished, I should go north and join the liberation forces. To
continue staying in Gobojango was fraught with danger. I too felt that I should join the
liberation forces. So I went to Francistown where I consulted with the ZAPU
people we used to work with in Gobojango such as Dick Vuma. They arranged for
me to go to Zambia. So together with cadres recruited in Botswana, we went straight
to ZIPRA (the armed wing of ZAPU) to train as soldiers for the liberation war.
We were trained by the trained ZIPRA soldiers who had trained in various
countries like USSR, Cuba etc. The Zambians did not participate in our training.
They played the protective role to safeguard our camps like what the Botswana
police and later Botswana Defence Force did.
Zambia was really a transit camp. The real training was done at Morogoro in
Tanzania. There we met some ZANLA cadres who were the armed wing of ZANU.
It was decided that ZIPRA and ZANLA should join forces and go to fight from the
Mozambique front. Some went there, but others saw the danger of merging with
ZANLA and fled to Zambia from where we decided to open our own front. The
merged army was called Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA); they began to take our
arms and we saw the danger of being eliminated by ZANLA. ZAPU decided to
disengage from ZIPA, clandestinely, and moved back to Zambia to fight as a
separate force. In Zambia we cooperated with Umkhonto we Sizwe (ANC) and the
SWAPO Liberation Army.
I recall one incident in which I was involved; ZAPU had learned that the Rhodesians
had recruited an American who was said to have fought in the Vietnam War. His job
was to advise the Smith regime on how to crush the liberation movements operating
from Zambia. We were sent to capture him alive, if possible, in Victoria Falls. The
aim was to extract information which could be useful to the liberation struggle from
him. The mission was successful, but unfortunately the man was shot during
interrogation, before extracting the information from him.
We had broad training which also embraced survival skills. In 1976 we were
given experience in the field, but not actual fighting was involved during that
phase. We infiltrated Zimbabwe to make contacts with the people to tell them about
the liberation struggle. It was when we returned from one of those sorties that we
were
1994
ambushed by Smith’s soldiers and I sustained severe injuries; that is why I have
these scars on one of my hands and eye brow. Some of us died there, and two of
them were from Gobojango (Botswana), like me. I was sent for treatment and later
sent for officer cadet course at the training college in Zambia, where I met some 12
BDF men from (PMU) who had come to train, including. Ramadeluka Seretse,
Rameleko, Ntalamo, Motlhatlhedi.
I was sent with 300 cadres in Libya, but things did not go well and they were
returned to Zambia. I was sent to the Soviet Union to train in communications and
intelligence, and how to be commander. On returning to Zambia I found that peace
talks had begun, and operations had been suspended.
Concerning the Frontline States, we were once addressed by Presidents Kaunda,
Seretse, and Neto. The purpose was to encourage us to fight on as our mission was
very important for all the countries in the region. They addressed all the liberation
movements together. They asserted that our fighting would force Smith’s government
to enter negotiations. Those who trained earlier tended to be more dedicated and
disciplined. Some few members who came later tended to be undisciplined, and
some became sell-outs.
In terms of cooperation among liberation movements there was a lot of cooperation.
However, the splinter movements like ZANU (from ZAPU) and PAC (from ANC)
we in ZAPU did not cooperate well with them. ZAPU worked well with Botswana,
Zambia, and Angola. FRELIMO tended to cooperate with Tanzania mostly, and later
following independence of Mozambique, with ZANU.
Concerning the role of Botswana in the liberation struggle, the country made
great contribution. We worked well and shared information with the BDF. Botswana
gave material, moral and political support to the liberation struggle. Some Batswana
actually went to participate in the struggle. On some occasions, guerrillas got
ammunition secretly from BDF. The working relationship between BDF and
ZIPRA in the field was good, and there was cooperation.
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Molapisi, Motlatsi
[Francistown; May 2007]
Mr Motlatsi Molapisi, a 64 years old from Boikhutso Ward, Francistown, tells about how
the refugees and freedom fighters were treated by the Botswana government and people.
Botswana was affected by the wars of liberation because people from these
countries fled here. Botswana did not assist these people with weapons, but
protected them from their enemies. She gave them shelter, hid and fed them.
Botswana made a great contribution to the liberation struggle because she provided
protection and food. Refugees from the neighbouring countries of Zimbabwe,
South Africa and Namibia were well received and some were even accommodated
by ordinary citizens.
The winds of change were sweeping through Africa and Batswana knew that their
fellow Africans were fighting for the truth. At the beginning of the struggle, a few
people understood the liberation struggles, but with the arrival of people like P.G.
Matante, people began to understand. People in towns such as Francistown, were
the first to understand what was happening. In places such as White City and Blue
Town in Francistown, there were houses known as Refugee Houses, and refugees
stayed there.
Rhodesians soldiers launched raids at night as the liberation struggle intensified
and refugees dispersed. Botswana helped those who were injured with medical
treatment. Botswana assisted freedom fighters, but did not want it to be revealed for
fear of reprisal.
The coordinators of the liberation movements monitored the movement of
freedom fighters in Botswana. Freedom fighters passed through Botswana on their
way for military training. Even when they re-entered Zimbabwe from their training
they went through Botswana secretly. Commanders of freedom fighters helped in
these movements. When the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) encountered these
fighters, they provided them with transport. Some countries in the OAU and the UN
condemned Botswana for continuing to trade with the white dominated settler
states, but Botswana could not cut trading links with these countries because she
was landlocked;. it was not possible. It was a clever move by Botswana to continue
economic links because she had no other options, but she continued with her policy
of supporting liberation movements.
Botswana also mediated between feuding liberation movements because they
were fighting one enemy. Their feuding could affect the liberation struggle, while
they were pursuing a single goal. Batswana were much more inclined towards
Nkomo’s ZAPU, because it was the first movement and he had started politics early.
Some Batswana such as Knight Maripe, also worked with Nkomo in the Railways
in Bulawayo.
Botswana made major sacrifices in the liberation struggle because she was a
small country that had just achieved her independence. During the liberation war,
buildings were destroyed and people in Botswana were killed. The Mophane Club
was bombed
1994
and there was also bombing at Minestone and some Batswana together with some
refugees lost their lives. Botswana condemned the racist regimes of South Africa
and Rhodesia, and called for the independence of these counties at the OAU and the
UN. She angered these strong neighbours, but this was an indication of bravery.
Botswana believed in her ideal of Ntwa kgolo ke ya molomo, which means It is
better to jaw jaw than to war war. She was in a vulnerable position, but she
persevered. The leaders of the liberation movements understood Botswana’s
position; that she was a weak country in a desperate position. Had Botswana allowed
to be used as a launching pad, she could have been overrun by her powerful
neighbours. Botswana maintained her foreign policy principles.
Development and government policies were affected due to the war of liberation
because people along the border in the North East were forced to leave their ploughing
fields. It was not safe to live near the border. The friendship between Botswana and the
former white racist states were cemented after the latter obtained independence. But,
Botswana has not been happy with the way she is treated by South Africa. There is
a lot of competition economically and each country wants to further its own
interests. Botswana has not benefited much from SADC. The aim of SADC was
to attract foreign investment, but Botswana has a small population of 1.7 million
people and foreign investors come in and later move on to other countries, hence
there has not been much benefit from SADC. Botswana had hoped that the
independence of SA and Zimbabwe would reduce the illegal movement of people.
There is need for economic independence in the SADC countries and not only
political independence. Peace and stability can only be there if people in the region
live well. The Front Line States tried to coordinate the liberation struggles and
encourage countries and liberation movements to stand together. Countries such as
Tanzania and Zambia coordinated resources against apartheid. They offered
encouragement to liberation movements.
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Molefhe, Patlako
[Gaborone; October 2008]
Patlako Molefhe is a businessman and a retired civil servant, who was active in the
struggle for freedom with ANC and PAC activists. He moved to Botswana where he could
be more active, and was well received as a refugee. Later he assisted others who were
crossing the border into Botswana
I spent three to four years at Turflop (University of the North) which catered mainly
for Tswana speaking students. I was elected chairperson of the University Cultural
Society. We used to invite activists in the nationalist movement such as ANC, PAC
and others to address us. They inspired us a lot about the struggle for freedom. Most
of the students wanted to skip the country to study abroad which was the primary
motive of many of us. Eventually we returned to fight for the liberation of the country.
It was not easy to leave the country. So some came to Botswana from where they
would be enabled to go further north.
In Botswana we were well received. Those who had relatives stayed with them.
Others moved on north. The reception was good and they were catered for. Upon
arrival one had to report to the police and to the UN High Commission for Refugees.
You then went to meet your representative who would direct you where to go.
Organisations like the YWCA also helped to cater for these students. These people
did not enter through gazetted border posts. They entered illegally.
Later I sometimes played a role in assisting those who skipped the border into
Botswana. Some of them were former school mates and others were relatives. We
reported these to the police and we were allowed to host them for a short period
before they moved on. This was a risky undertaking as the South African police
and secret agents were after them.
I recall one incident when one of our friends came scantily dressed. We gave him
some clothing and arranged for him to travel north by ambulance dressed in pajamas,
pretending to be a patient. Arrangements were secretly made with the ambulance
driver to take him along, because he was wanted by the South African police. We
used to disguise activists so that they could go undetected. At times we arranged for
some to travel in a hearse after we had arranged with the undertakers secretly.
The genuine refugees were well treated by ordinary Batswana and the
government; those with qualifications were offered employment.
1994
Morake, Kesegofetse
[Topisi; November 2008]
Mr Kesegofetse Morake is a retired livestock inspector and a farmer who worked in Nata
and Kasane, and had a good experience with the freedom fighters that were transiting in
the area. He tells of how he used to give them transport and food because they looked
desperate and hungry whenever he met them.
In 1972 I was transferred from Palapye to Francistown. Later I was reposted to
Nata. During the days I worked in Nata and Kasane, I used to meet with freedom
fighters as I travelled in the course of my duties. When I met them, they were
usually desperate and hungry, and I would give them whatever I had to eat.
Whenever I went on my trips, I took with me food to feed them if I met them.
I gave them transport free of charge from Nata area to Maitengwe from where they
made incursions into Rhodesia. I really felt pity for them and sympathised with their
cause. At times I would spend the night with them in the residence of my cousin,
called Mangazha Moremi. I used to meet different groups of guerrillas there. He
was working at the quarantine in Maitengwe as a fence foreman. Moremi used to
give them shelter and food, but they warned me not to tell whoever I met about
them. I was warned, ‘Never tell them you saw freedom fighters.’ On several
occasions I met Rhodesian soldiers who asked me if I had seen a group of people
moving together, and I denied ever seeing them. The guerrillas came to know me,
and my car. Those I had never met would tell me they had known about me from
those whom I had met before. They came to like and trust me, and I too liked them,
for I knew about their cause.
At one time I spent the night with them at Moremi’s place in Maitengwe. The
following day I went with Moremi to Francistown to get our pay. On the evening of
that day the Rhodesians attacked the quarantine camp hoping to kill some freedom
fighters and Moremi. However, luckily, there was nobody at the camp that night.
Then they drove towards Dukwi to attack it, but they realised that the sun was going
to rise soon, and they beat a retreat to avoid being found in Botswana at day time.
The freedom fighters did not bother anybody. All they asked for was help;
because when they carried heavy weapons when they travelled. I felt pity on them
and so helped them by carrying them and their heavy weapons to their destination,
several kilometres from Nata area. I usually travelled on roads not normally used to
avoid meeting people who might pose danger to them or report their whereabouts.
They used to tell me what they did after reaching Rhodesia. They told me that
they used to lay land mines in areas frequented by Rhodesians. Then they returned
to Botswana, leaving one of them, who later reported whether the land mines had
worked or not. On one occasion I met some guerrillas who hurriedly departed
warning me about the possibility of meeting Rhodesians. Indeed, soon I met the
Rhodesians who enquired about the guerrillas, but I denied seeing them. Later
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when I went to Maitengwe from Kasane I was told there was some fighting between
Rhodesian soldiers and guerrillas, and many Rhodesian soldiers had died. I actually
saw the damaged car belonging to the Rhodesians, where the fighting had taken place.
Moremi helped guerrillas by giving them shelter and food. The guerrillas came
to know him well. They used to plan their method of attack from Moremi’s house.
Moremi gave them information about the whereabouts of the Rhodesians; and the
Rhodesians knew about Moremi but they were unable to capture him. We knew
about the oppression in Rhodesia and wanted to contribute to the struggle by aiding
the guerrillas.
On one occasion I was stopped at Dikabeya near Palapye by a man driving alone in
a car. He told me he was Oliver Tambo and wanted to be taken to Motsamai Mpho’s
house in Palapye. I took him there and Mpho hugged me saying they had heard
Tambo had fled from South Africa but they did not know where he was. He then
took Tambo to his house. At that time Mpho was living in Palapye.
1994
More, Mme Lentle

[Naledi Secondary School, Gaborone; October 2008]
Mme Lentle More stayed with many people, who were mostly refugees, in the 1980s. At
that time she was working at the President Hotel, and many of the refugees frequented the
President Hotel, which was a social meeting place for different people. These people were
mostly from South Africa.
In the 1980s I stayed with many people who were mostly refugees who had run
away from oppression. These people were mostly from South Africa. At the time I
was working at the President Hotel. Many of the refugees frequented the President
Hotel, which was a social meeting place for different people.
Some of these refugees were young people, others were adults but they used to
ask for all kinds of help from us. At the time I was working in the reception. They
used to ask me to help them call their parents, friends and relatives in South Africa.
That I did, using President Hotel’s facilities and not so much with the permission of
management. They also used to ask for food and drink; and I and my friends would
dip into our pockets to buy these people some food. Whenever there were social
gatherings, like parties, we used to invite them; sometimes we even invited them
to our homes. They were very easy going, and they found comfort in our homes,
particularly in my home.
As I said earlier, some of these refugees from South Africa were very young, and
had been students who belonged to students’ organizations such as the South African
Student Organisation SASO, other belonged to Black Conscious Movement BCM,
and yet others were members of the ANC Youth League. Some came with families,
and others with very young children, but we got used to them. Most of them got used
to me through my work at President Hotel. Some began to have confidence in me and
began to ask me to do errands for them.
At one point I and a sister called Mma Segola, and my late brother went to
Johannesburg for a visit. While there, we decided to visit a friend in one of the
local townships. This particular friend asked us if we would give her cousin a ride
to Botswana. We happily agreed. When we asked specifically where in Botswana
she was going, we were told that she was visiting a cousin of hers, who was a
refugee. This refugee man was a priest; I think his name was Morris Ngakale, if I
remember well. I also confirmed that I knew Morris as he frequented the President
Hotel. So we agreed to give this cousin a lift. Our host did not elaborate beyond
this, as to what kind of a person we were to travel with. The following day we went
to get her. When she came out, she came with a baggage of nice suitcases, and
dressed very nicely. We came with her all the way until we crossed the border with
her. She was not saying much during the journey. We crossed the border in the
evening, and I was going to work the next day. Unknown to us, she was using a
passport that did not belong to her, and she would have landed us into trouble of
unimagined proportions.
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But by the grace of God, the police did not recognize her. They did not realise
that her passport was not hers. Meanwhile she was known to have been a prominent
“official” who organized students to cross the border; because of oppression, and
such students crossed the border either for educational or military purposes. Later
we learned through other people that she was wanted by the South African Police.
Her photograph was said to have appeared in several South African papers.
When we got home, I said to her that it was late at night and besides, I didn’t
know where her cousin Morris lived, I only knew him because of his frequency to
the President Hotel. I was going to work the following day at two in the afternoon,
and I promised her that I would enquire after her cousin. At that time I was married
and lived with my husband in Ext 10 in Gaborone. I told my husband the whole story
and that I was going to help her locate her cousin when I reported for duty. When I
got to the President Hotel, the cousin was nowhere to be seen, and I knocked off at ten
in the night without seeing him. The first, second and third days passed, without the
cousin being seen. It became obvious to me that the girl was stranded. She didn’t
know me, and I didn’t know her; the only thing I knew was that her aunt had
requested us to give her a lift to Botswana.
I told her that it was over three days, and this cousin had not showed up at the
President Hotel as was expected. I could tell from her face that she was petrified of
the news, and she still had not divulged to me that she was a refugee. I asked her if I
could talk with my husband about accommodating her for some time, while hoping
that the cousin would show up. Suddenly she brightened up because of that
suggestion. My husband said he had no objection, and if I wanted to give her
accommodation I could do so. I started to stay with her, and even when I eventually
found the “cousin” and told her about it, she said that she just wanted to stay with
me, and she did not want to go to live with the cousin.
I was buying her food, clothes and shoes; from this a bond emerged, and we
became one. By this time she had told me that she was a refugee but still she had
not told me about herself and the passport.
At that time refugees were being given free food, and there was a place in
Gaborone where food for refugees was distributed. My cousin tried to suggest to
her that she could register for food rations as other refugees were expected to do
then, but she was not interested in that suggestion. We shared the food I bought at
my house, and I could understand why she did not register for food rations.
One notable thing was that the police never came to look for her in my house. We
stayed together like that for two years and I was treating her like a member of my
family in every sense. I later learnt that she was waiting to go to school somewhere
abroad. But many people from South Africa used to come by the house to see her and
I just took it that they were her former school mates, as the majority of them were of
her age. Even her parents, when they came from South Africa to Botswana, they
came to visit my house. She told me of her two sisters who were both in exile in
Zambia. There were many student organizations then, but she said she belonged to
the ANC.
1994
We stayed together while she was organizing her papers to go to school abroad.
One day a cousin of mine said that the girl was a wanted person, according to the
papers in South Africa. That is when she told me that she crossed the border without
using her own passport. I was not worried by those reports as most refugees at that
time were almost always on the wanted list of the South African Police.
It came to a point where her arrangements for further studies abroad were
finalized. She left to go to school in New York, United States of America. She went
to school, finished and worked there. She began to send me stuff from there. She
has been sending me things from America ever since. As we speak, this lady is now
the South African Consular General in Los Angeles, USA. Her younger sisters have
now returned from exile, they are now in South Africa and are doing very well.
One has a doctorate degree in engineering and is in the construction industry; the
other one is an economist.
Both of them look after me because I used to look after their parents and sister.
Even her cousins and relatives who were refugees, whenever they are in Botswana
they come to the house called Lentle. My house was ever so full of refugees. But as
they came, I gave them food, and generally provided them with what they needed.
My brother died in 1982 and I felt like I needed a breath of air. I decided to go
to Port Elizabeth. That is where I nearly got into trouble with the police. When my
permission to stay was almost expiring, I went to the immigration police to extend
my permit, and they just told me to wait. While waiting, the police came and said if
I told them about the refugees in Botswana I would have my days extended. They
even offered to bribe me, so that I could tell them where the refugees were. I told
them that I did not know anything about refugees, and that I was just a worker in
the President Hotel. They offered me tea, but I refused because I suspected that
they had put something in the tea to drug me. I was kept there for almost three
hours, but I refused to tell them anything. They refused to extend my days and I
immediately returned to Botswana.
I suspected that they had unconfirmed reports of my association with refugees,
especially that one of my cousins was married to Koous Segola, a refugee who was
among the men who were most wanted by the South African Police. At one point I
went with my cousin and her husband to Zambia where I stayed with refugees for
five months. Since that time I used to receive refugees from Lusaka, and they
would stay with me for brief periods. Sometimes they would disappear for a night
or two days, and when they came back some had inexplicable injuries which they
would not talk about. I suspected they had crossed the border for their missions.
They used Botswana a lot to cross the border. I was not afraid because I wanted to
help our people. They even bombed a house in the neighbourhood that used to be
occupied by Koous and his wife, who was my cousin.
A refugee called Thami, who was one of the officials of the ANC, once came
into my house during what was called “stay away”. That was when their
intelligence had told them that it was not safe to stay where they were that
particular night. I found
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him in my bedroom sleeping with a gun besides him. He was also friends with the
most wanted Koous Segola, and that is when I feared for my children in the event
of him being traced. But he immediately left, explaining that it was a stay away.
When Gaborone was bombed, I was in Francistown, and I heard that many
refugees were killed including someone that I knew quite well, George Phahle, but
when I returned to Gaborone I accommodated his brother Levi Phahle until he went
to school abroad.
I was determined to help the South African refugees. You could feel pity for
them (Ba ne ba tlhomola pelo) and some Batswana were afraid of them, in the
event they got caught in the crossfire. They wanted them to go to Dukwi. The
Batswana men particularly did not like the refugees as they accused them of taking
their women (Ba ne ba re ba tseela banyana).
South African refugees, in my view, were more polished and more trustworthy
than those from Zimbabwe. The refugees who stayed with me were mostly ANC
members and were genuine. There used to be a refugee who was said to be a pilot
called Knox, he is now deceased, and he used to come from Zambia on their missions
and stay with me. Such refugees used to come with lots of money, and I don’t know
where they got the money from. They used to entertain us with parties and dinners.
On one occasion the police came looking for some wanted refugees and warned me
that such refugees were dangerous to me and to others and that they should be made
to leave the country. Koous Segola was one such refugee, among others. Sometimes
the police came, and asked me that they had heard that so and so was here the day
before. I remember them looking for a boy called “Pretty Boy”, he is now in
Pretoria. Another person who was wanted by the police was Thabang, who is now
the Premier of Mpumalanga.
We have helped the people of South Africa a lot. I feel proud that I have played a
part in their eventual emancipation, all because of Janet Ndlovu, the present South
African Consular General in Los Angeles, USA. People here used to see her here at
Lentle’s house. She knows me, even if you asked her, she will tell you that Lentle is
my sister, she was a friend of Koous Segola and visited my place a lot. I also knew
Dr Manto Shabalala when she was a medical doctor at Athlone Hospital. She is
now a Minister in the ANC government.
1994
Moroka, Tshidi
Tshidi Moroka is a South African ex- refugee who lived in Botswana during the
liberation struggle. She arrived in Botswana in 1977 as a student and continued with her
education. She explains about the kind of life she had as a refugee.
When some of us arrived in Botswana in 1997 it was not difficult for us to secure
schools in the institutions because the ground work had already been done by those
who were there before us. I applied to the institution and was accepted on merit. The
applications did not differentiate between Batswana and non Batswana. I then had to
go to the Botswana Council for Refugees with my acceptance letter; it was they
who had to contact the schools and arrange for payments. It really was not difficult
to find schools for those who wanted to go to school. There was no discrimination
in terms of gender; education was accessible to those who wanted to further their
education.
When we arrived in Botswana we had nowhere to stay and there were some
discussions between an organized group of South Africans and the YWCA about
finding alternative housing for women. The World Council of Churches (WCC),
through Ms. B Bam organized a house through YWCA for South African women
to stay. The women got better accommodation and food; amongst ourselves we had
programmes along gender lines. There were very young girls who needed to guidance
and support from the elderly ones, and this meant that we had to form a women’s
group to cater for the needs of the women.
Educational levels were from high school to tertiary. There were those who
had not finished their matric and had to complete. Some went to schools such as:
University, NHI, and BTC, and used to look after the ones who were not at school
by providing food.
The lives of South African refugees in Botswana were very interesting and
challenging. When most of us arrived in Botswana we were very young less than
20 and we had to assume great responsibilities for our lives, without parents to guide
us. We found each other, and each one of us was a parent to the other. We had one
thing in common, the struggle, and all of us wanted to go back and fight the Boers.
We were very clear that we were not going to stay long in Botswana, Our
commitment to the struggle; militancy was what kept us close. The other ladies who
shared the place with me were like my sisters, and we supported each other
emotionally and other wise. When one gets visitors, we shared those visitors and
everything that they brought.
I never had any problems relating to Batswana, and even when I worked in
Ramotswa they treated me like one of them. When the Boers were raiding the places
we were staying, some of them offered me their place to hide; that’s how supportive
they were. Of course there were those who were negative, but those were in a
minority. I believed the government was very negative towards us and they made it
difficult for us to live there. When we were suspicious of a person and reported to the
authorities, they did nothing about it, or just asked the person to leave the country. I
remember
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there was one guy of whom we were suspicious of being a South African spy, and
reported this to the authorities.
I was never in Dukwi, but I used to visit the people there. There was no gender
differences, both male and female used to live together. The conditions were
difficult for people; they had to fetch water from far, look for firewood in order to
make fire and cook, they did not get any stipend. They had to live on canned food
donated by the UN, and spoilt maize meal with worms. This was a harsh reality.
There were no shops; people did their shopping in Francistown when they had
money, which was very far, and there was no regular transport so they had to rely
on lifts.
What made it easy for us to adjust to life in Gaborone was the language, even
though we did not speak the Setswana we understood each other. There were also
lots of former South African families that resided in Botswana and they accepted us
into their homes. That made our lives better. I was never rejected by the local people
I only felt the hostility of the authorities. I think the authorities failed us because they
did not look at us as kids, but expected a lot of maturity from us.
There was a lot of interaction with the South African community in Botswana, and
I indicated earlier that was where we got the comfort and felt accepted. We had social
gatherings with them and others hosted some of us. We developed a lot many friends
and we kept in touch up to now; we still visit each other and very much keep in touch.
We received support from other refugees, because we were like one big family.
Whenever we had problems we tried to resolve them and if we could not, we took
them to the older guys who were like our parents, and there they tried to find a
solution. Those of us who were at school, school kept us busy, and we focused on
the books. We had contacts with the home base, and could get information of what
was happening. Newspapers also kept us informed about the situation at home. We
had music; we went to cinemas and participated in local sports. There were guys
who played soccer for the local teams and they made their mark there.
The South Africans who lived in Botswana provided support and in them we
found refuge and acceptance. The local people were supportive as well, and some
made us a part of their lives. The broader refugee family provided the cushion for
all of us; without our bond we would not have survived there. We made friends
at school, worked there and became part of the community. The good thing was
that, after completing any sort of training, the government placed all of us without
discrimination. I guess at that time there were no systems in place to check who
was a Motswana and who was not. This helped some of us because when we
finished our course we were placed in different places of work.
Ethnicity was never an issue with South Africans then, and that is why we could
not understand when the Zimbabweans were fighting amongst themselves and along
ethnic lines. We saw each other as South African first before anything else. We had
one goal which we all wanted to achieve.
Most of the Batswana in South Africa were Xhosa speaking, and they treated us
the same. Most of the youth came from Soweto, and really ethnicity was never an
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issue. There were some groups from other places but there was no discrimination
displayed to us. Settling in Botswana was not difficult because we found people
there and they welcomed us, and took care of us. The authorities however were very
biased towards the ANC, when you declared your status they would want to coerce
you to register that you belonged to the ANC. There we were very adamant and
because we were already made aware of this, we had to present our case very
clearly; they told us that there was no group like BCM, Soweto students and so
forth. A few minutes after arrival the representatives from different organizations
started fighting amongst each other for the group. Each organization wanted to score
points by having as many students as possible. This is where most of the students
had no choice but to join organizations that were already there. Some political
organizations were favoured more than others; as indicated above the ANC was
supported more than other organizations. They were like part of the government.
Some of the refugees are still in Botswana. Some got married and never returned
and others are working.
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Mosetlhe, John
Mr John Mosetlhe was one of the people involved in accommodating refugees between
1976 and 1978. He tells of his experiences with the task he had during the liberation
struggle.
Our task was accommodating refugees when I was staying with Mr Aubrey Sago.
He was a South African, working for a company called IGI. These refugees came
around 1976, but most of them came around 1978, I think we had about 15 to 17 of
them who were introduced to us by one gentleman, I didn’t know them before. We
stayed with them for nearly two years; some came and stayed for some time and
then went to Tanzania for training. Others came and stayed for a while and also left,
while others came for food and then left.
These people did not tell us much, but what we knew was that they were being
attacked by the Boers, so they were running away. Some came very young; they
were very young, I think most of them were under 20, and when they arrived they
were given scholarships by the United Nations or somebody I don’t know but what I
was just doing was to offer them accommodation. I don’t have the details as to how
they obtained the scholarship and how they went to school. The first lot who were
nearly fifteen stayed for nearly two years.
They interacted very well and they were well behaved. You wouldn’t believe
they were South Africans, except those who were very young and had girlfriends,
they would occupy you with them and we would become a parent to them. We
were just their parents; we also interacted with them in parties.
You know! those South Africans were well behaved they were not like what we
are seeing today about our other neighbours. They looked for jobs and did not steal
or interfere with people’s property like our neighbours today; they had a mission
which was that they came from South Africa as passerby who have come to stay for
a while and go to school or go to do some training and go back with their degrees;
they were really behaving well.
As far as I know I did not receive any assistance from the government, even the
guys we were staying with we were just using our own money on them; so we were
just buying them food and they cooked for themselves. We accommodated about 15
to 17, and those who were passersby were up to 6. They liked Botswana very much,
I think even up to now if I can go with you to Jo’burg and let you meet a few of
them, you would see that they really had protection when they were in Botswana,
and also Batswana liked them.
I still have connections with some of them like Dr Mmotlana’s children; two of
them were not refugees, but one was a refugee and he even married here. There were
others who came in disguise that they were UB students, but I knew that they were
running away from that side.
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When the government established the facility for refugees in Dukwi, that really
helped because when they came in they went to Dukwi and then we were no longer
accommodating them.
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Mosogwane, Makgabane
[Gobojango; May 2007]
Mrs Makgabane Mosogwane is a former school teacher who took care of refugees and
freedom fighters who came to Gobojango. She explains how she and her close relatives
went through some experiences in dealing with and taking care of refugees, particularly
from Zimbabwe between 1977 and 1980.
In 1977 we began to see many people coming to Gobojango. They went to the chief
’s place. We lived near the chief ’s place. Whenever they arrived, I would go to the
chief ’s place to check if any of my relatives were among the arrivals. We learned
that they were fleeing from the war in Rhodesia. They were fed at the chief ’s place
and sometimes I took some of them to feed them at my home. As the cooking pots
were not sufficient, I bought a huge pot to be able to cook for large numbers. Up to
this day I call that pot the “pot of Zimbabwe” because it was used to cook for people
from that country.
They arrived in large numbers and some of them were injured. One day I met an
elderly man who was very weak. I gave him a very nutritious drink called Mageu
to revive him. He told me they had gone through a difficult situation and they had
been on the road for three days. His sister was shot in the hip and could not walk;
she requested him to finish her off with a knife but he refused to do so. Another time
there was some fighting and my brother’s son was involved; he was shot and they
took him to Selebi-Phikwe to remove the bullet. One other man was also hurt and I
requested to take him to my home to take care of him. He spent the night at our
house.
I used to request the chief to allow me to take care of those women who were
particularly suffering from bruised feet and could hardly walk. I used to put their feet
in warm water so they could feel better. They spent nights at my home. Sometimes
I had a large number women staying at my home. I experienced a particularly
painful incident when I saw a small girl in a group of refugees. She was dressed in
a large dress which was not her size. I took some clothes from my children to dress
her properly. When the group was transferred to Bobonong, the little girl refused to
go with the others, saying she had found a mother. The chief allowed me to keep the
girl, and in 1978 I registered her at our school. In 1979, she enrolled in standard
two, and in 1980 she did standard 3; but in that year, Zimbabwe got independence
and she returned to Zimbabwe with the others.
After the Independence of Zimbabwe I visited my relatives there to attend a
funeral. Some gun men came there and asked me where I came from. They threatened
to hurt me. These were the freedom fighters who had refused to return home after
independence, the so–called dissidents. They did not harm me and I returned to
Botswana safely.
In 1983, there was a report that some armed men had been sighted. These were the
Zimbabwean dissidents. Soon they appeared at our home and harassed us. They took
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the Tirelo Sechaba boy we stayed with to the school and they stole his shoes, watch
and clothes; thereafter he left for his home. We fled from our home and put up in
the veld that day; my husband fled as they were looking for him. The following day
there were no classes as teachers had been kidnapped. One teacher, Mr Ngakedi
was released at the Shashe River. All the remaining teachers fled to Bobonong to
report the incident to the Police. Finally, we returned to Gobojango after spending
two days in Bobonong.
Concerning the Manama Mission students, when we came from our school, we
were surprised to see children in red uniforms. We were told they were pupils from
Manama Mission who were abducted by freedom fighters. It was pathetic. Women in
the village were weeping for the children. Among them were mission hospital nurses
and teachers such as Mr Paulos Matjaka. I took one group to feed, and the others
went to the school to be fed there. Just then, a Rhodesian plane flew low over the
pupils; some of them removed their uniforms to avoid being spotted by the plane. My
husband and other people drove to Bobonong to report the incident, and the pupils
were then driven to Bobonong.
One aspect of the liberation struggle was that quite often freedom fighters stayed
with us for a number of days; we fed and hid them. One day a report was received
that a young man had spotted Rhodesian soldiers nearby. He reported to the chief.
The freedom fighters at our house were armed and ready to fight. They quickly ran to
where the Rhodesians were and fought them. They fled. Our soldiers arrived and told
the freedom fighters not to fight on Botswana soil as that was the government policy,
but they did not disarm them.
Another incident was that at one day, just before classes ended at our school, we
saw pupils fleeing. It was said that some pupils had picked up something which
exploded when they played with it, it was a grenade. One pupil was hurt on the
head. We all fled due to this. The pupil was taken to the hospital for treatment. It was
thought that the grenade was planted by spies from Rhodesia.
Concerning spying, I had no knowledge of it then, except that my brother-in-law
was once arrested in Zimbabwe. He was shown my photograph at the soldiers’
camp in Manama Mission, and he was told that it was of a woman in Botswana who
assisted refugees and freedom fighters. How and who took the picture I do not
know.
The reason why I assisted in the liberation struggle was that I felt pity for the
people of Zimbabwe, because many of them were our relatives. I felt pity not just
for our relatives, but also for others who I did not even know. It was the plight of
fellow human beings which made me associate with them in their struggle for
freedom.
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Motang, Pule
[Good Hope, Barolong; June 2007]
Major General Motang is a former Major General of the Botswana Defence Force. He
explains the role that Botswana and in particular the Botswana Defence Forces played in
defending the country and the people against South African and Rhodesian forces
Botswana is a peaceful country because our first President took it upon himself to
protect every human being, resident in the country regardless of colour, race or
creed. Examples can be found in such people as David Finlay, Phillip Steenkamp
who found refuge in this country.
Many people running away from oppressed regimes of their country of origin
passed through Botswana. People like Samora Machel of Mozambique, Mandela,
Tambo, Mbeki, and Hani of South Africa, all passed through this country. The regimes
pointed a finger at Botswana and yet she continued to lend support to the people who
were in the liberation struggle. At that time we did not even have an army, it was
just the Police Mobile Unit, which used old fashioned guns like 303 and 306.
Botswana had its own intelligence, the Special Branch, which interrogated the
refugees, gave them protection and eventually helped them to be on their way to
places further from Botswana, like Zambia and Tanzania. If the regime asked the
Botswana government if it had seen such people, the answer was that “We have not
seen them”.
Botswana did not have much in terms of resources to help the liberation struggle.
It made do with the little resources that it could find; perhaps the hospitality of
Batswana towards these oppressed people was a sacrifice on its own right. They
gave them shelter and food.
Batswana supported the refugees, because we were aware that they were
oppressed. We had visited those countries and seen for ourselves how black people
were oppressed. Botswana identified with them as their brothers and sisters and
helped them in the best way they could.
Botswana’s internal policies were not affected by the struggle. In fact, the
internal policies were used to employ some refugees, give them shelter and help
pursue further studies.
We had good relations with other countries and organizations because they were
the ones who understood our situation and helped us in a number of ways. But
South Africa and Rhodesia were hostile, demanding visas from Batswana. At one
point they closed the border for the train, and it had to return at Rakhuna. The other
organizations such as Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the
United Nations were sympathetic to the Botswana situation.
Botswana was clear with the liberation movements. It discouraged disunity,
encouraged unity and avoided supporting one faction of the liberation movement
over the other.
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It was not known that there were freedom fighters in the country, but if they were
seen, they were arraigned and returned to where they came from. I remember that
in Francistown some were once arrested because they were in possession of
firearms, and they were returned to their place of origin. Chris Hani was once
arrested and put in prison because he was suspected of having been carrying
weapons. He was later released and helped to return to where he came from.
The role played by the BDF in the liberation struggle, was that the BDF
protected Botswana. It guarded its people against South Africa and Rhodesia. There
were occasional skirmishes between our soldiers and the enemy. The Lesoma and
Sedudu incidents are cases in point.
In 1985 the BDF did not retaliate because there would have been lots of
casualties involving civilians. We were once attacked by Rhodesian soldiers at
Dukwi, and my battalion repulsed the attack with no casualties.
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Motswai, Sekgwa
[Boyei Ward/Gumare; September 2007]
Sekgwa Motswai was born in 1929 in Seronga. He worked in Wankie, Southern Rhodesia
from 1949 to 1951 when he was back in Botswana. He was then employed as a local
policeman, the job he did until he retired in 2006.
My name is Sekgwa Motswai. I am from Seronga. I was born in 1929. I worked in

Wankie in Zimbabwe. I was in Rhodesia in 1949 and came back in 1951. From
1951 I was employed to be a local police and worked there for a long time until I
retired. I think I retired in 2006.
I met with freedom fighters and refugees from neighbouring countries when they
arrived in Shakawe. They were given accommodation and at times they were given
food and everything for their survival. When they arrived in Shakawe we were told
freedom fighters have arrived and that there was shortage of accommodation and the
government officials in Shakawe asked Mabowane here in Gumare of the
possibility of him offering them accommodation. Some of them were brought here
and the chief was asked to come and see them. They had their leader who was called
Tsombo. He was a Mombukushu, and he helped those who came from Namibia.
During the colonial times we were not allowed to help freedom fighters at all, but
we did that secretly.
It was not at all safe to help freedom fighters, and so we were very careful. It was
highly secretive. We also put our faith on Jesus that we shouldn’t get caught.
Freedom fighters stayed with me here in my home, they came here without anything
and I was forced to take one blanket from children and accommodate their need. It
was a pity that they didn’t have anything but we had to help them. They sometimes
came in the night and by the following day they disappeared.
After their arrival in Ngamiland, we gave them food. They were accepted by the
independent government of Botswana. Initially when they started coming, we were
called Bechuanaland Protectorate but those who came after 1966 found that things
were much better, because Botswana was independent.
Officials of the Bechuanaland Protectorate under the British government did not
encourage the supporting of freedom fighters. However, our chiefs accepted freedom
fighters to stay in their villages. We were allowed to take freedom fighters to the
“kgotla”; we reported them to the chief whenever they arrived in our village.
The only problem we experienced with the presence of freedom fighters in our
village was when freedom fighters and refugees looked down upon each other.
Those who knew a little bit of English were taken to Dukwi. They came to us and
reported all sort of unpleasant incidents; fortunately they did not stay here long
before they were taken to Dukwi.
Baherero was the dominant tribe among the freedom fighters who came to
Botswana. These came here long before the liberation struggle and a lot of them
were
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from Namibia. Baherero were many but that was before the Angolans came here.
We did not have any problem with them.
It is true that some Basarwa staying along the Mohembo border area once joined
and worked for the South African Force against the liberation of Namibia; some
Basarwa worked for the Namibian army but up to now I don’t know even a single one
of them who left the job or who retired. I haven’t seen one.
I only know that, in Lesoma in the Chobe there was fire exchange. There was no
such an exchange here.
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Mpho Motsamai
[Maun]
Motsamai Kejetswe Mpho is a Moyei, born in 1931 in Maun. He went to school at
Batawana Primary School. After he finished school he went to work in the South African
mines and became one of the active members of the South African political movement in
trying to get black workers recognized during those days in the mines. As politics took a
different phase in South Africa, he became actively involved in politics, became very
popular and worked alongside President Mandela and President Mbeki.
Motsamai Kejetswe Mpho is my name. I am a Moyei and I stay in Boyei Ward. I

was born in 1931 here in Maun, grew up at the cattle post and then returned to
Maun. I went to school at Batawana Primary School but my parents experienced
financial hardships, and because of that I left school and went to Boajwankwe,
where I stayed for some time. During that time we had to pay school fees, and if
our parents could not afford to pay for us, we were not allowed to attend school.
Later when fees were available I came back to Maun to continue with my
education. I met one gentleman who noticed my potential. When the gentleman
went to work in the mines of South Africa later, he asked me to go there and join
him. After I finished school here I stayed for a few months and then went to work in
the South African mines, where I met that particular gentleman. I worked with him
and I had great respect for him, and he also respected me.
I worked in the mines for a long time. As you might be aware, the South
Africans were also trying to get their independence from the white racist regime. I
was one of the active members of the South African political movement in trying to
get black workers recognized in the mines during those days. A lot of people did
not know that I was a citizen of Botswana; they thought that I was a South African,
and most of them wanted me to join politics so that I could help them get liberated. I
worked with them and they were satisfied with what I did to help. As politics took a
different phase in South Africa, I became actively involved in politics and became
very popular. I worked alongside Nelson Mandela and the current President Thabo
Mbeki.
There was a time when Mbeki approached me to campaign for the position of the
Secretary General of ANC, but I refused. I actively participated in the organization
of ANC, and mind you, by then there was no political party in Botswana. I learnt a lot
of things, particularly politics, from South Africa. Since the mines were run by
whites, one morning we were told that in order for us to move from one Province to
another we needed to have a “pass book” which would be used to travel from one
Province to the other. I called all those I worked with to refuse to get these “passes”
forced unto us. I continued talking to mine workers about pass books; and one
morning when we woke up the mine owners introduced some Acts on the “pass
books” and our salaries were also affected. I then called all the workers and
organized a strike. That is a day I will not forget, and I think a lot of people
involved will remember that day. We did
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not sleep; I was one of the demonstrators and we burnt all the“pass books”. The
police were called to come and “shambok” us, but it was difficult for them to
contain us. It was on this day that workers died and some had their compounds
burnt down.
My friends warned me that the police were looking for me and instead of going
to my place after the incident I decided to change place of stay and look for another
safer place. The police were searched for me the whole night, and since I was
already popular, they would have easily identified me. We spent a few days without
going to work and during that time some of us were required to report to the to the
police. That was the time when my wife was pregnant with our first baby boy. I had
met my wife for the first time when I was in South Africa. I was caught and
imprisoned for a week if not two, when my wife was inside South Africa. When in
prison a lot of politicians came to see me, as I was the ANC Youth Secretary
General; and some politicians insisted that I should stand for elections but I kept on
refusing because I wanted to come back to Botswana and start my own political
party. When I was released from prison, I was deported back to Botswana and I
took my wife and my new born baby to Botswana.
When I came back home, I stayed in Palapye because when I left for South
Africa there was a conflict between the Bayei and Batawana in Ngamiland and I was
actively involved in that conflict. Therefore, authorities in Ngamiland already knew
my ‘political’ record and they saw me as a bad person. Starting a political party in
Maun was going to be a problem, nobody was willing to listen to me because of
what I did while in South Africa and the image I left behind before going to South
Africa was not satisfactory in many people’s eyes. I then decided to stay in Palapye
and started a political party alongside the likes of Phillip Matante, Kgalemang
Motsete and others. This is the time when there was nothing like Botswana. It
was Bechuanaland Protectorate under the watchful eyes of Britain which
declared Bechuanaland a Protectorate after the three dikgosi visit to England. The
three dikgosi went to seek for the Queen’s protection after being threatened by
South African Boers and Cecil John Rhodes with the idea of incorporating
Bechuanaland, Lesotho and Swaziland into South Africa. Bechuanaland was
under the British and everything that took place had to be approved by the British
before they could roll into action. Therefore, everything the chiefs did had to be
approved by Britain first. This translated into the help Batswana gave to refugees;
Bechuanaland was not given the opportunity to help freedom fighters by Britain.
The Bechuanaland Democratic Party members (BDP) did not want to help
freedom fighters but we at Bechuanaland People Party (BPP) were actively
participating in helping freedom fighters, because we believed we could not watch
our neighbours being tortured and fail to give them food to eat. We argued on the
need to help freedom fighters; that the outcome of helping freedom fighters would
ultimately benefit the whole country and not just the BPP. As an opposition party,
BPP came up with a committee of a few people responsible for taking care of
refugees. The ordinary people in the country on the other hand, were at first
afraid to give help to freedom fighters because they were afraid of the
government;
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and the police were ordered to “shambok” all those who would be caught helping
freedom fighters.
A lot of freedom fighters passed through Maun, on their way north, and some
ended up staying here for good. Maun was a transit route for refugees. They passed
through Maun to Francistown, Bulawayo, and from there they were taken to their
destinations where they got their military training.
There were no offices established for the ANC of South Africa and SWAPO of
Namibia, anywhere in Bechuanaland. We could not establish such offices because
that would have been more dangerous. We only assisted the liberation movements
through protecting freedom fighters. We wanted them to be safe but not by assisting
them in setting up offices here; that would have been very dangerous. There were
no offices of SWAPO, ANC or SWANO in Bechuanaland, but some of their leaders
knew us and if they needed any kind of help they contacted us directly. These guys
had their offices in Lusaka, Zambia, that is where they were operating from, not from
Botswana. The offices in Lusaka were the nearest point from which they operated.
In addition, Zambia devoted some areas in Lusaka and elsewhere to build refugee
camps, and spent a lot of money helping refugees. I want to make myself clear that
there were no offices of ANC, SWAPO, SWANO or PAC in this country. But they
operated from Zambia. When I left ANC I came here and formed a political party
and left everything about ANC behind.
Whenever ordinary people heard that refugees were found in their village, some
were afraid having them around but, some were not. Some of them did not want to
help refugees. But as times went on, people were getting educated on liberation
movements through grassroots politics; they gradually changed and began to
participate in helping freedom fighters. The love of the brother and sister freedom
fighter and refugee persisted among Batswana, and they began to see the need to help
their neighbours. I can cite an incident of some people from Namibia who were kept
at Makunda village to be transported to Maun, and we found ways of assisting them
to get to Maun.
Refugees came in from South Africa, Angola and Namibia, but of course most
of those who came here were from Namibia. There were people in BPP, which was
our party, who were responsible for guerrillas. We assisted them a lot. We as a party
had a certain number of people who were helping freedom fighters. They ensured
them security and safety. We had “mekhukhu” [shacks] in our homes here in Maun,
where at times we were forced to keep freedom fighters inside for some days
before they travelled to Zambia. The ANC had its offices in Lusaka, which was
relatively not far away from my home in Maun. Some of them were transported to
Francistown and some to Palapye. We once transported one boy who was from
Mozambique by a truck from here to Francistown.
BPP was responsible for the transport of the freedom fighters. I also personally
helped a lot. I used my own money to help these people to be transported through
Botswana. We used to pay £85 to Charpet Baipudi who was a BPP activist, for him
to
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transport freedom fighters to Kazungula Ferry. This man had a truck which he used
to transport these people. Bishop Setlalekgosi of the Catholic Church also played a
role as a leader during the struggle. He helped by contributing money so that freedom
fighters could be taken to their destination. Indeed, he did play a major role.
There was some money that came from Tanzania, I should think, because the
country was fully involved in helping freedom fighters. They gave us money in
order to help freedom fighters. They sent in money to a bank and that’s where we
collected the money and used it properly for managing the welfare of refugees.
Botswana had good relations with various liberation movements from the
respective neighbouring countries. Botswana even built the Dukwi Refugee Camp
to cater for freedom fighters. Some, of course, went back to their countries but
others refused to go back. But the governments of South Africa, Namibia and
Rhodesia did not like us because of help we were giving to freedom fighters. If you
look at Zambia, it was very supportive of what we were doing, and Zambia alone
did more than enough in helping freedom fighters.
Of course, the government only helped after the country was independent, and
especially after we had built the Dukwi Refugee Camp. The government wanted to
make sure that they gave comfortable accommodation and well deserved security
and safety for freedom fighters through the establishment of Dukwi.
I don’t know how Botswana government dealt with the wars of destabilization
because I wasn’t in the Botswana Democratic ruling party. But let me tell you that
at least we had a remarkably intelligent President who was able to deal with all that
with ease. President Seretse Khama met with intelligent people like Kwame
Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, and they discussed such issues at
their Pan- African and Frontline sates meetings. Our President always believed in
dialogue. He knew that when the region was free from all these problems, it was
going to benefit him and the country a lot. He chose not to confront either the
Rhodesians or the South Africans because he knew we heavily relied on them
economically.
I never had any problems with President Seretse Khama. During parliamentary
session, he used to come to me at break times, and we drank tea together. He asked
me some interesting questions; and we talked mostly about the OAU, UN and how
one could approach the liberation struggle issues. I enjoyed working with Khama.
He used to deal with other countries in a diplomatic way. I respected him very much
because there was always the possibility of him taking your words of advice or
ideas seriously. He sometimes came to me and said, “I don’t understand how to
handle this.” Not that he really did not know how to handle such situation, but he
come to me so that he could get some ideas on how to deal with other situations. He
was a good man.
One day when I was at Mohembo I went to the border and I found about six tall,
dark complexioned men. They were a bit far from us and as I approached them, I
realized they were refugees. When at first I talked to them they wanted to run away
but I convinced them not to run away. They said they were from Angola and this was
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the time that the Angolan Civil war was going on. I took them to Maun and I notified
the police of their presence; this time around the police did not have problems with
freedom fighters. After reporting them to the police at the Maun station, they were
taken to the prison cell so that they be could be kept there before they were sent out
to Dukwi. I owned a bar for sale of liquor at that time, and I could afford to take more
people into my house, so I took three of them and they stayed with me for a month
before leaving for Dukwi.
Today we have an area called Etsha from number 1 – 13, those people are
refugees, they are from Namibia, and Angola. Most of them are from Angola even
today they are still there, they live there and they were given citizenship. Most of
the people in the villages of Etsha 1 to 13 are Angolans, I must say. Namibians just
came and passed; the largest number of Namibians who passed here could be
estimated to be between 40 and 60.
Botswana has benefited a lot, economically, from the establishment of SADC,
because what is done at SADC is done jointly, and therefore we benefit a lot from
that. At SADC level member states are given tasks and they try to provide solutions
for the benefit of the whole region.
Thank very much mma.
1994
Munisola, Joseph M.
[Kasane; December 2007]
Mr Joseph M. Munisola is a Mosubiya born in 1936. He was born at Parakarungu but
he moved to Kasane to search for employment and he is now staying in Kasane. He went
to school at Kachikau primary school up to standard four and then was employed as a
tractor driver in North West District Council.
I am Joseph Munisola. Most people call me “Va J” which is a nickname I was given
when I was still a football player. I am a Mosubiya born in 1936. I am not sure of
the day and month of my birth because my mother never kept the records. I was
born at Parakarungu but I moved to Kasane to search for employment and I am now
staying in Kasane. I went to school at Kachikau primary school. During those years
Kachikau was the only place or village where there was a primary school. I went
up to standard four; then I was employed as a tractor driver in North West District
Council. I can’t remember which year it was when I attended school but I remember
that I got employed in NWDC in 1965 and retired in 1999. I retired because I was
old and not feeling well. The tractor was killing me.
People who live along the Botswana border with Namibia are relatives. We have
Basubiya here in the Chobe and our cousins are living across in the Caprivi. Those
who ran away from the whites and came to Botswana were helped a lot by people
here. Our relatives used to cross the river and spend days here. Refugees who had
relatives here were also welcomed by their relatives. The groups of refugees used
to arrive in Kasane from Namibia early in the morning, then the Kasane people
would go to the kgotla and take relatives to their homes. Sometimes the refugees
came in large numbers, but I can’t remember when this happened because it has
been a long time since some of us experienced the refugee movement across the
border.
There was a time we spent some days with a group of male refugees from
Namibia, who had ran away from the Caprivi because the white soldiers used to
beat them in trying to find out if they had seen freedom fighters. These young men
came to my place because they heard my children speaking Sesubiya. Fortunately I
knew their father. They spent a number of days with me and then went back to
Caprivi.
There were many refugees who came to Kasane, but I cannot mention their names
because I don’t know how some of these people ended up settling here. Many of the
refugees went back to Namibia and some crossed to Zambia and were transported to
Tanzania. The other group was taken to Dukwi and Francistown. Honestly speaking I
do not want to put myself into trouble. There are many refugees here who came here
a long time ago. The government took the responsibility for transporting the refugees
to other places far from this place. The police were received them and transported
them to Dukwi.
The only refugees we received in Kasane were from Namibia. We were not
treated well when we visited our relatives in Namibia. The problem was that there
were other
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Basubiya who were employed by the white soldiers as their informers. These are
the people who used to inform the Boers that there were refugees in Kasane and
were being housed by relatives. Many people who visited relatives in Namibia were
beaten up by the white soldiers. The good thing is that the white soldiers did not know
people well, they could not tell a black from another black. Whenever they saw
someone they did not know well, they would beat them mistaking them to be
freedom fighters. My cousin Daniel Shamukuni crossed into Namibia and he was
seriously injured by white soldiers. I really did not understand the Basubiya of
Namibia because we never troubled them when they came here. They used to come
and buy food here in Kasane because this was the only place close enough, where
could buy food from. The BDF warned us not to cross to Namibia because it was
not safe.
The whites who had Safaris in Kasane were a bit difficult to understand because
they never troubled us. But they used to allow white soldiers from Namibia to cross
into Botswana to drink beer at Chobe Safari Lodge. Renleys and Mamson were
named soldiers by the villagers. It was difficult to know who the real white soldiers
were because they all dressed in their plain clothes and drank beer with their white
fellows in the safari industry. These soldiers were coming here secretly to check if
there were any freedom fighters in Botswana but they failed to find them. This is
why they now started to beat up people who crossed into Namibia. There were people
here who used to report to the white soldiers about Batswana who harboured
refugees.
The refugees were our relatives. I am saying this because nobody ever
complained about the refugees. The government also helped with providing shelter,
especially for the refugees who did not have relatives. These were tents and were
erected at the police station. They were given food and clothing by the
government, and this is where we used to visit them. They were immediately
transported to Dukwi and Francistown.
The white soldiers used to patrol along the border; they even used planes for
patrolling; sometimes they entered Botswana. They sometimes patrolled with boats
and fighter jets. The BDF even stopped us from going to Namibia for fear of attack.
These whites who stayed in Botswana working in Safari Companies used to inform
their fellow white soldiers in Namibia about what was happening here in Botswana;
Mamson is one of them. He was working for WENELA. Another one was called
Renleys. Renleys worked in a company called Hunters Africa. I don’t know exactly
what happened, but what I know is that Mamson moved from Kasane to Shakawe.
I don’t know what happened to Renleys, but I think those who were members of
BDF can answer that one because they wanted that white man dead or alive. The other
time they followed him where he was hiding in the bush. We heard rumours that he
was killed by BDF soldiers. Please ask the guys who were BDF soldiers. I think
they can give you better information about what happened to Renleys. Thank you
Mma.
1994
Muyoba, Akanyang
[Lesoma]
Akanyang Muyoba was born on 12 June 1973 in Pandamatenga, where she also attended
primary school. She went to Chobe CJSS in Kasane, and later joined the Botswana local
police in 1993.
My full names are Akanyang Muyoba. I was born on 12 June 1973 at

Pandamatenga, where I attended primary school, and later I went to Chobe CJSS in
Kasane. I then joined the Botswana local police in 1993.
I was young during the days of the liberation struggle but what I learnt from
my auntie was that in 1978 our uncle Moruti Zambo went missing and was never
found. She told me that one day Moruti went to look for cattle and never came back
home. What the elders used to tell us was that they don’t know what happened to
him because they searched for him but failed to find him. Even his bones were
never found. When this incident happened we were staying at the Sebuyu cattle
post and the guerrillas came and camped near our place. What I heard was that
uncle Moruti was one of the best friends of the freedom fighters. They used to
come at the cattle post and ask him to accompany them when they were going to
cross over to the then Rhodesia. We understand he was their tracker. He is the one
who guided them when they were moving around in Botswana and in Rhodesia,
particularly at the border area. What I am not sure about is whether he was killed
by the white soldiers in Rhodesia or not. My Auntie suspects he was shot by the
white soldiers in one of the cross fire encounters between the Smith white soldiers
and the guerrillas who used to fetch Moruti to go with them or their operations.
After Moruti went missing, I understand my father reported the matter to the
police. They carried out some investigations and it is likely they found out that
Moruti was being used by the freedom fighters. The police did not want people to
relate closely to the guerrillas. The police wanted to find out where the guerrillas
were hiding. They interrogated my father but he refused to tell the police where the
guerrillas were camping. My father was tortured by the police who wanted to know
where the guerrillas were hiding. They even injured him and had a wound which
never healed. The old man [Akanyang’s father] refused to show the police where
the freedom fighters were camping. He claimed he did not know where they were
hiding because he feared the freedom fighters were going to kill him, had he tried
to show the police the guerrilla hiding spot.
Moruti went with the guerrillas and never came back. People did not understand
what happened to Moruti. I am not sure whether the guerrillas told my father what
happened to Moruti because he never disclosed anything to us and he is now late.
People in Pandamatenga heard that Moruti was missing and this created dilemma to
my father. He did not know whether to inform the police about the guerrilla’s
hiding place or keep the secret. The police tortured him but he did not tell them
stories
anything. It is not known whether Moruti was killed by the guerrillas or died during
the guerrillas’ fight with white soldiers. Moruti was recruited by guerrillas to work
as spy and he is the one who used to inform them about the movement of the white
soldiers. I think that is the little I know.
Thank you very much Ntate.
1994
Muyonda, Gaufiwe
Gaufiwe Muyonda was born in 1920 in Kgosing Ward. He grew up in Gumare village as a
tax collector. His father was the Moyei chief of Gumare. He focuses on the war of
liberation and how freedom fighters reached Ngamiland from either Namibia, Angola or
South Africa, and how the people of Gumare helped them.
My name is Gaufiwe Muyonda. This village was set up in 1939 and when I grew up
I was one of those people who were collecting tax from the people of Gumare.
When the village was set up, chief Moremi sent one chief representative from Maun
to come here in Gumare and take care of us and he was Chief Monie Tladi. When
he arrived here in Gumare he brought with him a letter from Chief Moremi
requesting that the village should be shifted from where it was first. Initially, this
village was not here; it was on the other side of the stream, where our cattle posts
used to be situated. The letter requested that the village should be moved from
there to where it is now situated. After shifting, we continued with our responsibility
as tax collectors. By then my father was the Moyei chief of Gumare.
When Moremi went to Mmadinare for a year, after being charged for unfair
treatment of people, and was found guilty. On his arrival he was told that he should
not continue with such practice, as everybody was considered free in the country.
When Sir Seretse Khama came here after independence he also advised the
Batawana chieftaincy that there should not be unequal treatment of people, and no
one is supposed was to be oppressed. But all in all oppression was there but it was
not that much, because the villagers here detested oppression.
We knew that the guerrillas were our people, our brothers and sisters. They felt
welcomed here, except that at some instances they caused some problems. They did
not want to listen to our advice; they only did what they thought suited them best.
For example, they could come and ask for accommodation, but early in the morning
we would find them gone without knowing when they left or where they had gone
to. Those who were from Angola, and were staying in Etsha, did not cooperate with
us at first. They came in large numbers and they were accepted by our government,
settled at Etsha village. When they were asked to turn up for “kgotla” meetings,
they failed to come, and at times they used to destroy our properties at the farms and
they stole our livestock. The government bought them donkeys for ploughing their
farms. They also had to choose their own chiefs from their own people and they did
choose one of their own, not a Motswana. You could see that they were required to
be totally independent upon arrival.
Freedom fighters from Namibia passed here but they were not troublesome. We
hear that most of them stayed in Dukwi, but then of course some of them stayed in
Maun, before they moved on to Dukwi, and subsequently went to Francistown; and
then they proceeded to Zambia for military training. Freedom fighters just passed
through Gumare, but sometimes they asked for accommodation and food. Those
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who are now staying in Etsha were given accommodation and security; and were
given citizenship by the government of Botswana.
People of Ngamiland gave refugees accommodation, food and safety; but those
who ended up settling in Etsha were given some donkeys so that they could use them
for ploughing. We gave them anything we could in order to help them. Botswana
helped freedom fighters a lot because these people were not denied the opportunity
to pass through Botswana. Botswana gave all the help needed by freedom fighters.
But for those who are staying in Etsha, government gave them draught animal-power
to plough.
There were conflicts and misunderstandings between refugees or freedom fighters
and the villagers, because those who are staying in Etsha are the ones who were
stealing donkeys, goats and cattle from us; even today some are still doing that. At
first they were afraid and they were not stealing as much as nowadays. These days
they are not afraid because they are citizens of Botswana; they are not afraid of
anything. I think it is also because they have stayed here for a long time. In the past
they might have been afraid that they would have been taken back to their countries
and be oppressed by the white regimes.
I think Botswana has learnt a lot, especially on how to deal with people from
other countries in the region.
Batswana helped freedom fighters. Of course, Sam Nujoma stayed in Maun for
some time, but he also came here in Gumare for some meetings. He even went as far
as Nxaunxau. He came here in the company of some Botswana government
officials. They were addressing meetings here and in other villages. When Sam
Nujoma first started addressing the meeting here in Gumare, he asked the Baherero
who were staying here with us whether they were those from Namibia. Most of
them said they were now Batswana. He told them that they should know it was still
dangerous to go back to Namibia. He told all those who wanted to return to
Namibia about the dangers and the hardships they were likely to go through. He
told them that there were no schools for their children, and facilities were limited
for blacks and they were going to be in trouble under the white regime rule. Some
of those in the meeting insisted on going back and that is when the government of
Botswana started spending a lot of money in trying to help them to resettle in
Namibia. Some of them went back others settled here for good. You know some of
those who returned are coming back here in Botswana secretly. They want to settle
here in Botswana again. Some of them are going to Maun to ask for residence and
citizenship, they want to come back to Botswana.
don’t know whether the government is giving them papers for residence or they
are being given citizenship
I don’t know for how long Sam Nujoma stayed in Botswana because he used to
sleep everywhere he addressed a meeting. He started addressing meetings in Maun.
1994
The freedom fighters told us that they were oppressed in their own country; they
were killed by those Boers and that is why they had to run away from that kind of
oppression. They were open enough to tell us that they ran away from war.
Thanks a lot.
stories
Ngonga, Edward
Edward Ngonga was born in 1940, and come to Botswana as a refugee in 1976 during
the liberation war for Angola. He is married to a Batswana and has been granted
Botswana citizenship.
I’m now a Motswana; I have an Omang and I receive tandabala like all old
Batswana. When voluntary repatriation was announced I opted to stay in Botswana
because I have a large family. I did not think we could make it in Angola.
Government built us houses that we are currently living in Newstands. I can’t
complain, my children are all working and the family is managing well.
All my stay in Dukwi I have lived well with Batswana; my children are all
grownups now and have married Batswana. During wedding arrangements there
was no fuss. We sat down and harmonized our cultures to allow the marriage of our
children
I left Angola in 1976, and I stayed in Shakawe, Etsha, Maun, Gaborone, Phikwe
and eventually I settled in the camp in 1982. It was logical to choose Botswana
because it was the only country which was not involved in a struggle.
I tried applying for resettlement but failed. I guess it was due to the number of
children I have. I have a large family because I was married to two women. I had
no specific country in mind but I thought of a peaceful place where my children
could grow, get good schooling and job opportunities.
My family lived on what we produced in our garden. Part of it was sold, while
the other part was used to feed the family. All the family members worked equally
on the garden. Normally when people hear the word garden, they think of a small
piece of land. Ours were huge pieces of land, so all my family members were
absorbed in the garden. I also sustained the family through knitting; I continue to
knit even today. The rest were supplementary rations we got monthly from
UNICEF.
There were good inter-refugee relations because through zone leaders unity was
emphasized. Zone leaders were individuals who were given responsibility over
sections of residence within the camp. We unanimously voted for such people and
some were charismatic that they were obviously suited for the role. It was a
position of responsibility and people of good conduct held the position. Zone
leaders also took our grievances to the BCR.
We could practice our culture freely. We were known for our Shinganje dance
(masquerade dance) this dance was the only lively cultural aspect that we did not
share with Batswana. The rest of other things were a fusion of our culture and
Batswana culture.
Coping strategies, we have been through a lot and I cannot say anybody could
forget what we went through. However the fact that we were not just seated folding
our arms in the camp was enough as a coping strategy. We were preoccupied with
our gardens and putting other skills into practice. There were various entertainment
facilities within the camp and our children attended them. Some of us went to church.
1994
The relationship we had as refugees was also a way of making up for what we lost
in the war.
When we came here we were told not to participate in Botswana politics and we
respected that. We could not also regroup and start our own politics in Botswana.
That was the policy.
stories
Ngala, Join
[Bobirwa Area; May 2007]
Join Ngala, 64, is a Headman (Kgosana) in Mabolwe, in the Bobirwa area, a village
which is nearest to the Zimbabwe border. He was an activist in the liberation struggle,
and was involved in rendering assistance to freedom fighters and refugees from both
Rhodesia and South Africa. He tells of his experiences with the freedom fighters as well
as with soldiers and spies from the Smith regime.
During the war of liberation, I met with many difficulties. Many people came to
this village and to my home. I was not a chief then. Many did not know exactly
where they were going as they were fleeing from the war. Some were given my
name by people who knew me in Zimbabwe such as teachers or pastors because I
had studied in Zimbabwe. They gave them pieces of paper with my name written
on them. This is how many of them came straight to my home. They sought
assistance to reach their leader Joshua Nkomo. I told them that in Botswana they
were required to go to Bobonong to report to the police. From there they would be
taken to Selebi-Phikwe and other places, as guided by the Botswana authorities. I
told them that secrecy was vital for purposes of security,- this was before the actual
liberation war started.
Some of those who passed in Botswana earlier went for military training and
then returned to our part of the country so that they could make incursions into
Zimbabwe. One of those who came early was a young man called Kgaogelo. He
was alone. He crossed into Zimbabwe and killed a white man who was buying
goats. He took money from the white man and returned to my home. He passed on
and later came with other freedom fighters. They crossed into Zimbabwe to recruit
cadres for the war because people were suffering in Zimbabwe. I used to provide
them with transport on my tractor, picking them up from the border. The Botswana
police and other people transported them to Bobonong and onwards.
As the war accelerated in Zimbabwe, hundreds of people fled here. At times 300
or 500 people would flood our village. The government stationed a truck here so as
to cope with transporting these people to Selebi-Phikwe and Francistown.
There was an incident where students from Manama Mission in Zimbabwe crossed
into Botswana led by freedom fighters. They came with some teachers and nurses.
A Rhodesian aeroplane came in search of them, but it did not do anything to the
pupils. I think they were deterred by the presence of our soldiers and the freedom
fighters. We cooked for the students and fed them, and we hid them in the bushes and
streams. Later they were transported to Bobonong and onwards.
As time passed the number of freedom fighters and refugees increased and we fed
and housed them. The government assisted me with food supplies to feed them. We
felt safe because we believed that Rhodesian soldiers would not dare attack us
because of the presence of the army and the freedom fighters. We were not only
assisting the people of Zimbabwe. We knew we were also safeguarding Botswana.
As for the
1994
freedom fighters, they cooperated with our soldiers. The soldiers did not bother them
when they were at my home with their weapons hidden there.
Concerning South Africa, at times some freedom fighters passed through our
village to attack South Africa. On one occasion they told me that they were going
to enter South Africa and they did. We later learned that they had attacked a bank
there. Many people did not know that among the freedom fighters there were those
of South Africa.
I was encouraged when, as the war escalated and the refugee numbers rose,
President Seretse Khama invited me to Gaborone. He had learned that I was doing a
great job of assisting refugees from my own resources. The President was surprised
that I was able to keep these people. I told him that the villagers also contributed food
to assist. Among those present at the meeting with the President was Joseph
Legwaila and Charles Tibone who were working at the office of the President.
As the war heated up and the freedom fighters were attacking the Rhodesian
soldiers, the Rhodesian intelligence sent spies to check exactly where I lived. In
fact, at one point a Zimbabwean black soldier came with some refugees pretending
to be a refugee, and he fled back to Zimbabwe at night. I suspect he is the one who
gave information about where I lived and that indeed I harboured freedom fighters.
In 1978, on Good Friday, Smith soldiers came intending to capture me. They
knocked at our bedroom door at night. On asking who they were, they said they were
Nkomo’s freedom fighters who had come to seek help as one of their colleagues
called Erington, my brother-in-law, had been injured badly in a shoot-out with
Smith’s forces. The mention of my brother in-law’s name was a ruse to get my
cooperation. They asked if I had some medicine to treat him so that they could then
take him to Seleli-Phikwe for proper medical treatment. The moon was bright and
when I peeped I saw that one of them was a white man who stood behind a black
man. I told them falsely that my wife and I were visitors, and we found that Join
Ngala and his wife had gone to Selebi-Phikwe. I then said I would go next door to
seek assistance. They had surrounded my house and others were under a tree near
my house. They wanted my wife to go seek help, but I told them that this was her
first time to visit the village and so she would not know where to go. Only I knew
the village well. This is when they allowed me to go to seek help but instructed me
to hurry.
I was wearing a white shirt which my wife said I should remove as it would
make me easily visible. So I did and dashed out. At some safe distance away I
shouted,“I am the Join Ngala you are looking for.” This was meant to draw their
attention away from my wife. They left her alone in a hot pursuit. They fired
everywhere and the villagers were awoken by the sound of guns. Some emerged
undressed and fled to the bush. Fortunately I met my brother, Busang, and hopped
into his truck. We drove to the army base and reported the incident. They had
already heard the gun fire.
What helped us was that there was a freedom fighter nearby who was caring for
one of them who had been injured. He dashed unnoticed to call on the assistance of
fellow guerrillas who were nearby, such as Mdubane, the son of Tlou’s step brother
stories
who lived in Zimbabwe. There were seven of them. They vowed to repulse the
invaders because they knew if I was killed, they would have lost a vital rear base. I
had to be protected at all costs. I believe that they wanted to capture me alive so that
they could extract vital information from me. This may explain why they let my
wife go.
In the morning, together with our soldiers we followed their tracks which went
towards the Shashe River, where there was their camp across the river. The seven
freedom fighters had laid an ambush for them. They killed all 27 of them and brought
back the loot to hide at my home, such as watches and clothing, some of which we
later gave to the refugees who needed shoes and clothing. Often some of the
refugees came without any clothes.
After this incident, our soldiers advised me that I should leave my home for a
while and live with relatives in Semolale, a neighbouring village. As there were
some refugees at my home, I took them to the lands and requested some families to
hide and care for them. I also distributed some food to them because following my
visit to meet the President, food supplies were available. I told the freedom fighters
that often used my home to continue doing so.
My home had literally become a supply base for the freedom fighters. Their
ammunition and other war material were hidden in my home. This was a strictly kept
secret. Indeed the President had advised me to keep these things secret.
By the end of 1979 it was clear that the Smith regime had felt the impact of the
war. Several freedom fighters were making frequent successful raids into the
Gwanda South area. For example, from my area alone there were three groups of
freedom fighters that I worked with, operating in the Beit Bridge, Mberengwa and
Kezi areas. Each of them told me about the successes they scored in the war. One of
the great battles was fought near Manama Mission where Smith had established a
base. The regime’s soldiers had been sent to hunt for freedom fighters on horseback,
and they terrorised villagers in the area. They clashed with the freedom fighters and
were almost wiped out with their horses.
Following the raid of Mabolwe, the next morning Seretse Khama, Ian Khama and
later Merafe, Commander of the BDF, visited Mabolwe to see for themselves what
had happened.
When the war ended, the freedom fighters told me that they were now returning
to Zimbabwe with their weapons. They requested me to help transport their weapons
to where the high command of Nkomo would meet us and take over the weapons.
That is when we saw the huge arsenal the freedom fighters had assembled. There
were weapons of many kinds and a lot of ammunition. I mobilised transport. I used
my tractor and others like Motsumi Mogorosi, Mokgoba, Maziba and Daniel
Maposa made their trucks available. We transported the weapons for about four
days. These weapons were hidden in the mountains in our area all the way to the
confluence of the Shashe and Tuli Rivers. Later we discovered some of the
weapons near our lands and reported the finds to the BDF who took them.
Certainly, there were sufficient weapons to protect Botswana. Otherwise Smith
would have terrorised Batswana.
1994
Indeed many battles were fought in the areas adjacent to the Botswana border. The
freedom fighters had turned the area into no go area. I was invited by the freedom
fighters to visit their assembly camp at Zezane. They were happy to see me and told
their comrades how I had assisted in the war effort.
Sometimes there were misunderstandings among the freedom fighters. I recall
rescuing one ZAPU official whom they nearly shot, the complaint being that he
delayed bringing war material to the front. This threatened their lives as they could
not defend themselves if they were attacked.
There was a case of a spy who used to come to look for me. I was away in
Bobonong. When I arrived some villagers told me to return to Bobonong as some
of Smith’s soldiers were looking for me at my lands. They were being helped by
Mogorosi Sethukga, a Zimbabwean who lived on the border area. The matter was
reported to the police in Bobonong. There was no BDF camp at that time. By the
time they came, Smith’s soldiers had disappeared. There was also a South African
man called Mpheku. He was deported because of his spying activities. There were
other instances when I was harassed on my shopping visits to South Africa. They
often held me at the border to check if I was Join Ngala, but they did not harm me
in any way. Confusion of names helped me. My passport was written Nkala but
they had Ngala in their records. They asked if we knew anything about guerrillas.
We denied any knowledge of freedom fighters. They told us that if we ever knew of
or saw any, we should report to them and we would be rewarded for that.
Tswaipe of the BDF had learned that some white farmers in the Tuli Block
Farms had guns. He went there and arrested two farmers who refused to be
searched. He locked them up in a cell in Bobonong. The following day he brought
them back and took them to the farms. One of the Boers tried to shoot him and he
ordered that he be shot. He searched their houses and killed both of them. When we
learned that he was being tried we were sad because we knew he had killed
enemies.
Some of the heroes of the war were Joel Sijie, Mdubane Mangisi, Keobokile
Ndebele, Brain Mashila, and Kgaogelo Modise. I knew many people in Zimbabwe
for I studied t at Manama Mission, and I was taught by Thomas Tlou.
What made me support the struggle was that the people in Zimbabwe knew me and
I knew them well because I had studied in Zimbabwe. Also my cattle post was on
the border with Zimbabwe and so there was interaction between me and
Zimbabweans. Besides, the people on either side of the border were relatives. There
used to be free movement of people in the olden days. There were no border
restrictions. Now, border demarcations restrict people’s free movement and hence
separate related peoples.
stories
Ngonga, Lucas
Lucas Ngonga was born in 1978 and he is a son of a former refugee from Angola. His
parents left Angola for Botswana in 1976, but settled in the refugee camp in 1982. He
was born in Gaborone.
My parents came from Angola in 1976 but we settled in the camp in 1982. I was
born in Botswana, Gaborone. The family survived through food rations provided by
UNICEF and through farming. We sold vegetables in and around the camp. At first
we had with free transport from UNICEF, but later we were asked to pay a 5 pula
transport fee.
We enjoyed peace from Batswana; we could even play with Batswana children
without any nationality divide. It did not occur to us that we were different. Refugees
practiced their culture without any problem. My family was polygamous, but we
were never persecuted for that fact. More cultural elements were demonstrated
during Dukwi Day celebrations. The refugees were also flexible in that they
adopted some elements of Batswana culture.
The Botswana Council for Refugees (BCR) was one of the organizations that
were responsible for our welfare. It processed refugee grievances and scholarships,
among other things. I think the BCR was well organized and well equipped despite
certain displeasures especially by the South African refugees.
The South African refugees wanted to be above law, they were uncontrollable.
They put the government under pressure with constant strikes and police had to
intervene with tear gas and other weaponry. The South African refugees burnt the
BCR offices with a petrol bomb in 1992 or 1993 I’m not certain of the date, but I
am sure they burnt it and the ruin still stands there to date.
Some South African refugees had tried to escape from the camp by cover of
darkness, and road blocks were mounted by the police and soldiers and they were
taken back to the camp. This was around 1989 or 1990. The SA refugees hated the
camp; they did not like being there. Most South African refugees could not go
back home because they feared for their lives. In fact some were killed on arrival in
South Africa.
The camp was really big, and we were not located by house numbers but by
zones. Each zone had a leader who could forward grievances to the authorities or
act as a unifying factor when there were problems between refugees.
We coped with our situation as refugees through various sporting activities in the
camp. There were various forms of entertainment. Even attending school was a way
of coping for refugee children. We enjoyed schooling; we were treated with dignity
by the teachers. We were initially struggling to grasp Setswana but later we spoke it
like any Motswana child. I had trouble especially with proverbs and Setswana
figures of speech. We were very active in extra-curricular activities and travelled
through the whole country. Sometimes we went on tours and all the children
enjoyed it because
1994
it brought all the things we were learning to reality. We shared our experiences with
our parents, who were mostly not educated. Our conduct was good. During our time,
unlike nowadays, there were no cases of teenage pregnancy, we schooled up to the
end without disturbance.
Being a refugee has taught me never to give up in life. There is always a way out of
every situation.Who would have thought that today I would be married and working?
stories
Nkhwa, Kenneth Moesi

[Gulubane; May 2007]
Kenneth Moesi Nkhwa, 80 years old, is the headman of Nkhwa Ward, Gulubane village.
He was the former MP for North East, and explains how Botswana was involved in the
liberation struggle of southern African countries.
Botswana obtained independence in 1966 through an election. There was no

bloodshed in the independence process. As an independent country, Botswana had to
assist other countries that were still struggling to achieve their independence. These
were the neighbouring countries of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, Angola
and Mozambique.
As the liberation war intensified in Zimbabwe people started pouring into
Botswana as refugees. In Botswana there were different political parties such as the
ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and opposition Botswana Peoples Party
(BPP). The BPP welcomed refugees, but the BDP was worried at the beginning,
thinking it was risky to welcome refugees. The BPP argued that if Botswana was
truly independent, then she should accept refugees. Other countries had to know
and accept the fact that we were receiving people who were facing oppression in
their countries of origin.
During the liberation war in Zimbabwe, the different movements started sending
cadres outside for military training in order to come back and liberate the country.
Botswana government later started to accept refugees. Other counties such as Zambia
were prepared to accept refugees to go for military training abroad. Many refugees
came to Botswana and they were well received and moved abroad for military
training. Botswana did not accept military training to be conducted here. Botswana
did not accept to be used as a launching pad to attack her neighbours. Botswana was
a young country that had just gained her independence and could not withstand
attacks from her strong white dominated neighbours. Botswana thought she did not
need an army at the beginning. In Parliament, the BPP led by myself, Mr Motlhagodi
and Matante called for the formation of an army to defend its citizens.
As the war in Zimbabwe intensified, Rhodesian soldiers crossed the border into
Botswana and attacked villages, burning homes and kidnapping both refugees and
Batswana. The BPP warned the government that what was happening was inevitable
and that led to the formation of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) in 1977.Despite
her precarious situation of being landlocked and surrounded by white dominated
settler states, Botswana accepted refugees and supported the liberation struggle,
because she knew that those people were fleeing oppression and murders in their
countries.
When the refugees arrived at the borders, Batswana informed the authorities and
the army, who took the refugees to refugee camps at Dukwi and Francistown.
Batswana lives were endangered when Rhodesian forces crossed the border in pursuit
1994
of refugees and what they called ‘terrorists’, as there were kidnappings of both the
refugees and Batswana.
At the beginning of the struggle, some Batswana did not understand what was
happening, and why their country had to be involved. With time, Batswana started
to understand why Zimbabweans were coming in large numbers and why Batswana
had to support them. When they arrived, Batswana helped fleeing refugees with
food, and took them to relevant authorities. Batswana understood the fact that these
people were fighting for their rights. Batswana were more inclined to the
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) because it was the movement that was
formed earlier, and it was also strong in Matabeleland, which borders Botswana.
The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) appeared later. The Botswana
government did not discriminate between these two movements, and the
government and its people assisted those Zimbabweans who were on transit to
other countries. However, the Botswana government did not tolerate conflicts
between the different movements, because that could have caused trouble.
The Frontline States (FLS) helped liberation movements a lot, because many of
the refugees from South Africa and Zimbabwe received military training in
countries such as Zambia. Financially, the FLS assisted liberation movements to
buy weapons. Other countries such as Cuba assisted with weapons. Although
Botswana was not at war, she helped with finances and transportation of refugees.
Leaders of liberation movements understood Botswana’s position, that she was
militarily weak. Botswana was a new and militarily weak state, and the powerful
neighbours could retaliate if she allowed herself to be used as a launching pad to
attack those neighbours. Other countries at the United Nations (UN) and the then
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), also understood the fact that Botswana could
not stand alone economically because she bought many things from Zimbabwe and
South Africa. Botswana even bought most of her foodstuffs from those countries.
When Botswana army came across freedom fighters, they helped them to transit to
Zambia, and there was no fighting between the two.
After the independence of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia the countries
worked together with Botswana. These countries already had good infrastructure
when they obtained their independence, whilst Botswana was lagging behind. In
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Botswana gains
something because she has access to SADC markets where she can buy and sell her
products. She obtains those things she doesn’t produce.
Botswana policy during the liberation struggle was clear, she did not want any
war because of fear of reprisal, but supported the oppressed people. Refugees were
not allowed to possess arms when in the country.
stories
Phatudi, Gladstone
[Barolong Farms/Hebron Good Hope; July 2007/June 2007]
Gladstone Phatudi was born on the other side of the Botswana border. His parents were
Batswana, but they were working in South Africa. He went to school there and saw for
himself how the black people were being treated. After finishing high school he trained as
a teacher; he came to Botswana and started teaching among his people, the Barolong,
and became one of the people who were in the forefront in helping escapees of apartheid to
cross over to Botswana.
Batswana helped the refugees in the liberation struggle because they were
oppressed by the Boers. We stood by not only for refugees but by the African
National Congress which sought liberation from the Boers. We believed that once
the African people of that country were liberated, we would also be liberated.
I was born on the other side of the border. My parents were Batswana, but they
were working in South Africa. I went to school there and saw for myself how the
black people were treated from there. After finishing high school and trained as a
teacher, I came here and started teaching among my people, the Barolong. I was
one of the people who were in the forefront in helping escapees of apartheid to
cross over to Botswana. When they crossed the border, illegally of course, we went
to fetch them. At night we used to go to the fence and meet the refugees and give
them accommodation for about two to three days before sending them to comrade
Fish Iketseng in Lobatse. Oliver Tambo passed by here and we took him to Lobatse
where he was later helped to move on to Zambia.
As to why Botswana supported the liberation struggle, Black people in South
Africa are the same as black people here. Their suffering was Botswana’s suffering.
Although the country was in a vulnerable position, as far as resources are concerned,
the country helped the refugees in every way possible. Some refugees were
accommodated by other Batswana and the government allowed skilled refugees to
work within its structures as teachers and civil servants.
Batswana subtly supported the liberation struggle for fear of reprisals from the
hostile neighbours of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. However, the people of
Botswana did the best they could to recognize and help the refugees. The help that
Botswana offered to escapees of oppression made it gain international reputation
among the independent countries of Africa, organizations such as the Organization
of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
Botswana could not afford to be partisan in relation to these movements. The
government treated all of them the same, at least at the surface of it. The country
could not be used as a base camp for fear of exposing its people to the menace of
the oppressors of the settler regime. While there may have been occasions when
guerrillas used Botswana as a transit passage, it was not allowed; and when
detected freedom fighters were apprehended and disarmed. It is not impossible to
imagine that sometimes the organs of the law chose to be subtle about some such
acts.
1994
Sometimes liberation movements competed among themselves and vied for
recognition by the government of Botswana. Sometimes among the movements there
were conflicts of issues of strategy, ideology and who really represented the people.
The government of Botswana acted as an arbitrator and counselled the liberation
movements on unity and standing for a common goal.
While the government faced the problems of the liberation movements and
refugees, it also had to deal with acts of destabilization from the settler regimes.
The country invited the settler regimes to come and identify bases that they claimed
were in the country. The country condemned all acts of harassment and appealed to
the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth. The
country also started its small army to defend itself and educated its citizens to be
vigilant against suspicious persons, both black and white.
As far as refugees were concerned, the Government of Botswana built refugee
camps in Dukwi, Francistown and Selebi Phikwe, so that genuine refugees could
be screened. A verification process in that direction was put in place.
Dr Molema was informer of the ANC, and was friends with a British policemen,
he tipped them. In May 1959 the Boers tried to kill him, by recruiting him into
the police force, and sending him to Scotland Yard. Although he had never been a
policeman, Boers were aware that he was an ANC link. He ran away to Botswana
and was followed, but he refused to go back. Boers tried to frame him in all kinds of
ways. Ntloko was his nickname. He helped the 1976 Soweto Uprising refugees to
be taken to Lobatse. Ramatlabama Police came to know that I was the transporter of
refugees. Codename was Modisaotsile, Slovo, Mandela, Thambo stayed in Boswela;
Tlou was a freedom fighter. Ocallighan helped freedom fighters by educating them
in Botswana; and Tiger Kloof with Masire and Chiepe saved Dr Molema from
being arrested by the Boers. Mangope was also ANC initially, but subsequently
joined the Boers.
stories
Pinto, Alvaru
[Dukwi; July 2008]
Alvaru Pinto is a former refugee and he was born in 1942 in Angola. In 1979 he ran away
from the war and crossed into Namibia, but in 1980 came to settle in the camp in
Botswana.
I left Angola due to the political instability in 1979. From Angola I crossed into
Namibia but could not stay long in Namibia because there was a war going on there
against the Boers. I stayed briefly in Selibe Phikwe and then came to settle in the
camp in 1980. I found mostly Zimbabwean refugees, whose houses we later
occupied when they were officially repatriated in 1982. Before the Zimbabwean
repatriation we lived in tents.
I sustained myself through gardening and monthly rations. We sold our vegetables
in areas such as Tutume, Nata, Gweta, Francistown and the other villages surrounding
us. UNICEF offered us a free truck to carry our produce, but later we were asked to
pay 5 pula fee for transport. It wasn’t much because we made much more from the
sale of vegetables. We never returned with vegetables back to the camp, they sold
well. With this money I could cover where monthly rations failed to cover. With
money I could buy things of my choice.
The Botswana Council for Refugees (BCR) helped us by overseeing that we
received our rations, helped parents with their children’s school uniforms and many
other things that affected us as refugees.
The war had terrible effects on my life because I had to give up everything I
managed to raise for my whole life. I had to start life afresh. I lost my freedom
because in the camp we were not allowed to move freely; we could not go
anywhere we pleased. Our movement was monitored and it made life really hard. I
did not like living in the camp but it was better than living in a war zone. If I had
stayed in Angola maybe I would be dead by now.
There were many zones within the camp each with a leader. We could even meet
as zones to discuss our problems within the camp and also discuss ways of improving
relations among refugees. The relationship between various refugees was fine. We
also had a good relationship with Batswana.
Refugees were allowed to practice their culture. During Dukwi Day celebrations,
we came together and displayed our culture through music and artefacts. The
Angolans presented our traditional dance known as Shinganje. The Zairians
presented kwasakwasa. Within the camp, there were Angolans of different ethnic
groups such as Kikongo, Kimbundu, Ombundu, Chiokwe, Kubale, Kunyama and
Ngangera; but we got on well with each other.
Recently when all was calm in Angola we were given the choice to be
repatriated or to become citizens of Botswana. Most of us chose to stay; only a few
went back to Angola. I’m sure you saw them on BTV. Having decided to stay, the
government built us two roomed houses in Newstands and we left the camp to stay
in our new homes.
1994
We made way for new refugees in the camp, like Namibians and Somalis, to
mention only a few. Though it took long, we were given Omang cards, and we were
left to live life like all Batswana. Recently our rations were stopped because we are
no longer regarded as refugees. This is where life started becoming difficult for us.
We were promised that we would be funded to start our own projects, but the
promise seems to be taking long to be fulfilled.
stories
Ramsden Ronald
[Boseja – Kubung Maun]
Ronald Ramsden attended Moremi Memorial School; and then started working in one
company which was responsible for road construction in Kasane from 1977 up until the
late 1990s then he went back to Maun and joined politics. He worked for a long time in
the Wildlife Department in Maun. He has been a member of BDP since the 1999 elections,
and he has been a Councillor since 2004.
My name is Ronald Ramsden. I started schooling at what we now call Moremi

Memorial School. And then when I finished my schooling there I started working
in one company which was responsible for road construction in Kasane. I started
working in Kasane from 1977 until the late 1990s, then I came back to Maun and
joined politics. I have been a member of BDP since the 1999 elections and I won
the council seat in Maun in 2004; and up till now I am a councillor. Before
becoming a councillor I worked for a long time at the Wildlife Department here in
Maun and I made tremendous changes in the department before I joined politics. I
left Wildlife because people wanted me to be a councillor and I did not want to be in
two different government jobs at the same time. After winning the 2004 elections I
left the Wildlife Department and I became a councillor.
Botswana helped freedom fighters. You know, if your neighbours are in fire you
help them; but when we did that we were not doing it publicly because we knew
that would provoke war with the white regimes who were fighting these freedom
fighters. Therefore, we helped freedom fighters knowing that we could be attacked
by the Boers anytime, and we did not want the Boers to be aware of what we were
doing. Even though we knew what was likely to happen to us, we helped our fellow
African neighbours and that worked for us in the long run. We definitely helped
freedom fighters.
I have a clear understanding of what was happening in the Chobe district, where I
was based at the time. Whenever freedom fighters arrived in Lesoma they normally
travelled in groups of 3 – 5 people, and it was difficult for some people to know
whether they were freedom fighters or villagers. They spent a few minutes with us
in the village before they disappeared back into the bush. We were used to them
because I was a driver at the time and I used to give them lift from Kasane to the
border. They did not wear military uniform, and therefore some people had no idea
they were freedom fighters.
We met them quite often and sat down with them to discuss issues of the liberation
struggle. We used to drink traditional beer with them at the border area. Whenever
freedom fighters came to Kasane we would sit down with them and tried to understand
what was going on in Rhodesia. They would share their own personal experiences
before going back to their camp across the border. We met different people.
1994
You know what they did to me one day, when I was driving to Lesoma from
Kasane on a gravel road across very bushy area? One freedom fighter ran into the
road and faced the vehicle, standing right in front of it. He was pointing a gun at
me. Since I already knew what was going on in the region and was familiar with their
movements, then I knew that he was a guerrilla fighter. He was ordering me to
stop the car, but this was a way of requesting us to wait for him and give him and
the friend a ride. I stopped the car and he came in and told me to drive slowly
following him, as he was walking in front, to where he picked his injured friend
and he asked me to drop them at the hospital. I wasn’t afraid of him because that
seemed to be my daily bread, helping freedom fighters lifting them in our vehicles
and dropping them where they wanted. They did not want to occupy the front seat
of the lorry. They sat at the back of the vehicle, where I covered them with the
canvas material, and rushed them to the hospital. I also informed the police who then
took care of the freedom fighters. For me that was an easy thing to do because
freedom fighters only needed help from us and they were not causing any trouble. I
was used to seeing them carrying guns; that was nothing to me. I wasn’t afraid
because it was my daily bread to help freedom fighters. I cooperated well with
freedom fighters because these people spent a long time with us on the Botswana
side of the border and discussed their problems with us which made it easy for
both parties to cooperate. The local people did not have any problem with freedom
fighters. One thing that you should be aware of is that the local communities and
freedom fighters had something in common. Since these freedom fighters were
from Rhodesia and they stayed close to the border, they had an affectionate
relationship with local people in villages at the border. They shared something in
common: language. Therefore, it was easy for them to communicate with those
who lived in Botswana. You should be aware that Baherero here in Ngamiland
have relatives in Namibia, same applies to Basubiya of the Chobe and
people across the border.
Of course, it was difficult to control their movement but our government tried its
best to control their movement. I will keep on referring to Chobe area because
when liberation struggle in Rhodesia happened I was based there. Whenever
freedom fighters crossed the border into Botswana and when they were not seen by
anyone they would launch attacks from where they were hiding in the remote areas
of the border area. This became a problem for Botswana. We were on spotlight.
The Botswana Defence Forces (BDF) played a significant role and should be
applauded for having done a good job defending us against possible attacks. They
always patrolled the border day and night so that when freedom fighters arrived in
our country they knew about their presence and where to keep them safe. We once
heard that freedom fighters shot three jet fighters from Rhodesia and then ran back
to hide in the bush near some of the villages along the border. That is what they
normally did, when they were in the village; they could cross into Rhodesia go into
the bush and secretly launch an attack at the Rhodesian camp, and then ran back to
hide in Botswana. This is what caused one of the major shootings in Kazungula
border near the ferry where
stories
some soldiers were killed. We stayed near the border and it was during the night
when we heard some gun fire and saw some bullets in the air. This was in Lesoma.
I understand few civilians and soldiers died in the Lesoma incident. I think it was
in the late 1970s.
One day when I was drinking beer with them, they were putting something on the
ground, some sort of syringe which had water and methylated spirit in it. According
to the guerrillas, a movement of that water and the methylated spirit was a sign that
they were under attack. They showed me the movement of water and methylated
spirit and quickly ran into the bush for hiding. In a matter of minutes we saw jet
fighters flying above Lesoma and the guerrillas shot them from the bush which
was confirmation of their suspicions. There were about 3 jet fighters and they were all
shot.
Freedom fighters from Namibia and other countries were using Maun or Ngamiland
as a transit route to either Francistown or Zambia. Some went to Francistown, where
they were taken to Bulawayo and transported to East Africa but others went to
Kazungula to cross the Chobe River to Zambia for their military training. During
those days Zambia housed a lot of refugees which led to the downfall of their
economy. I only know that they used Maun as a transit route to East Africa. Some of
the freedom fighters stayed in Maun some days before passing or going to Zambia.
The former president of Namibia Sam Nujoma stayed here in Maun for a few days
with Mr Mmutla. A lot of refugees, both youth and elderly, passed through Maun.
They travelled in groups and also arrived on different days. Some passed to other
countries but some of them of course stayed here for good, even today they are still
here with us as they never went back to their country.
Of course Angolans were coming in large numbers, but a lot of refugees were
from Namibia. Some of them like I said earlier never went back to their countries.
If you take a village like Etsha in Ngamiland, today it is made up of refugees and
few local people. Refugees from Namibia and Angola have stayed in Etsha for
some time and they are now citizens of Botswana. They can do anything a citizen
can do; they can even vote.
Of course, Boers from South Africa and Rhodesians raided Botswana. You know
of the Gaborone, Bontleng bombing by the South Africans. Those raids were a sign
of showing Botswana or suspecting that Botswana took part in helping freedom
fighters. But all in all, we cooperated well with those countries partly because some
of them were not sure that we were taking part in helping freedom fighters.
I don’t know of any churches in either Ngamiland or Botswana that may have
played a role in assisting freedom fighters. Here in Ngamiland we had intelligent
people like Mr Sethoko who worked well with the late Kgosi Letsholathebe and
they were responsible for taking care of freedom fighters. Most chiefs did not
understand politics and our Chief was under the watchful eyes of Mr Sethoko, who
always advised him and Letsholathebe never had problems with freedom fighters.
Here in Maun we received them with both hands.
1994
In Ngamiland such incidents might have happened in Shakawe, Seronga or
Mohembo, because those villages are close to the border. If you look at Lesoma,
Kasane or Pandamatenga, those villages are close to the border and if you need
information about activities in the Chobe, it will be easy to get people who
witnessed the activities from such villages. I know of the exchange of fire in
Lesoma. Maun is about 450 or 500 km from the border hence few liberation
activities of such nature happened in Maun.
I witnessed the Lesoma incident because I was there. I also witnessed other
activities. I remember one night we crossed into Rhodesia, it was around 5pm and
we went to the Zimbabwean guerrilla camp because there was a bar there. We drunk
beer with them and they also bought beer for us. It was nice we were laughing and
they were laughing too. They didn’t talk about the struggle and we also avoided
conversation on liberation activities. We stayed there until 9pm and then we told
them we wanted to go back to Botswana and they accompanied us until we crossed
the border and they went back. It was really nice.
The Botswana Defence Force was formed during hardships and they were
determined to face the challenges, hence being able to deal effectively with safe
guarding the border. We understand that when it was difficult to contain the
incursions they called for other soldiers from either Gaborone or Gantsi or anywhere
else in the country to assist at the border, and I am glad they managed. It was okay for
us to help our brothers to get independence.
Thank you.
stories
Sankwasa, Luckson
[Kasane; December 2007]
Luckson Sankwasa was born on the 3rd April in 1946 at Kavimba. He attended school at
Kachikau primary school from 1954 and finished. He was born on the 3rd April in 1946
at Kavimba. He attended school at Kachikau primary school from 1954 and finished
standard four in 1958. He is currently the Chairman of the Chobe Enclave Conservation
Trust.
I am Luckson Sankwasa. I was born on the 3rd April in 1946 at Kavimba. I

attended school at Kachikau primary school from 1954 and finished standard four
in 1958. This was the highest standard of primary education during those days. I
never studied further. From 1958, I was just home and in 1974 I decided to join
politics and was a member of the Botswana Democratic Party. I was in politics
from 1974 and quit politics in 2004. I am now the chairman of the Chobe Enclave
Conservation Trust.
Our area Kasane or Chobe district as a whole did not have people who were
seriously involved in politics. I wanted to represent my people. We were a new
country having attained independence in 1966 and the country was developing. I
wanted Chobe to be recognized and developed. I also used to attend political
meetings which were held by Sir Seretse Khama. He was a strong man. He had the
words of wisdom. His words pulled me along and I ended up in the Botswana
Democratic Party.
I was a councillor for Kasane Central from 1974 – 2004 and brought
developments which were not there before 1974. I asked for so many things and the
government brought developments to our district. You know how Kasane was in
the 1970 and 1980? I tried hard to push for developments and schools were built.
The Chobe Community Junior Secondary School is one such example of
development provided by the government.
II did not quit. Honestly I was not elected to be the Councillor. People decided
to change and elected Mme Diao. Luckily I was employed by the Chobe Enclave
Conservation Trust and I was elected the Chairman in 2004 and I am still with the
Chobe Enclave now.
I personally definitely think the reason why Botswana decided to do that was
because as an African republic state, it was important at the time for Africans to
assist in the struggle for the independence of other African states. I think Botswana
was right to support the liberation struggle because leaving other Africans suffering
in the continent was going to leave Botswana isolated from other African states.
This was the reason why Botswana decided to support the liberation struggle to free
other Africans from the colonialism, an oppressive system.
The government of Botswana contributed to the liberation struggle and there were
some challenges. When freedom fighters came into this country they were fed by
villagers and the government, and this was a constraint because it was not something
that the country was ready for. This was a constraint on the side of people because
freedom fighters asked for food from our people. These freedom fighters were coming
1994
in unexpectedly. Feeding somebody you did not expect in your home was itself a
constraint.
During the liberation struggle the movement of ordinary people was difficult. It
was not easy to travel from here to Victoria Falls. People were searched at almost
every one kilometre that one travelled. People were stopped and searched. The
system of travelled across into Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was difficult. The white
soldiers knew that people from Botswana were supporting or helping freedom
fighters. It was not easy to visit relatives in either Namibia or Zimbabwe.
There were several other problems. I remember one incident where a pontoon was
blown by the Rhodesia regime forces. The pontoon was from Zambia and there were
some casualties. People died there. I can’t remember who died and how many. This
was in 1978. I still remember another incident whereby about 15 of our soldiers were
killed at Lesoma because the Smith regime forces were following freedom fighters
and ended up killing our soldiers.
White soldiers illegally crossed into Botswana several times. They did not wear
army uniform when crossing to Botswana. They liked moving along the border and
even crossing into our territory. The areas around Kazungula and Lesoma are the ones
which were liked by white soldiers. These are the areas where freedom fighters
used for hiding, as well. They followed white soldiers in Zimbabwe at night and
attacked them. The freedom fighters sometimes asked for food from people around
Lesoma and Kazungula because these places are close to the border.
Before Namibia got independent there were some refugees who were crossing
into Botswana and they received help. They were given food at the police station.
Botswana was mainly used as a stopover before they were immediately moved
from here to Zambia and then Tanzania, where some young men were trained as
freedom fighters. Some refugees were taken to Dukwi and Francistown. Refugees
did not stay in Kasane for a long time. They were secretly transported to
Francistown. It was not safe for them because Kasane is close to the border and
white soldiers from Namibia and Zimbabwe could easily cross into this area.
Among the refugees there were political refugees and those who ran away from the
war. Political refugees were not kept here; they were taken on transit to prevent
them from being killed. Villagers were free to help refugees. Some people had
relatives among refugees. Non-political refugees had relatives in Kasane, whom
they frequently visited and were allowed to stay with. They normally asked for
permission from the police officers and spent a day with their relatives before they
were repatriated. They gave them food and in the evening went back to the camp.
The community around here helped refugees a lot. There was nothing much done to
use refugees here. They would stay here in Kasane for a day or two before being
transported to Francistown.
Botswana accommodated refugees and this affected the economy. These refugees
were transported to their point of exit at Kazungula or to Dukwi and Francistown in
Botswana government vehicles. Service delivery in the country was for both
citizens and refugees. Nelson Mandela was happy that Botswana helped them.
When they
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attained independence, he mentioned that they were lucky that Batswana were there
for them and that people of Botswana supported the struggle whole heartedly.
The only point of exit I knew was Kazungula because that is where Botswana
and Zambia share the border. Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa were still
under colonial rule. All these countries were ruled by the white minority regimes
and they did not like freedom fighters and refugees. Kazungula was the only area I
knew those days. Maybe there were other places in Botswana but personally I feel
Kazungula was only place safe for freedom fighters when people were using the
pontoon to cross to Zambia. The Kazungula border was also guarded by the
Botswana Defence Force and the police. When the white regime forces realized
this, they were not happy because it meant that Botswana was harbouring their
enemies, and that is why they bombed the pontoon.
The relationship between Botswana and the people that were being liberated was
quite good. People from Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe were very friendly;
moreover we had a lot of things in common. The relationship was not bad at all.
Let me just be honest to you, there were completely no impipis here. People here
saw Africans from Namibia and Zimbabwe as their brothers and sisters. There
were no such people who informed the white soldiers about the whereabouts of the
refugees. What I know is that people here in Kasane used to warn refugees that there
were white soldiers at such and such a place.
There were no freedom fighters who came here from Namibia. The only freedom
fighters that came here were from Zimbabwe. The white soldiers in Namibia had
total control of the Caprivi Strip. Those freedom fighters that came to Botswana were
those who were troubled by white soldiers and then ran away across the border to
their relatives here. We used to hear that there were freedom fighters that came to
certain areas and reported to the police. These types of refugees were repatriated
immediately to Tanzania. This was a secret between family members and the
police. It was not something for public consumption because if the white soldiers had
known about their presence here, they would have troubled the host families.
As a politician, there was little that I did to help refugees from Namibia or
Zimbabwe. We never housed any refugees or hid any because most refugees from
Namibia had relatives and never suffered a lot. The police were also responsible for
looking after them. Kasane is close to the border and there is a National park on the
western side [Chobe National Park]. The police and soldiers were always getting
the refugees from the national park where they were hiding; and they were never
allowed to spend many days in Kasane, before being transported to Francistown.
There were many political refugees who crossed into Botswana and were
received by the police at the police station. I don’t remember their names.
Thank you mma.
1994
Sarah, Mma
Mma-Sarah, a former refugee, arrived in Botswana in the 1970s from Zimbabwe. She
settled in the camp and chose to remain in Botswana after Zimbabwe got independence.
I cannot pin down the year I arrived in Botswana, but it was in nineteen-seventy
something. Some Zimbabweans went back home after independence but I and my
relatives chose to stay in Botswana because we were already established down
here.
Settlement in the camp was facilitated by different organizations within the camp.
They made our life easier. We had two roomed houses, furnished. We had a police
station, a clinic and a school. That is why I say settlement in the camp was not a
problem at all.
We lived more or less like Batswana, because we kept chicken and goats. We
also did field crop production. Adjusting in the camp was not specific to any sex or
gender. We were equally involved in farming.
My children attended school and some even ended at Mc Connel College in
Tutume for their senior secondary school education. They were all born here. I am
trying to emphasize that they did benefit from the education system in Botswana.
They are even participating in the development of Dukwi village. My daughter has
been in VDC for a while now. Batswana were good to us that was why we chose to
stay. Batswana are really good people. We continue to live as neighbours and nothing
xenophobic has ever risen between us. There was once an inter refugee ‘war’
between Zimbabweans and Angolans, but the police managed to quench it. That was
the only scenario; refugees were relating well too.
To me life in the camp was easy because we were provided with everything.
However things changed when we became Batswana and made way for new
refugees,. We were promised programs that could empower us but such promises
were never fulfilled. We expected financial support to start businesses and other
projects but it never materialized. However I think we are now managing because
my children are all grownups.
I sought comfort in many churches but I coped well because my relatives were
all around me in large numbers; they gave me enough support to make me cope
with life as a refugee.
I think there are many lessons to be learnt from living as a refugee. We taught and
inspired people to do vocational activities. Many Batswana can now go around
selling goods produced at home, they have textiles and gardens. The self-reliance
we see around was inspired by work done by refugees.
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Seepapitso, Kgosi
[Gaborone; February 2008]
Kgosi Seepapitso was a good friend of Pik Botha, former Foreign Minister of apartheid
South Africa and related well with him. While his friends (Botha) had hang-ups about
race, Botha was different as he was a liberal Afrikaner. He used to invite him to his house
on several occasions. Being related to Dr Moroka because his mother’s mother came
from the family of the Moroka, Kgosi Seepapitso frequented Thabanchu in the Orange
Free State where Moroka stayed. He used to be sent errands by his uncle for the ANC,
like secretly being sent to give some letters to Nelson Mandela, who was then in hiding in
the Orange Free State, as he was wanted by the Boers; but that particular errand saved
Mandela from arrest as the letter was warning him to move to another hiding.
Botswana supported the liberation struggle because the apartheid regime oppressed
black people and that oppression was spilling over this country. Also those of us who
went to school in South Africa were always attacked, not physically but
psychologically. For instance, there were certain shops that discriminated against
black people, and as students, we used to see other black people being oppressed. So
Botswana supported the liberation struggle because it wanted to stand by other
black people.
Botswana welcomed the refugees, but there was always the danger that not
everyone would be accepted as a refugee. There were some who were spies of the
apartheid regime. At one time some white people who knew that I crossed the border
frequently, followed me by driving behind me to my own village in Kanye. I
stopped the vehicle and confronted the men about their intentions and I simply told
them off, and they drove back.
As far as the liberation struggle was concerned, I also played a role. Being
related to Dr Moroka because my mother’s mother came from the family of the
Moroka, I frequented Thabanchu in the Orange Free State where Moroka stayed.
Moroka was also a member of the African National Congress in the 1950s. I used to
be sent errands by my uncle – errands of the ANC like secretly being sent to give
Nelson Mandela some letters. Mandela was then in hiding in the Orange Free State
as he was wanted by the Boers, but that particular errand saved Mandela from arrest
as the letter was warning him to move to another hiding.
Botswana related well with the liberation struggle movements. It urged all
liberation movements to bury their differences and fight a common goal. Liberation
movements vied for recognition from the government and differed from each other
in terms of strategy and recognition. Among members of the liberation struggle there
were spies or “double crossers”. There was one known member of the ANC who was
a double crosser, working for both the movement and the Boers, he was called
George Phahle. The Boers discovered that he was a double agent and wanted to
eliminate him. I tried to warn him not to be a double agent and to stop this cunning
act! But George would not listen. If he had listened, he would probably be alive.
I warned
1994
George that he was being tailed by a car, and sometimes by unknown people on foot.
I warned him once again, but he did not listen.
I also helped some comrades in the liberation struggle. There was a group that I
was supposed to deliver. I drove the group and delivered them at Rakhuna and they
crossed the border on their own and I went through Ramatlabama border only to
pick them up again on the other side. I left them at an undisclosed place to do what
they had come gone to do. I crossed the border into Botswana carrying weapons,
grenades and letters to be delivered. Mandela still has not forgotten me, every time
he has seen me, he has thanked me for delivering the letter that saved his life. I also
helped Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa, to locate his brother Jarma Mbeki
who was a lawyer in Selibe Phikwe, some 350 km north of Gaborone.
About the raid of June 1985; some people knew about it but did not want to
confront the situation because consequences would have been disastrous. It was safer
for the citizens to let the South Africans do what they wanted to do and get out rather
than be confronted by a small and unsophisticated army. It was better to sacrifice the
few who died, than have the entire nation wiped out.
Botswana was brave enough to host refugees, some of whom could easily have
been freedom fighters. But Botswana had a clear policy that its country could not be
used as a base to unseat other governments. The position of Botswana was clearly
understood and supported by organizations such as the United Nations, the
Commonwealth and the Organisation of African Unity.
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Sefako, Fumbani
[Pandamatenga; July 2007]
Fumbani Sefako was born on the 15th of March 1937 worked in the Colonial
Development Corporation as a maid for a few months; she got married and became a full
time farmer in Pandamatenga.
My name is Fumbani Sefako. I was born on the 15th of March 1937. I worked in
the Colonial Development Corporation as a maid. I only worked for a few months
and this is when CDC was moving out. I then became a full time farmer here in
Pandamatenga. I worked in CDC in 1954 as a maid. I was just a maid. I retired when
I got married to my late husband Rre Sefako and that was in 1955. I then
concentrated on subsistence farming.
In Pandamatenga during the liberation struggle I used to see guerrillas coming
from Zimbabwe. The white soldiers used to follow freedom fighters here. The
freedom fighters used to attack white soldiers in Zimbabwe and then cross over
to Pandamatenga. The White soldiers then followed them but they never entered
Pandamatenga. Freedom fighters used to move people (blacks) from the white-
owned farms in Rhodesia. Then they came with them all the way from Matetsi
to Pandamatenga.
The freedom fighters came with those Zimbabweans to the border and crossed
with them right here at the border with Botswana. The guerrillas wanted farming to
fail because whites relied on black labour. Normally they travelled at night and
white soldiers followed them up to the border. Some of those Zimbabweans
sometimes went back to the farms to work if the guerrillas just accompanied them
up to the border.
Here in Pandamatenga we were affected by the war because some of our people
died. One person was killed by the Boers and another one called Chibariso, was
killed by the white soldiers, because he was carrying a gun along the Zimbabwe
border and I think they mistook him to be a freedom fighter. This was when the war
was coming to an end, and those Whites came to remove freedom fighters from the
bush and sign some kind of peace treaty; they were moving along the border from
Kazungula to Pandamatenga.
The other people died at a certain place called Sebuya on the road to Kasane just
5 kilometres from Pandamatenga. We heard that there was a fight over a girlfriend
between a certain man called Jack and a freedom fighter. These freedom fighters
were using a particular tree at some cattle post as their base. People here still
believe the freedom fighters took Jack away and killed him. They were fighting over
a girlfriend.
I think we should leave this matter. You can ask his relatives bo Akanyang and Tiyane,
if you need to pursue it. This other one called Moruti also went missing but according
to rumours here, he was a guide to the freedom fighters. He was also their tracker and
the rumours we heard were that he went away with the freedom fighters some day
and never came back. His relatives suspect he was killed in the cross-fight
between
1994
whites and guerrillas because he was always with them, showing them the
directions and the safe places.
There was this old man called White. I don’t know his surname. He was once
tortured by the freedom fighters. It’s like he knew where the white soldiers were
hiding and they found out he knew. They wanted to find out where the white soldiers
were hiding and he was refusing to tell them. They lit a big fire and “ba bo ba
mobesa” (roasted him). Initially he was refusing to give them information but later
gave up, and told them where they were, by the border. I don’t know why he was
refusing to tell them. What we heard is that he was tortured. You can ask his
children, they are around.
When we came across freedom fighters we gave them food. They used to cross
the border to ask for food and we gave them. If we had not cooked anything we
cooked for them. Sometimes we had no choice but to take them to the police at the
border because some of them came with broken arms and some having bad injuries
in their heads. Those who had no injuries were helped with food and then they went
back to the bush. Those who were injured were taken to the police and the police
immediately took them to Kasane where there was a hospital. There were some
refugees who ran away from the wars in Zimbabwe during the liberation struggle.
Some were coming with children, traveling at night and in some cases they left
those who were not able to run in the bush. What was happening was that when
they arrived here in Pandamatenga they informed us about some of their relatives
who remained behind. Since freedom fighters used to move around the village
drinking beer and socializing we would then inform them about other black
Zimbabweans at certain places and the freedom fighters would then follow them,
get them and bring them here.
The police vehicles were used to transport them, and it was done in secrecy in
case the whites were around hiding; they were not supposed to see what was
happening. When refugees were going to the police station they moved in a group of
two or three with one person from the village directing them where the police
station was.
Freedom fighters never had time to stay and talk with refugees. They spent most of
their time fighting and the refugees were handed over to the police who transported
them to Kasane. We did not keep refugees here because the village is close to the
border. When they were just by the border, white soldiers used to come to the border
following these people. It was not safe to keep them here. I think the government
played a big role in moving these people from here because on their arrival we
immediately informed the police and they were secretly transported to Kasane and
then Francistown. We had no choice but to take some of our relatives and those we
knew to the police so that they were also moved from here to safer places. You
know I am surprised that now these same Zimbabweans are coming here stealing
things from us and not getting advice not even from the President of Botswana.
Even their President today is not listening to SADC. The Botswana government
helped them a great deal during the liberation war.
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It was not safe to allow these freedom fighters to stay in this country, because
freedom fighters were running from the white soldiers and attacking them from here.
They had camps around Pandamatenga. They had a camp at Sebuyu and at that place
where there are Wildlife Department offices. I feel it was not safe for them to stay
here because white soldiers were following them and liked torching the village at
night with search lights.
The only freedom fighters we reported were those who were injured so that they
could be transported to Kasane where there was a hospital. We failed to report others
because some of these freedom fighters had relatives here and we knew some of
their parents. Most of them had relatives especially among the Ndebeles, and they
used to visit fellow Ndebeles at that place called “Botebele”. There is one story I
nearly forgot to tell you. This is about a certain man who was bombed by the
whites. They laid a bomb along the border road. This man was working at a Safari
Company and he was in a car with the other white guys. I am not sure when this
was but it happened at “Kapaipi” along the Pandamatenga, Lesoma border. It
happened in the morning at around six o’clock. The White soldiers came and
troubled us here at night. They came with an aeroplane at night and I think they
were following guerrillas. During the middle of the night in the village they threw a
big search light and the whole village was ‘electrified’. This caused panic, people
ran away from the village. We went to a certain place called Base 1, and slept there.
One woman even gave birth to a baby boy and this boy was named Masole
(soldiers).
This was in 1977 and the BDF soldiers came to get us from the bush and told us
to go back to the village. They assured us that we were safe and when we went
back to the village we found that Botswana soldiers were now right on the
Botswana border road, guarding people’s movement. They advised us that it was
not safe to be at Base 1 in the bush because if the White soldiers found us there
they were going to think that we were refugees or freedom fighters, and would kill
us. The soldiers (Botswana Defence Force) stayed in the village for some days
guarding us.
Some refugees had relatives and some were known to village people here. Those
who had relatives were received by family members but they never stayed here for
a long time because it was close to the border where their enemies were camping.
They were immediately transported by the police to Kasane where they did not stay
long before again being transported to Francistown and Dukwi. I think there were
not enough facilities to keep refugees here. They were given tents to sleep in and
these were not enough to protect them from rain and cold. We reported many
refugees to keep them safe from white soldiers. Even our own relatives, we
informed the police and they were taken to safer places like Dukwi and
Francistown.
We did not report freedom fighters because they were soldiers fighting for freedom.
One other thing which made us not to report them was that they had previously
asked us not to inform anyone where they were hiding because some of their enemies
were black impipis (sell-outs). We also did not report or inform anyone where they
were because we feared them. We heard that in Zimbabwe they tortured those black
1994
Zimbabweans who betrayed them. This is why we did not inform the police or
Botswana soldiers where they were. They killed people in Zimbabwe, especially
those who were on the side of white soldiers.
Most of the freedom fighters were Ndebele and there were a few from my tribe
of the Nanzwa. There is one person who can tell you more about these people. She is
one of the women from here who fell in love with the commander of the freedom
fighters. This woman went to Zimbabwe with that soldier after the war. The man
who took him was called Mkhwanazi and the woman is called Monica.
They never troubled us; they respected us a lot. They only came to socialize
among our people. They used to drink traditional beer with our people. They
bought the beer in containers and went to the bush. They used to tell us that in the
evening they went back to work in Zimbabwe.
They were fit to be members of your society because they were our tribesman
and had relatives here. During the day when white soldiers came with their
aeroplanes harassing and throwing the search light the guerrillas really helped. One
day the search light which was thrown by white soldiers caused a veld fire and we
found guerrillas putting out the fire when our people were running away. The fire
was also going to destroy our traditional huts. I think they put out the fire because
they did not want to be seen by their enemies from a distance.
Thank you a lot.
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Sekgororoane
[Borolong]
Sekgororoane was a former government employee at Good Hope. He worked with a
refugee, who was killed by the South Africans, which was a traumatic experience for him.
He continued working with refugees as a way of helping them to live as normal a life as
possible.
Botswana as a country never struggled for independence. It was not like its neighbours
where people fought and ran away from their countries. We have a Setswana saying
that if your neighbour’s house is burning you should help in putting out the fire,
because the next house that burns might be yours “Matlo go sha mabapi”. That is the
spirit that Botswana adopted regarding the liberation struggle.
Botswana supported by doing what it culturally knows best “Ntwa kgolo ke ya
molomo”. It urged negotiations and discouraged war in countries like Zimbabwe
and South Africa. In the negotiation process, Botswana lost a number of people,
including soldiers because the other countries shunned negotiations and preferred
war. Our contribution was mostly in human terms. Batswana helped and
accommodated refugees. Batswana helped in the negotiations for the liberation of
the oppressed countries.
Batswana themselves did not initially support the liberation struggle. They did
not understand why the government supported the struggle. They wanted to be left
alone. It was the Botswana leadership which took people aboard and explained to
them why it was necessary to support the liberation struggle.
A lot of policies were affected. We had to get enough soldiers to the border with
Rhodesia. We had to have enough funds to man the border with South Africa. Some
of the developments that were supposed to take place were shelved because the
funds were diverted to the army. Funds had to be diverted to the negotiating teams.
Botswana’s relations with the international world were quite good. International
organizations and friendly countries understood Botswana’s position and supported
it. Zambia and Tanzania particularly sympathized with Botswana in its precarious
position with the hostile neighbours of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.
The relations were quite good and the government of Botswana worked well
with these liberation movements. Last year the President of Mozambique came
here to build a house for the family that accommodated the head of liberation
movement, Samora Machel, the government also accommodated Tambo Mbeki,
Mugabe, Nkomo and Nujoma. Botswana supported all these movements.
The army, the police, the intelligence were instrumental in monitoring guerrilla
activities and got the situation under control. Botswana encouraged unity and not
factionalism within the liberation movements. Botswana has purely good relations
with all the countries that were involved in the liberation struggle. They know what
Botswana did to get their liberation. Before then the relations with these countries
were sour, because the settler regimes were accusing Botswana of harboring
terrorists.
1994
But Botswana has never stopped assisting people who are oppressed and that has
put Botswana’s reputation in good standing. Botswana also helped refugees as
people who needed help. It gave them accommodation and food.
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Sekhambo, Mma
[Lesoma]
Mma Sekhambo was born at Pandamatenga in 1928 and has been a subsistence farmer
since she was a young lady. She got married in Lesoma and has lived there with her
husband who passed away, and children since then.
I am called Mma Sekhambo but I have a name which I was given by my parents.
Sekhambo is my first born child. I was born at Pandamatenga in 1928. I am not
sure about this year because my parents were not educated. I never went to school
and have been a subsistence farmer ever since I was a young lady. My parents were
subsistence farmers at Pandamatenga and that is where I grew up. I got married here
in Lesoma and had children with my husband who passed away around 1985.
During the liberation struggle the people of Lesoma did not understand what the
government was doing. We saw things happening in secret. People were not allowed
to keep refugees and freedom fighters in their homes. The police and soldiers used
to come to Lesoma asking people whether they had seen freedom fighters and
when they found them at beer parties they ordered them to go away. Freedom
fighters liked coming into the village to socialize but the Botswana Defence Force
(BDF) never wanted them to be in the village, they chased them out. Whenever the
police found freedom fighters they would take them to Kasane; sometimes they
even arrested them and took them to Dukwi. The government was supporting
guerrillas but they never wanted us to be part of the struggle. They were saying we
would be killed by the Smith regime forces if we hid refugees and freedom fighters.
This is why I am saying I cannot give my name to someone coming from
Gaborone. I am not sure what is going to happen to this information if it reaches the
government. Maybe they want to send us out of the country to Zimbabwe where our
relatives are. The government had secrets regarding the liberation struggle in
Zimbabwe.
We helped freedom fighters a lot because they never had time to relax. These
guys were busy in Zimbabwe fighting the white soldiers. They moved around the
village particularly in the evening around seven asking for food from people. They
came to us in the village at night to ask for food. We sometimes cooked food for
them or gave them maize meal and raw meat for relish to go and cook elsewhere
and they would happily go away. The other place where we met most freedom
fighters was at the
fields (masimo). This is where they preferred coming to meet villagers because there
were no police officers or BDF bothering us about their whereabouts in the bush.
We spent hours with them in the afternoon, and in the evening they crossed into the
then Rhodesia to fight white soldiers. We used to cook fresh maize corn for them. We
had a good relationship with these freedom fighters because they sometimes gave us
game meat when they had killed an animal in the bush. Sometimes they came to our
fields and picked fresh maize corn, but we never reported them to the police. They
even slept in the fields guarding our crops from animals which destroyed them.
1994
I have been here for a long time. When the Zimbabwe war started I was married
and still energetic. You should know that freedom fighters had relatives here in
Lesoma and they used to visit them. I can’t mention their names because when the
sixteen (16) soldiers were killed there were people who accused the Ndebele people
here for allowing freedom fighters to visit them. This nearly divided people into
factions and this is why I said I cannot give you my full name. The police went to
the extent of saying Kgosi Jameson should not have reported the guerrillas, yet they
were repeatedly saying we should report guerrillas and refugees when we saw
them. Freedom fighters used to visit some of the people they knew here in Lesoma,
but never stayed with them for a long time. They came during the day and went
back to the bush after visiting their relatives.
I am from the Nanzwa tribe and never met freedom fighters from my tribe. The
only time I met a freedom fighter from my tribe was at the masimo. I heard him
saying something in Nanzwa language and when I asked him if he was from the
Nanzwa tribe, he said that he was. He then introduced himself and I knew his parents.
Some people in Lesoma had relatives among freedom fighters and they helped them.
However, some of us helped freedom fighters because they were fellow blacks and
we were only divided by the border. Another time freedom fighters came into the
Lesoma village and camped near our yard; my husband was still alive by then.
They came in large numbers but the police and BDF never saw them because during
those days it was bushy and the guerrillas hid in the dense bush. The guerrillas used
to leave the camp in the evening or at night and whenever they were about to leave
they informed us that they were going to leave for Rhodesia, but two guerrillas
were left to guard their belongings. They normally arrived in Lesoma in the middle
of the night or early in the morning looking very tired. One day, one of them came
with an injury on the arm. When I asked them what happened, the others told me he
was hit by a bullet shot by the white soldiers. We treated his wound and he was
fine. These freedom fighters were many and had no containers for fetching water. We
had drums of water at our place, and whenever they arrived from a battle in the
middle of the night, they woke me and my husband up to give them water. They
could finish two drums of water; and one good thing about them is that they thanked
us a lot. During the day they dressed in ordinary clothes and came to our place and
we talked about what was happening in Rhodesia. They hardly gave us any details
regarding where they attacked the Smith soldiers or how many they had killed.
When visiting us in the village in the evenings, they never left their weapons at
their secret camp. They brought their weapons with them in case of any attack from
the Smith soldiers. My husband used to talk to them a lot because he used to visit
them at their secret camp. He used to spend long hours with them, but he never told
me what they were talked about. Freedom fighters stayed at that camp for a long
time, and towards the end of the war they came to thank us for our cooperation.
I can’t remember when freedom fighters had a secret camp here. I am now too old to
remember. The years and some things which happened have been forgotten by most
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people, but the young people around here never witnessed the events; most people
who were there have now passed away. Men are the ones who talked to
freedom fighters a lot, and most of them are no longer with us. You should have
carried out your research immediately after the war when we had fresh memory of
these events. Freedom fighters never troubled us; therefore there was no need to
report them to the officials. The only thing which brought fear to us was that the
Smith soldiers knew that freedom fighters were in Botswana and they liked
patrolling along the border and sometimes coming into our country in airplanes. We
were always worried that one day they would attack us like they did with the
sixteen (16) soldiers. We had good relationship with the freedom fighters, so they
never troubled us. How do you report someone you know well to the police
when he has not troubled you? Some of them had relatives in Lesoma, and
reporting them would mean police taking them to Kasane, that would be like a
betrayal to your own relatives. We also did not report freedom fighters who had no
relatives here because initially they begged us not to tell anyone where they were.
They warned us that some of their people from Rhodesia were enemies employed
by the white soldiers as informers. The other thing which made us not to inform the
police about their presence in our villages was the things we heard from people
who were coming from Rhodesia. They told us that those who betrayed freedom
fighters were tortured. We were afraid they could have caused us trouble.
We were always in fear of being attacked. We used to hear guns inside Rhodesia
along the border. We thought one day they would cross into Botswana fighting. The
only incident which shocked us here was the day when the sixteen (16) soldiers
were killed. What happened was that the guerrillas crossed into Botswana in the
morning at around nine. This was after we heard gun shots inside Rhodesia. The
headman of Lesoma then sent his two children to go and inform the BDF at
Kazungula. When the soldiers reached Lesoma, they were killed, and up to now
there is confusion because we don’t know who killed them. Some people say it was
the white soldiers, others say it was the guerrillas. When the BDF vehicles were
bombed the earth was shook. We ran from here to the bush and spent the night
there. The BDF searched for us and found us in the bush. They asked us to return to
the village and we did so. It was bad that day because the whole village was covered
with smoke. One boy who was sent to call the soldiers died there and another one
called Gure survived. I can’t remember the name of the young boy who was killed;
he was still young. His mother is still alive and she is called Maria. You can go and
ask her. Unfortunately Gure passed away a month ago from illness.
There were no refugees who came to Lesoma. The white soldiers were patrolling
the border. If the refugees crossed and came here, then they immediately went to
other places. Any movement was monitored. One day, the white soldiers found me at
the border with a small boy from one of the Ndebele families here, looking after
cattle, and they told us to move away from the border. They wanted to beat the
Ndebele boy. They were speaking Afrikaans and we did not understand, but later to
realized that they never wanted us at the border. Lesoma was a small village. If
there were any refugees who came here, maybe they were accommodated by other
people secretly; you can ask other people in the village.
Thank you mma.
1994
Sekwababe, Calvin Thunamo

Calvin Thunamo Sekwababe is a politician and a farmer, who was one time the head of
Criminal Investigation Department. He talks about what he experienced as a member of
the police force in Botswana, particularly in the border areas, during the liberation
struggle; He explains about the raids and bombings by Rhodesian and South African
forces, of the villages and what role was played by the Botswana Police.
Our task, as police, was to safeguard our people along the borders. The Selous
Scouts of the Rhodesian police were particularly harsh on our people, suspecting
that they sympathised and aided the freedom fighters. I recall an incident in the
Francistown area near Moroka. The Selous Scouts entered a village pretending to
be Nkomo’s guerrillas and asked for food, and then left some of their weapons with
the old man of the village. Later another group of the scouts came to demand those
weapons, and they abducted the old man and took him to Rhodesia for
interrogation.
Another incident was when the Rhodesians attacked a truck driven by Batswana,
whom they abducted and imprisoned in Bindura. Then the Rhodesians alleged that
Botswana had established training bases for freedom fighters along the border. I went
to investigate and there were no such bases. This proved that the allegations were
baseless. The abductees were held for 4 to 5 months being interrogated. Sometimes
they slept in a room full of corpses to frighten them so that they might reveal that
there were training camps in Botswana, but this did not work.
From South Africa bombings were frequent and spies were rife. At one point
they kidnapped an innocent person who I had to go and free in Pretoria. We also
cooperated with the South African police to fight crime. But we always knew that
among the police who worked with us, they planted spies who disappeared when
they realised their cover was blown. We used to interrogate them, and we could see
that they were soldiers, not police. It seems there was an element of truth about the
suspicion by people in border areas that white farmers in Tuli Block worked with
Rhodesians and South Africans. The farmers used to wear military uniform, an
indication of such cooperation. We believe that, yes, they passed on information
about freedom fighters to the minority governments.
The law prohibited armed guerrillas and so we arrested them. After completing
their sentences, they were not sent to South Africa or Rhodesia where they could
face trouble; some stayed here or chose to go north.
There were spies amongst the refugees; sometimes there were fights among
refugees because of allegations of spying. I recall in Lobatse some refugees burnt a
spy with hot iron. In another incident they murdered a spy and burnt the body along
the Lobatse road.
Botswana assisted these countries to gain independence and we work better with
independent neighbours as opposed to former racist regimes.
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Sekwababe, Kepaletswe
Kepaletswe Sekwababe is a businessman who transported refugees within Botswana, while
working for the Red Cross and the United Nations Council for Refugees.
I was a driver and used to transport refugees from such places as Gobojango,
Mothabaneng, Talana farms. We were working for the Red Cross and UN Council for
Refugees. We took them to Bobonong, from where they were transported to Selebi-
Phikwe and then to Dukwi Refugee Camp. Some passed on to Zambia to fight for
freedom. Many lived at Dukwi camp until the independence of Zimbabwe and then
they went back to their country.
We were not the only ones who transported refugees. Some villagers with transport
also assisted to bring the refugees from remote villages to Bobonong. The villagers
were transporting refugees even before we started doing so. They also fed them and
gave them shelter.
The guerrillas recruited people for the war effort, such as students who often left
their homes without bidding farewell to their parents and joined the freedom fighters
voluntarily. I recall Manama Mission students who came to Botswana en mass, and
they were assisted to go onto Zambia. These were the forms of assistance Batswana
gave to refugees.
Whenever we found freedom fighters on the way as we transported refugees, we
gave them a lift to Gobojango, from where they went wherever they were going. I
knew some of them personally such as Modubane, Brain and others. They operated
from Gobojango and Mabolwe and we often gave them transport when it was
necessary. They used to carry their weapons, which were brought from Zambia. I
knew Nkomo’s guerrillas in particular, as they were the ones who used to enter
through Gobojango.
At times, among the people I transported, there were Smith’s spies who were
discovered and arrested at Selebi-Phikwe.
Some of the early refugees from Staudze area came with their property, like
donkeys, building material and settled at Talana farms. They were fleeing from
ZANLA forces that were harassing them for supporting Nkomo. Batswana
welcomed them warmly. I later transported them to Dukwi. So in the earlier days
refugee communities were established in Bobirwa villages before they were taken
to Dukwi. At Dukwi they had arable land and they grew crops which they sold in
Francistown. After the war many decided to live in Botswana. Some joined relatives
and did not return to Zimbabwe.
Batswana assisted the refugees largely because these people were our relatives
on the Zimbabwe side. We felt strongly that they deserved to be free. But we did
not discriminate against the others who also fled to Botswana. They too were
assisted. The ethnic ties were so strong that we sometimes tried to stop our relatives
from proceeding to Zambia to become freedom fighters. But they were so
committed to the struggle that they went to join the freedom fighters.
1994
Serote, Thibedi
Thibedi Serote left South Africa immediately after the pro-FRELIMO rally, in 1973,
which was organised by the Black Peoples Convention, BPC, which was affiliated to
SASO. He was helped by his uncle, Bishop Nkwane, who is now late, who drove him all
the way to Suping Stadt in South Africa.
Botswana accepted refugees from South Africa and other countries because of its
humanity “botho”. Despite the fact that South Africa was prone to attacking countries
such as Botswana, the latter continued to accept refugees nonetheless. It felt
obliged to do so because even international law allowed it to do so. Botswana
therefore took a deliberate stand that despite attacks from South Africa, it would
continue to host refugees until there was freedom in that country.
I was a member of the African National Congress, and I know that refugees of
the ANC were well received by the government of Botswana. The Botswana
government helped even those who wanted to go to other countries, whether for
further studies or other purposes such as military training.
ANC had two kinds of freedom fighters, those who came from South Africa to
go abroad, presumably for military training and those who came from abroad into
South Africa, presumably infiltrating guerrillas. The structures of the ANC were
such that they were underground to the extent that even the government of
Botswana did not know about them. The MEDU Ensemble was such an
organisation. It was on the surface an Art and cultural organisation, but underground
it was military strategist. It was founded by Tim Williams, and someone who is
presently Acting Commissioner of Police in South Africa and Dr Wally Serote.
These were the co-founders of this organisation. This organisation functioned as
such, but within it there were members who belonged to its underground structures.
I left South Africa immediately after the pro-FRELIMO rally, which was
organised by the Black Peoples Convention, BPC, which was affiliated to SASO.
That was in September 1973. For me to come over I was helped by my uncle,
Bishop Nkwane who is now late. He drove me all the way from Johannesburg up to
Suping Stadt in South Africa. He dropped me at around 3.30 am. I jumped the fence
at Tlokweng after walking for about two hours from Suping Stadt. I did not know
exactly where I was, but my only bearing was the Onion Tower at the station. By
then it was very visible because all these building that are there now had not yet
been built. I was told about this Onion Tower before I left Johannesburg. In fact the
road that I took was used frequently. I jumped the fence at about 6 am and arrived in
Gaborone at 4 pm. I walked through Tlokweng. Abram Tiro was already here; there
were other comrades that were here, like Bo Zikalala.
I started asking around and I ended up in the main mall of Gaborone. People did
not seem to know these comrades. Then I met this Zimbabwean chap who also
happened to be a refugee. I asked him about the comrades but he didn’t know them
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either. Eventually he suggested that I go to the Central Police Station, which was
not very far from the mall. I went and reported myself there and I spent about three
days at the Central Police Station trying to locate these people. Meanwhile I was
being processed by the police to legitimize my refugee status. From there they
referred me to Botswana Christian Council. At the BCC there was a lady we called
Mma Rogers, she was an American lady. I went through all this screening process,
and then from there, there was a refugee camp where Tsholofelo Hall is. The
building looked like an old farm house which was renovated to become a refugee
camp. I stayed there for about seven days. By then I managed to locate them. They
came to pick me up. I went and registered with the ANC.
I ended up staying with my other comrades that I knew from Johannesburg instead
of staying in Bontleng. There was a house in Ext 10, next to Mr Balopi’s residence.
It was popularly known as Phela Ndaba. It became so popular that whenever we
had problems we gathered there to sort them out. In 1975 I left Botswana and went
to Libya for military training. From Libya I went to Baghdad, I spent 11 months in
Libya and 3 months in Bagdad and then came back. When I left for military training,
I went under the pretext that I was going to school. I then stayed in Botswana being
involved in ANC underground structures. When I left home, I was straight from a
technical school, where I did motor body building. So when I came back from
abroad I joined Wilco, the Panel Beating Company which had a good reputation.
That gave me a good cover. That was in 1976 the year of the Soweto Uprising.
Towards the end of 1976 I went up to Angola for further military training. In Angola
I was taught how to infiltrate arms into South Africa. Because of knowledge and
training in motor body works, I was able to conceal weapons in cars.
I would take a car, do whatever I had to do on it and somebody would come and
collect it. I concealed weapons in cars. I worked on buses as well. We left the
normal floor of the bus, and we put another floor for the weapons. We elevated
seats, so that we could have the whole compartment for the weapons. ZCC people
used to hire those buses to go for their pilgrimages in Moria, South Africa and
normally they were there for three to four days. When they arrived there, the buses
would be taken for ‘service’ by our contacts there and they would strip them and
remove the consignment, before putting the seats back. All this was done without
the knowledge of either the driver of the bus or the passengers.
I also went across into South Africa several times. I was involved in the Slurry
operation. That was the first time the ANC got into the country using 17 land cruisers.
That was in 1987. There was a South African army camp on the way to Vryburg;
they have turned this army camp into a school. The 17 land cruisers were not
detected because we had cut the fence and crossed at ungazetted points. Some of
the land cruisers went through the normal immigration processes. That operation
was very successful. When we were retreating we lost about three land cruisers. No
one within that unit was injured or captured. Three or four days later, the Boers
retaliated by attacking certain houses in Gaborone. One of the houses belonged
to Maloiso in
1994
Mogoditshane. This was not the first time that I had crossed, in fact I had crossed
many times on reconnaissance missions. I did that for operation Vula Vala. I was
involved with comrades in our units. Some of the comrades were local Batswana
and some of them were former Botswana Defence Force officers. We recruited
them because some of them had relatives in South Africa. We used to give
intelligence reports even to those who were still in the army, the MI, and they
would act on the information that we gave them, or vice versa.
Regarding the South African Raid of June 1985. We got information from
sources within the South African Security that a raid was imminent. Even the
Russians, from the Russian Embassy warned us, that there was a lot of movement
from the South African side of the border. A red alert was issued to the comrades
that something was going to happen, but we didn’t know when. Everything was
normal where we stayed; between 9 or 10 and 11 pm people switched off the lights
and moved out of their houses. Some of the comrades spent time at the bars or at
some parties and came back the following morning. The reason why Thami Mnyele
was killed was that he was from a meeting of the MEDU ENSEMBLE which went
on until late at night. When the meeting was over it was very late and he was
simply tired so he went to sleep, and therefore did not move out of his house as
directed. However most of the ANC cadres who were underground survived the
raid.
I survived all this because I had a cover of the workshop. I had started my own
workshop as early as 1982, so I had a legitimate cover, but towards the end of the
1980s the cover was blown. A certain Boer by the name of Coetzee came and
pretended to have the lights of his car fixed. It was immediately after a comrade was
blown up in a car one morning near Northside Primary School. This chap was
driving a motorbike, but that day the comrade had a mission and brought the
motorbike to my workshop. He then took a Skyline from the workshop to use in his
mission. It was this Skyline that was blown up with this comrade inside. This
Coetzee came and pretended he was looking for lights of a Skyline as he was
driving a white Skyline. He then shifted his attention to the motorbike and started
asking questions about the motorbike. I told him that the motorbike belonged to
Mpho Masire because the latter had a lot of junk at his workshop in Tlokweng. He
said are you sure? And he was asking in Afrikaans but I replied that I didn’t
understand Afrikaans.
Within the ANC there were people planted by SADF. The comrade who was
blown had been from a reconnaissance mission and was using a land cruiser, but
when they came back they hit a donkey. They brought the land cruiser for fixing as
it was part and parcel of the Slurry operation. We worked on the cruiser the whole
weekend.
While working on the cruiser, I came across a list of a requisition of arms that
were going to be used for Slurry operation. There was this comrade who was a
senior commander locally and there was always something cloudy about him. It
turned out the list was deliberately left in the land cruiser for the Boers to see it. I
gave the list to the comrade, but what was surprising was that when I gave it to him
he was a bit surprised. The operation Slurry was carried out on Tuesday but early
Wednesday
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morning BBC interviewed Pik Botha about Slurry. I was surprised when Pik Botha
mentioned the list and the type of arms and mortars. They had all the information, and
within us we knew that someone was a double agent and the situation became very
tense. Slurry was the biggest successful ANC operation after SASOL and
Vortrekker. The operation was carried out by 27 people using three land cruisers.
After these successful operations, we used to give ourselves time to go and “chill
out” relax and have fun. Most of the time we used to go to the villages, and there
was a popular spot in Metsimotlhabe that we used to go to. We hung around a
certain ‘letlapa’ by the Metsimotlhabe River.
1994
Sethoko, Lethogile Modumo

Lethogile Modumo Sethoko, 70 years old, started schooling at Tawana Primary School
which is now Moremi Memorial School in Maun. He did his Junior and Senior
Secondary at Moeng College. He then came back and started working in Maun in 1959,
at the District Administration for four months and then in a company called Ngamiland
Trading Company until 1978, when he left the job. All this time he was working he was also
involved in Botswana politics, as he joined Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP) in 1962
and when it split he followed Mr Mpho Motsamai to form Bechuanaland Independent
Party (BIP).
I am Lethogile Modumo Sethoko, and I am 70 years old. I started schooling at

Tawana Primary School which is now Moremi Memorial School in Maun. I did my
Junior and Senior Secondary at Moeng College. I came back and started working
here at District Administration for four months, before joining a company called
Ngamiland Trading Company in Maun, in 1959. I worked at the Ngamiland Trading
Company until 1978, when I left the job; but all this time I was working at the
same time that I was involved in Botswana politics. I joined Bechuanaland Peoples
Party (BPP) in 1962 and when it split I followed Mr Mpho Motsamai to form
Bechuanaland Independent Party (BIP). In this party I have been holding certain
positions, like that of a Branch Secretary, in charge of Youth Affairs and then went
on to be the Secretary General position of the party. But before that I was a Foreign
Affairs Secretary and ended up as a Deputy Secretary until Rre Tlhomelang’s party
Freedom Party joined BIP to form Independent Freedom Party. At that time I was
still a member of the BIP party holding certain positions. From IFP we then formed
Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) and I continued as a member holding certain
positions. In BAM I became the Foreign Affairs Secretary and now I am a National
Chairman.
When I first got involved in the Botswana politics, we wanted to strengthen our
own political party in the country, but not forgetting our fellow brothers who were
oppressed in Namibia, South Africa and Rhodesia. So we helped them to go to
countries north of Botswana where they were heading to as freedom fighters. We
helped a few refugees including Mr Sam Nujoma. He stayed here for some days.
We gave him a hiding place here in Maun.
In the 1970s Botswana was newly independent surrounded by white ruled regimes,
but we, as independent citizens of the Southern African region had an obligation,
that our neighbours should be independent. Of course we were putting ourselves
under risk of possible attack, knowing what could happen to Botswana. I’m happy
to say we took a risk as an independent country and not as the colonial government.
We started assisting freedom fighters while still under British rule in the 1960s.
BPP activists started assisting freedom fighters when our offices were in Palapye.
Mr Mpho was the one who was responsible for them. Botswana was a transit route
for such people like Thabo Mbeki, the current President of the Republic of South
Africa,
1994
as well as other political activists from his country. Before independence some of
the freedom fighters were caught by the authorities when using the then colonial
Botswana as an exit point. We secretly let their relatives know their whereabouts.
We talked to chiefs and district officers. Chiefs did not have powers, they were
under Queen Elizabeth.
Most of the freedom fighters and refugees we assisted in Ngamiland were from
Namibia and a few from South Africa. I remember we hid someone from African
National Congress (ANC). Although it was raining we had to hide him in a kraal with
goats. So we kept him with those goats. At 2 am some of our colleagues came to
my house suggesting I show them where we had hidden this freedom fighter as they
were planning to take him to Kazungula, unfortunately when they reached
Kazungula their car failed to stop and it sunk in the Chobe River and they all
drowned. Well, I wasn’t sure who was driving this guy to Kazungula since it was
early in the morning and I did not go to where the car was parked. They had sent
one person to come and call me from my house so that I could show them where
this person was hiding. I don’t remember the name of the gentleman from ANC that
I helped, but I think he was Debaranke and this was in 1964.
The problem was that ba ga Mma Mosadinyana colonial officials did not want these
people to use Botswana as a transit route. Even after independence we had a policy
that freedom fighters were not supposed to launch their attacks from Botswana.
During that time it was better, because the government got involved a little bit, that is
why refugees and freedom fighters were kept at Francistown and Gaborone. Military
attacks which were made by the South Africans showed that they suspected that we
were working hand in hand with refugees or freedom fighters. The government of
Botswana managed to control these freedom fighters and ensured that they were not
launching attacks against their enemy from Botswana because they were easily
seen when they arrived here or when some of them were on transit to other
countries. So I would say the government here was vigilant.
There was a small group of people taking care of the refugees and freedom
fighters. These refugees passed here secretly. The Ngamiland committee
responsible for their welfare was not of a large group. It was comprised by Mr
Mmutla, I, Mr Motsamai and a few others. We were responsible for helping the
refugees. If the group was larger, there was a possibility for infiltration and it would
be easy for the Boers to know when freedom fighters were coming into our country
and they could easily send military troops or detective soldiers to come and bomb
here. Such a committee was made out of, I think, ten and some members from the
central committee of BPP and BIP.
Freedom fighters and refugees passed here quietly, they were not disturbing or
stealing people’s properties. They knew their mission, and people here knew they
were refugees. Naturally some people are likely to say they were not good people,
but a lot of them were minding their own business. Of course they may have been
some bad elements. People did not openly complain in public about their presence
in the village.
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I cannot say the relations between Botswana and other countries were not affected,
but the cooperation was there. Refugees from Botswana went through liberated
countries like Zambia when going to Tanzania. There was good relationship among
the black people. Most of the refugees who went through Botswana were from
SWAPO and a few came from ANC and PAC in South Africa. There were a few
refugees from ZANU passing through here. There was good relationship between
all of us black people in the region. In Zimbabwe ZAPU and ZANU were the main
liberation movements at that time, and they had a good relationship and cooperation
with people in Botswana. The freedom fighters cooperated very well with us
because they needed our help.
There were a few women who were very active in the committee; for example,
Mr Motsamai’s wife. She was a member of the BIP party and played a big role in
helping refugees. There were others who also assisted, but they have passed away.
Women at that time did not venture into politics much. Women like Mrs Wright and
Mrs Mauchaza are new in politics
There were no churches in Ngamiland which played a role in helping freedom
fighters; even through the party there was no church which did that. These old
churches were from Britain and they were afraid to help.
These liberation movements were given money by the OAU and the UN. They
sympathized with the liberation movements and they funded them in order to help
the refugees and freedom fighters. They also had representatives in the country.
Freedom fighters had offices in Botswana, but you see, it was a struggle for the
liberation movements to run an office here where the ‘Boers’ were keen to know
how politicians here were working together with freedom fighters. So they didn’t
have an open area where anybody anytime could come and get help because it would
have been easy to be infiltrated. I know of a secret area where freedom fighters
operated from in Botswana; they held meetings with their fellow countrymen. They
were political asylum seekers. If they were to operate openly here it would have
been dangerous because the government would have exposed itself to attacks by the
Boers regime. It was risky because both the Rhodesians and the South Africans
wanted to see how freedom fighters were operating outside their home countries;
they always suspected that freedom fighters wanted to bomb them. The ‘Boers’
were always a nuisance to Botswana.
There were no any cross-border incidents here like that of Lesoma because
Lesoma is close or next to the Rhodesian camp. Therefore, here Namibians were
operating from far. We had patrols by the soldiers along the border. Even the Boers
from Namibia also patrolled their own border. We say there were rare incidents
because of the distance from the border and the nature of the terrain; for example,
the road that links Maun with Shakawe was terrible, it might have been a problem
to them.
The soldiers from the Boers regime came into these villages, but not in uniform.
Indeed, they were a threat to villagers close to the border, but the difficult part was
that at Mohembo, our San people (Basarwa) joined the Namibian force. Therefore,
1994
in some cases it became easy for the Boers to get information through the Basarwa
here who had relatives across the border. Some of us were able to find out that
some of the San from Botswana became soldiers in colonial Namibia. We were told
by their tribesman that these people were Namibian soldiers. We also gathered
information about what they were doing in Namibia, their routes in and out of
Botswana and what days the South African force would be patrolling along the
border, we managed to get such information. We knew it was dangerous and if we
were going to be seen to be against our fellow Basarwa, it was going to be worse.
Those in Namibia had relatives in Botswana; on this side of the border. Some of
them are still crossing the border today, when visiting their relatives. Even those
who were soldiers there are now back and some of them are employees of the
Botswana Defence Force. They are today good trekkers because they were used by
the Boers as trekkers following or trekking freedom fighters into Botswana. They are
still working with BDF as trekkers for poachers, but I do not have their names.
I remember some of the leaders like Daniel Munamava who persuaded his
fellow countrymen to register for elections here at independence and we managed
to assist in registering them. Even now some of them are still here as citizens
although some of them left; but this was after their independence.
Many of the people I talked about have passed away. But regarding Mr Sam
Nujoma’s stay in Maun you can talk to Mr Mmutla.
Personally I think Botswana learnt a lot from the ‘small’ good relationship with
other countries, and especially liberation movements from countries in the region.
Over time we built good relationship and cooperation even after independence. We
need not to have to go to Namibia so that they can help us, they already know that
Botswana is one of the African countries which helped them. This has created and
opened ways of good relations and cooperation.
SADC has provided cooperation and has made it easier for African countries to
work at regional level. They should continue the cooperation.
Well, from the beginning it looked as if we were putting ourselves at risk by
supporting the liberation struggle, but we had the right vision of where we were
going and what was going to happen. The vision was the independence of these other
countries. This is why even after their independence we still have good relationship
with these countries because of the earlier cooperation. That is why African countries
struggled for the formation of SADC. That is why the likes of Mr Nkrumah stood
aside to help the struggle together with Mr Kaunda. The Zambian economy fell
because of his government fully getting involved in helping liberation struggle.
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Setshwaelo, Ntombi
Mrs Ntombi Setshwaelo is one of the people who assisted people who came to Botswana
as refugees or freedom fighters during the liberation struggle.
I am one of the people who assisted refugees and freedom fighters during the
liberation struggle. First there was, you might term the regular coming in of South
African refugees, the first lot were more like older people, and then later on, after
1976 during the June 16 riots, a lot of young people came. They were in their 20s
and early 30s and so on, across the spectrum.
Well there were some that we lived with as a family, but there were also others
who had other accommodation, some were provided by the institutions like UNHCR
and the Botswana Council of Refugees and so on; at some stage other people
assisted materially and interacted with them. We assisted them materially, morally
and emotionally. I accommodated about six people at any one time.
As I was staying with these people they did mention what was happening in their
own country and how they were being treated. The fact that I’m originally from there
also, this was very topical, what was going on. We spoke about it a lot, it was in our
minds. Basically I knew their parties, but it was not about parties but about people
coming in and also knowing that these people needed my assistance.
They talk about many things, and it was a matter of trust; the people trusted me
well enough, like I said we did choose which people should come here but they
wouldn’t talk about that. We had our own debates here and talked about geology,
about approach and everything we needed to discuss.
Well for one thing Gaborone was very small, even people who were sort of
outsiders so to speak were very visible and there was sort of negligence but there
are lots of people here who were originally South African. So for almost like each
case, we met people like that socially, at other people’s homes, at the mall, in church,
so we talked and developed some kind of rapport and relationships; and thirdly by
virtue of the fact that expression of languages, culture and a question of history,
some of them were people that we had gone to school with. Others came and were
introduced like people and some I searched for them and found them, the young ones
brought others in to the house. I did not get any government assistance for what I
was doing.
Well, I am not aware of any refugee policy change. Besides, that situation has
changed drastically, because at that point, remember, it wasn’t only just South African
refugees. There were a whole lot of other people from Angola, Namibia, and
Rhodesia. Whatever policy prevailed, was, I think, on the basis of what was going
on then; but right now I do not know if there has been any policy change.
The refugees were treated well, but there was the question of girlfriends from the
young ones, they complained about stipend but other than that Batswana treated
them well.
1994
Certainly there were no any elements of xenophobia at the time; it was a
different time all together. There was not so much unemployment, and remember a
lot of Batswana historically had worked in South Africa. So there was a lot of
compassion for refugees, and some of them even became part of families, and some
of them even stayed on after their independence in 1994. Batswana were very
friendly and good at accepting people from other places. Even I who was an
outsider, married to a Motswana, never experienced any negative reception from
Batswana.
I think the biggest assistance from the Botswana government was creating an
environment that was friendly, that was comfortable for the refugees, you know there
wasn’t any harassment. There was a government house which accommodated these
people and it was comfortable. Educational training was open to refugees; schools
were open to everyone and to refugees. Some were even at a secondary school
level, remember this was about high school students; the June 16 story was about
high school students and even primary level and some at a tertiary level. They did not
have to pay fees for their education that is why I said the government was of
assistance.
There was an office here of the UNHCR which assisted with the refugees. The
Botswana Council of Refugees existed at the time, and that is where refugees found
assistance. It was very active at the time
I still have contacts with the people I accommodated; even those I didn’t
accommodate. I even see some of them when I am in South Africa; some of them
are officials in their government
The relationships between South African refugees belonging to different
political organizations were normal. We used to host some informal meetings, and
they differed on ideological grounds, and used to engage one another on their
differing perspectives. Although they had different opinions on political grounds,
they always viewed themselves as South Africans, united by their common
predicament, and for this reason they always remained civil towards one another
and never fought over that.
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Sisingi, Adriano
Adriano Sisingi is 60 years old and a former refugee from Angola who has been living in
Botswana since his arrival in 1979. He tells about his experiences as a refugee in
Botswana.
I left Angola and arrived in Botswana, Maun in 1979. Batswana and their president
welcomed us with warm hands. They understood our situation. In 1980 I arrived in
the camp during the time which some Zimbabwean refugees were going back
home. As they repatriated, we occupied the houses they left because most of
arriving Angolan refugees lived in tents provided by the Red Cross in collaboration
with other organizations such as the LWF.
With the involvement of the Red Cross, LWF, BCR, UNICEF and other
organizations our settlement in the camp was made easier. We were not struggling or
suffering like refugees in other countries.
The BCR ensured that we had food supplies and clothes. Apart from that we lived
through money made through selling vegetables and the food we actually produced
in our gardens. Personally I am a builder, but when I won tenders outside the camp a
lot of paper work had to be done before I left the camp. My employer had to arrange
for a work permit with the labour department and the authority within the camp had
to approve before I left the camp.
We sold our services in and outside the camp. Selling outside the camp needed
validation from the Settlement Commandant. Transport was provided for by the
UNICEF.
Reception was good. When we sold our vegetables there were no cases of
xenophobia or hatred. People appreciated what we were doing and we shared our
skills with them. I even married a Motswana woman in 1983 and since then we
have been living in peace.
My children are all working and one is a Doctor in Princess Marina hospital.
This is evidence that refugee children were allowed access to school and that they
were good performers at school. All my children were born in Botswana of course.
Distance education was also recently introduced for adults who never went to school.
We even learnt Setswana from our children, and I also learnt Ikalanga language from
the interaction with Batswana.
Life was hard at the camp due to lack of freedom. People could not fully utilize
their skills by just staying at the camp. Opportunities could not just bring themselves
to an individual in the camp. We were over protected.
Of course war had negative implications on most of us. We lost our jobs running
to save our lives, we lost our homes, and we lost relatives and our means of
surviving such as livestock and other valuables.
At one point we were granted citizenship after we declined to repatriate. The
Botswana government built us two roomed houses and we relocated to Newstands,
Botshabelo ward. Immigration officers came and also processed our Omang cards.
1994
Since then all former Angolan refugees have been cut from monthly rations. Most
former refugees are poor because they are now too old to work. A few that keeps
livestock do not own boreholes, and in order to water their livestock they have to pay
people who are already established.
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Slash, Siana Mothusi

[Dukwi; June 2008]
Siana Mothusi Slash is twenty seven years old. He tells of his experiences as a Batswana
child among the refugee children in Dukwi.
When I arrived in Dukwi Refugee Camp in 1990, I was doing Standard 3. Our class
was largely populated by Zimbabweans, Angolans and a few South Africans and
Zambians. Batswana children were very few; even in the whole school because for
a Motswana child to live in the Camp, mostly they had to be a relative of a police
officer, teacher, nurse or BCR worker.
The refugees received free basic education just like any Motswana child and
there were free meals in school but they did participate in fund raising activities for
the school
Access to education was very relaxed because all refugees we schooled with
were very much older than normally expected. A standard 7 pupil during the time
was a big man or woman who was much closer to the age of the teachers then.
Relatives, brothers and sisters, despite their age differences, could be found in the
same class. During athletics and sporting activities, Dukwi Primary School always
excelled more than other primary schools, like Tachibona Primary School, and
Mosetse Primary School, due to the fact that we had older pupils.
About 99% of the teachers were Batswana, and I remember only one
Zimbabwean who was an upper class teacher. The non-teaching staff such as the
cooks and those who were pounding sorghum were mainly refugee parents, only a
few Batswana.
The refugees were being treated like Batswana because they learnt all the
subjects including Setswana. The way they spoke Setswana was awkward and that
posed a great challenge to their learning. Angolan children, who most of the time
spoke Portuguese experienced double the problem because they had to learn
Setswana and English.
Refugees could repeat a particular standard or grade several times and that did not
seem to matter to anyone. Some even wrote the standard 7 examination more than
once. However in other subjects the refugees were equally good. In supplementary
practical subjects such as Art and Craft, Home Economics and Agriculture the
refugees were exceptional.
The refugees were very active in extra curricula activities such as traditional
dance, which was then under the well-known 4B, scout movement and other school
clubs. They were involved in all school trips just like students from other schools.
Student discipline was not a cause for concern as such, except constant cases of
fighting. Some parents could unceremoniously come to school to attack teachers
while some pupils absconded from school at will. In other cases we were sent
around the camp to literally carry some refugee students back to school.
Teachers, who were much older as compared to those who came for Tirelo
Setshaba, were very tolerant of refugees. The TS participants were fond of
ridiculing
1994
the refugees, especially males and most of the time were assaulted by students outside
school or the relatives of those students.
Traveling to school was not a challenge because the residences of refugees
surrounded the school. At Junior and Senior Secondary School we were in boarding
school and traveling back to the camp during school holidays. Some of the refugee
pupils made it to Junior Secondary School and Senior School. I also met very few
at the University of Botswana and it sounds very interesting that they were mainly
in the faculty of Engineering.
Those who did not do well at Junior school were catered for by the Education
Resource Centre (ERC). Teachers were mostly foreigners but not necessarily
refugees. Some Batswana also enrolled at this school. There was also a carpentry
school within the camp to cater for the interests of other refugees. Some went to
Maun Vocational Training Centre to further their education after failure to proceed
beyond Form 5 level.
What I observed was the fact that as we went up the ladder of education it meant
living outside the camp most of the time and meeting more Batswana. Hence in those
instances refugee students always displayed low self-esteem.
From my view both males and females had equal access to education. Both
males and females studied similar subjects within the same class., the gender divide
was only evident in extra curricula activities e.g. boys were scouts while girls were
doing traditional dance.
Access to school was varied, the younger ones started normally just like
Batswana at 6 or 7 at Primary school, there was also a crèche for refugee children
and Batswana children whose parents worked in the camp. Some students were
slotted in according to their ability or age, but the basic idea seemed to be letting all
refugees have some education because some were older than normal school going
age.
I have already mentioned that the refugees followed the Botswana curriculum;
there was nothing political in their education but some refugees were citing that
before they were taught in their languages. There was previously a school known
as Sizanani where mostly Zimbabweans were schooling. There were text books in
Ndebele. However I did not witness that, when I came, what was previously
Sizanani had become a hostel for Dukwi CJSS students who had to travel to school
3km or more every day before the hostels were built within Dukwi CJSS. Of course
supplementary reading material was availed through the help of the UNICEF.
I’m not sure of any intercept between education and political objectives because
all the refugees I schooled with managed to complete, except for those who left
school just to idle around the camp.
The refugees’ set-up was similar to that of Batswana; women performed mostly
domestic roles while men were always ‘outside’ family doing farming. The
refugees had been supplied with different farming materials and one could see the
letters UNICEF printed on most of these tools.
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Housing was provided for all refugees; two roomed houses were built for
refugees and they still stand up to this day, they had a toilet and some stand pipes to
provide them with water. Electricity was the only thing which was not available in
these houses. There was basic furniture provided in the houses e.g. beds and
wardrobes. Some refugees however extended those houses with mud bricks,
making themselves kitchens depending on their family size.
Refugees had huge gardens where they planted vegetables and other crops.
These crops had market within and outside the camp, I remember tomatoes and
spinach, choumolier were sold as far as Tutume and Francistown. The South
Africans were mainly involved in poultry and pig production. The Zimbabweans
were mainly involved in field crop production to sustain themselves. Some had
donkeys, kept pigeons and one refugee owned an orchard. Some refugees were
sustained by their talent and skills; we had refugees who were photographers, brick
moulders, mechanics, sculptures and knitters. Some performed ‘piece’ jobs around
Batswana yards.
As you enter the camp, there was a bar and a restaurant which were run by refugees
collectively; Batswana could only rent it out. Batswana could also rent a hall meant
for refugee entertainment. Some refugees had small shops where they sold
everyday needed commodities. One Angolan even owned a bakery which supplied
Dukwi CJSS with bread.
I can’t specify the intervals but something like every month, the refugees were
given free food rations and clothes. There were two big warehouses where refugees
went to collect food and clothes.
Some refugees married or co-habited with Batswana. Hence the Setswana names
among refugee children. The refugees also interacted with Batswana in recreational
activities such a football. The football team at the camp was called Stone Breakers;
it was comprised of refugees and Batswana, mainly policemen, but it was supported
by everyone in the camp.
Refugees were free to practice their culture; sometimes there were masquerade
dances, especially by Angolans and more cultural practices were displayed during
what was known as Dukwi Day (refugee day commemoration). On this day
refugees displayed even their talent and skills, like music and poetry. Some were
evidently still practicing polygamy and burial rituals dictated upon them by their
culture.
There was a library where refugees went to read, and in the evening in the same
library there was movie watching. There was also a clinic within the camp. There
were shebeens around the camp where home-made beer was prepared. From these
places came noise, abusive language and fighting.
Generally Batswana who were living in the camp accepted and appreciated
refugees, except for a few protective cases. I was not allowed to play with refugee
children or even bring them home, but I never ceased to be their friend. We pushed
toy cars together and shot catapults together. Batswana parents met with refugee
parents during PTA meetings in school, there was a good relationship.
1994
Refugees were divided by sections or Zones within the camp; the Angolans
stayed in Zone 9 while the Zimbabweans stayed at what was termed Plot 5. The
South African refugees stayed in part of these zones. The ANC and the PAC were
divided, they did not stay together. The PAC stayed on the periphery of Plot 4 while
the ANC stayed on the periphery of Zone 9. It must be noted that the South African
refugees, unlike others were mainly males. They did not reside as families, men
and women. They were just like soldiers in their barracks. However I don’t recall any
inter-refugee conflicts; despite the separation they mixed well.
There was an open ground which served as the refectory and cooking place for
South African refugees. They convened there during meal times and every evening
they met in the open space and chanted ANC slogans and sang freedom songs, which
were characterized mostly by names such as Oliver Tambo, Chris Hani and Nelson
Mandela. AK47 and Scorpion were mentioned in the songs as war tools. The songs
talked about killing Boers and taking back ‘our country’. We even learnt such songs
and sang them in school, mainly during school athletic or sports competitions.
There were days when SA refugees were taken for an outing with a truck to
Francistown. There they spent the day whiling off or even shopping.
The SA refugees houses’ walls had the ANC logo or emblem drawn on them;
there were drawings of Hani, Mandela and Tambo and drawings of Guns and then
labelled scorpion or AK47. Some walls had hand grenades and several other war
artefacts drawn on them.
I remember one day there was an SA refugee strike and the BCR offices were
burnt down by a petrol bomb. I cannot possibly outline what their grievances were.
The SA refugees seemed engulfed in the struggle than anyone else, they also
feared for their lives hence they used false names for fear of being tracked down. For
example some called themselves Power and Lovebeat; I am mentioning these two
because they used to teach us martial arts.
Refugees who had stayed for a very long time were then allowed Botswana
citizenship. Most Zimbabweans became Batswana, some stayed in Dukwi village
while most of them resided in Shashemooke. When Mandela was released from
prison, most of the South African refugees we lived with went home. I must admit
everyone missed them; their singing and some of them were our church mates. In
school we were just left singing some of their songs such as ‘Mkonto we sizwe’
Refugees taught me one big lesson, and that is tolerance. In my life I have
always managed to make friends with people who were different from the majority;
these are the disabled, the old and people from other ethnic groups and races.
Refugees contributed immensely on my education. In school all my Design and
Technology projects were inspired by things I saw at the camp or things we used to
play with. I just re-lived my memories in the camp through materials provided for
me at school. Everyone thought I was very intelligent, they did not know I was just
a collection of refugees’ ideas.
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The refugees shaped most people’s interest in Agriculture; almost everyone had
a small garden in the backyard tendering some vegetables. I also developed zeal for
working with my own hands.
1994
Thupane, Shirley
Mrs Shirley Thupane is a Motswana from Kanye who felt sorry for the refugees and
started helping them with food and other logistical matters.
I am a Motswana in Botswana, I was just helping the refugees, am just a Motswana

from Kanye. I was feeling sorry for them. Long back at the time, when they started
in 1976, most people came to Botswana, as you know we go around meeting
people, I was staying in town at the time, I was introduced to these people and they
told me that they were here and they are running away from this and that. These
people told each other that there is a lady that offers assistance and so on. And since
am a person who likes feeling sorry for people, they came to my house and I
offered them food. Life at that time was not as difficult as it is today, I was able to
feed them because things were cheap.
It was a Motswana who introduced these people to me; as you know you would
meet people in parties and this person told me these people’s problems and we knew
how the Boers were treating them from the TV, and I knew that these poor people
were suffering and did not have relatives here. They told me their problems and how
they were suffering, I felt sorry for them and every weekend they came to my house
I did not want to interfere with their things, as you know they were from two
parties, some were from ANC and others from PAC and also amongst themselves,
they did not trust one another, I was not very much involved but I knew they had
a problem. I knew I could help where I could manage because life at that time was
cheap and by looking at how much I was earning. These people came in numbers
of about 13,14,15; am not talking about 2 people, but I could manage to give them
food. My sitting room was full of people and sometimes my friends asked me if I
would be able to manage and I told them that I could, because I also felt that I
needed to help them. They called me their mother and if they did not have
accommodation they told me.
They were staying in some houses near the station and were given food, but the
food was not enough. They were not staying with me, but I bought them food. I could
not give them accommodation because I was staying in a small house and I also
had my family.
They just told me what was happening and told me how the Boers were
treating them.
They were not staying in a refugee camp, they were just given accommodation in
people’s houses like Bontleng. If I had a house I would have accommodated them.
Some were staying in Mochudi others in Francistown as you know. There were others
who were a bit elderly like Makoko, and Ziikalala (Snokie) he is on SABC now.
These people brought them to me when they arrived, but the government of
Botswana was helping them. There was also a council of refugees They were very
happy with the
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government of Botswana’s assistance. Botswana is very peaceful and they did not
have any complaints.
They were very happy about how Botswana was treating them, and did not
complain about anything at all. They were only complaining about the Boers from
where they came. Batswana were really helping them and I also heard that some
were given money to look after them. I did not get any of the money though.
The people I helped were not schooling, they were older people; most of them
were already at a tertiary level and most of them went overseas. It was not
schooling like Mater spei or GSS; some went to Nigeria to train as guerrillas to
fight South African Boers. Even the lady who was killed during the raids, she was a
social worker so these people were already professionals. As I told that these people
did not trust each other, they sold each other out to the Boers, a lot of houses were
burned in Bontleng and we were asking ourselves how the Boers knew about them.
A lot of them were killed There were no elements of xenophobia at the time.
Batswana, as you know, even though they do not like foreigners, it is foreigners
from the North, they do not like, Zimbabweans and so on; but they liked those from
South Africa because as you know South Africans and Batswana are relatives.
There was no feeling of dislike; they did not have any complaints, they were
happy. Sometimes I went to see them and they were fine. At that time I was
working at the National Assembly.
As you know Batswana are sympathetic people and they made favourable
policies. That is why they made an office especially for them. If the policies were not
favourable they would not have done so. So the policies were there and they were
favourable.
I do not know about the treatment of refugees today, but sometimes we hear them
complaining on the radio. I only know about those of a long time back because
they are those that I stayed with and helped.
I do not keep in touch with the people I accommodated; but it does not matter
because I just wanted to help them, and not that they should give me something
in return.
1994
Tlou, Stephen
[Dukwi; June 2008]
Stephen Tlou is 39 years old, and he was born of refugee parents from Zimbabwe, in
Semolale, Botswana. He lived in several parts of Botswana as a child and finally he resided
in the Dukwi refugee camp.
My parents came to Botswana as refugees from Zimbabwe and settled in the camp.
I did not experience the war in Zimbabwe; I was born here in Botswana. I spent
part of my childhood in Semolale where I was born. My parents’ intermarriage with
Batswana saw me living in different parts of this country, until eventually following
my other relatives in the camp.
Educationally I observed that Zimbabweans liked education and schooling. They
had a school of their own called Sizanani meaning ‘help each other.’ This was
a primary school, but it later became a secondary school before Dukwi CJSS was
built. In Sizanani there were Zimbabwean volunteers who were teaching the young
ones, however the government of Botswana paid them for their services. This was
mainly a Zimbabwean school. There were Ndebele books which were used to teach
children, but later it was stopped and every refugee child embraced the Botswana
curriculum. Setswana might have been difficult for students, but they liked it
due to their enthusiasm for learning. Most pupils were very happy to learn the
new language. Both boys and girls we equally energetic about schooling; all children
attended school and no one remained at home. Student discipline was impressive
and there were no cases of leaving school for political activities.
Adjusting in the camp was not easy for some refugees. Some Zimbabwean youth
were without their parents in the camp so sometimes they tried to escape to go back
home to their parents despite the political instability. When caught and brought back
to the camp, such youths were placed under foster care or under any volunteering
individual who was willing to raise them as his/her own children. Most people
escaped at night because it took a long time before it was noticed that they were not
around.
The refugees coexisted with Batswana without any problems. Refugees felt more
comfortable and safer in Botswana. Hence they married Batswana. When some had
to go back to their home countries, they did not agree because of the hospitality in
Botswana. Today that is when we are seeing refugee hatred by Batswana, maybe it
is because of new twists in political consciousness, but back then Batswana and the
refugees accepted each other. I played football with other refugees and Batswana; I
was a goal keeper then.
Refugees from the different nations mixed well with each other, however the
South African refugees’ commitment to this interaction was very suspicious. They
were always together as a group and never mixed like other refugees were doing.
They could attend football matches but after that they always re-grouped and
walked to their residences as South Africans. The South Africans were even
divided among
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themselves along party lines. The ANC and PAC members were not staying The ANC
were always together singing liberation songs.
Though I might not be sure, among the South African refugees there were Xhosas
and Zulus while the Zimbabwean refugees were mainly Ndebele and a few Shonas.
The South African refugees were always complaining and claiming they wer e
not taken into consideration. During that time most of them wanted re-settlement;
they wanted to live in Canada and America, but mostly they were obsessed with re-
settling in Australia. Some wanted scholarships. Hence they did strike burning down
the BCR offices around 1991 and 1992.
The refugees were highly supported by the refugee office in Botswana; they were
all involved in farming. South Africans refugees kept rabbits, pigs and chicken.
Others were involved in gardening and field crops. Refugees were agriculturally
empowered and sometimes students from other parts of Botswana toured the camp
to gain agricultural insights.
The refugees resided in different zones, but these zones were meant to monitor
reception of food rations. Different zones received their rations on different days to
avoid overcrowding. Food rations were received on a monthly basis and family size
was taken into consideration when this food was distributed. Clothes were given out
after a much longer period, something like 6 months. Each zone had a leader and if a
refugee left the camp they had to notify the zone leader.
Refugees had different methods of trying to ease off the thought of the struggle.
There were various forms of entertainment within the camp: movies, music bands
and sports. There was even a very famous team which was known as Bubezi, which
means lion. The refugees also went to church with Batswana
I cannot certainly say all South African refugees left in 1994. I know one who
was an engineer in the Soda Ash mine, he never went back but instead he was
granted citizenship and continued to live in Botswana.
1994
Tsholofelo Morake, Mrs

[Gaborone]
Mrs Tsholofelo Morake was a senior officer who was working in the hospital during the
liberation struggle. She explains briefly of her experiences with freedom fighters who
came for treatment at the hospital in Francistown.
We were living in Francistown at that time, and I was working at the hospital as
a senior officer. Occasionally freedom fighters and others with injuries came for
treatment at the hospital; some of them had lost their limbs. We lived in constant fear
of attacks by the Rhodesian forces. On one occasion there was a shoot-out between
the Rhodesians and our Police Mobile Unit. We were instructed to turn off the lights
early in the evening to avoid being detected by the Rhodesians. So by eight o’clock
at night, we had eaten our meals and gone to bed. We strictly observed this routine.
I recall the occasion when our soldiers were ambushed by the Rhodesians at
Lesoma resulting in many being killed. We were told at the hospital to be ready to
attend to the injured. There was total mobilisation of staff, including doctors and
nurses, amongst others, in to prepare them to receive the injured. However, the
hospital did not receive the injured that were taken elsewhere. We were ready to
assist. Although we were afraid that Rhodesians might attack us, our patriotism and
desire to help the injured made us to ignore the fact that we were putting ourselves
in danger of being attacked. There was that war and we rose to the occasion.
We were sympathetic to the people of Zimbabwe who were fighting for their
freedom. We also knew that the war could spill into Botswana. So we assisted the
freedom fighters as best as we could with the hope that they would defeat their
oppressors.
Those who fled to Botswana told us how they suffered under the white rule in
Rhodesia. We could see that it was true because many of them were injured, but they
struggled to reach Botswana for help.
Another thing I remember is that, they used to tell us that they survived in the
bush because the people in the country side fed them and protected them by hiding
them, so the enemy would not find them. The people in the country side warned
them about the whereabouts of the enemy and their movements. I recall one freedom
fighter stating that on one occasion he hid under a bushy pumpkin plant in the arable
land and the Rhodesians could not find him. Generally, the Rhodesians ill-treated
Batswana living on the border alleging that they were hiding freedom fighters.
There was a lot of harassment, especially along the border areas.
We saw the Manama Mission students. They were many. Some parents came to
persuade them to return to Rhodesia, but only a few returned with their parents. Most
of them refused to Zimbabwe, and said that they were going to join the liberation
movements.
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Concerning our soldiers and the Rhodesian soldiers, our soldiers were sometimes
attacked by white soldiers from Zimbabwe. I recall an occasion when they attacked
our soldiers at night. We lived near the army base by Ngangabgwe Hill. We could
see traces of bullets as fire was exchanged. Eventually the Rhodesians retreated. It
was these incidents which made us live in constant fear. That was why people were
not allowed to move about at night in Francistown. There were also incidents of
kidnappings that we heard about. There was one painful incident which occurred.
Our hospital driver went to Tsamaya village to collect a patient. On his return, he
found that the Rhodesians had massacred two people. Their remains were brought to
the hospital. It is alleged that these people had been kidnapped and then murdered.
Despite its precarious position, Botswana assisted the liberation movements
because the country sympathised with the suffering people of Zimbabwe, who were
being oppressed by the whites.
1994
Vanqa, Mrs
[Gaborone; February 2007]
Mrs Vanqa, worked with the young people that were coming in from South Africa to
Botswana as refugees in 1976, under the YWCA. She was employed to counsel the girls
who were part of the refugees. She tells of her experience with the youngsters.
It was in the 1970’s, particularly after 1976, when the YWCA was requested to do
something about the large numbers of young people who were coming in. It was
worse with girls, particularly due to personal hygiene issues. A lot of them were
about 13-14 years of age. Mrs Molefhe was employed as the Programme Officer, and
we had to offer counselling, as some needed it badly.
The accommodation problem was also serious, so we looked for a place, later to
be known as WAZA, an acronym for Women of Azania. That was the house where
they were accommodated, which was initially a disused farm in Broadhurst. There
were other girls who came from Namibia and Southern Rhodesia and they all
lived together there. It was mostly girls who were accommodated there, while boys
were just there temporarily until the Botswana Council for refugees could place
them somewhere else.
We now had to start looking for something for them to do as well. We started Art
classes, and Thami Mnyele was very active in this. We also offered book-keeping
and secretarial courses, and we connected with Pitman’s so that they could offer
certificates. We even offered sewing lessons, and once a month we sold the items
that were sown in the Centre; it was called “Why not” shop. The current Centre
opened in 1984. We had a crèche, and some of the refugees worked there, people
such as Jeff Baqwa. Actually, we decided to open the program to all young people
in Botswana. We did this purposefully so that we could encourage integration. Some
of these young people made such strong relationships and formed such strong
bonds that they have lasted long after that period of their lives. Most of the teachers
were refugees themselves.
Life in exile was very difficult, and as I mentioned already, many of the refugees
were very young. They needed mothering, and this was provided by people like
Mrs Molefhe and Mrs Esther Mosinyi. Most of the refugees were mobile, but others
were married here. We also did fund-raising for those who were taken to Dukwi.
They got donation of clothes, but we also received clothes from overseas. The
Quakers also worked with them to help with fund raising to buy them the basic
necessities. Sheila Willet, in particular, used to work with us. Trips were organized
for the YWCA to go to Dukwe to see how the young people were living there; the
conditions were not very good, but they could not leave as they had to have a job or
be in school to be able to avoid living in Dukwe. Those who had relatives could go
and live with them and did not have to go to Dukwe. The people who did not have
to go to Dukwe were people such as panel beaters who had set up their own
enterprises
stories
There were real security risks involved, and we used to be threatened with bombs.
One day we all got a scare of our lives, because somebody reported that there was
a bomb in the Centre, and we were all running around scared. Thankfully, it was
just a hoax.
1994
Vanqa, Themba
Prof. Themba Vanqa left Port Elizabeth and migrated to Botswana in 1958, where he was
accommodated by friends whom he had known in South Africa. After completing his
education he continued with his profession as a teacher for both the refugees and
Batswana nationals.
We left Port Elizabeth in South Africa where we were working around the close of
the 1950s, and the beginning of the 1960s. The reason for our departure was that the
Boer government was sending Administrators to schools to teach people Afrikaans,
so that teachers could then be in a position to teach in this language. Prior to 1948,
political pressure was not so much, but after 1948 apartheid was institutionalized.
In 1955, I had finished my studies at Grahamstown. After 1958, we came to feel the
pressure because there were many laws and regulations which were applied. Things
were particularly bad in the Eastern Cape, due to the activities of people like
Mandela and others. When we came to Botswana, we were accommodated by
friends that we had known previously.
There had been earlier migrants, people such as bo-Sikunyana, Tsoebebe, Gugushe,
Mei and Mqum. Apart from South African refugees, there were others from places
like Lesotho as well. In Botswana we were also with people like the Lupondwanas,
Mzondekis who had come after us, and they went to Moeng.
We came here because we already knew of many South Africans who were
already here. In fact, there were many South Africans at Moeng College, and we
could have even gone there too. There were teachers there such as Petze, Mokoka,
and Mkhize. But others went to Swaziland and Lesotho. Still many went to places
like Ghana and Nigeria, where the salaries were reportedly good. One chap by the
name of Nqcobongwana left Port Elizabeth and went to Nigeria, then proceeded to
Manchester in England, and then to Botswana where he ended up working at the
Tonota College of Education.
Teachers were not necessarily a political unit, even though they may have
been members of political units. Even those who were going to places like
Nigeria and Ghana were not an organized lot; they went of their own accord.
However there was another category of people, even prior to 1976, but after 1948,
who had come to work and were passing on, and were sponsored by political
organizations. The linkage that we had with them came from the fact that they
were people we had previously known. Some of them had been imprisoned,
while others left because they were feeling the pressure. Some of us who had
come earlier accommodated them. People like Njobe who was a Maths teacher went
on to Zambia, and after some time decided to go home, then felt even more pressure
and had to leave again. This second lot was generally politicized. There was also a
chap called Rasekwala who came from Jo’burg. The Boers always wanted the
migrants to cooperate with them, and questioned those whom they suspected
wished to leave. But the exodus kept mounting all the time, and by the close of
1960s, the volume of migrants was really intensifying.
stories
White, Songai
[Lesoma]
Songai White was born in Lesoma and attended school in the same area. Although he
was very young when the liberation struggle was going on, he remembers some pertinent
issues that he could recall and he tell them as part of his experience as a boy, as he lived
on the border with Zimbabwe.
My name is Songai White. I was born in 1964 and I don’t know the day and month
of my birth. I was born here in Lesoma and attended primary school here in Lesoma,
but I did not finish school.
During the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe I saw a few things happening here
in Lesoma but I was young and did not understand certain things. But what I
understand was that my family and a few other Basarwa were staying near the border.
Our parents were informed about the possibility of troubles before the massacre of
the 16 Botswana soldiers.
The Botswana police and other government officials came here and told us that
Zimbabwe freedom fighters were going to fight the white soldiers in Zimbabwe.
The white soldiers were along the border and we moved from where we were staying
close to the border. Our plots were close to the border and we moved to the higher
land, some few kilometres from the border.
I used to see the Zimbabwean freedom fighters; they were called guerrillas.
These guerrillas used to come to the village but they never carried any weapons.
They used to come in the evening to ask for food. One day, around twelve people
came to ask for food. They looked hungry, so I cooked papa without relish for them
and they ate it. They used to say that they were fighting for us. They also used to
come to my mother’s place to ask for washing powder and tobacco and we used to
offer them some. There were freedom fighters who also came to the village to drink
traditional beer.
I think they bought it because there were no complaints from the people who were
selling the beer. They also used to ask for it and they never forced the people to
give them beer.
After drinking the beer they went back into the bush where they had camps. One
of their camps was not far from where we were staying. It was at the highland and
we used to see fire when guerrillas were cooking in the evening. The police and
the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) had a tendency of coming into the village, and
sometimes chasing away these guerrillas. They did not want them to walk about
freely in the village. What I can’t confirm was whether they knew that guerrillas had
camps in Botswana.
We used to hear gun shots inside Zimbabwe but the bullets never reached us here.
On the day of the massacre gunshots were heard inside Zimbabwe. What we heard
from our elders was that freedom fighters attacked the white soldiers. It was in the
morning. That was the first time we saw freedom fighters carrying guns in the
village.
1994
They were running towards their camp base. They passed by our place running at very
high speed. They then hid in the bush and a helicopter came into the village. I think
they were searching for the freedom fighters but they did not see them. People came
into the village from the fields running. Others ran into the bush towards direction of
Kasane. The headman Jameson Kelesitswe sent my cousins Gure and Uwe to go
and call the BDF. They went to Kazungula and came with the soldiers. Uwe and Gure
were older than me and understood some things better. The soldiers came with three
Land Rovers and went to the area where the freedom fighters were running to. After
some time we heard gun shots and there was fire where the Botswana soldiers had
gone to. Gure came running with other BDF soldiers, some of whom were injured.
Gure was not injured. When he arrived he told his father Jameson that they were
attacked and Uwe and some soldiers had remained behind; Uwe never came back
and we knew he was killed.
stories
Willet, Sheila
Sheila Willet, worked with refugees under a project that was started by the Society of
Friends (Quakers) in 1979, in Gaborone. She resigned her work in the University of
Botswana and Swaziland, and started working with the Botswana Council for Refugees
and the UNHCR. She later formed a committee which worked with other agencies
connected with refugees in Botswana,
I started working with the refugees on a Project that was administered under the
Society of Friends (Quakers) in 1979. This was started by the Quakers in the UK
who had an interest in Southern Africa. When they got to hear about the enormous
refugee problem in Botswana, they sent someone out to see if something could be
done, especially in education. The Quaker work started was largely carried out at the
Kagisong Centre in Mogoditshane
My involvement with Kagisano commenced when I decided to resign my work at
the University of Botswana and Swaziland. I found a house at the Village in
Gaborone, near the BTC. There I started working with the Botswana Council for
Refugees and the UNHCR. I then formed a Committee called the Kagisano
Society, which worked with the Lutheran World Federation, the Botswana Council
for Refugees, the Botswana Christian Council, the International Red Cross, UN
agencies and the Quakers. All these bodies were connected with the refugees and
had representation in this Committee. The house opened as a short stay Centre. The
Americans had a program through which they were sending people to the States;
so initially they would come to us. We also worked with the Special Branch, as
there were security matters involved during these short stays, whilst papers were
still being processed. Some of the refugees were sent to Lobatse Secondary School
before Dukwe started.
In relation to South Africans, who were part of the 1976 struggle, the government
had some of them staying at a farmhouse in Broadhurst. The farm also housed
Namibians, Angolans and Zimbabweans. At my place in the Village, we had turned a
garage into a dormitory. My maid, Mma Emily also helped out; the Quaker Peace and
Service paid her allowance, and met the costs of her food and rental. At the house,
which was called G9, the first people who stayed there were Zimbabweans.
Some refugees found accommodation privately, and others were staying with
people (refugees) who had come earlier. The ANC had their own place and some
South Africans stayed there. Most of the South Africans belonged to SASO. We
may have had some ANC members staying in our accommodation but we did not
know since we did not ask. The ANC generally did not come to us, as they were
worried that there could be spies amongst the refugees. The Namibians belonged to
SWANU. We used to run evening programs with films and got South Africans, like
David Housen for their entertainment.
We also ran counselling programs for the youth with problems, such as those
who ran out of money before their allowances were paid, lack of money for food
and rental, and general social problems within the community. A lot of them were
1994
struggling and were not understood by Batswana. Some had been tortured and lost
hearing, others had been in prison.
We had a kind of a “slush” fund, and we got financial help from the Lutheran
World Federation. Out of this Fund, we were able to finance some of them to start
businesses, for example Angolan refugees.
As we carried on with the work, women and children started appearing; eventually
we had the Quaker Peace Service and a young Australian to help with babysitting.
The space was getting smaller, and meanwhile, we had a woman in the Red Cross
and she advised that we should see Chief Dihutso, who was tremendously helpful.
He finally allocated us a plot, which was on the outskirts of Mogoditshane. We got
money from the Quaker Service in the UK and also fundraised with the European
Union, who actually gave us the bulk of the funds. We were able to build houses for
staff, a dormitory, a kitchen and a dining room. We soon had to build a crèche, which
was also used by the village. We started getting some young white South Africans
as well, but they were not conscientious objectors. They were a mixed bunch and they
all fitted in; one of them was Mike Hamlin. It was during the time when Americans
were also resettling refugees in the States. They were resettling mainly Angolans,
because they were fighting a Communist regime. They also took a few South
Africans.
Batswana were more accepting at the beginning. After 1985, Batswana did not
want refugees nearby. In Mogoditshane, after the raids, Chief Dihutso held a meeting
to explain to the community that they were not being targeted. Chief Dihutso was
very helpful, and this helped the villagers to understand.
The Botswana Defence Force soldiers came in the morning to search for other
soldiers who were missing and found them dead and Uwe was also found. I was
young and did not attend his funeral in Kasane. If I remember well, he was buried
the following day because he was rotting. Rumours are that the BDF found some
guerrillas hiding in the bush and the freedom fighters did not agree to be disarmed.
Some BDF soldiers said that they should be left alone, but the commander insisted
that they should surrender their weapons.When they were discussing some guerrillas
ran away and those who remained were disarmed, and some of their cache was taken
away. What I heard was that, as the BDF went back into their vehicles, they were
immediately attacked. The only person who could have told you the true story is Gure
but he is late.
The White soldiers never came to the village on foot. The time we saw them
was when they came chasing some guerrillas. They had employed some people as
informers to give them information.
There was one man, a Mosarwa who was an informer and was paid by the white
soldiers. This man had a girlfriend and this girl fell in love with one of the freedom
fighters. The girl knew that the boyfriend was serving as an informer for the white
soldiers. One day this man found a photo of a freedom fighter and wanted to know
what was happening. He beat up the girl and then the girl told the freedom fighter
that his boyfriend was working as a spy for the whites. The freedom fighters came
in
stories
the evening and took him away to the bush and beat him thoroughly; they thought he
was dead and left him there. He was found by herd boys who reported the matter to
the police. When the police went there they learnt that he was beaten up for working
with soldiers of the white regimes. He was ordered to leave the village, and we
were told he went to the mines in South Africa and he died there. I did not mention
their names because I don’t want trouble with their relatives. I can’t remember the
year that all this happened.
Thanks.
1994
Woman (2) - Anonymous

[Gaborone; November 2008]
The Anonymous Woman (2) grew up in Francistown, Botswana, an area which was
highly politicized and she grew up with children of famous politicians who migrated to
Botswana as refugees. Later when she grew up she continued interacting with the
liberation struggle and got married to a refugee. Since she was a media person by
profession she also became a courier of information. Whenever there was critical
information which might be helpful to the community in which she lived, including the
community of refugees, she transmitted it. She also relates her life as a government
employee and her support for the liberation struggle, and the risks she took by allowing
her house to be used as a transit area for refugees and liberation movement members.
Botswana was obliged to help the liberation struggle because of its position in the
region. In Setswana, and other cultures, when a neighbour’s house is on fire, you
are obliged to help lest tomorrow it is yours. It was also the humanity of Batswana
to help in the liberation struggle (botho). Even politically, Botswana was obliged to
help as it was one of the few politically independent countries in the midst of
oppressive countries.
We have long been associated with South Africa. We used to have students
educated there; training of some of our nurses and medical staff was done in South
Africa. Because of the oppression in that country some of the people fled and
became refugees here and those with skills were employed in our civil service.
I grew up under that political environment – I grew up in Francistown and it used
to be a highly politicized area with Pan Africanism, especially in the 1950’s and
1960’s until we got our independence. Our homestead was neighbours with that of
Matante, who was the leader of Botswana Peoples Party, which was challenging the
Botswana Democratic Party. In our area in White City, Francistown, there were
many refugees who lived there and belonged to the ANC and PAC, like Rre
Seperepere, Rre Ndlovu, and many others who I can easily name. We lived not far
from the famous White House, the house that housed refugees with personalities
such as Nthite. Francistown was developed in terms of its interaction with people
with other political ideas. We grew up playing with these people’s children, and we
came to know that their parents came here because they were oppressed in their
own countries. We therefore had to accommodate some of those people.
So from long time ago, I interacted with the liberation struggle, not so much
because I eventually got married to a South African refugee, who was fighting for
liberation, but because the political ideas of liberation had always been part of my
growing up. This of course was coupled with humanity (botho) of generally wanting
to help other people.
Rre Seperepere belonged to the African National Congress. He was a
representative of the ANC and used to accommodate new arrivals before they
proceeded to their missions. He was in charge of the transit area.
stories
The different liberation movements were fighting as a united people fighting for
one cause. These were like one big family fighting for one cause. The White House
is now demolished, but people can show you where it used to be, especially at Blue
Town, people could show you who used to live where.
Mophane Club used to be the meeting place and when it started, it used to be
associated with whites until bo Rre Muchekwane came into the picture and changed
its outlook. Other members included, teachers such as bo Rasebotsa. It was just like
Notwane Club today. In the 1970’s Mophane became a popular disco place and the
bombing incident happened during a disco party at night. Someone told me that
when the bomb exploded, it was at a time when a popular song of the time,
“Remake the World”, by Jimmy Cliff was playing. It was terrible. I know some
people who were there, and when you talk about it, they start crying. The bomb was
the orchestration of Smiths Security Forces.
Regarding my contribution to the struggle. As you know, I am a media person; as
a media person you end up as a courier person, a courier of information. Whenever
there was critical information which might be helpful to the community in which
I lived, including the community of refugees, I transmitted it. The community
was called Isandhlwana Revolutionary Movement and was a Black Consciousness
Movement; this group came at the time of Onkgopotse Tiro, Harry Nengwekhulu.
Some of those people who set up Isandhlwana had been well trained in different
professions, like my husband did four years of medical school; some were trained
as teachers and ended up teaching at such secondary schools as GSS; so this group
of BCM was a group of very literate people. They started a newspaper, using the
old typewriter which I still have at my house. They used stencils which are also still
there. You gather information and when you come across crucial information, you
pass it on to them. You also tip them if you see something so that they should be
alert. You gave them information that could help them in the liberation struggle or
information, such as scholarships, that could help them to further their education.
Isandhwana was neither PAC nor ANC, it was BCM, mostly composed of members
of the June 16 Soweto Uprising, when most of them skipped the border and came to
Botswana, (Steve Biko era). I used to go to the UN office, read around and identify
possible scholarships and let them be aware of possibilities for scholarships.
It was not easy. It was a time when the ANC was making inroads, and was
fighting for recognition from other South African organizations. So, if you were not a
member of the ANC they pushed you out of the scholarship programme. Things got
better with the coming of the Nigerian High Commissioner, Mme. Ibrahim.
Isandhlwana appealed to her, and a group of them managed to go to study in
Nigeria, for a variety of professional careers. Makgolo who had trained in Nigeria
in Museums ended up working in the Botswana Museum, and now he is the
Director of Museums in South Africa. Others are holding important government
positions in South Africa. Some ended up getting married here, like Kgotso Lebata
who is married to Motsepe’s daughter. Mr Lebata used to run the shoe fix companies
in Gaborone and also used
1994
to run dry cleaners. He is now a Motswana owns a farm. The older generation looked
after the younger ones who came in 1976, under the ANC Youth member. Tsietsi
Mashinini lived with Mme. Mosinyi in Bontleng before he moved on to Liberia.
The SASO group, learnt from those older members from Zululand, because
education there was more advanced compared to that of Johannesburg or Soweto.
My house was one of the transit areas because I used to accommodate young
girls, coming as refugees. We had to run around and report to the police before we
facilitated their movement northward. During the raids it was uncomfortable because
one was not sure whether one’s house would be bombed or not, since I was helping
the refugees so much.
During the 1985 bombing I was not there, but I lived with my brothers and sisters
and my husband; my house became a protected target, because there were so many
young men who went in and out of it, that it was beginning to be associated with
military training.
Sometimes other Batswana were hostile to refugees because they thought that
they would bring them trouble because there was the possibility of being bombed.
My house was patrolled and protected by the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), but
I didn’t even know it until I heard it from other people. The government knew who
was involved with the liberation movement and gave them due protection. Regarding
my relationship with the refugee man who stayed in my house, a lot of people did
not even know that I am a Motswana; they thought that I was a South African. I also
found the level of appreciation of political issues very low in Gaborone, compared
to where I came from in Francistown. Besides, being a journalist I was aware of
political issues. I went through a difficult time because once you associated with
refugees, you lose friends and relatives because people do not appreciate your
position and they end up calling you names like “refugee girl”. My parents were not
initially supportive of my marriage.
As far as courier-ship was concerned, as a journalist I undertook a lot of trips
overseas. I carried literature to and from overseas to share with comrades. They used
to give me a list of books to buy when I was overseas, and I used to use my own
money to buy such books. I was never sent to do any errands in South Africa. We
still have some of these books and we are keeping them for posterity. This would be
our Isandhlwana history. We are looking at possibilities of publishing a book with
Rampholo Molefe on our lives here.
We had two commune houses in Mogoditshane under Isandhlwana. A commune
house is where all refugees lived. My husband had to quit his job as a teacher at
GSS because he had to choose between working and working for the liberation
struggle. He left and was running transport taxis which was not that much in terms
of remuneration.
I know that arms and ammunition used to pass through Botswana and some
weapons were kept in my own house. My house ended up being used as a base, it
was dangerous, but I was saved by the fact that I worked for government. We
transported
stories
the arms that were in our house, easily as we were running public transport. We
transported them through a taxi, and we used to go through road blocks with them
because the police hardly ever searched taxis. The arms were transported to certain
areas, (masimo) close to the borders; such areas as Tlhareseleele where there are
Basotho residents. Sometimes he would undertake reconnaissance missions in these
areas. Even my brothers, with whom I stayed in the house, never knew that there were
guns in the house because we were so discreet.
I did not have the support of my marriage from my parents, and it was difficult.
My husband’s parents were not here; finally his mother and aunt came. In the end we
just had to sign ourselves, but my parents cancelled it, until Minister
Makgekgenene intervened. Finally when his parents came and my parents saw them
and were assured that their child was not totally lost, they agreed and I got married.

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SADC

Hashim Mbita Project

2 LIBERATION WAR COUNTRIES

4 4.1 South Africa – Personal Stories

8 COUNTRIES AND REGIONS OUTSIDE SADC

(8) Mugabe, Robert. Interview of 18 February 2007.

They,inturn,havebeenworkingwiththe NationalArchivesandthe National Museums

(22) Nyagumbo, Maurice. With the People: See p.140.

(24) Tekere. A Lifetime of Struggle. p.61.

(54) Ibid. pp. 124, 126, 128.

1961. With time, however, the growing conflict in the‘world revolutionary

The Intensification of the Struggle after the UDI

(69) Ibid., p.43.

to be a continuous exercise, in which we on the Zambian side would continue to send

account which details ‘Operation Chikuwa’, a strategy used to recruit in Zambia in

(81) Zimbabwe Review, Vol.2, No.3/4, 1970.

(87) Mphoko. “The Joint Military Command.” See p.17.

(94) Sithole, M. Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle. See p.125.

in Zimbabwe.98 Former ZIPRA fighters offer a different explanation. They claim

Developments in Rhodesia, 1971-1972

were a number of casualties amongst those members of the Christian community

(108) Mitchell, D. Josiah Chinamano. Harare: Longman, 1998: See p.30.

The ‘Joint Military Command and Beyond’: ZANLA-ZIPRA Cooperation

The Resumption of the War, 1972

(110) Mphoko. “The Joint Military Command.”

Centenary in 1972. The unsuspecting DA was lured into a trap by a chimbwido

(130) Sibanda. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union. See p.163.

(136) Zimbabwe Review. 6 Oct. 1973, Vol. 3, No. 1.

(144) Muzorewa. Rise up and Walk. See pp.131-133.

(151) Ibid. Chapter 12.

(154) Ibid. p.157.

Problems in ZANU, 1974-1975

high command to pave the way for international investment in an independent

(185) Sithole, M. Frontlinestatism and the Zimbabwe Question. p.23.

Ambrose Mutinhiri, (ZIPRA) Director of Training and Personnel

(187) Interview with Rex Nhongo.

(197) Interview with James Munyuki, (Gutu) 08 May 2007.

first base in Mozambique. From there on we were supposed to go straight to Chimoio,

(198) Interview with Comrade Lotus Gumbo, (Masvingo) 04 May 2007.

(201) Interview with Akwias Akwino, (Harare) 14 May 2007.

(202) NMMZ Report, Nyadzonya Massacre. Unpublished Report 2006.

(206) Interview with Comrade Mariyo, (Kwekwe) 04 May 2008.

(207) Interview with Comrade Mariyo, (Kwekwe) 04 May 2008.

(210) Interview with Rex Nhongo.

(226) Ibid. p.105.

The Situation in ZANU after Geneva

(228) See Chung, F. Re-Living the Second Chimurenga. See Chapter 9.

(236) Interview with Comrade Mariyo, (Kwekwe) 04 May 2008.

(245) The Daily News. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 6 January 1978.

(248) Parker, J. Assignment Selous Scouts: See p.187.

Province will focus on how non-combatants viewed the situation, in addition to

(260) Interview with Theresa Chigombe, (Mt. Darwin) 25 February 2008.

(266) Interview with Toko Mpofu, (Centenary) 04 March 2008.

(269) Interview with Yeukai Magamba, (Mt. Darwin) 20 July 2008.

(272) Steadman. Peacemaking in Civil War: See p.128.

(274) Flower. Serving Secretly: See p.209.

about seven ZIPRAs at Nguruve’s homestead, after which Nguruve committed

(291) Interview with Ms. Mabuwa.

(292) Nkomo, J. The Story of My Life.

Administrative reorganisation: I was one of the members of the RC [Revolutionary

A peculiarity in the interviews covering this period of the Internal Settlement

(325) The Sunday Telegraph. 22 April 1979.

(331) Schleicher, H.G. and I. Schleicher. Special Flights: See p.82.